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Abstract
Few recent studies have shown how Mexico, like many other Latin American 
countries at the beginning of this century, has adopted new policies and programmes 
in order to maintain and (re)build economic, social and cultural bonds with its 
migrant communities in the US, who represent about 15 percent of Mexico’s 
population. Less research has been conducted on the constitutional reforms and 
electoral laws that allow Mexicans abroad to participate politically in their home 
country’s domestic affairs from afar. Employing a transnationalist approach to 
international migration and democratization studies, this thesis is the first major 
study of the politics of Mexican emigration to the US and the impact of migrants’ 
electoral participation in their home country’s affairs presented in political and 
institutional terms.
The main question is how and with what consequences did the Mexican state extend 
formal political membership to its emigrant population both at the national and sub­
national level? Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods, this 
thesis shows that the implementation of emigrants’ political rights in Mexico has 
resulted from cross-border coalition formations between US-based political migrant 
groups and domestic non-PRI political parties (mainly the centre-left PRD) in a 
context of democratization and decentralization unfolding in Mexico, as well as the 
country’s insertion in the global economy. In turn, although only a small number of 
Mexican migrants have taken advantage of these opportunities for cross-border 
political action to date, the opening up of the Mexican political system creates new 
challenges to the incipient democratic practice. For instance, the growing influence 
of migrants and migrant organisations in domestic politics, the complexities of
representing and being accountable to constituencies abroad and to a limited extent, 
the transformation of traditional political structures, especially in communities with 
high levels of emigration.
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Chapter 1
1. Introduction
In the year 2000, marking a new phase in Mexican history with the toppling of the 
PRI and initiating a new democratization era, President Vicente Fox of the National 
Action Party (PAN) proclaimed himself not only as the leader of 100 million 
Mexicans in Mexico, but also of the 23 million of Mexican origin living in the 
United States. PRI President Ernesto Zedillo had already said in the 1990’s that ‘the 
Mexican nation extends beyond the territory enclosed by its borders’ (Cited in 
Leiken 2000). In a very general sense, these remarks have captured the dilemma that 
faces the Mexican state attempting to (re)incorporate its migrant citizens back into 
the national political map. In the last two decades, the change of attitude of the 
Mexican government towards migrants has become clearly discernible, in which the 
perception of ‘the migrant’, as inscribed in the discourses and practices of the 
Mexican state, shifted from being that of a ‘traitor’ to the fatherland and entitled to 
no national and citizen rights to being a ‘hero’ promoted as an ‘extraterritorial 
citizen’ (Fitzgerald 2000)1. The change has been represented by a series of legal 
reforms (constitutional and electoral) and policy initiatives that promote the political, 
economic, cultural and social participation of Mexican migrants into the domestic 
sphere, as well as legitimising discourses and practices of the main political parties, 
state institutions and civil society organisations. Political parties have opened
1 Mexican president Vicente Fox in his first visit to the United States gave a controversial discourse calling 
migrants ‘heroic paisanos abroad’. See New York Times (2000). Mexican president praises migrant 'heroes'. The 
New York Times. New York.
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committees in Mexican migrant communities, while Mexican politicians have 
regularly campaigned among expatriates to gain their political and financial support. 
In this respect, increasing migratory movements are changing political institutions as 
well as the notion of membership in both the country of origin and the reception 
country. It is also a reflection of the diverging effects of economic globalisation, 
which in theory pushes states towards opening up their borders to international 
labour. However, whether countries of reception try to manage and restrict 
immigration flows due to domestic security concerns (in particular in the post-9/11 
era), countries of origin try to secure and strengthen their ties with their emigres 
whose remittances have become an important source of capital (Hollifield 2004).
Mexico has gone beyond its earlier initiatives that attempted to forge patriotic 
feelings among its expatriate community to institutionalise emigrant political 
participation in domestic affairs from afar. Constitutional reforms and electoral laws 
have been adopted both at the national and sub-national levels welcoming the 
migrant as a new actor in Mexican politics. At the national level, an absentee vote 
bill allowed Mexican migrants to vote for presidential elections in Mexico for the 
first time in 2006. At the sub-national level, albeit asymmetrically, more far- 
reaching migrants’ political rights bills have been adopted. For instance, in the 
migrant-sending state of Zacatecas a bill known as the ‘Migrant Law’, approved in 
2003, allows expatriates from this state to run for elections from abroad and have 
parliamentary representation in the local congress by using an innovative formula of 
‘bi-national’ residency. In the state of Michoacan, a 2007 electoral reform allows 
Michoacano migrants to vote for state governor from abroad. Similar absentee voting
15
systems for local elections are currently being negotiated and adopted in other 
Mexican migrant sending states.
The central question in this thesis is how and with what consequences did the 
Mexican state extend formal political membership to its migrant population both at 
the national and sub-national level? And how does the case of Mexico differ from 
other countries in the region? Using a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods, this thesis shows that the implementation of emigrants’ political rights in 
Mexico has resulted from cross-border coalition formations between US-based 
political migrant groups and domestic non-PRI political parties (mainly the centre- 
left PRD), in a context of democratization and decentralization unfolding in Mexico, 
as well as the country’s insertion in the global economy. In turn, although only a 
small number of Mexican migrants have taken advantage of these opportunities for 
cross-border political action to date, the opening up of the Mexican political system 
creates new challenges to the incipient democratic practice. For instance, the growing 
influence of migrants and migrant organisations in domestic politics, the 
complexities of representing and being accountable to constituencies abroad and to a 
limited extent, the transformation of traditional political structures especially in 
communities with high levels of emigration.
By means of analysing the main determinants that guarantee the approval of a 
migrants’ political rights bill, both at the federal and at the sub-national level and its 
political implications, I pursue a dual analytical agenda. Firstly, I analyse the main 
protagonists that play a key role in the formulation, negotiation, and eventual 
approval of migrants’ political rights’ bills and their main motivations. Secondly, I
16
explore the actual results of the implementation of such bills and analyse how they 
have influenced the political system. I do this both at the national and sub-national 
levels, exploring the case of the vote abroad bill for presidential elections adopted at 
the federal level in 2005, the 2003 ‘Migrant Bill’ implemented in the state of 
Zacatecas and the 2007 vote abroad for governorship elections in the state of 
Michoacan.
Granting the right to Mexican expatriates to participate politically in domestic affairs 
adds a new dimension to politics at home. Mexico at the beginning of this century is 
the country with the largest number of people living past its physical frontiers, the 
majority of them residing in the United States . An estimated 9.18 and 11.5 million 
of Mexican-born persons live in this neighbour country3. However, if we add that 
figure to the estimated number of US-born citizens of Mexican-origin residing in the 
United States, there were approximately 28.3 million people in 2000 (bom either in 
Mexico or in the United States) with close consanguineous ties with Mexico4. In fact, 
about 15 percent of Mexicans of working age live in this country and they represent 
about 30 percent of US foreign-born population (US-Mexico Binational Council 
2004, p.l). In addition, in 2007 Mexico received about 24 billion dollars in migrants’ 
remittances, which is the country’s second major source of foreign income; the first 
being oil exports, which represent 2.5 percent of the country’s GDP.
2 Figures according to the United Nations Population Division
3 9.18 million is the data from US Bureau’s Census 2000 and 11.5 million from the American Community Survey 
2006.
4 People of Mexican-origin according to the 2006 American Community Survey
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On the other hand, Mexico is currently undertaking a democratic transition for which 
extending the franchise to Mexicans abroad and granting other forms of direct 
political participation in the country’s domestic affairs has prompted the debate on 
whether to deepen or widen democracy. Mexico’s democratic transition has been far 
from homogenous leaving institutions as well as a number of states where corruption, 
nepotism and political clientelism are still common activities. However, as the 
country struggles for democratic development, it aims at incorporating previously 
excluded social groups back into the new national political map.
The Mexican case has not developed in isolation; state-led initiatives towards 
institutionalised forms of migrants’ political inclusion such as the enactment of dual 
nationality and citizenship is currently a global trend. At present time, 115 countries 
have legal provisions in place to allow external voting, the majority only granted this 
right in the last two decades (IDEA 2007). In a similar way, the number of countries 
granting dual nationality is rapidly increasing. Sending countries’ initiatives to 
maintain, create and rebuild bonds with their migrant communities have also been 
supported by an emergent body of international norms on migrants’ political rights -  
various Conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO); an attempt to 
regularise high-skilled migration under the General Agreement on Trade and 
Services (GATS); to control illegal migration, human smuggling and trafficking 
within the context of the United Nations Convention on Transnational Crime (United 
Nations 2001). In particular, the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families which entered into 
force in July 2003 explicitly signals that: ‘migrant workers and members of their 
families shall have the right to participate in public affairs of their State of origin and
to vote and to be elected at elections of that State, in accordance with its legislation’ 
(United Nations 1990, Art. 41). Although this right is restricted to documented 
migrants, it is, nonetheless, the first international instrument that explicitly refers to 
migrants’ right to participate in their home country’s domestic political affairs 
despite the fact that they do not reside within the national territory. These 
developments in international law have prompted the debate on whether political 
participation is to be linked to the country of residency or of origin (see for instance 
Spiro 15 March 2006; Rubio-Marin 2006).
In this thesis, I use Ostergaard-Nielsen’s definition of ‘political transnational 
practices’ as ‘the various forms of direct cross-border participation in the politics of 
their country of origin by both migrants and refugees as well as the indirect 
participation via the political institutions of the host country (or international 
organisations)’ (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001). Here, however, “transnational” is used in 
common sense terms as “cross-border”. State policies that encourage migrant 
political participation in domestic affairs pose a challenge to our understanding of the 
nation-state order. By institutionalising transnational political engagement the state 
itself is contesting traditional notions and the meaning of ‘liberal citizenship’ (as a 
singular membership in a sovereign polity), as well as the concept of ‘nation’ and 
‘national territory’. It seems that in a globalised world, being classed as a migrant 
does not appear to be an obstacle to active participation within two nations in two 
distinct countries as postmodern political subjects (Santamaria Gomez 2003). The 
common shift in state policies especially aimed at migrant political participation in 
the domestic ambit combined with the persistent movement of people, shows very 
clearly that in this stage of globalisation, nations, cultures and economies across
borders are remarkably mixed and not ‘national’ in the standard sense (Gomez and 
Zackrison 2003). These processes support Baubock’s notion of ‘transnational 
citizenship’ and Tambini’s ‘post-national citizenship’ that refer to new forms of 
citizenship participation and representation beyond the national level facilitated by 
international and supra-national institutions and the human rights discourse (Baubock 
1994; Tambini 2001; Baubock 2003; Baubock 2005; Baubock February 2002). 
These citizenship practices have mainly developed in the case of the European Union 
whose legal institutions allow member countries’ citizens (or EU citizens) to 
participate in local and parliamentary elections (Soysal 1994; Castles and Davidson 
2000; Fox 2005).
The focus of this thesis, however, is exclusively on institutionalised cross-border 
channels of political participation that connect Mexican emigrants with their country 
or regions of origin in Mexico. I divide the various forms of migrants’ transnational 
political engagement, that is to say, cross-border political participation by Mexican 
citizens in their home country; into formal and informal (see Table 1.1. below). 
Formal forms of participation are highly institutionalised, usually endorsed by the 
sending country in constitutional reforms or electoral laws and involve electorally 
related political means such as absentee voting, political representation in the 
legislature and the right to stand for elections. In other words, formal electoral 
participation would focus on migrants’ right to vote or to be voted for in their 
country of origin. Informal forms of transnational political participation, on the other 
hand, refer to both electoral and non-electoral activities. The former would include 
membership in a political party in the country of origin, monetary contributions to 
these parties and an active involvement in political campaigning whether lobbying
20
the government in the country of reception for political issues affecting their home 
country, or directly influencing political developments at home. Informal non- 
electoral activities consist mainly in non-governmental activities such as membership 
in hometown civic associations, monetary contributions to public projects in the 
community of origin and regular membership in state or charity organizations 
sponsoring projects in the country of origin. I consider non-electoral activities as 
political because, as Levitt rightly observes, they represent mechanisms to uphold 
high status and political influence in the migrants’ local communities (Levitt 1997) 
and more often than not, they are supported by the state.
Table 1.1 T ypes of em igrant political participation
T ypes of Em igrant Political Participation
Formal Informal
A dopted by the s ta te  
Enshrined in constitutional or 
institutional rules
Migrant initiatives 
Not institutionalised
Electoral Dual nationality 
A b sen tee  voting (ballot box; 
postal voting; electronic vote, 
etc.)
Parliam entary rep resen ta tion  
Right to run for elections
M em bership in political 
parties of th e  country of origin
M onetary contributions for 
political p u rp o ses
Political cam paigning and  
lobbying in the  country of 
origin
Non-Electoral R em ittances m atching 
program m es 
Institutions and  offices 
crea ted  for m igrant 
represen tation
M em bership in HTAs and  
charity o rganisations that 
im plem ent projects in the 
country of origin 
Collective rem ittances
Own elaboration
The main difference between formal and informal means of transnational political 
participation is the degree of the sending country’s involvement. Given that 
electorally-related formal types of transnational political participation need to be
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supported by constitutional reforms or electoral laws, they would require the political 
will of different domestic actors. An analysis into the dynamics of legal reforms and 
electoral laws that favour directly formal cross-border political participation would 
help us understand how states of origin respond to transnationalising and globalising 
processes and to what extent they decide to open the door to ‘the migrant’ as a new 
actor in domestic politics. In particular, the justification for this study is twofold. 
First, in contrast to other forms of cross-border or transnational participation in the 
cultural, social and economic realms, the increasing practice of emigrant political 
participation (not only involving the diplomatic body and the military abroad) is 
something relatively new, facilitated in turn by the technological advances in the 
means of transportation and communication that have accelerated globalizing 
processes in the last few decades5. Secondly, enshrining migrants’ political rights in 
constitutional and electoral rules demonstrates the state willingness to open up the 
political system to non-resident citizens in the long run. In this way, the results of 
this thesis aim at expanding our understanding of the impact of international 
migration on domestic and international politics. Furthermore, the evidence 
presented here offers central normative questions for political theorists specifically 
related to the notion and the meaning of the ‘nation-state’, ‘residency’ and 
‘citizenship’.
5 External voting rights were initially restricted to military personnel (such as the cases of the United Kingdom in 
1918, New Zealand, Canada in 1915 and the United States in 1942), especially during the First and Second World 
Wars and government administrators (such as the case of the French administrators in Rhineland in 1924)). They 
were also inherited from colonial powers to newly independent countries (the United Kingdom passed such 
legislation to Malaysia). See also IDEA (2007). Voting from Abroad: The International IDEA Handbook. IDEA 
and the Federal Electoral Institute of Mexico. Stockholm, International IDEA.
22
The growth of the number of Mexican migrants in the United States and the recent 
Mexican laws that allow them to have dual nationality and citizenship have created 
controversies in academia and the policy world. However, most scholarship has 
focused on the impact of this group in the US political, economic, social and cultural 
life and mainly the economic impact (through the transfer of remittances) that 
Mexican migrants have in their country of reception (Heer 1996; Pickus 1998; Boijas 
1999; Huntington 2004), rather than embarking on projects on the kind of politics 
involved and the state-society relations that are being renegotiated across boundaries 
and their implications. Furthermore, the few existing studies on cross-border 
political participation have been mainly approached from a sociological and 
anthropological perspective and rarely from a political science standpoint. Important 
contributions on the Mexican case have relied on ethnographic accounts and have 
focused mainly on how migrants develop transnational political practices and 
connections, as well as the moral dimension of citizenship claims at the translocal 
level, that is to say, within their communities of origin (R Smith R. 1995; Fitzgerald 
2000; Goldring 2002; Bakker and Smith 2003; Castaneda 2003; Smith 2003 ; 
Castaneda 2004; Smith 2005; Smith and Bakker 2005; Castaneda 2006; Smith and 
Bakker 2008). These studies mainly illustrate how informal forms of transnational 
political engagement take place; both electorally-related activities, such as migrants’ 
involvement with local governments, and non-electoral mechanisms, such as their 
participation in hometown associations and migrant groups, as well as the 
sponsorship of local public works. However, they do not provide a full account of the 
role of the state in the transnationalisation of the political system, specifically the 
dynamics that lead to the institutionalisation of emigrant political participation and 
the consequences for the practice of democracy that derive from it. That is to say,
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\the reasons for extending political membership to citizens abroad and how migrants 
respond to formal cross-border channels of political participation such as absentee 
voting, parliamentary representation at home or running for elections in their country 
or regions of origin.
Therefore, this thesis represents the first major study of the politics of Mexican 
emigration to the US and the impact of migrants’ political participation in their home 
country’s affairs. There are two disciplines that can help us examine why Mexico has 
institutionalised migrants’ political participation in domestic affairs through the 
adoption of national and local legislations at a time in which it has undertaken a 
democratic transition, these are transnationalism and democratization theories. In the 
transnationalist approach, earlier and current work has tended to focus on the 
migrants’ side, their role as active political participants and as direct international 
investors, as well as the impact of their hometown associations. Yet, very few 
transnationalist scholars have concentrated on the role of the state and its institutional 
efforts to reincorporate Mexican migrants into the nation and the political logic 
behind it (Smith R. 1998; Smith R. 2001; Smith R. 2003; Smith and Bakker 2008). 
This study is one of the very few works on Mexico that does this. The field of 
democratization, on the other hand, offers an understanding of the political logic 
behind the extension of political rights to previously excluded social actors, although 
it fails to explain why the state would pursue the construction of a nation beyond its 
current borders, such as granting political rights to people that do not reside within 
the state territory. Before I explore these two fields of study in the next chapter, 
firstly, I offer an account of the status of migrant political rights in the Latin 
American region.
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1 . 1 . Emigrant political participation in Latin America
As I have already mentioned, currently, a growing number of states are adopting 
strategies to maintain, create and rebuild bonds with their expatriate communities 
and create patriotic sentiments amongst them. Certain migrant political participation 
provisions are already widespread throughout the world such as dual nationality and 
external voting rights. We should note that dual nationality does not necessarily 
entail political participation. ‘Nationality’ refers to the legal status of state 
membership, thus dual nationality only refers to the capacity to hold memberships in 
two (or more) states (Spiro 1998). ‘Citizenship’, in contrast, refers to the member’s 
rights and duties within the state. Thus, there is a special distinction between dual 
nationality and migrants’ right to vote or to be voted for in their states of origin. In 
Latin America, in particular, countries with a high diaspora presence in the US as 
well as Europe have recently granted more political rights -  dual nationality, the 
right to vote and, to a lesser extent, to be voted for -  to their expatriates. Migrants’ 
political inclusion has become a regional phenomenon that also reflects the new 
social and economic changes both in the countries of origin and in reception 
countries. This section maps out the different practices in migrants’ political rights 
and external voting in the region and attempts to find out what have been the main 
motives for the extension of the franchise. In particular, whether institutionalised 
emigrant political participation has responded to individual causes or if it has been a 
regional trend.
The majority of Latin American countries have adopted dual nationality after 1990.
However, we can identify three ‘early-adopters’ or countries that passed dual
nationality laws before this date: Uruguay (1919), Panama (1972), and El Salvador
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(1983) (Jones-Correa 2001). ‘Late-adopters’ or countries that have approved dual 
nationality post-1990 are on the rise. At the time of writing, seven Latin American 
countries recognise dual nationality, these are: Brazil (1996), Costa Rica (1995), the 
Dominican Republic (1994), Ecuador (1998), Mexico (1996), and Peru (1995). There 
are a few countries in which a restricted form of dual nationality is allowed. The 
case of Chile is special. It only allows those people that have lost their Chilean 
nationality because they have adopted a new one to recover it, it does not grant dual 
nationality per se except with Spain ((DICOEX) 2008). El Salvador only allows 
dual nationality in a few cases where there is a bi-national cooperation agreement 
with the country of reception (Vono de Vilhena 2006). Similarly, Guatemala only 
recognises dual nationality with other nations in Central America.
Migrant political rights in the form of voting from abroad and getting elected are an 
even more recent phenomenon in the region. We can only identify two ‘early 
adopters’ of voting rights: Colombia and Brazil. Colombia approved the right to vote 
for presidential elections as early as 1961 (Law 39, 1961), although it was not 
implemented until 1991 when the Colombian constituent assembly created a global 
extra-territorial district, dual nationality was also recognised that same year 
(Guamizo, Portes et al. May 2003). Subsequently, Colombia granted migrants the 
right to elect congressmen in 1997 and have parliamentary representation in the 
Lower House in 2001 (Hazan 2001; Torres 2006; Escobar April 2004). Brazil, on the 
other hand, extended the franchise to residents abroad since 1965 (Law 4.737, 
Chapter VII, Art. 225-233), but in contrast to Colombia, it has not adopted a 
comprehensive approach to migrant political participation (Levitt and de la Dehesa
2003). The countries that have extended the franchise to residents abroad since the
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beginning of the new millennium are Argentina (Law 24.007, 1993), Bolivia (Art. 97 
Electoral Code, Law 1984), Dominican Republic (Electoral Law 275, Chapter XI, 
Art. 83-85), Ecuador (Law 81, 2002), El Salvador, Honduras (Decrees 72-2001; 44-
2004), Mexico, Nicaragua (Art. 122, Electoral Law 331, 2000), Panama, Peru 
(Organic Electoral Law 26859-98)and Venezuela (Art. 44, Organic Law of Voting 
and Political Participation). Panama only introduced external voting by law in 2007 
and it will be implemented for the first time in the presidential election of 2009 (El 
Panama America 2007). There are also a few countries in which the absentee vote is 
currently being debated in Congress. In Chile, the external vote is one of the four 
main priorities in the 2006-2010 government plan in relation to the Chilean diaspora, 
and it is being debated in the chamber of deputies (DICOEX) 2008). In a similar 
way, the Uruguayan government sent a bill to Congress in 2005 supporting the postal 
vote; the bill also enjoys strong support from migrant groups (Website of the 
Ministry of External Relations 2008). Figure 1.2 shows the formal types of emigrant 
political participation (electoral and non-electoral) that have been adopted in the 
Latin American region so far.
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Figure 1.1 Latin American countries using formal mechanisms of emigrant political 
participation
Selected Latin American Countries
Country Electoral Non-Electoral
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Argentina
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile *1
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador *2 *6
Falkland
Islands
Guatemala *3
Guyana *4
Honduras
Mexico *7 *8
Nicaragua
Panama
Peru
Uruguay
Venezuela *5
*1 non-loss of nationality only dual nationality with Spain; *2 on reciprocal basis; *3 only with other Central 
American countries; *4 only civil servants and full-time students abroad; *5 for presidential recall only; *6 
‘Unidos por la Solidaridad' (United for Solidarity) implemented by the national development agency FISDL in 
1999; *7 ‘3x1’ matching funds programme implemented by SEDESOL in 1999; *8 Direction General de 
Atencion a las Comunidades en el Exterior (Directorate General of Attention to the Communities Abroad— 
DGACE).
Own elaboration. Sources: IDEA Handbook 2007, Various government websites
What most of these countries do have in common is that most dual citizenship and 
voting rights bills have been highly debated in the legislature. Furthermore, in some 
cases they have faced opposition, which has also led to a wide gap between the
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actual approval of migrant voting rights and their eventual implementation. The 
Dominican Republic, for instance, passed an electoral bill in 1997 allowing the 
external vote to elect president and vice-president, but it was not until 2004 when the 
necessary legislation was approved to implement this right on time for presidential 
elections the same year. Ecuador established the right to vote from abroad for 
presidential elections in 1998 at the time in which it also adopted a dual nationality 
law reforming constitutional articles 10 and 11. However, additional legislation was 
not implemented until 2001 and Ecuadorian expatriates were only able to vote for 
presidential elections for the first time in October 2006 (Torres 22 November 2006; 
Ecuador's Ministry of Exterior website 2006). El Salvador, on the other hand, has 
adopted external voting rights, yet it does not have the necessary legislation to 
implement it (Vono de Vilhena 2006). It is the same case with Nicaragua, in which a 
law enacted in 2000 provides the possibility for citizens who are temporarily absent 
form the country to vote in presidential and legislative elections. However, a strict set 
of requirements have to be met in order for the electoral authority to decide to carry 
out elections abroad, which has not yet taken place (IDEA 2007). In the case of 
Mexico, the debate on whether and how to implement migrants’ right to vote from 
abroad lasted almost eight years -  since the first legal initiative was handed in 
congress in 1998, until the final vote abroad bill was approved in mid-2005. 
However, in 1996 a constitutional reform to article 36 already allowed Mexicans to 
vote outside their original electoral districts.
In addition, external voting rights have varied in the type of elections to which they 
apply as well as the voting procedure. However, in most countries in the region the 
actual terms of engagement and the conditions for the exercise of these rights are
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highly restrictive which has had a negative impact on the degree to which the rights 
have been exercised so far (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2000; Aleinikoff 2001; 
Aleinikoff, Martin et al. 2003). The most common practice in Latin America is to 
allow external voting for presidential elections only (see figure 1.2. above). There 
are a few exceptions, in Argentina expatriates can vote for both presidential and 
legislative elections, whilst in Colombia and Peru citizens abroad can also vote for 
referendums (IDEA 2007). On the other hand, most countries in the region favour the 
use of conventional personal voting at a polling station that is especially set up; for 
example, at a diplomatic mission or other designated places. So far only Mexico and 
Panama have endorsed the postal vote.
Furthermore, a few Latin American countries not only allow their citizens abroad to 
vote, but also they have specific congressional representation. We should note, 
nonetheless, that migrant legislative representation involves the right to be voted for, 
but not necessarily the right to vote (Fox 2005). Colombia has reserved one seat out 
of 166 for migrant political representation in congress. Ecuador and Panama have 6 
seats out of 130 (4.6%). However, in the latter it will be implemented in the 2009 
elections. Mexico is the only country in which migrant political rights have been 
adopted both at the federal and local levels, which has created different layers of 
rights. All Mexicans can vote for presidential elections as long as they meet all 
requirements, but Michoacano migrants can also vote for state governor and migrants 
from Mexico City can elect the head of government. In the Mexican state of 
Zacatecas, the Zacatecan migrant community, which exceeds the number of their 
home counterparts, have two migrant seats in the local congress to represent their
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interests at home. Zacatecans can run for local elections (except for the mayorship), 
but an absentee voting system has not been implemented yet.
Questions arise, however, about why most Latin American states have granted 
political rights to their expatriates in the last two decades? Are these developments 
the result of similar sets of internal and external pressures or a regional trend? Before 
surveying the existing literature that has focused on Latin American case studies in 
order to map out patterns of convergence and divergence, let me show how migrant 
political rights have entered into regional inter-state discussions on migrant issues. 
First, ‘La Paz Declaration’ that emerged from the Fifth South American Conference 
on Migration, which took place in Bolivia in 2004, mentions that ‘for the sake of 
migration governance, the importance of creating or consolidating policies and 
programmes seeking permanent and increasing work lines with nationals living 
abroad, underscoring the fact that the linking with emigrants is a part of migration 
management’ (South American Conferences on Migration). This conference stressed 
the importance of moving from temporary policies and programmes of 
‘acercamiento’ (‘proximity’) to implementing permanent strategies to forge links 
with migrant communities abroad. Subsequently, in the Sixth South American 
conference that took place in Paraguay in May 2006, it was clear the emphasis was 
on forging links with emigrant nationals for the benefit of skills transfer and 
development in the communities of origin. One of the commitments in the ‘Paraguay 
Declaration’ was to ‘work for the recognition of citizenship rights of migrants both 
from origin and destination countries to an enlarged citizenship (the right to vote 
when allowed by national legislation), not only in sending but in receiving countries 
as well’ (South American Conferences on Migration). What was interesting during
those discussions was the view that ensuring political rights was not only the 
responsibility of the country of origin, but also the host country and instead of using 
the terms ‘dual nationality’ and ‘dual citizenship’, it highlighted the benefits of an 
‘enlarged citizenship’. In addition, North American and Central American countries 
cooperate under the regional conference on migration (RCM). In its eleventh 
regional conference in El Salvador in May 2006, RMC countries acknowledged the 
positive contribution of migrants and highlighted the importance of programmes that 
link nationals abroad with their communities of origin (Regional Conference on 
Migration).
Secondly, at the international level, Latin American countries have also been active 
advocators of the UN Convention on the Rights of all Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families (in force since July 2003), which, as we have seen, 
recognises migrants’ right to vote and be voted for in their home country’s elections. 
This convention has legal effects in the countries that ratify it. Up until now, not a 
single major host and developed country has ratified the convention making it one of 
the weakest human rights instruments. It has been welcomed, nonetheless, by 
sending countries in Latin America, Africa and to a lesser extent in Eastern Europe 
(37 parties in total) (United Nations 2008). The Latin American countries that have 
ratified this convention are mainly those that already grant substantial political rights 
to their citizens abroad such as Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay (United 
Nations 2008).
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However, the late consensus on migrant’s political rights by sending countries in the 
region and their agreement and commitment as evidenced in the different regional 
and international instruments do not seem to show a complete picture. The few 
comparative studies in Latin America that have examined the shifting policies 
adopted in various Latin American countries towards their expatriate communities 
living abroad from the state perspective have highlighted either the effects of 
globalisation and human rights discourse, or/and national developments (Basch L., 
Glick Schiller et al. 1994; Guamizo 1998; Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Itzigsohn, 
Dore Cabral et al. 1999; Itzigsohn 2000; Hazan 2001; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; 
Torres 2006; Margheritis 2007). However, most of these comparative studies focus 
on a wide range of policies that the state of origin utilises to encourage expatriates’ 
continued sense of membership such as ministerial and consular reforms, investment 
policies to channel remittances, consular protection of nationals abroad, political 
rights and symbolic policies. There has not been any study that looks at the legal 
channels of migrant political participation per se and the rationale behind it.
The first to analyse migrants’ transnational practices and the new trend among states 
to integrate their populations residing abroad, by looking closely at the cases of 
Caribbean and Filipino populations in the New York metropolitan area, were L 
Bash., N. Glick Schiller, and C. Szanton Blanc who in their pioneer work in 
transnational studies argued for a new type of national building, one in which the 
notion of nation-state encompasses not only the citizens within the traditional 
established territory, but also those living beyond the physical boundaries of the state 
-  what they called ‘deterritorialized nation-state’ (Basch L., Glick Schiller et al. 
1994). Although we will explore this concept later on, it suffices to mention that for
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Basch et. al. these multiple identities are mainly the embodiment of positions of 
resistance against a negative context of reception, the selectivity of immigration 
policies and economic uncertainty as well as the adverse effects of greater 
penetration of global capital. In this respect, state policies of proximity are a direct 
response to grassroots’ claims by migrants and migrant groups.
Building on the work of Basch and her associates, other scholars have mentioned the 
importance of national-level dynamics in home countries’ development of 
transnational links with their expatriate populations in addition to external 
considerations as well as the key role of migrants and migrant groups. Itzigsohn’s 
study on political transnationalism among migrants from Dominican Republic, Haiti 
and El Salvador looks into the role of the different domestic actors, in particular, 
political parties and state apparatus, together with US-based migrant organisations
(2000). He explains that Haiti and the Dominican Republic were able to establish 
transnational political institutions, such as an overseas department in the former and 
the extension of political rights in the latter, as the right conditions were in place. In 
Haiti the lack of a developed party system has been compensated by the existence of 
grassroots civil society groups that ally with migrant groups abroad. In contrast, in El 
Salvador the question of reaching the emigrant community was still marginal as the 
lack of trust of the migrant community towards the political system restricted their 
influence at home. A later comparative work on Brazil, Mexico, the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti carried out by Peggy Levitt et. al. examines the shifting policies 
adopted in these countries towards their expatriate communities living in the US and 
argue that these countries seem to respond to structural imperatives as well as the 
emergence of international norms (2003). Their types of policies and their scope
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differ, however, due to national-level considerations such as economic capacity, state 
institutions and the role of political parties, as well as the degree of emigration and 
organisation of the migrant community in the country of reception. Thus, Brazil and 
Mexico might have the economic resources to pursue those policies, but in the latter 
the proportion of Mexicans that live abroad explains why this country has paid more 
attention to develop strong linkages. In the case of Dominican Republic and Haiti, 
migrant organisations have played a key role influencing state policies of proximity. 
However, Haiti’s unstable political scenario deters the development of further 
policies.
On the contrary, recent studies on the cases of Colombia and Argentina have 
emphasised the role of the state and political elites. Hazan who analyses specifically 
the case of migrants’ political rights in Colombia argues that they have taken place 
within the context of a country trying to reformulate the notion of the ‘nation’
(2001). She posits that in Colombia migrants’ right to vote abroad approved in 1961 
responded to the need of the state to legitimize a new political order and its goal to 
reincorporate political elites that had left the country during the long period of 
political violence and a military dictatorship (Hazan 2001). Also, the right to dual 
citizenship and the right to vote for and have a parliamentary representative approved 
in 1991 were efforts carried out by the Colombian elites to reform the state 
machinery and extend political participation. That is why this constitutional reform 
was accompanied by the acknowledgment of other demands for recognition made by 
ethnic minorities such as the indigenous and black population. In a similar vein, Ana 
Margheritis, who identifies a similar policy shift in Argentina towards its population 
in Spain argues that in this case, it has been the state, under the government of Nestor
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Kirchner, that has initiated political transnationalism, not migrants. In her own 
words: ‘the state, rather than grassroots movements, has been the engine of 
transnationalism’ (Margheritis 2007, p. 99; Website of the Ministry of Interior 2008). 
She maintains that this move has gone hand in hand with the human rights discourse 
and, in her words, ‘unfinished processes of democratic consolidation’ (Margheritis 
2007, p. 100).
To sum up, the handful of comparative studies in the Latin American region on the 
recent policies that aim at reaching out to migrant communities abroad and 
incorporate them into the national political map illustrate that a different mix of 
factors have determined such policies in the various countries studied. In particular, 
however, they refer to the size and organisation of migrant communities, the role of 
political parties, state apparatus and economic capacity, as well as the effect of the 
global economy and international law. Differences arise regarding whether such 
policies of proximity respond to grassroots movements by migrant groups or follow a 
‘top-down’ perspective implemented by state actors. What we can observe is that 
countries in the region have responded individually to external and domestic factors, 
at least initially. In the last couple of years, however, Latin American countries have 
been able to interact with each other in the various regional and international 
migration conferences. During the Congressional debate on external voting rights in 
Bolivia, for instance, Mexican civil servants, who participated in the External Voting 
Commission during the 2006 Mexico’s presidential elections, were invited to talk 
about their experience. What this suggests is that formal transnational political 
channels are only beginning to open and it is only a matter of time before more Latin 
American countries join the transnational political field.
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Mexico, as we have seen, falls into the group of countries that are building a new 
relationship with its migrant community, leading to a reformulation of the Mexican 
nation. In contrast to other countries in the region, Mexico has adopted migrants’ 
political rights bills at the federal and, asymmetrically, at the sub-national level. 
Therefore, these factors make it a good case study in order to discover the main 
variables and determinants in the incorporation of the migrant as a new political actor 
and the implications on an incipient democratic political system. A convergence 
point with other Latin American countries that have granted political rights to their 
emigrants is the fact that such legal reforms have come into being during democratic 
transitions and the countries’ insertion in the global economy. Specifically, in the 
case of Mexico, particular migrant groups have been created with political goals, in 
both the country of reception and origin, which have formed coalitions with non-PRI 
political parties, principally the centre-left PRD. The reason that makes the Mexican 
case unique, however, are the dynamics that lead to the implementation of emigrant 
political participation and its effects on the political system. The rationale is 
threefold. Firstly, the long history of Mexico-US migration and state intervention has 
influenced Mexican hometown associations and migrant groups’ to develop their 
own forms of consolidation and activism. Secondly, the construction of political 
linkages with Mexicans abroad also responds to the closer bilateral relationship 
between the two countries, enhanced by the NAFTA and Mexico’s insertion in the 
global economy. Lastly, the asymmetric and at times, contradictory forms of formal 
emigrant political participation are directly influenced by the particular pattern of 
democratization and decentralization that has taken place in Mexico. This theoretical 
framework is exhibited in the following chapter.
1.2. Research strategy
The unique characteristics of emigrant political participation in Mexico dictate the 
need for a two-level analysis. That is, formal forms of emigrant political participation 
adopted a) at the national and b) sub-national levels. There is the relevance of 
exploring an in-depth case study of emigrant political participation in Mexico since it 
has been implemented unevenly among migrant sending states (‘estados’) in the 
country. This thesis, however, sacrifices undertaking other country case studies in 
depth, although points of convergence and divergence with other countries in the 
Latin American region are discussed in the concluding chapter. At the same time, the 
scope of these levels is dictated by two main aims. These are to uncover both the 
determinants of emigrant political participation as well as some of the consequences 
that derive from it on the incipient democratic system in Mexico.
Addressing the first research objective, I examine the determinants for emigrant 
political participation in Mexico. I explore how Mexican migrants and migrant 
groups have formulated and put forward their demands. Who are, for instance, those 
groups that lobby for political participation in Mexico? Who do they represent and 
what are their motivations? What are their strategies and means for lobbying at the 
Congress in their country of origin? Do migrant groups’ strategies in the different 
contexts converge or diverge? And what is their relationship with governments and 
political parties? In addition, I explore the motivations of political parties, national 
and local governments, state institutions and social civil society groups to support 
migrants’ demands and act in favour of their implementation. How do domestic
political actors act upon migrants’ and migrant groups demands? What are the main 
motivations for supporting or opposing migrants’ political rights? How does migrant 
political inclusion become part of their political agendas?
The second aim of this study is how migrants respond to formal forms of political 
participation in their country of origin. Given that most of the legal reforms on 
migrants’ political rights are still very recent, this analysis presents some limitations. 
However, it gives some indications of whether emigrant political participation is 
likely to influence domestic political developments and dynamics in Mexico. Given 
the different emigrant political participation formulas presented in this study, their 
implications also vary. The main questions addressed here are: To what extent do 
Mexican migrants respond to institutionalised opportunities for political participation 
at home? How do local political actors try to influence emigrant political 
participation? Who are those migrants that participate -  whether by voting, running 
for elections, or occupying a parliamentary seat? Does the new insertion of ‘the 
migrant’ as a new political participant change domestic political dynamics and order?
There is one conceptual path which proves useful in the study of the determinants 
and consequences of emigrant political participation, that is, the concept of a 
transnational social space in which migrants and migrant groups, local governments 
and political parties are interlinked. According to Faist, ‘the concept of transnational 
social space aims towards a recognition of the practice of migrants and stayers 
connecting both worlds and the activities of institutions such as nation-states that try 
to control these spaces’ (Faist, 2000, p. 12). The concept of transnational social space 
as well as later migration studies have questioned methodological nationalism, that
is, whether the nation-state is to be seen as the point of departure for migration 
research (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002; Glick Schiller, Caglar et al. 2006). This 
framework facilitates viewing international migration and its consequences in an 
increasing globalised world where the actions and events in the region of origin and 
destination impact on one another. Understanding the migration phenomenon outside 
the realist perspective of defined nation-states helps us grasp initiatives to foster 
political inclusion and participation of groups that live outside the state territory and, 
in turn, the interest and response of (some) citizens abroad to have a voice over 
political developments in their country of origin. Furthermore, it helps explain how 
difficult it is in recent years to classify a country as of origin or of destination and the 
fact that more and more people decide to live a transnational life, that is, moving 
back and forth (see for instance Pries 2004).
Although Faist’s concept of transnational social space provides the tools to explain 
how the strengthening and building up of new (political) linkages takes place (2000), 
it complements other empirical frameworks that explain how migratory movements 
originate in the first place and how they are sustained over long periods of time. This 
thesis understands Mexico-to-US migration in terms of migration network analysis 
complemented by migration system approaches. The latter, on the one hand, 
highlights ‘the existence of linkages between countries other than people, such as 
trade and security alliances, colonial ties (Portes and Walton 1981), and flows of 
goods, services, information and ideas’ (Faist 2000, p.51). The former, on the other, 
explains how migratory movements can persist as prospective migrants are supported 
by kin and friends abroad and how emigration is embedded into family and cultural 
traditions (Palloni, Massey et al. 2001).
Thus, the findings of this thesis are based on a detailed empirical analysis of the 
determinants and implications of emigrant political participation in the Mexican 
context. The empirical research of this thesis was undertaken during fieldwork in 
several rounds between 2005 and 2008 (see Annex 1 for a selected list of interviews). 
During this time, I carried out 77 interviews, mainly in Mexico: Mexico City, 
Zacatecas and Michoacan. The interviews were carried out with national and local 
legislators (in the case of the federal absentee vote bill, with both deputies and 
senators); local governments; federal governmental institutions such as the Institute 
of Mexicans Abroad (IME for its acronym in Spanish), the National Institute of 
Migration (INI for its acronym in Spanish), Ministry of Social Development 
(SEDESOL for its acronym in Spanish); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE for its 
acronym in Spanish); local migrant institutions such as the Institute of Michocano 
Migrants Abroad and federal and state electoral institutes, as well as members of 
migrant lobby groups; presidents of hometown associations and migrant leaders. 
Most interviews were carried out during legislative negotiations (with the exception 
of the Zacatecan migrant political rights’ bill that was approved in 2003) and during 
the early implementation stage. Responses were, thus, meant to capture opinions 
whilst events were still unfolding. In addition, it was possible to visit electoral 
authorities during the period of implementation. Due to a limited research budget, 
interviews with migrant leaders and presidents of hometown associations and 
federations were carried out during short visits in Los Angeles (in 2007) and Chicago 
(in 2008). Complementary interviews and follow-ups were carried out via telephone. 
Virtually all interviews were carried out in Spanish (apart from a few words and 
sentences in English) and I am responsible for all the translations.
In addition, during fieldwork visits I was able to review primary research material 
such as parliamentary archives, governmental offices’ reports, newspaper databases 
and transnational local media. In the case of Zacatecas, I was also granted access to 
migrant deputies’ political agendas and future proposals and legal initiatives. Again, 
all this material was supplied in Spanish, for which I am responsible for the 
translations cited in this work. In this thesis I utilise qualitative, and to a lesser 
extent, quantitative methodologies (descriptive statistics). An unpublished survey 
among Mexican emigrants on absentee voting in the 2006 presidential election, 
whose results are presented in chapter five, was provided by the Commission of the 
Vote Abroad (‘Comision del Voto en el Extranjero’- COVE) of the Federal Electoral 
Institute (IFE for its acronym in Spanish).
1.3. Thesis structure
The study of emigrant political participation in Mexico requires defining particular 
concepts and theory building. Chapter 2 reviews the main literature looking into the 
transnationalism approach and Mexico’s pattern of democratization to construct a 
conceptual framework of migrant politics in Mexico, which serves as the theoretical 
foundation for the empirical case studies. Chapter 3 provides a historical overview of 
the Mexican state policies towards Mexican migrants in the US. It shows that 
although the Mexican state has varied in response in different periods in history, the 
current phase starting in 1988 -  characterised by efforts towards the cultural, 
economic and political participation of migrants from abroad -  has no precedent. It 
demonstrates that in the contemporary period current politically constructed state
policies at the federal and state levels have not only been created to mediate the 
flows of transnational migration as well as cultural production and human rights 
protection, but also (increasingly) political practice across borders.
Chapter 4 and 5 are dedicated to the case of the vote abroad bill for presidential 
elections adopted at the national level in 2005. Chapter 4 analyses the almost eight- 
year negotiation period of the vote abroad bill and identifies who were the main 
actors and their interests in influencing and shaping this bill. It illustrates how non- 
PRI parties and successful migrant groups’ involvement -  in particular the migrant 
lobby group ‘Coalition para los Derechos Politicos de los Mexicanos en el 
Extranjero ’—were key determinants that led to the approval of the vote abroad 
legislation in 2005. Chapter 5 looks at the first Mexican vote abroad experience for 
the presidential election in 2006, which was characterised by a remarkably low turn­
out. It offers a discussion of why Mexican migrants failed to avail themselves of this 
opportunity for political action and identifies those migrants that did participate. The 
main finding is that mainly educated and affluent migrants with permanent (and most 
likely legal) residence in the US tend to vote. This analysis helps to reveal whether 
the original intentions of legislators and advocators of the vote abroad bill were met 
and, on the other hand, which political actors benefited as a result. The socio­
economic characteristics of the Mexican migrant voter explain why there was a 
marked preference for PAN’s Felipe Calderon’s over other political options, as 
higher income and education levels are predictors of PAN support.
Chapter 6, 7 and 8 shift the focus to the implementation of migrant political rights at 
the sub-national level. Chapters 6 and 7 concentrate on the case of la Ley Migrante
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(‘Migrant Law’) in Zacatecas adopted in 2003, whereas chapter 8 considers the case 
of the absentee voting law for governorship in the state of Michoacan approved in 
2007. Chapter 6 explores the dynamics that led to the implementation of the 
“Migrant Law” and how it has institutionalised migrant political participation in 
Zacatecas. I demonstrate that three steps have been necessary for the adoption of this 
bill: political organisation of the migrant community (the main lobby organization 
was the ‘Frente Civico Zacatecano ’), a significant flow of collective remittances and 
the experience of a change of government and emergence of party politics. Chapter 7 
addresses the question of whether the institutionalised intervention of migrants in 
Zacatecan politics has changed its political order and to what extent this is 
transparent and compatible with democratic principles. I illustrate how the 
institutionalisation of migrant political participation in local affairs, by allowing local 
legislative representation (two migrant seats) and migrants’ right to run for electoral 
positions (except governorship), transforms political structures, not only due to the 
inclusion of new political actors (migrant organisations and migrant candidates), but 
also challenging old social hierarchies and realigning power structures at home, 
albeit only to a limited extent, as well as lifting borders between constituencies at 
home and abroad. Chapter 8 then looks at the case of Michoacan, a Mexican state 
where there is an electoral law that explicitly grants migrants’ political rights 
establishing an absentee voting mechanism for governorship elections. This case 
serves to test the argument that the interaction of a centre-left PRD government with 
strong presence in the local congress and politically and economically active migrant 
organisations -  in this case the ‘Frente Binacional Michoacano’ in a context of 
democratic contestation would guarantee the implementation of a migrant political 
rights bill at the local level.
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Chapter 9 draws together the thesis’ findings on why and how the Mexican state has 
extended formal political membership to its migrant population both at the national 
and sub-national level and what the consequences have been on the dynamics of the 
political system and Mexico’s incipient democracy. It also poses critical questions 
about the future prospects of migrant politics in Mexico and compares this case study 
to other countries in the region. Finally, it highlights the main contributions to the 
field and opportunities for further research.
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Chapter 2
2. Mexico’s  Pattern of Democratization and Migrant 
Politics
We should look into how we can account for the political incorporation of non­
resident citizens into the domestic political map from fields that can provide us with 
appropriate conceptual framework for examining long-term processes of cross- 
border migration, migrants’ political participation from abroad and its implications. I 
turn to the transnationalist approach to cross-border migrant political participation 
and secondly, Mexico’s pattern of democratization and migrant politics.
2.1. The Transnationalist Approach and the Mexican 
case
Facing the need to analyse migration and related processes from a perspective
unbound by national borders a growing number of scholars have in recent years
advocated a transnational approach (see for instance Basch L., Glick Schiller et al.
1994; Guamizo 1998; Guamizo and Smith 1998; Mahler 1998; Portes, Guamizo et
al. 1999; Vertovec 1999; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003;
Smith 2003 ; Levitt and Nyberg-Sorensen 2004; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004).
‘Transnationalism’ and ‘transnational’ have become common terms often displayed
in titles of conferences, books, discussion panels and scholarly meetings. However,
given that this field is in its infancy, it is still filled with theoretical ambiguity and
analytical confusion. By contemplating the fact that political adaptation to a new
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country does not necessarily exclude political involvement in the country of origin, 
the growing literature on transnationalism provides new vocabulary and research 
tools for examining the causes and implications of the institutionalisation of cross- 
border migrant political participation. Transnationalism or transnational migration, in 
its broader definition, refers to the whole set of political, economic, cultural and 
social networks and institutions that connect migrants’ countries of origin and of 
destination and influence not only those that have settled in the new country and 
those who move back and forth, but also those who never move (Glick Schiller and 
Fouron 1999, p.344). It has been suggested, this new pattern of migration, responds 
to a global capitalist economy, as well as significant technological advances and the 
facilitation of international travel (Basch L., Glick Schiller et al. 1994).
In particular, the transnational approach seems to contradict orthodox approaches to 
immigrant incorporation and settlement. Traditional theoretical approaches to 
immigration, especially push-pull and assimilation theories were created from a 
methodological nationalism perspective, in other words, these were based on the 
assumption that the world was divided into well-defined national political units 
(Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Migrants who settled in a new country, were 
eventually expected to assimilate into the dominant society’s socio-cultural and 
economic systems while simultaneously giving up their previous cultural practices 
and political loyalties (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002). Transnationalism, on the 
other hand, stresses the fact that migrants, even though they settle in a new state, do 
not necessarily lose their political, economic, social and cultural connections with 
their country of origin. Most literature on international migration has been dominated 
by issues of citizenship, integration and participation of immigrants within their
countries or reception (Ireland, 1994, Koopmans and Statham, 2001, Soysal 1994); 
only in the last two decades migrants’ transnational linkages with their countries of 
origin has become a new subject in this field.
However, we should be careful not to view transnational migration as an alternative 
to assimilation in the country of reception, rather we should grasp the two 
phenomena as parallel forms of adaptation within a new context that provides 
opportunities for long-distance membership. It still remains unknown to what extent 
migrants engage into transnational practices and for how long and whether second 
and third generation descendants still choose to participate in developments that take 
place in their parents’ places of origin. Up to now, most research on transnationalism 
has mostly relied on sociological and ethnographic accounts, which does not 
illustrate to what extent the phenomenon is occurring (with the exception of a few 
quantitative studies. See for instance, Guamizo, Portes et al. May 2003). A few 
studies, nonetheless, point out that it is only a very small proportion of migrants that 
maintain linkages with their places of origin beyond sending remittances home and 
those that do so seem to fall into the category of well-established, mostly well- 
educated and economically successful in the country of reception (Porters 2002; 
Guamizo, Portes et al. May 2003).
Although transnationalism encompasses all social, cultural, economic and political 
aspects, my focus is on political transnationalism, that is to say, political linkages 
between state of origin and their citizens abroad, and, in particular, how institutional 
channels are constructed to maintain a transnational political system. As we have 
seen in the previous section, there have been a number of studies from the
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transnational perspective that have looked at how Latin American sending countries 
seek to include economically, socially, culturally or politically their diasporas mainly 
located in the US and in Europe (Basch L., Glick Schiller et al. 1994; Guamizo 1998; 
Itzigsohn, Dore Cabral et al. 1999; Itzigsohn 2000; Hazan 2001; Levitt and de la 
Dehesa 2003; Torres 2006; Margheritis 2007; Guamizo, Portes et al. May 2003). 
Fewer studies have been carried out across the Atlantic, in the European context 
(0stergaard-Nielsen 2000; 0stergaard-Nielsen 2002; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003). 
What most of these studies have in common, albeit only to a limited extent, is an 
emphasis on migrants’ agency and the grassroots dimension in the negotiation for 
more spaces for cultural, social, economic and political inclusion at home.
Previously, scholars have tried to define transnational political activities by the 
intensity of migrants’ activities. Itzigsohn, for instance, refers to ‘broad’ political 
practices as those meetings or events taking place occasionally to ‘narrow’ forms of 
political involvement which mean more direct initiatives, such as membership in 
political parties or groups (Itzigsohn, Dore Cabral et al. 1999; Porters 1999; 
Itzigsohn 2000). Ostergaard-Nielsen, on the other hand, proposes four types of 
migrants’ political practices (30 June - 1 July 2001; 2001; 2003). Broadly, 
‘immigrant politics’ would refer to activities carried out in order to improve their 
political and economic situation in the country of reception. ‘Homeland politics’ are 
those activities aimed at opposing or supporting domestic or foreign policy of the 
homeland. ‘Diaspora politics’ would be an extension of the latter, it would refer to 
those groups that cannot participate in politics of their home country or belong to 
stateless groups. ‘Translocal politics’ pertain to those activities carried by hometown 
organisations that aim at improving the economic situation of their local
communities. Although my focus is mainly on the institutionalisation of homeland 
politics, I consider this nomenclature unable to show the role of the state as well as 
the level of institutionalisation of migrants’ cross-border political practices. As I will 
show in my case studies of Zacatecas and Michoacan, it is often difficult to 
distinguish between the economic and political influence of migrant groups, which 
illustrates that, more often than not, ‘homeland politics’ and ‘translocal politics’ go 
hand in hand.
Some political scientists have also addressed the debate on transnational political 
participation in their country or communities of origin versus Latino politics in the 
US (Jones-Correa 1998; Jones-Correa 2001; Jones-Correa 2002; Smith 2007). 
Importantly, the earlier tendency to perceive the former as carried out by recently 
arrived migrants and hometown associations, whilst the latter as dominated by 
Hispanic citizens and Latino organisations, has been proved wrong. Instead, 
migrants’ involvement in politics at home and in their country of reception is not 
mutually exclusive (Smith 2007). Jones-Correa, for instance, illustrates how Latino 
groups and hometown organisations have at times campaigned for similar goals such 
as an immigration reform in the US (1998; 2001; 2002). DeSipio argues that 
members of migrant organisations that engage in politics at home are also most likely 
to be involved in electoral politics in the US (2006). M. P. Smith goes further by 
arguing that Mexican migrant leaders of hometown associations who have gained 
dual citizenship, express dual allegiance (or at times dual reluctance) to both 
countries in which they engage politically (2007). Thus, although the focus of this 
thesis is mainly on migrants’ involvement in their home country’s and communities’ 
political developments, I view transnationalism as a practice that does not necessarily
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exclude integration in the country of reception. This helps us understand why, more 
often than not, well-established Mexican migrants with a long period of residence in 
the US have been the main advocators for political participation in Mexico and 
repeatedly use the discourse of regional integration to justify their demands for 
further political participation in their country of origin.
2.1.1. Political transnationalism and translocality in the Mexican 
case
Mexican migrants in the US and their influence on domestic and local politics across 
the South border have been a recurrent case in transnationalist studies in recent years. 
Despite the rich and significant implications for political science and theory, existing 
research has been mainly approached from anthropological and sociological 
perspectives and mainly relied on ethnographic accounts. Most of these studies 
single out the role of Mexican migrants and hometown associations in the formation 
of transnational communities, as well as their involvement in the reformulation of 
state/society relationships at the local level. In his analysis of the Mexican case 
before the change of federal government took place, Goldring (2002) already pointed 
out the function of sub-national linkages. In his own words: ‘the state hegemonic 
project involves the largely symbolic reincorporation of paisanos living abroad back 
into the nation but depends on provincial and municipal authorities and transmigrant 
organisations for implementation. Because these vary, the project has been 
implemented unevenly’. What differentiates this process from the new post­
authoritarian era is the increasing autonomy that sending states enjoy pursuing 
unique policies and constitutional reforms that extend political membership
independently from the position of the federal government and national legislation.
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As I demonstrate in this thesis, the institutionalisation of Mexican migrants’ political 
incorporation has varied according to uneven democratization and decentralization 
processes.
There are three main bodies of literature and perspectives that have addressed the 
case of Mexican migrants and transnational political practices. The first group 
focuses on migrant citizenship practices and their demands for inclusion in local 
politics in everyday life (Fitzgerald 2000; Castaneda 2004; Fitzgerald 2004; 
Fitzgerald 2004; Castaneda 2006; Smith and Bakker 2008). Fitzgerald, for instance, 
addresses migrants’ moral claims for extra-territorial citizenship in the context of the 
Mexican state of Michoacan (Fitzgerald 2000). In a similar vein, Alejandra 
Castaneda describes migrants’ transnational practices and discusses how they 
challenge state definitions and practices of citizenship making reference to the case 
of migrants from Aguililla (Michoacan, Mexico) and their community based in 
Redwood City (California) (Castaneda 2006). Also, Castaneda’s work illustrates to 
what extent migrants’ citizenship practices are affected by immigration reforms in 
the US and citizenship reforms (such as dual nationality rights) in Mexico. She 
argues that ‘citizenship is constructed by nation-states and by migrant’s transnational 
practices and the embodiment of law’ (Castaneda 2004). Michael Peter Smith and 
Matt Bakker address similar issues with ethnographic accounts from the Mexican 
states of Guanajuato and Zacatecas and their main places of destination in California 
(Smith and Bakker 2008). Similar to this approach, but from a state perspective, R. 
Smith identifies those institutional determinants, such as state policies of the country 
of origin, that have contributed to and shaped migrants’ transnational economic,
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social and cultural engagements and migrants’ political claims for membership 
(Smith R. 2001; Smith R. 2003).
A second body of literature, mainly authored by migrant political rights advocators 
and Mexican academics -  at times the protagonists of the migrants’ rights movement 
in Mexico -  concentrates on migrants’ demands for transnational voting rights and 
dual citizenship, as well as the significance of these claims for Mexican communities 
in the US (Moctezuma Longoria 2001; Martinez Saldana and Ross Pineda 2002; 
Bada 2003; Martinez Saldana 2003; Martinez Saldana 2003; Badillo Moreno 2004; 
Moctezuma 2004). Raul Ross, Badillo Moreno and Martinez Saldana have provided 
useful historical accounts of migrant rights’ activism across borders, as well as their 
relations with local governments and political parties (Martinez Saldana and Ross 
Pineda 2002; Martinez Saldana 2003; Badillo Moreno 2004; Martinez Saldana 
2005). Moctezuma Longoria’s prominent work on the notion and practice of bi­
nationality among Mexican migrants from the state of Zacatecas influenced the 
content and shape of the ‘Migrant Bill’ adopted there in 2003 (Moctezuma Longoria 
2001; Moctezuma Longoria 2004; Moctezuma 2004). This literature is rich on 
migrant activists’ views on the extension of political rights to Mexicans abroad as 
well as their perceptions of democratization processes at home. A third group of 
scholars have largely focused on Mexican hometown associations’ involvement in 
their local communities and their impact on local development (Guamizo 2003; 
Goldring 2004; Orozco 2004; Orozco and Lapointe 2004; Rivera-Salgado, Bada et 
al. 2005; Caglar 2006). The transformation of migrant groups’ economic power into 
political leverage in their local communities’ affairs requires more elaboration.
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Collective remittances and the state
Hometown associations’ donations for communities’ celebrations and infrastructure 
projects and, less often, productive schemes are alleged to increase emigrants’ 
political leverage in their communities of origin. Anecdotal case studies of migrant 
leaders and hometown associations participating in their local communities’ 
economic development and political affairs frequently appear in transnationalism 
scholars’ ethnographic accounts (Smith R. 1995; Fitzgerald 2005; Smith R. 2006). 
Yet, this argument has not been assessed to any extent. In this thesis, however, I 
demonstrate how migrant groups -  whilst lobbying for more political rights back 
home- use their economic involvement in the local communities’ development as a 
bargaining position; which is, more often than not, also picked up by non-PRI 
political parties (mainly the centre-left PRD) as a motive to support their demands.
‘Collective remittances’ is the term coined to refer to those donations sent by migrant 
groups or hometown associations to finance projects in their local communities 
(Moctezuma Longoria 2001; Goldring 2004; Jimenez-Cuen 2005). In contrast to 
individual remittances which are private transferences that emigrants make to their 
family or kin that have stayed behind. However, the main distinction is that the latter 
are private transfers in which the state has no reason to intervene, apart from 
negotiating lower transfer costs6. Their intrinsic private character has restrained the 
tendency to see individual remittances as ‘the new development mantra’ (Kapur
6 The Mexican government has undertaken considerable actions to increase remittances-sending by lowering 
tariffs and promoting official banking transfers. For instance, the ‘matricula consular’, under the US-Mexico 
Partnership for Prosperity Program, allows Mexican migrants since 2002 to open bank accounts in the US 
regardless of their immigration status. In addition, transfers costs from the US to Mexico have lowered by 60 
percent since 1999. See Report, W. B. (2006). Global economic prospects. Implications of remittances and 
migration. Washington D.C., World Bank. p. 137.
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2005, p.331) (See also Guamizo 2003; Goldring 2004; Gammage 2006). In 
particular, the 2007 declaration adopted at the VII Conference on South American 
Migrations mentions that ‘remittances are private financial flows, the product of 
migrant population’s work, which are used to improve the quality of life of the 
recipients, and, therefore, should not be considered official aid for development, 
under any circumstances’ (South American Conferences on Migration, website 
2008).
Collective remittances, on the other hand, fall directly into the state’s sphere of 
responsibility for the well-being of citizens. In particular, it undermines local 
governments’ monopoly over public works and services. Although collective 
transfers have never reached the level of private individual remittances7, their effects, 
nonetheless, are tangible mainly in small and rural communities with a long 
emigration tradition and with organised natives abroad -  although not necessarily in 
the poorest (Aparicio and Meseguer 2008). In a few small migrant sending 
communities, migrant associations’ donations exceed the local government’s yearly 
budget. It has been shown that in communities of under 3,000 inhabitants, hometown 
associations’ contributions have reached an average of 59 percent of the municipal 
budget spending on public works (Table 1, Orozco and Lapointe 2003, p. 6). 
Although the phenomenon of collective remittances has presented the paradox of
7 Individual remittances reached USD 18.1 billion in Mexico in 2004 (World Bank, 2006). Over 1 million 
households receive remittances and for about 40 percent of them migrants’ remittances are the only source of 
income (CONAPO). On the other hand, collective remittances (total funds in the 3X1 program) amounted USD 
43.5 million in 2002 (IOM, 2005). Total funds for the programme are expected to reach USD 135 million in 
2008 (including funds from migrant organisations) (SEDESOL, Segundo Informe Trimestral, 2008). The 
programme takes place in 27 of the Mexican states (SEDESOL, 2008). The percentage of municipalities that 
participate in the ‘3X1’ program has increased from 10 percent in 2002 to 18 percent in 2005 (Aparicio and 
Mesenguer, 2008, p. 11).
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whose responsibility it is to look after citizens’ wellbeing. As Delgado Wise and 
Marquez mention in the case of collective remittances (and individual remittances) 
‘poverty and marginalization are alleviated, and the state is partially released from its 
obligation of participating in social development tasks’ (Delgado Wise and Marquez 
Covarrubias 2007, p. 674). In contrast to the private sector, migrant groups and 
associations do not expect anything in return, apart from, perhaps, reaffirming their 
identity and local recognition (Bada 2004), which, in turn, is likely to enhance their 
reputation as benefactors (Sana 2005).
The Mexican state has responded, however, by matching such collective remittances 
by each level of government -  federal, state and municipal -  in a programme known 
as ‘Citizen Initiative 3x1’. Until now, there is only another Latin American country,
Q
El Salvador, where a similar matching funds programme exists . However, 
Colombian, Peruvian and Ecuadorian organisations in Italy are promoting similar 
matching funds schemes with their home countries in the education sector (Garcia 
Zamora 2007). Although the origins of the ‘3 for 1’ programme in Mexico are 
explored in more detail in chapter 6, it suffices to mention that this programme was 
first implemented at the sub-national level in the state of Zacatecas and then 
expanded to other Mexican migrant sending states.
Do collective remittances actually have any effect on democratic practice? This 
question has recently been explored regarding individual remittances. A recent study 
carried out on the effects of individual remittances on political participation of those
8 'Unidos por la Solidaridad’ (United for Solidarity) implemented by the national development agency FISDL in 
1999
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left-behind in Mexico reveals that remittances-receivers and people that expect to 
emigrate are less likely to vote in elections (Bravo 2008) (See also Adida and Girod 
2006 for a similar finding). On the other hand, it has been pointed out that 
municipalities with a high proportion of remittances-receivers households are more 
prone to vote for a non-PRI political party (Pfutze 2008). Thus, individual 
remittances can have ambiguous effects on the country of origin’s democratic life, 
lowering voting turnout among those that stayed behind, but also encouraging 
political change. Conversely, research into the political economy of collective 
remittances is still in its infancy. As Goldring suggests there is a need to bring 
‘politics back into the study of migrants in development’ (Goldring 2008, p. 12). 
However, the dynamics of collective remittances are different as ‘it allows organised 
migrants to participate as new social actors that operate in two countries for the 
social development of their communities of origin’ (Garcia Zamora 2007, p. 167). As 
economic development is discussed by government representatives and migrant 
groups, as well as people that live in such communities, accountability and 
ownership increases. From their inception three key issues have arisen in 
negotiations between migrant groups or hometown associations and the different 
levels of governments. These are: Who decides what projects to sponsor? Who is in 
charge of the funds? Who is responsible for the implementation and results? Thus, 
negotiations between both parties have resulted in debates on ownership, project 
selection, decision-making, democracy, transparency and accountability issues.
On this basis, it has been argued that migrant groups and hometown associations’ 
participation in government matching funds programmes has given them a political 
voice (Burgess 2005). In particular, migrant leaders and presidents of hometown
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associations gain exposure and experience dealing with politicians and government 
representatives, which also strengthens their negotiation skills. For instance, Rivera- 
Salgado and his associates show how hometown associations’ economic participation 
in ‘3 for 1’ or ‘4 for V state programmes have helped them gain increasing political 
leverage in their communities of origin (2005). On the other hand, it has been 
pointed out that collective remittances can foster political clientelism and 
corporatism across borders (Goldring 2002) and, more often than not, can exclude 
recipient communities from decision-making processes (Garcia Zamora 2007). 
Evidence has been presented to show that matching fund programmes are indeed 
politicized. Given the tripartite character of the programme, party label does matter 
when deciding projects and allocating resources. Between 2002 and 2006, a period in 
which there was a PAN federal government, PAN-govemed states and municipalities 
were more likely to participate in the 3X1 programme and localities with larger PAN 
and PRD support were more prone to receive more funds than their PRI counterparts 
(Aparicio and Meseguer 2008).
However, coupled with their political bias, remittances matching funds programmes 
have placed migrants and migrant groups at the centre of the re-emergence of party 
politics. As I will show in this thesis, collective remittances have been a determinant 
of the extension of migrant political rights in the country and, in particular, the 
implementation of migrant political participation formulas at the sub-national level. 
The latter, a distinctive feature of emigrant political participation in Mexico. As 
remittances matching programmes are expanded to other Mexican migrant sending 
states, more migrant groups and hometown associations feed their demands for ‘no
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taxation without representation’ by often referring to their participation in ‘3X1’ 
programmes.
To sum up, whilst the growing literature presented here provides useful insights into 
migrants’ political and economic ties with their communities of origin and the 
politics of translocality, it is, nonetheless, mainly grass-roots agency oriented. This, 
in turn, gives theoretical priority to the role of migrants and informal forms of 
transnational political participation (such as their membership in HTA’s). Thus, in 
my analysis of the adoption of migrant political rights, this literature is useful to 
explain migrants’ involvement in campaigning for political rights at home and their 
justifications, but it does not provide the other side of the story; that is to say, an 
explanation why state actors would respond to those demands for inclusion and 
membership and which political context would guarantee their approval.
2.1 .2 . Political transnationalism and the role of the state of origin
As political transnationalism has been mainly studied through the lens of migrants 
and migrant groups, there is a tendency to view the role of the home country and 
domestic actors as secondary. The problem with this is that it overlooks the fact that 
governments and their policies define membership into the nation and ultimately 
decide who belongs and has a political voice in the country’s internal affairs. In the 
introductory article of the special issue on ‘transnationalism’ published in 1999 by 
the Journal of Ethnic and Racial studies (1999), Portes, Guranizo and Landolt 
maintained that ‘for methodological reasons, we deem it appropriate to define that 
the individual and his/her support networks as the proper unit of analysis in this
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area’. In recent years, however, a number of transnationalist studies have 
increasingly tried to acknowledge the role of the state as a key actor in the 
development of transnational linkages and the construction of a transnational space 
(Smith R. 1997; Smith R. 1998; Itzigsohn 2000; Smith R. 2001; Levitt and de la 
Dehesa 2003; Levitt and Nyberg-Sorensen 2004; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004). In 
particular, through the formulation of various programmes and consular and 
domestic policies. This perspective has evolved from the notion of a 
‘deterritorialized’ nation-state envisaged by Basch et al in the early 1990’s. Recent 
research questions the post-national discourse on de-territorialization as it contradicts 
the logic of national sovereignty and overestimates the power that states have to 
impact their citizens abroad, who have, at least momentarily, accepted to live under 
another state’s rules.
Thus, a group of transnational scholars have proposed a distinction between the 
political strategies employed by migrant groups and the sending state. Goldring’s
(2002) study of the reformulation of the Mexican state-migrants relation and the 
policy shift towards the incorporation of the Mexican expatriate community during 
the Salinas and Zedillo administrations identifies ‘migrant-led’ versus ‘state-led’ 
transnationalist processes. He defines state-led transnationalism as ‘institutionalized 
national policies and programmes that attempt to expand the scope of a national 
state’s political, economic, social and moral regulation to include emigrants and their 
descendants outside the national territory’ (Goldring 2002). Guamizo (1997), for 
instance, advocates the notion of ‘transnationalism from below’ to refer to the grass­
roots initiatives by immigrants and their home country counterparts and
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‘transnationalism from above’ to explain the efforts carried out by institutional actors 
such as states and multinational corporations.
My study of the institutionalisation of migrants’ political participation in Mexico 
illustrates, however, that migrant political rights’ negotiations involve a complex 
process that cannot be viewed from a dichotomous perspective. Instead, empirical 
evidence shows how migrant leaders and migrant organisations tend to form 
coalitions with certain political parties when this would guarantee the legal 
endorsement of their political participation and representation in their country or 
place of origin. At the same time, migrant leaders continuously swing from positions 
in the migrant civil society sector, as well as within state institutions and political 
parties in both countries. Thus, when migrant political rights are implemented it is 
the result of both dynamics that continuously overlap and nourish one another and as, 
I demonstrate have as a consequence the extension of Mexican political institutions 
to reach out to Mexicans abroad and with it the enlargement of the state apparatus 
and bureaucracy in the form of consular service in the neighbouring country.
State-focused transnationalist studies have also attempted to distinguish the new state 
policies of sending countries towards their communities living abroad (Smith R. 
1997; Goldring 1998; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Gamlen 2006). As it has been 
identified, these new policies aim at maintaining links and encourage a sense of 
membership and loyalty without imposing a need to return. Previously, state efforts 
focused on trying to reach out to expatriates encouraging or facilitating return to their 
homeland, or simply offering protection from human rights abuses. In his extensive 
work in transnational practices, Smith classifies the former as ‘global nations
policies’ and the latter as ‘homeland policies’ (Smith R. 1997; see also Levitt and de 
la Dehesa 2003). Goldring (1998) makes a similar distinction between ‘policies of 
introversion’, which extend protection to temporary residents in the US and ‘policies 
of extension’, which extend protection to settled migrant communities and thus 
redefine membership in the country of origin (Goldring 1998). Gamlen, on the other 
hand, offers a classification of what he refers to as ‘diaspora engagement policies’ 
into different sub-groups, such as those policies that aim at building up ‘capacity’ or 
the appropriate environment to cultivate cross-border practices; for instance, 
symbolisms used by the country of origin to gain the appreciation and trust of the 
expatriate community and institutions created to facilitate those exchanges. He also 
distinguishes what forms part of emigrants’ citizenship practices such as the 
extension of rights (political, civic and social) and the demand of obligations, mainly 
related to the transfer of fiscal and financial assistance to the country of origin or 
lobbying the country of reception to advance the home country’s interests (2006).
Although these distinctions have been useful to highlight a new practice among 
sending countries as well as to reflect an increasingly widespread beneficial view on 
emigration also supported at the international level by UN discourses (United 
Nations 14-15 September 2006). Some of the terminology employed, such as ‘global 
nation’ and ‘policies of extension’, fails to convey the real intentions behind the 
adoption of such policies. The case of Mexico where migrants’ political 
participation, albeit limited, has been institutionalised at the federal and local levels, 
shows how certain policies and reforms are not the result of one single actor, the 
state, that aims at extending or constructing a global nation. Instead, in a post-PRI 
authoritarian era, new and increasingly autonomous actors have emerged or
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undergone significant transformations -  such as state institutions, federal and state 
governments, political parties, media and public opinion and civil society. In this 
respect, their motivations to incorporate the migrant population are diverse, but 
mainly aim at advancing their particular economic and political interests at home. It 
is, however, in this new context of democratic contestation in Mexico that migrant 
leaders and their organisations have found a window of opportunity to put forward 
their demands for political inclusion and participation.
Thus, this thesis attempts to re-vindicate the role of the political process within 
nation-states towards their populations abroad. By analysing particular domestic laws 
on migrant political participation both at the national and sub-national levels I 
attempt to further uncover the interaction of domestic political actors and external 
players such as migrant groups at the different levels of government (national and 
state level). One of the main arguments put forward here is that the formation of a 
cross-border coalition between US-based migrant groups and non-PRI parties is the 
main trigger for the adoption of a migrants’ political rights bill. In this way, I follow 
a similar line of work as Itzigsohn in his study of political transnationalism among 
migrants from Dominican Republic, Haiti and El Salvador, and Peggy Levitt et al in 
Brazil, Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, as they do not take the role of the 
state as a single variable, but instead look into the role of the distinct domestic actors 
(2000; 2003).
Therefore, to examine how the Mexican state has adopted legal reforms to allow 
migrants’ political participation at home and their implications, it is necessary to use 
an instituted process perspective that provides the framework for analysing the
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different stages in which such initiatives are debated, negotiated and implemented. 
Thus, it is necessary to look into how migrant politics affect Mexico’s processes of 
democratic contestation which take place unevenly within the country. Here, a pure 
transnational perspective cannot fully and satisfactorily explain how policies on 
migrants’ political participation are formulated and implemented within a changing 
Mexican state, or how the extension of political membership coincides with 
processes of struggle and contestation that have characterised Mexico’s pattern of 
democratization.
2.2. Mexico’s pattern of democratization and migrant 
politics
We should, in turn, look into Mexico’s pattern of democratization to explain why the 
Mexican political system has reframed the terms for membership to the Mexican 
nation -  not only in terms of who is included and excluded from this membership, 
but also how this membership has been translated into the legal language. The move 
towards the inclusion of 28 million Mexicans and the attempt to return them to the 
category of Mexican citizens marks, directly or indirectly, a new dimension in the 
country’s democratic sphere.
However, first of all, it is important to view Mexico’s pattern of democratization as a
multidimensional set of structures. As Whitehead mentions we need not a fixed
concept, but instead a ‘floating but anchored’ conception of democracy (Whitehead
2003, p.3). In this way, democratization is understood as a process not entirely
defined by a fixed goal -  for instance, the ‘two turnover test’, which refers to two
successive peaceful transfers of government between contending parties after the exit
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of an authoritarian regime -  but rather by a complex and fluid process, which leads 
towards the implementation of strong democratic institutions, a trustworthy electoral 
system, a consistent set of legal reforms and the enactment of the rule of law which 
would favour a more participative political environment (Whitehead 2003). This 
way, the actual people play a key role in the democratization movement. As 
Whitehead mentions ‘before a democratic transition can begin there must be a 
political community receptive to democratic aspiration’ (Whitehead 2003, p.65). The 
move towards the perception of the Mexican migrant population in the United States 
as a significant political actor reinforces the view that the re-definition of national 
membership and citizenship are key components in Mexico’s democratic transition. 
As it has been noted, citizenship is intrinsically bound with democracy (in its liberal 
version), in which, as Falk rightly asserts, the more democracy the better quality of 
citizenship and vice versa (Falk 1994).
Many studies from the pre-democratization era in Mexico demonstrate that most 
emigration policy was undertaken by the chief executive and his close advisors 
(Corwin 1978; Garcia 1980; Morales 1981). However, as I will illustrate, the gradual 
and uneven fading of the PRI hegemony and the once-seen ‘perfect’ authoritarian 
rule have led to the emergence of new social actors (political parties and new interest 
groups) that are able to have an impact, albeit to a certain extent, on the outcome of 
emigration policies. In addition, emigration policy and law making are distancing 
from the apex of the national executive to take place in local governments and 
legislatures, as well as being discussed in public forums amongst expatriate 
communities in the US. Thus, this represents a move from interpreting Mexican 
emigration policies from a 'state-centric' perspective to a limited pluralist approach.
In this way, the passage of constitutional reforms and electoral laws that extend 
political rights to Mexican migrants have been proposed, supported and negotiated 
within a context of a democratic transition unfolding in Mexico. The relation 
between Mexican political actors and the Mexican expatriate population in the US 
changed dramatically after the 1988 presidential election (Fitzgerald, p. 526), in 
which the PRI’s Carlos Salinas de Gortari was granted the victory over the centre-left 
opposition candidate and PRI defector Cuauhtemoc Cardenas under widespread 
suspicious of fraud and corruption (Von Sauer 1992). Cuauhtemoc Cardenas -  the 
son of the most deified post-revolutionary president, Lazaro Cardenas -  had much 
support amongst the Mexican migrant communities in the US after he campaigned in 
California and Chicago, encouraging migrant supporters to advise their relatives and 
friends back home to vote for him in exchange for dual nationality rights and the 
right to vote from abroad (Jones-Correa 2000).
It is claimed that Cardenas’ support amongst Mexican circles in the US prompted the 
PRI national government to reformulate its policy towards Mexicans abroad (Dresser 
1993). On the other hand, however, I would also argue that Mexicans in the US 
represented an ideal ally in the implementation of the neo-liberal economic project 
that Salinas had in mind. At the turn of a political transition, migration policies and 
laws have been decided not only because of political concerns, but also increasingly 
because of their economic implications. The administration of PRI President Salinas 
(1988-94) targeted for the first time working-class migrants and Mexican Americans 
through innovative policies and programmes (Fitzgerald 2004). His successor and 
last PRI president after more than 70 years of the party’s continuous rule, Ernesto
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Zedillo Ponce de Leon (1994-2000), went even further by supporting the dual 
nationality laws passed by the federal congress in 1996 which allowed Mexicans to 
maintain their Mexican nationality even if they adopted a new one (constitutional 
reform to Art 30, 32 and 37). Also, that same year an electoral reform permitted 
Mexicans citizens to vote outside their electoral district (reform to Art. 36), which 
opened up the possibility of extending the franchise to Mexicans abroad.
Although the next chapter outlines in more depth this policy shift towards the 
Mexican community in the US, it is important to note that even though policies 
adopted by PRI’s Salinas’ and Zedillo’s administrations acknowledged the 
significance of the Mexican expatriate community in the US for the country’s 
economic and political development and efforts were carried out to secure their 
economic rights in their home country, migrants’ political rights remained curtailed. 
At the national level, it was not until the PRI lost the majority of seats in the national 
congress when legal initiatives to secure the vote abroad were proposed -  mostly by 
the opposition (centre-left PRD and PAN) (Perez Godoy 1998). It was also not until 
Mexico experienced a change of national government in the year 2000 with the 
historical victory of PAN’s Vicente Fox, that the right to vote from abroad for 
presidential elections became one of the main issues for legislative debate and was 
then finally approved in 2005. Similarly, the negotiation and approval of migrants’ 
political rights bills at the sub-national level have taken place in migrant sending 
states where there has been a change of government and a centre-left PRD local 
government has been elected with significant presence in the legislature. However, 
as in the case of Michoacan and Zacatecas where not a single party holds the 
absolute majority in the local congress, migrants’ political rights bills are subject to
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intense negotiation. That is not to say that the institutionalisation of migrants’ 
political rights in Mexico is the consequence of a change of national government, but 
instead it has been facilitated by all the changes that have accompanied the gradual 
and uneven fading of the PRI hegemony. In this way, the adoption of different forms 
of migrant political rights adds to the fast increasing number of constitutional 
reforms and new electoral laws that attempt to set up the new rules of the game in 
‘Mexico democratico ’ (democratic Mexico).
Thus, we should perhaps reformulate our question as why when a regime is 
undergoing change, do political and social actors with different motivations and 
interests reach agreement on the need to extend political rights to previously 
excluded social groups? Also, why would they do so to incorporate a social group 
that is not present within the boundaries of the state? The extension of political rights 
to include those citizens that live past the boundaries of the state adds a significant 
dimension in the study of democratizations within the contemporary context. 
Scholars such as T. H. Marshall, Mann, Rokkan and B. Turner have debated the 
extension of political citizenship rights in democratizing nations mainly in the 
European context (Marshall 1950; Rokkan, with Campbell et al. 1970; Mann 1987; 
Turner 1993). However, there have not been any attempts to understand how, in 
recent years, countries that go through democratization processes ultimately decide 
to grant political rights to nationals that do not live within the territory of the state. In 
addition, there has not been any systematic study on how migrant politics in Mexico 
affects democratization processes in the country.
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I would argue that the extension of political rights to non-resident citizens is in 
significant part the result of sending state’s reactions to economic globalisation and 
transnationalisation processes and, simultaneously, to internal political 
transformations. At the same time as the Mexican state undergoes a democratic 
transition, like other countries in the Latin American region, it has had to deal with 
the economic and political consequences of emigration within a globalised context. 
As we have seen, most Latin American countries that have implemented ‘dual 
nationality laws’ and migrants’ voting rights, have done so at a time when they have 
undertaken a democratic transition or a radical reformulation of their political 
system, as well as adapted to the requirements of the global economy. Even in the 
case of Colombia, the Latin American country that adopted these policies much 
earlier, it did so at a time when there was a reformulation of the notion of the ‘nation’ 
as Hazan suggests (2001). To put it another way, during times when the nation has 
experienced the reconstruction of the political project, which would occur due to 
either/or simultaneous internal ideological struggles and ongoing democratization 
processes, the question of who gets to participate in the formulation of the ‘nation’ 
becomes of paramount importance.
Thus, the creation of strong democratic institutions and competitive politics are the 
minimum requirements to set up the participative political environment necessary for 
the debate on who gets to belong to the ‘nation’. What Mexico has experienced 
since the late 1980’s is a gradual and uneven dismantling of the old political order, 
which mainly consisted in the hegemony of a single political party (the PRI) and the 
concentration of authority in one institution -  the presidency -  that monopolised the 
other legislative organs in policy-making process. The continuous endurance of this
system was guaranteed by an institutionalised mechanism for power transfer which 
involved no re-election, but instead the president’s appointment of his successor {‘el 
dedazo’), as well as a fa?ade of liberal-democratic institutions and control of the 
labour sector through state-corporatist associations which impeded the formation and 
participation of opposition groups (Lawson 2000). What a democratic transition in 
Mexico has meant, amongst many other things, is not only the revival of political 
parties and an increasing presence of civil society organisations and interest groups, 
but also the transformation of the roles of the presidency and the legislative 
chambers. Although the president still retains significant influence, the policy and 
law making process has returned to the legislature. However, in contrast to other 
Latin American countries where there has been an expansion of political rights to 
residents abroad, in Mexico the institutionalisation of emigrant political participation 
has also taken place at the sub-national level. In the case of Mexico, the renewal of 
federalism has meant that local governments have been able to gain more autonomy 
over local issues and to address them with local policy solutions, as illustrated in the 
cases of Zacatecas and Michoacan.
For the approval of migrants’ political rights, thus, the existence of a democratic 
political system has been necessary in which different and autonomous actors could 
express their views and be able to negotiate, even if they do so only according to 
their own interests. As Sara Schatz mentions in the case of Mexico ‘democratization, 
as an emergent form of political authority, accelerates when multiple social actors 
with different motives (possessing simultaneous ethical, political, utilitarian, and 
instrumental dimensions) are able to agree’ (Schatz 2000, p.98). The remarkable 
feature of the negotiations on migrants’ political rights, at the national and sub­
national level, in which not only the Mexican government and migrant groups have 
been involved, but also civil society groups, domestic political parties as well as the 
media and public opinion, is that they have taken place in a transnational political 
space, that is to say, they have involved actors and their interests from both sides of 
the border.
In line with the conflict theory perspective in democratization studies (Przeworski 
1986 and Schmitter and Karl 1994 p. 174), that is the view that social actors are 
unpredictable, but their movements are guided by the maximisation of their interests, 
I show how adopted migrants’ political rights bills in the national and sub-national 
scenarios have been the result of the minimum common denominator of the main 
actors’ immediate political and economic objectives (such as votes and remittances), 
mediated by the importance that this issue has had on public opinion. In other words, 
the different political participants in these processes provide support for migrants’ 
political rights’ bills only when this matches their motivations and particular 
interests. Yet, it is difficult to predict their political behaviour and strategy due to the 
importance that this issue has played in bi-national public opinion.
In contrast to other studies that have analysed law and policy making processes in 
Mexico in the new democratic era (Nacif 2005; Nacif March 2003), my study of 
migrants’ political rights offers the first institutional study that takes into 
consideration not only domestic actors, that is to say, the role of government, 
political parties, public opinion, media and civil society groups, but also it places 
emphasis on the increasing political leverage of migrant organisations, which is the 
main point of departure of transnationalist studies. Populations abroad have also been
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significant democratizing forces, although it has not been possible to assess to what 
extent they have had an impact at home. The history of democratization indicates, 
however, that pressures for greater democracy more often than not emerge from 
oppositional civil society and very rarely from the state itself. This study, thus, 
considers migrant leaders and migrant groups as an autonomous actor in law and 
policy making processes in Mexico and shows how through their transnational 
political strategies they have been able to influence domestic policy and law making 
processes in Mexico within both ‘transnational’ and ‘translocal’ contexts.
2.3. Towards a model of migrant politics in Mexico
As we have seen, both the transnational approach and democratization theories offer 
us important tools to understand why Mexico as a country of origin extends political 
membership to Mexicans abroad from afar and over the long term. On the one hand, 
transnational studies on the Mexican case point at the importance of the size and 
organisation of the migrant community and the interest of government and political 
party actors in gaining migrants’ political and economic support. However, the 
transnationalist perspective focuses on the role of migrants and migrant groups in the 
reformulation of Mexican state-society relations by asserting claims of membership, 
but it does not succeed in clarifying the role of domestic actors and the dynamics 
behind their support for granting political rights to residents abroad.
On the other hand, the component of democratization theories relating to the ever- 
increasing proportion of the population becoming involved in the process of decision 
making tells us why political participation in post-authoritarian Mexico requires the
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involvement of previously excluded social groups. New political actors during a 
regime change establish the new rules of the game in the form of constitutional 
reforms and electoral laws that might include some and exclude others, but it falls 
short in acknowledging how the formulation of new rules of political participation 
might be affected by non-resident social groups and what are the effects of the 
extension of political membership to groups abroad on the incipient democratic 
system. Also, accompanying decentralization processes have given increasing 
autonomy to sending states (‘estados ’), which are able to pursue unique policies and 
constitutional reforms that extend political membership to their populations abroad 
independently from the position of the federal government and national legislation. 
Thus, the institutionalisation of Mexican migrants’ political incorporation has varied 
according to uneven democratization and decentralization processes. Figure 1.1 
shows the main actors in the politics of migrant citizenship both at the nation and 
sub-national levels.
Figure 2.1 Main ac to rs in th e  politics of m igrant citizenship
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Therefore, this thesis contributes to both transnationalism approaches to migrant 
political participation in their home country and democratization theories’ accounts 
for the extension of political membership in the light of recent constitutional and 
electoral reforms in Mexico. By using the transnationalist approach from a political 
science standpoint I am able to contextualise the policy making dynamics in Mexico 
concerning the political rights of Mexican migrants. I show how certain migrant 
groups have been created for strictly political purposes and serve as catalysts for 
political change by lobbying for reforms in national (the Senate and Chamber of 
Deputies) and local congresses. Migrant groups per se, however, are not responsible 
for the approval of migrants’ rights bills, which also depend on a context of political 
change and a divided government.
As a result, this study adds a new dimension to democratization processes in Mexico 
by showing to what extent policy making dynamics have altered under a divided 
government. It shows how in early stages of democratization the position of the 
different political actors is often unpredictable. However, two points are evident, 
political spaces have opened up for the participation of new social groups such as the 
migrant lobby and a more independent media. Secondly, ‘los estados’ (states) have 
become more independent to be able to approach local issues differently from the 
national government. As figure 1.2 shows there are mainly three conditions that 
secure the approval of a migrant’s rights bill, these are: 1) the economic and political 
impact of migrant organisations and the creation of strong state institutions to serve 
them; 2) a change of government and the absence of an absolute majority in the 
legislative; and 3) an eventual cross-border political coalition between migrant 
groups and a non-PRI political party.
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Table 2.1 Determinants of the adoption of migrant political rights in Mexican sending states
Non-change of 
government
Change of government and 
divided government; 
existence of state 
institutions to cater 
migrant population
Strong presence of US- 
based migrant 
organisations in economic 
and political developments
No change; lobbying ag a in st 
governm ent (i.e. O axaca)
Form ation of cross-border 
political coalitions and  
ex tension  of m igrant political 
rights (i.e. Z a c a te c a s  and 
M ichoacan)
No strong presence of US- 
based migrant 
organisations
No ch an g e  (i.e. Hidalgo) No ch an g e; leads to the 
organisation  of m igrants (i.e. 
S an  Luis Potosi)
Own elaboration
Thus, the main actors in this study are federal and local governments, political 
parties, migrant organisations and public opinion affected by both mainstream and a 
transnational media. I now briefly describe each of these actors and their role in 
migrant politics.
Federal and local governments
The weakening of the federal executive and the dismissal of presidentialism in 
contemporary Mexico has meant that local governments have gained more 
independence from the federal government to develop their own rules and laws, 
albeit to a certain extent. As Lawson describes: ‘democratization has not been a 
homogenous process. It has been different across regions or levels of government’ 
(Lawson 2000). Federal and local governments are then used in this analysis as 
single actors that play a key role in defining the notion of ‘home’ and setting the 
boundaries of citizenship within their own jurisdictions. Ultimately, sending states 
(‘estados ’) are the ones that feel more directly the effects of individual and collective
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remittances and negotiate infrastructure or development projects with migrant leaders 
and representatives of migrant organisations. At the same time, migrant groups in the 
form of hometown associations seem to test primarily their influence in local politics, 
as it responds to their primary attachment, where they might still maintain kinship 
and friendship networks. I argue that the unevenness of the transnationalisation of the 
political system in Mexico (taking into account only those states that experience 
emigration) responds directly to both different degrees of democratization and, on 
the other hand, to the local effects of international migration and historical exposure 
to sustained emigration flows.
Political parties
The prohibition of re-election in consecutive terms in the Mexican constitution 
strengthens the importance of the role of political parties in policy and law making 
dynamics in Mexico’s new multiparty democracy. Mexican politicians have to rely 
on the party label to advance their own careers, which might also result in the 
coherence of political motivations at the party level. On the other hand, however, 
during the democratic transition, common disagreements and conflicting positions on 
relevant issues, as well as the lack of a consistent party’s project have often led most 
Mexican political parties to experience internal fracture and ruptures. For instance, 
during the 2006 presidential elections, two different strands of the PRI party could be 
identified, each one supporting different potential candidates (see chapter 4). 
Similarly, during the change of leadership of the PRD party in 2008, a number of old 
and new streams emerged such as the ‘Nueva Izquierda’ (New Left), ‘Izquiera 
Unida’ (United Left), ‘Foro Nuevo Sol’ (New Sun Forum), iCorriente de Izquierda
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Democratica' (Democratic Left Stream), ‘Los Civicos’ (the Civic) and ‘Grupo de 
Accion Politica’ (Group of Political Action) (Palma and Balderas 2008).
As it has been suggested in various country studies in Latin America, opposition 
parties play an important role in the inclusion of the migrant population (Itzigsohn 
2000; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003). It is becoming a common practice for political 
parties in many Latin American countries to court for migrants’ financial support and 
votes abroad and to open chapters in various American cities with high numbers of 
migrant supporters. The case of Mexico does not differ in this regard. The PRI 
opposition to establish formal forms of migrant political participation, disguised in 
many rhetorical statements in support of migrants rights, was publicly known (Smith 
R. 1998; Goldring 2002; Escobar April 2004). However, efforts by the centre-left 
PRD and the PAN to materialise migrant political inclusion are less well 
documented.
Migrant organisations
In the case of Mexico, although most migrant organisations emerged first as meeting
points for Mexican expatriate communities in different US cities, later they became
transnational organisations with a fundraising capacity in the US that could support
public-related works in their local communities in Mexico (Itzigsohn 2000;
Moctezuma Longoria 2001; Goldring 2002; Fitzgerald 2004; Orozco and Lapointe
2004; A. Portes 2005; Rivera-Salgado, Bada et al. 2005; Caglar 2006; Williams
January 2004). Apart from their social role in the country of reception, the
transnational character of migrant groups and hometown associations has
increasingly made them act as intermediaries between the migrant communities and
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the state of origin. However, it was not until this new millennium that federations of 
hometown associations actually opened political branches. As I will show, the 
political arms of well-established Federations such as the Zacatecan and Michoacano 
have been decisive actors in the approval of migrants’ political rights in those 
Mexican states, as well as the ‘Coalition por los Derechos Politicos de los 
Mexicanos en el Exterior’ in the adoption of the vote abroad bill for presidential 
elections. Migrant groups, I argue, fulfil a central role in involving migrant 
communities in (mainly local) political affairs in the country of origin.
In contrast to the way that transnational advocacy networks operate, which according 
to the analysis of Keck, M. and Skkink, K. consists of a “boomerang” approach, in 
which civil society campaigns can get rid of authoritarian regimes or advance their 
own goals and interests by reaching out across borders and use international pressure 
to open up the domestic political space (1998; 2002), that is, forming partnerships 
with local civil society, governments and international institutions which multiply 
their chances of advancing their goals. The advocacy networks of migrant groups, 
on the other hand, rely on both US-based members, as well as those that can be 
physically present in Mexico; however, their campaigns are put forward from both 
fronts. In Mexico, by lobbying legislators and other political figures, whilst in the 
US, by coordinating with the various Spanish-language media and keeping the 
migrant community aware of their campaign progress in Mexico.
Although I consider migrant organisations as transnational political actors in my 
study, it is important not to see them as a homogenous political block with the same 
interests and motivations. The Mexican migrant population in the US encompasses
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diverse racial/ethnic categories, class positions, sexualities and forms of state 
authorization for entering the US. As this study shows, interests actually diverge 
clearly between certain Mexican migrant groups and Mexican-American or Latino 
groups, which became evident, in particular, during the debate for migrants’ political 
rights in Mexico (see chapter 4).
Mainstream and transnational media and bi-national public opinion 
Public opinion on the political incorporation of Mexicans abroad has been shaped by 
two different types of media: mainstream and transnational. The former relates to the 
changing role of mass media in Mexico whereas the latter refers to Spanish-language 
media that can be simultaneously reproduced across both sides of the border, albeit at 
the local level.
The emergence of independent media in Mexico has not been total and remains far
from democratic -  monopolies, corruption and other legacies of the old-regime still
exist. However, increasingly, media in Mexico is being used by both government
officials and civic activists to advance their goals. As Lawson mentions ‘government
officials are keenly aware of the need to “sell” their policies through the media.
Likewise, most civic activists seem to understand that calling attention to their causes
through the media is one of the best ways to influence officials and effect change’
(Lawson 2004, p.398). The mass media has played a crucial role in the debate on
migrants’ political inclusion by bringing home the image of the Mexican migrant in
the US. In the last decade, the nightly news have brought images of how those
Mexicans abroad live and express their Mexican identity through the celebration of
various national days, just in the same way as their home counterparts. National
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newspapers, for example, have dedicated sections for migration issues (i.e. the 
national newspaper ‘La Jornada ’). Also, the Mexican media has been able to awaken 
the sympathy of those that stayed behind by showing images of the human rights 
abuses that have taken place in the frontier. For instance, the case of the televised 
episode of a woman being beaten by border patrol police in Riverside, California in 
1996 (see Fernandez de Castro 1997).
Transnational media, on the other hand, relies largely on local media to transmit 
information on migration issues simultaneously in Mexican communities in the US 
and in their communities of origin in Mexico (for more on transnational media or 
migrants' media see Harold Riggins 1992; Georgiou and Silverstone 2007). It 
mainly consists of Spanish-language television channels broadcast in both countries, 
radio stations that can be heard simultaneously both sides of the border, as well as 
Spanish-language newspapers that are published in American cities with a high 
concentration of Mexican immigrants. Transnational media and Spanish-language 
publications in the US have been frequently directly used by migrant political rights 
activists to raise awareness of their claims and raise support amongst the Mexican 
communities in the US. Also, important channels of communication such as ‘MX Sin 
Fronteras’ have been created by prominent migrant leaders and migrants’ political 
rights supporters.
The next chapter offers a historical perspective regarding how the Mexican state has 
responded to the continuous flow of people for more than a hundred years. In 
particular, it identifies the distinct phases in Mexican emigration policy and shows 
how the contemporary period beginning in 1988 marks a change in the Mexican
80
state’s relationship with its diaspora, by implementing policies and programmes that 
aim at re-creating and strengthening bonds with Mexican communities abroad 
without necessarily implying a need of return. This turn in emigration policy has 
converged with Mexico’s internal changes due to democratization processes, as well 
as the country’s insertion in the global economy and increased economic integration 
with the US through the signing of the NAFTA and migrants’ remittances.
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Chapter 3
3. Policy antecedents and current state initiatives on 
migrant citizenship
‘We have been known as ‘braceros', traitors, ‘p o c h o s but now they know us as 
‘paisanos” (‘neighbouring brothers’) (cited in Lizarzaburu 2004). ... ‘Now we are 
powerful enough to make a difference’ (unstructured interview, July 2006). These 
remarks made by Guadalupe Gomez, a Mexican migrant worker in the United States 
and director of the ‘Federation de Clubes Zacatecanos ’ (umbrella organisation for 
Zacatecan hometown associations), illustrates how the Mexican state perspectives 
towards migrants have changed dramatically in the last few years. The history of 
Mexican emigration to the US is exceptional, not only in terms of the numbers and 
reasons causing it, but also by the economic, political, social and cultural 
consequences it has brought for both countries bordering the Rio Bravo9 (See Annex 
2 for descriptive statistics on Mexico-US migration over history). In particular, 
Mexico, after the experience of nearly 150 years of continuous exodus, faces a reality 
in which its physical national borders are being tested as its social, political and 
economic spaces stretch out to include those ‘paisanos * abroad.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the posture of the Mexican state in the face 
of this continuous flow of nationals since 1848, the year marked by the American 
annexation of parts of Mexico and the establishment of a new legal border between 
both countries. I argue that although the Mexican state has varied in response during
9 Also known as ‘Rio Grande’ in the United States
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different periods through history, the current phase starting in 1988, which is 
characterised by institutionalised efforts towards the economic, cultural and political 
participation of migrants from abroad, has no precedent. As I show, in no other 
period in Mexican history, has the state been actively involved in policies and 
activities to attempt to incorporate its migrant citizens in the cultural, social, 
economic and political life of the state; also, as it has already been pointed out, 
without necessarily imposing on them a permanent return to their homeland 
(Sherman 1999). The unique period, in which the Mexican state has concentrated in 
the creation of a nation that encompasses also those Mexicans residents in the US, 
only began in 1988 with the Salinas administration and was preceded according to 
most researchers by a long period of nationalist policies that focused mainly on the 
protection of Mexican citizens abroad. Another significant change in Mexican 
emigration policy in this new phase is that decision-making also takes place at 
legislative level, rather than only being decided by the executive (the president and 
his close advisors). Particularly, with the change of national government in the year 
2000, emigration policies and initiatives of ‘proximity’ have increasingly been 
formulated at the legislature and at the sub-national level of government.
We can, thus, identify four periods in which government approach towards 
emigration varied, given the different facets of the phenomenon in those times, such 
as: 1) Mexico’s loss of its Northern territory and ‘open border’ policy during 
revolutionary Mexico (1848-1910); 2) the ‘Great Repatriation’ period (1917-1932); 
3) the ‘Bracero’ programme (1942-1964) and 4) the ‘Pocho’ illegality phase (1964- 
1988). In this chapter, I provide a short account of the Mexican state policy 
responses to Mexico-US migration in these periods and explain how they differ from
the current pro-emigration government attitude and its well-defined and 
institutionalised initiatives on migrant political inclusion from abroad. Next, I 
examine how the 1996 constitutional reforms on dual nationality and the debate on 
migrant political participation have been the result of new economic imperatives in 
Mexico and the product of competitive politics, inexistent in Mexico before the 
democratic transition began in 1997, which have shifted the notion of ‘Mexicannnes’ 
from being territorially-based to one equivalent of membership.
As I show government behaviour for much of the 20th century pursued a nationalist 
emigration policy that mostly focused on migrant protection and was based on the 
belief that migratory movements to the North would only be temporary. In contrast, 
this current period is characterised by four main features. First, the degree of 
institutionalisation in state initiatives to incorporate Mexicans abroad without 
imposing a need to return. Second, these initiatives, programmes and legal reforms 
follow more directly an economic logic in the implementation of a neo-liberal 
project, as well as legitimising concerns of social inclusion prompted by a 
democratic transition. Third, in contrast to other periods in Mexican emigration, in 
which the executive and closer advisors where responsible for policy decisions, in 
the contemporary period, new social actors (such as US-based migrant groups and 
hometown associations) have been able to influence such initiatives. Finally, uneven 
democratization and decentralization processes, as well as the local impact of 
migrant lobby groups have given more independence to federal states to formulate 
their own initiatives and programmes towards their communities abroad.
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3.1. The history of Mexico-US migration and Mexico’s 
emigration policy
3.1.1. M exico’s loss of its Northern territory and ‘open border’ 
policy during revolutionary Mexico
We can trace back the beginning of the migration phenomenon to 1848, when 
Mexico not only lost half of its territory to the US, but also 75, 000 Mexican 
nationals (approximately 22 percent of the total population in the Southwest region) 
who were officially transformed into US citizens with the signing of the Guadalupe 
Hidalgo Treaty (McWilliams 1976; Morales 1981, p.59-60)10. Five years later, 
another part of the Mexican territory, lLa Mesilla’, was purchased. However, as 
Gomez signals, culture, traditions and language were among the things that the 
population bom in California, Arizona, Texas and New Mexico did not easily give 
up in the early years (Gomez and Zackrison 2003). Spanish was the most widely 
spoken language by the Mexican communities and they continued publishing their 
local newspapers in this language. They also kept practicing Catholicism and 
continued celebrating Mexican patriotic celebrations like ‘September, the 15th’ 
(Mexican Independence day) and ‘May, the 5th’ (the Battle of Puebla). Attracted by 
the similarity of cultures and physical proximity, Mexicans on the other side of the 
border continued migrating into these areas. This situation persisted up until the end 
of the Mexican revolution in 1921.
10. The Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty guaranteed Mexicans that lived in those territories equal rights according to 
the American constitution, also the right to exercise their religion and enjoy liberty and properties (Art. VIII, IX 
of the Guadalupe Hidalgo Treaty)
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Before the Mexican revolution began, the Mexican government had no interest in 
stopping Mexican nationals from emigrating to American lands. Especially during 
the Porfirio Diaz’s dictatorship (1876-1910), emigration was seen as a normal part of 
the free market’s functioning and also a moral right to return to the ‘lost territories’. 
In fact, up until the early 1920s, the Mexican-American border was not more than a 
theoretical notion, ‘Mexicans entered and left the United States at will, without 
passports’ (Yossi 1999-2000, p.673). In 1909, Porfirio Diaz and US President 
Howard Taft signed an agreement that authorised the movement of 1,000 Mexicans 
to work in plantations located in Nebraska and Colorado (Garcia y Griego 1983). In 
contrast to Diaz’s lack of formal policies on emigration, economic policies that 
aimed at the liberalisation of the market and expatriation of national lands were 
formulated by the dozens11. According to Hall and Coever, ‘by 1910, foreigners -  
mostly Americans -  owned about one-seventh of the land surface of Mexico’ (Hall 
and Coerver 1988, p. 12). Consular services together with Diaz’ business connections 
in the US, were simply used to spy on his exiled revolutionary opponents, most 
notably Francisco Madero and the Flores Magon brothers.
With the end of the revolution, the resulting government adopted a nationalist 
approach to emigration policy that was going to be maintained, albeit to a certain 
extent, by consecutive governments until 1988. Venustiano Carranza (1915-1920) 
made it clear that the Mexican government would not prohibit emigration which was
11 Land policies during the ‘Porfiriato’ were shaped by the Decree on Colonization and Demarcation Companies 
of 1883 and the Law on the Occupation and Alienation of Barren Lands of 1894. See Assies, W. ( 2008). "Land 
Tenure and Tenure Regimes in Mexico: An Overview." Journal of Aerarian Change 8(1): 33-63.
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indeed a right endorsed in the 1917 Constitution12 (Diario Oficial de la Federacion 5 
February 1917, Article 11), but would instead control it by favouring officially 
authorized emigration through contract protection and by simultaneously 
discouraging additional emigration flows through dissuasion campaigns. Thus, if 
migratory movements were to persist, the Mexican government would be in charge 
of the number of and conditions in which Mexican emigrants would work abroad, 
however, emigration would only be accepted on temporary basis. The 1917 
Constitution made it explicit that Mexicans wanting to undertake work abroad should 
have a written contract before leaving, stipulating minimum wage and maximum 
hours of work, the employer had also to cover for the worker’s health care and return 
costs to Mexico13 (Diario Oficial de la Federacion 5 February 1917, Article 123).
In line with this, Venustiano Carranza resisted the special American exceptions for 
contract labour in force during 1917 and 1921, when the neighbouring country 
unilaterally targeted Mexican labour to fill out jobs during the First World War14. 
The Mexican government attempted to prevent and control recruitment by 
representatives of American employers within the Mexican territory by insisting that 
Mexican labourers should have passports and contracts, often refusing the issuance
12 Article 11. ‘Everyone has the right to enter and leave the Republic, to travel through its territory and to change 
his residence without necessity of a letter o f security, passport, safe-conduct or any other similar requirement. 
The exercise of this right shall be subordinated to the powers of the judiciary, in cases o f civil or criminal 
liability, and to those o f the administrative authorities insofar as concerns the limitations imposed by the laws 
regarding emigration, immigration and public health of the country, or in regard to undesirable aliens resident in 
the country.’ 1917 Constitution.
13 Article 123, section A. XXVI. ‘Every labour contract made between a Mexican and a foreign employer must be 
notarized by a competent municipal authority and countersigned by the consul of the nation to which the worker 
intends to go, because, in addition to the ordinary stipulations, it shall be clearly specified that the expenses of 
repatriation shall be borne by the contracting employer’. 1917 Constitution.
14 In 1918 Mexican immigrants were also exempt from the 1917 Selective Service Act that forced foreigners to 
enrol in the US army
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of passports without the required documentation and setting up check points on the 
railways leading to the Northern frontier (Corwin 1978). Most of these efforts were 
in vain, by 1920, there were at least half a million Mexican settlers in the US not 
counting the number of Mexicans that were there before 1900, out of a Mexican 
population of 14.30 million people, that was 3.5 percent of the total population 
(Corwin 1978).
Public opinion in this new revolutionary order was important to avert further 
movements of Mexicans to the US. Mexican emigrants were not to be blamed for 
abandoning ‘la patria’ (fatherland), but instead they were perceived as victims of 
Mexican go-betweens or ‘coyotes’, or simply seduced by American wages. 
According to Corwin, the Mexican government made use of the press as well as 
emerging labour unions (i.e. Confederacion de Obreros Mexicanos (CROM)) to 
warn aspiring emigrants and their families of the dangers, as well as discrimination 
and exploitation that they could experience on the other side of the Rio Grande 
(Corwin 1978).
3.1.2. The ‘Great Repatriation’ and Mexico’s policy of return
As the Great Depression struck the US economy in the late 1920s and 1930s 
producing a major unemployment which peaked at 24.9 percent in 1933, the 
immigration context in this country became highly negative. The US Government 
substantially cut immigration into the country and on the other hand, immigrants 
became targets for discrimination and removals. In 1921 the US Congress passed the 
national origins based Quota Act aimed at limiting the migration of Jews, Southern
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and Eastern Europeans to the US. In 1924 this was modified to also ban all 
immigration from Asia (East Asians and Asian Indians). In California, in particular, 
government officials claimed that Mexican immigrants made up the majority of the 
California unemployed. White trade unions claimed that Mexican immigrants were 
taking jobs that should go to white men. Mexican immigrants in the US, as well as 
Mexican-Americans were openly targeted by President Herbert Hoover as a source 
of the great economic crisis of the 1920’s (Hoffman 1974). Mexican diplomacy was 
able to prevent a quota on Mexican nationals by agreeing to raise awareness of rising 
unemployment in the US, as well as the new threat of deportation penalties resulting 
from the Alien Registry Act passed by the American congress in March 1929. 
However, the Mexican government did not want permanent emigration of nationals, 
but rather it favoured a temporary workers’ scheme regulated though bilateral 
cooperation (Garcia y Griego 1992).
The American government of that time not only believed that Mexican emigrants 
increased competition with native workers for jobs, but it also feared that a large 
scale immigration would be one of the outcomes of the Mexican revolution -  as 
many Mexicans would flee the armed conflict and also as other potential migrants 
would take advantage of the unstable situation to get into the US via Mexico. The 
American government thus decided to carry out a large-scale deportation and to 
enforce greater control in the border zones. Between 1917 and 1932 the ‘Great 
Repatriation’ involved the return to Mexico of 150,000 Mexicans residing in Los 
Angeles, including many who had already become American citizens (Sanchez 1993, 
p. 120). In addition, in 1924 four mounted guards started to patrol 2,000 miles of the 
Mexican-American frontier. By 1930, however, the number of people of Mexican-
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origin had already reached more than 1.5 million, out of a total Mexican population 
of 17 million, which was almost 9 percent of the total Mexican population (Sanchez 
1993).
The response of the Mexican government during the ‘Great Repatriation’ was to 
retreat into its own territory (Gomez and Zackrison 2003). To come to the rescue of 
unemployed and destitute Mexicans was, as Garcia and Griego has put it, ‘a 
legitimating act by a nascent revolutionary state’ (Garcia y Griego 1992, p.88). The 
Mexican government undertook a policy approach towards its emigrants and 
Mexican-Americans that matched the interests of the American government. The 
government not only cooperated with its American counterpart in the repatriation of 
its nationals, but also formulated policies to discourage future emigration. The 
Mexican government particularly became eager to recover and integrate its Mexican 
sojourners. One of the outcomes of the revolution was to view Mexican rural 
migrants as potentially productive nationals who could modernize and transform the 
country and the nation. As Sherman argues ‘the primary goal of policy toward 
emigrants had to do with obtaining political legitimacy domestically at a time of 
major nation-building in the wake of the Revolution’ (Sherman 1999, p.840). In the 
most explicit sense, these efforts intensified during the administration of Obregon 
(1920-1924) and Calles (1924-1928).
A key component of Mexico’s policy on emigration in this period was the 
establishment of consular services for migrants to assist them against abuses and 
even help them to receive unemployment compensation, dismissal pay and casualty 
remuneration. According to Sherman the protection of migrants abroad became an
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official consular duty in 1916 with subsequent laws passed in 1923 and 1924 
(Sherman 1999, p.853). In 1920, President Alvaro Obregon (1920-1924) instituted 
among Mexican consulates the promotion of Spanish language and Mexican culture 
among its expatriates (Sanchez 1993). Obregon also sought to work in partnership 
with Mexican and Mexican-American organisations such as ‘Alianza 
Hispanoamericana’ with the purpose of preserving Mexican culture among Mexican 
communities in the US, as well as helping unemployed Mexican immigrants and 
providing assistance in voluntary returns (Cardoso 1980, p. 106). Mexican consuls, in 
turn, were encouraged to foster the creation of Honorary Commissions, whose role 
was to report any form of discrimination against Mexican workers in the US, as well 
as to carry out Mexican celebrations and other cultural activities (Cardoso 1980). 
Here again, the underlying message was to reinforce the view that labour migration 
should only take place for short periods, in which time the Mexican consulates would 
try to protect Mexican nationals abroad and organise cultural events to improve their 
social well-being until they returned home.
In order to convert Mexican returnees into productive nationals the state aimed at 
policies to subsidize and facilitate repatriation. Among them, Obregon’s government 
financed the return of an estimated 100,000 Mexicans (out of 400,000 Mexicans that 
expressed interest in returning) in 1921 (at a cost for the Mexican government of 
around $2.5 million) (Morales 1981). For most of the 1920’s the Mexican foreign 
ministry continued facilitating the resettlement of returnees and in 1930 created the 
Consultative Council on Migration. In 1932, the Migration Service of the 
Government Ministry created the National Repatriation Committee to raise money to 
aid and employ returnees; participants included members of the Government and
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Public Health ministries, organizations such as the Red Cross and the national 
chamber of commerce as well as private citizens. In 1936, Cardenas’ government 
(1934-1940) instituted a program of colonization of under-populated areas with 
expelled Mexicans (under the 1936 General Population Law). As Morales notes, a 
few colonies were created to receive the new arrivals such as the ‘18 de Marzo’ 
settlement located in Tamaulipas, which was one of the most successful. However, 
only 5 percent of returnees chose to settle in one of these planned colonies and most 
of them returned to their communities of origin (Morales 1981, p.94). At the same 
time, by 1939 there was an amendment to the Law of Nationality and Naturalisation 
to facilitate emigrants’ permanent return, which allowed those returning Mexican- 
born emigrants who had lost their Mexican nationality when acquiring the US 
citizenship to recover their Mexican nationality with the condition of re-establishing 
their residence in Mexico15. It is important to highlight that this legislation, however, 
did not apply to American-born descendents.
At the same time, the Mexican post-revolution government also tried to prevent more 
emigration through the formulation of federal and state policies (such as tax 
requirements), accompanied by an intense information campaign about the dangers 
and difficulties that Mexican workers would encounter in the US. Administrative 
measures were also employed to deter emigrant flows. New migration offices were 
opened inside busy train stations, which were common departure points in Mexico 
(such as Guanajuato, Sonora, Guadalajara, Monterrey and Coahuila) during the 
administrations of Obregon and Portes Gil (Cardoso 1980).
15 Reform to Article 27, Ley de Nacionalidad y Naturalizacion, 22/9/1939
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The media and general public opinion during the repatriation period also seemed to 
support the government’s attitude. Mexican newspaper editorials and even fiction 
books used emotive language to criticise the loss of Mexican citizens16. As Cardoso 
describes: ‘Editorial writers labelled expatriation as “suicidal” and “sterilizing and 
prejudicial” for Mexico’ (Cardoso 1980, p. 104). Most Mexican demographers such 
as Gilberto Loyo also emphasized the negative effects of Mexican emigration, which 
were against the nationalist goals of the Revolution. On the other hand, Manuel 
Gamio pointed out the benefits of temporary emigration in his two books ‘The 
Mexican Immigrant’ and ‘Mexican Immigration’. Nonetheless, what most Mexican 
scholars had in common was that once the new order of the revolution succeeded, it 
was going to bring enough jobs in the industry and agriculture and as a result 
Mexican workers would not have any incentive to emigrate (Cardoso 1980).
In contrast to other periods, during the ‘Great Repatriation’ the Mexican government 
and specifically the executive became policy active on the Mexico-to-US migration 
phenomenon. Scholars of Mexican emigration mention how the Mexican state 
between the 1920’s and early 1930’s took account of its Mexican emigres for the 
first time, as part of the need to re-formulate the Mexican nation after the revolution 
(Corwin 1978; Cardoso 1980; Garcia y Griego 1992; Sherman 1999; Cano and 
Delano 2005). Although, to be fully considered as Mexican those people not only 
had to maintain their loyalty to Mexico, as well as their language and culture, but 
also had to eventually return to their homeland. This approach changed dramatically 
with the implementation of the ‘bracero' programme in the 1940s, when once again 
the Mexican state lost sight of its Mexican nationals abroad.
16 Fiction books such as the short story ‘El Repatriado’ (The Expelled) by Rafael Munoz
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3.1 .3 . The ‘bracero* programme
The ‘bracero ’ programme, which began in 1942 and was renewed several times until 
1964 when it was finally unilaterally terminated by the US, was essentially a 
programme which recruited Mexican labourers mainly to work in the agricultural 
industry on a temporary basis (Bean 1990). The aim of the programme was to 
remedy the severe labour shortage that experienced the US during the Second World 
War. ‘Braceros' were also entitled to the rights of the Mexican 1917 Constitution as 
previously mentioned. According to Massey, 4.5 million Mexicans worked as 
‘braceros\  but perhaps many more crossed the border illegally in this period 
(Massey, Alarcon et al. 1987).
The reason why the Mexican government agreed on the implementation of the 
‘bracero programme’ was threefold. Firstly, the programme met the requirements of 
the Mexican government, in other words, it was a bilateral programme that would 
allow the Mexican government to have some control over migratory movements, as 
well as providing official protection to Mexican workers abroad and enforcing its 
temporary nature. In addition, it provided a safety valve to population growth and the 
effects of land reforms. Secondly, economic benefits such as workers’ remittances 
played an important part. This feature acquired even more importance during 
President Aleman’s (1946-1952) industrialization project, which involved less 
resources destined to rural areas from where most emigrants originated. Thus, the 
rural zones could benefit from braceros ’ remittances as well as human capital once 
they returned to their places of origin. Thirdly, the government of Avila Camacho 
(1940-1946) declared the war against the Axis Powers on May 22, 1942. Thus, the
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provision of Mexican workers to the Northern neighbour was seen as a way to 
cooperate in the war effort (Morales 1981, p.46).
Surprisingly enough, during the ‘bracero’ programme a period of inactivity and 
inattention to emigrants began. It was only in the first years of the programme that 
the Mexican government was willing to secure good working conditions for 
migrants, but as Mexicans continued to cross the border without an actual contract, 
government officials became increasingly disinterested. For instance, only seven 
months after the programme began, the Mexican government terminated the 
agreement citing as causes widespread discrimination against Mexicans and internal 
pressures against the treaty. Mexican authorities were able to re-negotiate the 
agreement securing better treatment of their co-nationals. In July 1943, the Mexican 
government also protested against discriminatory practices in the state of Texas 
against Mexicans and halted migration movements to this state under the ‘bracero 
programme’17.
By the 1950’s such measures vanished even though bracero workers continued being 
target of mistreatment and discrimination; the Mexican government did not devote 
enough resources to oversee the implementation and development of the programme 
and no governmental organization was created to deal with braceros’ claims. In 
contrast to previous years, the consular protection services decreased and even 
consuls were reluctant to get involved in the braceros’ issues. Moreover, illegal 
Mexican workers increasingly exceeded those contracted legally under the ‘bracero
17 It should be noted that Texas was not affected by these measures as employers were able to recruit illegal 
Mexicans that continued to cross the border.
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programme’. Between September 1942 and December 1947, 219,600 Mexicans 
were hired as braceros, but 372,922 undocumented Mexicans were apprehended by 
the US authorities during those years (Cornelius 1978, p.4). Thus, as illegal 
migration rapidly increased, the Mexican government became less interested in 
securing the workers’ rights of those who migrated without official approval (Garcia 
y Griego 1983). Public opinion also shifted from seeing emigrants as being subject 
to exploitation and widespread discrimination in the US to simply ignore the loss of 
nationals in the country. As Corwin mentions ‘(...) after 1954 the Mexican public 
shrugged its shoulders as if to say: “Let’em go, it’s no longer a national tragedy” 
(Corwin 1978, p. 186).
3.1.4. The ‘Pocho* Illegality Phase
After the US unilaterally terminated the ‘bracero programme’ in 1964, the migration 
phenomenon between the two neighbours became mainly undocumented, both as 
people continued to cross the border illegally to work and as an increasing number of 
Mexicans overstayed their work visas due to continued demand by US employers. It 
was also influenced by two events: firstly, the amendments to the American 
Immigration and Nationality Act, which among other things, abolished the national 
origins quota system and replaced it with a visa system with higher numbers and 
secondly, Mexico’s persistent and exacerbating poverty in certain regions. Between 
1960 and 1975, 700,000 Mexicans entered the US legally and anywhere from 1 to 6 
million crossed illegally. In 1970 there were 760,000 documented Mexican-born 
immigrants in the US and in 1980, there were 2,199,000 (Massey, Alarcon et al. 
1987, p.43; Sherman 1999, p.850).
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This period, which I term the ‘pocho’ illegality phase, from 1964 to 1988, was 
characterised by no salient state initiative involved in fostering links with nationals 
abroad apart from a few shallow intentions. It was a period when the view of 
Mexican emigrants as ‘pochos’ -  a derogative term which means that a Mexican 
migrant is neither Mexican nor American -  was envisaged not only by the general 
public, but also by the state. Jorge Castaneda attributes this attitude to the strong 
national self-confidence manifested in Mexico’s foreign policy in those years, when 
Mexico portrayed itself as an adherent to Third World causes and when foreign 
policy differences with the US became discernible (Castaneda 1988, p.58). In 
addition, Mexican elites wanted to avoid provoking retaliatory US intervention by 
becoming too involved in the affairs of their compatriots abroad.
Only in the 1970’s during President Luis Echeverria’s time in office (1970-1976) 
some attention was devoted to Mexican-Americans in the US. Echeverria was a 
fervent nationalist and left-wing social reformer, who became a prominent 
spokesman for Third World Countries (and the author of a far-reaching Charter of 
the Economic Rights and Obligations of States). Echeverria’s leftward position was 
also reflected in his pro-human and work rights attitude and his protectionist policies 
towards Mexican emigration and Mexican immigrants in the US. In his view -  there 
were no illegal Mexicans in the US, but rather undocumented workers that subsidised 
the American economy. Echeverria advocated the re-establishment of the ‘bracero 
programme’ and offered various services for Mexican families abroad through 
Mexican consulates (Sherman 1999). He opposed the Rodino bills (under 
consideration in the American congress since 1973) which attempted to penalize
employers of illegal workers and in response he implemented stricter immigration 
regulations that mostly affected American pensioners, business executives and 
“hippies” based in Mexico (Corwin 1978).
Echeverria also established relationships with some prominent Chicano leaders and 
created a programme for the distribution of Mexican books to libraries in the US; 
tours of artworks and artists; conferences with Mexican and Chicano intellectuals. 
Some governmental ministerial agencies were also requested to become engaged in 
Mexican-Americans’ issues. The labour Ministry started studies on the emigration 
phenomenon in order to formulate better ways to collaborate with Chicano 
organisations and, on the other hand, the Ministry of Education created a special 
programme to grant scholarships to ‘Chicanos’ (Mexican-Americans) to study in 
Mexico, which was later known as the ‘Cultural Programme of the Frontiers’ 
(Gomez Arau and Trigueros 2000). In addition, the 1974 amendment to the Law of 
Nationality and Naturalization gave second and third generation Mexicans abroad the 
same preferential naturalization as Latin Americans, which meant a two years 
residency requirement rather than five18.
His successor Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) tried to continue some of his policies 
such as the sponsoring of Chicano students in Mexico. However, he lacked the 
interest and organisation to effectively address the needs of Mexican-Americans. His 
administration also perceived migratory movements as part of the process to regulate 
population growth. As Corwin points out ‘...although some leaders of editorial 
opinion, like the national Excelsior, could still sputter pro-natalist sentiments, most
18 Reform to Article 21, Ley de Nacionalidad y Naturalizacion, 12/11/1974
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Mexican leaders in economic planning, public health, and social security 
programmes (the latter do not cover the poor) had come around to support the 
surplus-people interpretation, and the need to defuse the population bomb in 
Mexican cities’ (Corwin 1978, p.208). On the other hand, US President Carter’s 
amnesty and sanctions proposals delivered to Congress in 1977, which among other 
measures included a two-tier system to regulate illegal immigration; this offered 
permanent residence to those that had arrived before 1970, as well as a ‘non­
deportable’ status and conditional permanent residence after a five year provisional 
period, to those that arrived between 1970 and 1976 (Fragomen 1977). This, in turn, 
attracted thousands of Mexicans to the border hoping to benefit from it.
In the same vein, President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) only manifested 
interest in Mexican communities in the US during the political campaigning of the 
1988 presidential elections with a project entitled ‘Impacto 88’ (Impact 88), which 
consisted in bringing the Mexican community together and gaining their political 
support (Gomez Arau and Trigueros 2000). Something we should mention here is 
that most, if not all, of these efforts during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s targeted 
the Mexican-American community, that is, those who had already acquired 
American citizenship or were permanent residents in the neighbouring country, 
leaving unattended the Mexican migrants who continued to arrive in great numbers. 
This was a common feature of the ruling party’s (PRI) foreign policy until the 
political balance started to swing in the lead up to the presidential elections of 1988. 
Nevertheless, the number of documented and undocumented Mexican migrants 
increased significantly between the end of the ‘bracero programme’ (1964) and 1986 
despite successive modifications to the US Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965,
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1976, 1978, and 1980. According to Massey and Duran, between 1964 and 1986, the 
number of legal Mexican immigrants increased from 38,000 to 67,000 per year and 
over the same period annual gross undocumented migration rose from 87,000 to 3.8 
million (Durand, Massey et al. 1999).
T able 3.1 S e lec ted  M exico’s  national em igration policies 1948-1988
Period Selected Mexico’ 
emigration policies
Context of reception in the 
US
M exico’s Loss of its Northern 
Territory in 1848 and 
Revolutionary Mexico
‘O pen border’ policy during 
the dictatorship of Porfirio 
Diaz (1876-1910)
1909 bilateral ag reem en t;
1,000 M exicans to work in 
plantations in th e  US s ta te s  
of N ebraska and  Colorado
US controls Northern 
Territory and  buys l a  
Mesilla'
G uada lupe  Hidalgo treaty  
g u a ra n tee d  M exicans equal 
rights according to the  
A m erican constitution
Post-Revolution T he 1917 Constitution 
en d o rsed  th e  right to 
em igrate but under certain  
requirem ents (written 
contract m entioning 
minimum w ag e  and  
maxim um  num ber of hours, 
em ployer to cover w orker’s  
health ca re  and  return costs) 
M exican nationality w as  lost 
upon acquiring a  new  
nationality
Administrative m e a su re s  to 
de te r em igration
First World W ar 
A m erican excep tions for 
contract labour in 1917 and 
1921
'G rea t R epatriation’ (1917- 
1932)
Policies to  facilitate the  
return of 150,000 M exicans 
C onsular se rv ices for 
m igrants and  honorary 
com m issions 
Foreign policy to prom ote 
M exican culture 
A m endm ents to  the  Law of 
Nationality and  N aturalisation 
in 1939
G reat d ep ress io n  in the  US 
econom y in 1920’s  and  
1930’s
National Origins B ased  
Q uota  Act (1921,1924) 
Large sc a le  deportation  of 
M exicans and  M exican- 
A m ericans
‘B racero P rogram m e’ (1942- 
1964)
Bilateral p rogram m e for 
Mexican labourers to work in 
the  agricultural industry (4.5 
million M exicans)
S eco n d  World W ar
‘P ocho’ Illegality P h ase  
(1964-1988)
C haracterised  by non-salient 
initiative
E cheverria’s  policies to 
streng then  relationships with
R ep lacem en t of national 
origins q u o ta  sy stem  with a  
v isa  sy stem
Rodino bills (am nesty  and
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C hicano le ad e rs  (i.e. Cultural 
P rogram m e of th e  Frontiers)
sanctions) d eb a te d  in th e  
A m erican co n g re ss  since  
1973
Own elaboration
As displayed in the table above state policies towards Mexicans abroad, especially 
after the revolution, were based on nationalist interests -  emigration was to be, if not 
avoided, at least controlled; also, on the other hand, once across the border Mexicans 
were encouraged to maintain and embrace their Mexicanness through their language, 
celebrations and religious practices with the support of the Mexican consulates. The 
approach of the Mexican government was based on the belief, for the most part of 
the 20th century, that Mexico-to-US migration was only temporary and once the 
country benefited from the results of the revolution, migratory movements were to 
stop. In addition, protection of Mexican nationals abroad and emphasis on return also 
became common practices in Mexican emigration policy. Most importantly, most 
emigration policy decisions, before the democratic transition started, were taken by 
the federal executive and his close advisors.
3.2. The change in Mexico’s emigration policy
Since the late 1980’s the Mexican state has initiated a re-encounter with ‘el Mexico
de afuera’ (the Mexico beyond state boundaries). The recent shift in the Mexican
state’s attitude towards its expatriates indicates a move away from both limited
attention to migrants (as most of the 20th century) and emphasis on return (as during
the Repatriation period) to economic incorporation and yet political participation of
Mexican migrants from abroad. I argue that these new state policies not only differ
from previous ones due to their nature and purpose, but also by the manner in which
they have come into being. As I demonstrate, current state policies seek to maintain
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strong links with Mexicans in the US without encouraging return. This is a finding 
consistent with previous research (Sherman 1999). Current state policies, programs 
and even constitutional reforms on migrants’ participation have been the result of the 
interplay of new political actors such as opposition political parties and migrant 
associations in the US and, more often than not, they have been firstly conceived at 
the state and local levels. Thus, three main characteristics are salient in this period. 
First, emigration policy responds not only to political, but also to economic 
considerations. A second main characteristic is the unprecedented level of 
institutionalisation of new state initiatives. Thirdly, the formulation of emigration 
policies not only takes place at the federal, but also at the state level.
This new approach to emigration policy, I would argue, responds to three main 
events. That is, the changing dynamics of Mexico-to-US migration in the late 1980’s 
and 1990’s and the negative context of reception in the US and, on the other side of 
the border, to Mexico’s democratization and decentralization processes and the 
country’s insertion in the global economy. Mexico’s economic and political changes 
were felt among the Mexican communities in the US, where, on the one hand, 
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans realised that they were targets for new Mexican 
political actors’ interests and on the other, a political ‘voice’ in Mexico became a 
valued commodity in the US (fieldwork interviews).
3.2.1. Changing Mexico-US migration patterns and the US context 
of reception
To begin with, the situation of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in the US has
changed dramatically since the mid 1980’s, mainly due to US immigration policies
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that aim at curtailing the number of undocumented immigrants already in the 
country, as well as limiting further undocumented immigration flows. Amongst 
other features the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), which was the 
result of the Simpson-Rodino bill reintroduced in 1985, implemented strict measures 
to stop undocumented immigrant flows and restrict job opportunities to those that 
could have still made it across the frontier. For instance, it allocated new resources 
to the US Border Patrol for enforcement along the Mexico-US border and 
implemented sanctions to employers that knowingly hired undocumented workers.
The IRCA also opened up the possibility of legislation to those undocumented 
migrants who had entered the US before 1 January 1982 (under the Legally 
Authorised Worker programme, so-called LAW) and a special amnesty to those who 
had worked for 90 days in agriculture during the year preceding 1 May 1986 (known 
as the Special Agricultural Worker Program or SAW). Mexican immigrants were the 
main beneficiaries of such immigration reform. 70 percent (1.2 million) of those 
legalised under the LAW programme were Mexican, as well as 80 percent (1.1 
million) of those that were granted amnesty under the SAW programme (Durand, 
Massey et al. 1999, p.522). In turn, those Mexican heads of families that regularised 
their immigration status were later able to bring their wives and children. For 
instance, 52,000 dependants were allowed to join their relatives in the US in 1992,
55.000 dependants followed in 1993 and 34,000 in 1994. Undocumented 
immigration, however, exceeded legal immigration channels at an average of
300.000 persons per year (Durand, Massey et al. 1999, p.525). In addition, the 
expansion of the H-2A programme, an agricultural ‘bracero-like guest worker 
programme’, increased from 2,000 permits for Mexican nationals in 1986 to 6,000 in
1995 (Durand, Massey et al. 1999, p. 526). By 1996, there were 4.7 million 
authorised Mexicans in the US (Durand and Massey 1992).
According to Massey and Durand, the main impact of IRCA was to transform 
Mexican temporary migration pattern to permanent settlement for both documented 
and undocumented Mexicans. The reason is twofold. On the one hand, those that had 
recently legalised had to take English and civics classes in order to qualify for their 
Green Card19 and by bringing their families to the US; they had less incentives to go 
back to Mexico. On the other hand, border enforcement made it too dangerous and 
costly for undocumented Mexican migrants to cross back and forth (Massey, Durand 
et al. 2002).
Fundamentally, the 1990’s saw a surge in the number of US policies that try to 
restrict rights to immigrants. In particular, the Californian proposition 187 (1993), 
which included certain provisions such as preventing illegal immigrants from 
attending public schools, receiving social services and subsidized health care, also 
required that law enforcement authorities, school administrators and medical workers 
turn in suspected illegal immigrants to federal and state authorities. Although 
Proposition 187 was exclusively Californian, entangled in the courts and never fully 
enacted, from the very moment of its formal launching in 1993 it had negative effects 
on the well-being of immigrants in California and other American states. The legacy 
of California’s Proposition 187 materialised in the 1996 US Congress legislation on 
immigration. In August of that year, the US Congress passed a welfare reform -  the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act -  that imposed
19 United States Permanent Resident Card
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new restrictions on benefits to documented migrants. In addition, in September of the 
same year, the Congress approved the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (IIAIRA), which apart from making illegal immigrants ineligible 
for most non-emergency public aid, also enforced policing of the border and changed 
the conditions of deportation -  migrants could be deported without a hearing and 
they had to be able to demonstrate continuous presence of at least seven years before 
being able to appeal a deportation decision (Legomsky 1997). Although by 1997 
some of the provisions, especially for documented migrants, had been partially 
restored, still a negative context of reception was perceived.
However, despite a more restrictive environment, after five generations Mexicans in 
the US were not only significant in numbers, but they were also more organised and 
had more political power and influence than they once did. There were well-known 
Mexican-American leaders and leading business people, who differed from Mexican 
emigrants recently arrived with either documented or undocumented status. In 
addition, a network of hundreds of hometown associations, mainly from traditional 
sending states -  i.e. Zacatecas, Michoacan, Guadalajara and Guanajuato -  were well 
established and politically and socially active in the US. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs reported in 1995 the existence of 262 hometown associations from 23 
different states. The Zacatecan hometown clubs doubled in number in only one 
decade. In 1976-78 there were 15 to 20 Zacatecan hometown clubs and in 1990 they 
grew to 43, with 40,000 members, representing 31 out of the 56 municipalities in the 
state. Mexican hometown clubs, by definition have been the bridge between local 
communities in Mexico and those in the US. According to Arau and Paz Trigeros, 
Mexican hometown clubs have played a larger role in politics at home since the
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1970s when they became better organised and more politically conscious (2000). 
According to the large literature on Mexican hometown clubs, their main goal is to 
invest in important celebrations at home, as well as in the realisation of development 
and infrastructure projects to improve the general welfare of their communities of 
origin. However, as Arau and Trigueros argue, some of them have gone even further, 
by giving place to a reconfiguration of local power relationships and strengthening 
the political status of migrants at home ( 2000). In fact, hometown clubs have been 
key actors in the development of the new state policies in migrants’ cultural, 
economic and political participation, both by offering creative initiatives that have 
been later on supported by the state and by serving as enforcers of state policies and 
programmes in the ground.
3.2.2. Political and economic transformations in the country of 
origin
Thus, the changing profile of the Mexican community in the US was able to feel the
political and economic changes in their home country. Four major events are
necessary to point out in order to illustrate how the Mexican political engine found
itself during the late 1980’s and 1990’s. Firstly, the 1988 presidential and state
elections challenged the PRI’s previously iron grip on political power. Cuauhtemoc
Cardenas’ presidential campaign questioned the political legitimacy of the PRI,
which was widely accused of committing electoral fraud by declaring Carlos Salinas
the winner. In addition, the PRI lost for the first time a gubernatorial election in the
state of Baja California Norte where a PAN governor was elected (Rodriguez and
Ward 1995). Secondly, the mystery surrounding the killings of Cardinal Posadas
Ocampo in 1993 and of PRI Presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio a year later
prompted a political crisis in the country, which deepened with the Zapatista
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movement. Thirdly, in the mid-term elections held in July 1997, the PRI lost its 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies and the centre-left PRD had a stunning success 
in Mexico City {Distrito Federal), where voters could elect their head of government 
for the first time since the revolution, as the result of the 1996 electoral reforms 
(Secretaria Nacional de Asuntos Electorales 1997). Finally, in the year 2000 the PRI 
lost the presidency after more than 70 years of continuous rule to Vicente Fox of the 
PAN.
On the other hand, after the election of Miguel de la Madrid, a neo-liberal regime in 
Mexico gradually replaced previous protectionist policies. This new model of 
export-led development was first embraced by Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988) and 
expanded further under President Salinas (1988-1994). Mexico joined the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 and in 1989 started negotiations 
with the governments of Canada and the US to create a free trade zone. The North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was implemented in 1994 with the goal of 
removing (gradually) most trade and investment barriers between Mexico, the United 
States and Canada. Although the agreement did not include any chapter on labour 
migration, except for investors and business people (Chapter XVI), it was commonly 
expected that Mexico’s economy would be able to develop and strengthen which 
would in turn lead to the creation of new jobs20. In contrast, despite the gains from 
free trade and closer ties with the US for dynamic urban regions especially in the 
Northern border, economic re-structuring also meant for millions of Mexicans loss of
20According to neo-classical economic theory, free trade and increased investment would lead to income growth 
and jobs creation, thus dimishing pressures to emigrate. It has been argued that, in the long-run, these dynamics 
would first produce a migration hump, relatively small and short, and then a decrease in the number of emigrants 
(See Martin, P. 2001).
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jobs, economic instability and hardship that again forced them to seek better 
opportunities elsewhere. At the same time, individual remittances started becoming 
more visible due to growing emigration flows from Mexico, increment in the amount 
remitted home and an increasing proportion of remittances sent through official 
means, that is, through banks and remittances transfer companies. The latter also as 
a result of lower remittances transfer costs -  to send $300 in the US-Mexico corridor 
fell from $26 in 1999 to $12 in 2004 (Ratha 2007, p.8). As shown in Figure 3.1 
below, remittances flows to Mexico increased from $3.7 billion in 1995 to $24 
billion in 2007 (Bank of Mexico, 2008) (for a more detailed description of individual 
remittances sent to Mexico see Annex 3). Individual remittances represent the second 
source of foreign income, only after the revenue obtained from oil exports, but 
exceeding direct foreign investment. In 2005, Mexico led the list of emigration 
countries (with the highest absolute number of nationals abroad) and in the last 
decade it has been among the three top remittances-receivers in the world (with India 
and China) (Ratha and Zhimei 2008). Also relevant was the fact that individual 
remittances provided a safety net during the financial crises that used to accompany 
presidential change in the last few decades. For instance, during the ‘peso crisis’ in 
1995 the consumption of remittances in Mexico increased by more than half a 
percent (Figure 3, Ratha 2007, p. 4).
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Figure 3.1 Individual remittances sent to Mexico (1996-2007)
Individual remittances sent to Mexico by year (1995-2007)
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Own elaboration. Source: Bank of Mexico, Remesas Familiares, statistics, 2008
Political and economic changes in Mexico had clear repercussions on Mexicans and 
Mexican-Americans abroad. In particular, M exico’s entrance in the global economy 
and the growing family remittances received gave more attention to the Mexican 
community in the US. President Salinas turned to Mexican-American organisations 
and leaders to serve as a lobby during the NAFTA negotiations. Moreover, Mexican 
migrants’ interest in domestic politics was clearly shown during centre-left PRD 
candidate Cardenas campaign in 1988. During his campaign, Cardenas looked to 
Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in California and Texas for support. Redefining 
Mexican concerns for a US audience, Cardenas spoke o f the frustrations of Mexicans 
and Mexican-Americans who felt disenfranchised in the US and ignored by M exico 
(Sepulveda 1991, p.50; Dresser 1993). The Mexican community, which until then 
had experienced M exico’s government as a unified entity with clear policies, was 
now confronted with a choice between the PRI and the PRD. The majority of those 
who paid attention to Mexican domestic affairs opted to support Cardenas (Pew
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Hispanic Centre Survey 1988). Although Cardenas was not elected president, 
Mexicans abroad, from then on, were aware that the political balance at home was 
crumbling. Mexicans in the US have also increasingly demonstrated outside Mexican 
consulates against political events at home, such as the assassination of Colosio, the 
government’s military response to the Zapatista movement and more recently, 
against the impeachment of the PRD presidential candidate Lopez Obrador in April 
2005 (Yossi 1999-2000, p. 688; Notimex 2005).
3 .2 .3 . Politics without Borders: New state initiatives towards 
migrant political inclusion
Formal state policy efforts towards migrants’ incorporation, however, commenced at
the state level, inspired to a large extent by hometown clubs in the US. Among the
pioneer states that tried to establish links with Mexican migrants were the migrant
sending states, Zacatecas, Guanajuato and Oaxaca. In 1988, the PRI Governor of
Zacatecas from 1986 to 1992, Genaro Borrego Estrada, formalised the ‘Federation
de Clubes Zacatecanos Unidos’ and established the ‘2x1 programme (state funds
matched every dollar raised by a US-based hometown club). He also campaigned for
migrants’ social welfare, signing an agreement between the ‘Federation’ and the
IMSS (Mexico’s medical insurance system); built the ‘House of the Zacatecan’ in
Los Angeles and advocated the opening of a daily flight between Zacatecas and Los
Angeles. In Guanajuato, the PAN governor Vicente Fox initiated a series of
initiatives that were consolidated by his successors Romero Hicks and Juan Manuel
Olivia Ramirez. The ‘Mi Comunidad* (‘my community’) program was created to
channel the flow of Guanajuato’s migrants’ remittances into productive investments.
In Oaxaca, the PRI governor Heladio Ramirez Lopez travelled continuously to
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California to meet up with Oaxacan migrant leaders, and initiated the ‘dollar by 
dollar’ programme to channel Oaxacan migrants’ remittances, similar to the one 
implemented in Zacatecas and Guanajuato.
Another aspect that the Mexican state has emphasised in this new phase is consular 
protection of migrants, as well as international cooperation in the formalisation of 
migrants’ rights. Such activities can only be compared with the ‘Repatriation Period’ 
when the Mexican government, as we have seen, tried to secure the human and 
labour rights of its expatriates. In 1993, the ‘Fundacion Solidaridad Mexicana- 
Americana’ (Mexican-American Solidarity Foundation) was created with a clear 
focus on migrants’ human rights advocacy. In 1991, Mexico’s National Human 
Rights Commission issued its first report on the human rights violations of migrant 
workers in the US. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, Mexico has also actively 
participated in international and multilateral efforts to institutionalise migrants’ 
labour and human rights. The Mexican mission in Geneva was an active advocator 
of the ‘International Convention of the rights of all migrant workers and members of 
their families’, which entered into force July 1, 2003, as well as a constant participant 
in UN and ILO multilateral meetings on migration issues (Martinez 12 March 2005).
In addition, the Mexican government has protested against highly publicized 
immigrant rights abuses in the US and raised the issue in bilateral and multilateral 
meetings. For instance, in response to the Minuteman Project, which consisted in 
recruiting US volunteers to carry out vigilante operations in Arizona to stop illegal 
immigrants from crossing the border, the Mexican government condemned such 
activities both by calling on its American counterpart to take action on the subject
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and by accessing international mechanisms (Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(CNN 2005). In April 19, 2005, Mexico presented a resolution on human rights of 
migrants, which was approved by the Human Rights Commission calling on states to 
punish groups, or individuals that unilaterally attempt to prevent migrants of their 
liberty, functions that can only be carried out by state officials (Mexican Mission in 
Geneva, interviews, April 2006).
Salinas’ symbolic policies towards Mexicans abroad
Following state governments’ initiatives, the executive government, in the late 
1980s, implemented a series of policies on emigrants’ participation at ‘home’ at the 
federal level that have continued and increased until present day. PRI President 
Salinas was the pioneer initiating two migrant-centred programmes of overriding 
importance. The ‘paisano programme’ was created to change the migrants’ image at 
home and stop the abusive behaviour of Mexican border officials towards Mexican 
migrants who returned home to visit or settle down permanently. As part of this 
programme, a brochure called ‘cartilla paisano’ (migrant guide) was issued to 
inform returning migrants of their rights and responsibilities when interacting with 
hostile officials at the border.
However, the most relevant initiative was the creation in 1990 of the ‘Program for
Mexican Communities Abroad’ (PCME) overseen by the General Directorate of
Mexican Communities Abroad (DGCME), a division of the Ministry of Foreign
Relations. The PCME emerged, according to Rodulfo Figueroa, from the view that
the Mexican nation is ‘a cultural entity not limited by its geographical borders’
(Figueroa-Aramoni 1999). The programme was structured into eight project areas,
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namely: community organisation, education, culture, sports, health, business 
contacts, information and fund raising and its main objectives were to promote 
projects that served as a link between the Mexican community and individuals and 
institutions of the private and public sectors in Mexico and to improve the images of 
Mexico abroad and of Mexican-Americans in Mexico (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
1997) (unstructured interviews, Institute for Mexicans Abroad, June 2006).
Salinas’ programmes and policies transformed Mexico into a transnational state. His 
efforts to incorporate migrants in the public definition of the nation, had 
repercussions in both countries as they were aimed at Mexicans abroad as much as at 
Mexicans at home. In the US, they were designed to awaken and maintain patriotic 
sentiments among expatriates and offer them social support. In Mexico, they were 
intended to change the negative image of Mexican emigrants and Mexican- 
Americans among nationals as these initiatives were accompanied by much publicity 
material and great media attention. As Shain argues the ‘(Paisano) programme is 
attempting to teach the other part of the state and the elite surrounding it to re- 
imagine the Mexicans in the United States as part of the Mexican nation’ (Yossi 
1999-2000, p.681). At the same time, Salinas’ initiatives also focused on forging 
strong business ties with the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce (fieldwork interviews, 
Chicago, 2008).
Zedillo’s regionalist approach on migrants’ incorporation
President Zedillo not only continued Salinas’ initiatives, but also went further by
grouping them under the rubric of ‘the Mexican nation’, which figured in his 1995
State of the Union speech. In addition, he began to deploy a regionalist approach. In
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order to achieve many of the objectives of the PCME, he created the State Offices for 
Attention to Migrants (OEAM for its acronym in Spanish), which provide a forum 
for emigrants to communicate with their home states. As Smith mentions 
‘regionalism has thus become a key socio-cultural and political structuring element 
of the Mexican state’s transnational practices and discourses’ (Smith, Peter 2003, p. 
473). I would argue that this regionalism is also the consequence of both Mexico’s 
recent decentralisation processes and new state-civil society relations. The main 
objectives of these state offices are, on the one hand, to strengthen the relationship 
between migrants abroad and Mexican state institutions by helping create and 
consolidate Mexican migrant groups abroad and advising them how they can become 
involved in public work or development projects in their communities of origin. On 
the other hand, these offices also try to improve the image of the migrant in sending 
communities and often assist expatriates’ families back home on various issues such 
as the reception of remittances (Gomez Arau and Trigueros 2000).
In 2005, there were more than 23 active OEAM’s. The one which has received the 
most attention is the OEAM from Guanajuato, which has facilitated the 
implementation of productive projects with an active and more entrepreneurial role 
undertaken by migrant groups (for an insight into the case of Guanajuato see Smith 
2003 ; Torres and Kuznetsov 2006). Under ‘my community’ programme, co­
financed equally by migrants and the government, but in which migrant groups 
carried out a more active role during the implementation and follow-up, it created 14 
maquiladoras (export assembly plants), providing 339 local jobs (OECD, Economic 
Surveys, 2003). In the same way, this office has supported the creation of civil 
society organisations known as ‘Casas Guanajuato’ (Guanajuato Homes), which
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have been established in more than 33 US cities including Washington, California 
and Texas. However, the programme of mass communication with the 
Guanajuatense migrant has been the most innovative and successful. As Smith 
shows, a variety of T.V. programmes, radio broadcasts, informational brochures, 
newspaper sections and cultural magazines were designed by the state of Guanajuato 
‘to create a favourable image of itself, shape the cultural identity of the 
Guanajuatense migrant, and create appealing images of “home”’ (Smith, Peter 2003, 
p. 484). The TV programme ‘Me voy p a l  Norte’ (I am going North) is a weekly TV 
programme that portrays rural towns in Guanajuato, the migration phenomenon on 
both sides of the border and is broadcast by TV channels in Guanajuato and in the 
US. The radio programme ‘Caminos de Guanajuato’ (Paths to Guanajuato) features 
themes of general interest to Guanajuatense migrants living in the US and broadcasts 
in the main Mexican migrants’ host US cities. Guanajuto’s migrant office was also 
responsible for publishing the cultural bulletins ‘P a l Norte’ (to the North) and 
‘Fronteras’ (frontiers) which are distributed without charge to Guanajuatense 
migrants in the US.
Other OEAM’s have carried out similar initiatives, but they have not been as 
innovative and constant. The OEAM of Zacatecas, for instance, has continued the 
work that Genaro Borrego started which I have mentioned above. The most recently 
created OEAM’s have also had certain success. The OEAM of San Luis Potosi, 
created in 1998, inaugurated a direct flight from San Luis to Chicago (the main 
destination of migrants from this state), as well as negotiating the transfer of 
remittances at a lower cost. The OEAM of Oaxaca, created in 1999, according to 
Gomez Arau and Paz Trigueros, achieved that some hometown groups changed their
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posture towards the Oaxacan government of Jose Murat and accepted its support in 
order to carry out more communitarian works at home ( 2000).
Fox’ institutionalisation of migrant participation in domestic affairs 
Under Fox, state initiatives have multiplied and covered all variety of aspects. From 
the very first moment he came into office, he showed determination and interest in 
dealing with migrants’ issues as he did when he was governor of Guanajuato. As 
Ernesto Rodriguez mentioned in an unstructured interview, ‘Salinas and Zedillo had 
put the migrant issue in the spotlight, but Fox simply gave it real attention and in 
order to do that he started creating all these institutions to study, formulate and 
implement the right policies and programmes in order to bring back those Mexicans 
in the US’ (unstructured interview, July 2006). One of his first initiatives was the 
creation of the Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad, which in 2003 merged with 
the National Council for Mexican Communities Abroad and became part of the 
Institute of Mexicans Abroad under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to 
Candido Morales, director of the Institute of Mexicans abroad, ‘president Fox during 
his campaign received comments from paisanos that demanded a bigger volume and 
quality of attention to migrants in the US and in response the president invited Dr. 
Juan Hernandez to head the presidential office of Mexicans Abroad’ (Morales 
August 2006).
The main feature of the Institute of Mexicans Abroad is that it directly involves
Mexican migrants and Mexican-Americans in the migration-related policymaking
process. The institute is made up of three main pillars. The first is the National
Council of Mexican Communities Abroad, which is an inter-institutional council
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where 11 members of the cabinet participate and is chaired by the president. The 
second is the Institute of Mexicans Abroad, which acts as the executive organ that 
co-ordinates and implements all the programmes, policies, and activities. It is made 
up of 40 people based at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mexico and 96 employees 
in the different Mexican consulates in the US and 4 in Canada. The third institution 
is the Advisory Council, which is formed by 125 elected representatives of the 
Mexican communities in the US (including 4 in Canada). The Advisory Council 
meets twice a year and its main role is to make recommendations on issues related to 
Mexican migrants and Mexican-Americans that are then addressed by the respective 
Ministry. According to Candido Morales ‘after carrying out an analysis, they issue 
recommendations on how we should change policies to make things easier for them 
when they return to Mexico or while they live in the US’ (Morales August 2006).
The Advisory Council is not only unprecedented in terms of the involvement of the 
Mexican community in the US in policymaking; around 255 recommendations were 
issued and addressed by the Mexican government between 2003 and 2005, but also 
because of its democratic nature. Most members of the Advisory Council are elected 
by their communities at the consular circumscriptions’ level. When elections are due, 
the 46 Mexican consulates in the US use their registry of Mexicans living in the area 
and advertise the elections in the media and on the Internet. Members of the Council 
are appointed for a period of three years on a voluntary basis -  105 are Mexican and 
Mexican-American leaders in the US, 10 are members of the most renowned Latino 
organisations in the US21 and 10 are special advisors. In addition, the Council counts
21 Such as Association of Farmworker Opportunity Programs, Hispanic National Bar Association, Hispanic 
Scholarship Fund, League of United Latin American Citizens, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational
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with 32 representatives of the Mexican state governments. The structure of the 
Institute of Mexicans Abroad has thus institutionalised channels of communication 
between Mexican communities abroad and the Mexican government, as Cano 
mentions ‘the Advisory Council is the key transnational component of the IME’ 
(Cano and Delano 2005, p.33).
In addition, Fox attempted to reach a bilateral agreement with the US on the 
migration issue. Negotiations on a ‘guest worker’ initiative were well under way 
until the 9/11 events took place. From then on, American centred interest in security 
issues has led to the formulation of agreements in which migration has been 
restricted by security objectives. In December 2001, the US-Mexico Border 
Partnership Action Plan was signed by both countries, in which 22 points focused on 
security goals, both by strengthening the physical infrastructure and strategic 
facilities at the border and by exchanging intelligence information on a regular basis 
(Carral 2003). In the Americas Summit that took place in Monterrey in February 
2004 and the meeting that also included the Canadian prime minister in March 2005, 
the Bush and Fox administrations have only addressed the migration issue as part of 
national security concerns.
To sum up, a turnaround has occurred in Mexico’s attitudes towards its emigres since 
the late 1980’s with the PRI Salinas and Zedillo’s administrations and increased 
when an opposition party -  the PAN -  came into power. In the current period, the 
Mexican state aims at a new social construct of a nation that also includes those
Fund, National Association for Bilingual Education, New American Alliance, U.S. Hispanic Chamber of 
Commerce, United Farm Workers
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Mexicans abroad, who are incorporated into the social, economic and political life of 
their home country. These national policies and programmes, however, have been 
predated by migrants’ hometown association’s efforts to foster links with their places 
of origin, as well as local initiatives carried out mainly by migrant sending states 
accompanied with consular protection of Mexicans abroad.
T able  3.2 S elected  policies of ‘proximity’ during th e  last th ree  M exican federal
adm inistrations (1988-2006)
Administration Type of policies Selected policies Purpose
PRI President
Salinas
(1998-1994)
■ M ainly  
sym bolic
■ Prom otion o f  
lobby
■ ‘P ro  gram a  
P aisan o  ’
■ Programme for the 
M exican  
C om m unities 
Abroad (1990)
■ N egotiations w ith  
M exican-A m erican  
circles to lobby for  
the N A FT A  
passage at the U S  
congress
■ Im prove treatment o f  
M exicans that return 
hom e to v isit or to 
settle perm anently
■ Prom ote projects that 
linked the M exican  
com m unity in the U S  
with the M exican  
governm ent and 
private sector
PRI President
Zedillo
(1994-2000)
■ Sym bolic
■ Institutional
■ Legal 
initiatives on  
dual nationality
■ R egionalism
■ Prom otion o f  
lobby
■ 1995 State o f  
U nion Speech
■ State O ffices for 
Attention to  
N atives
■ ‘N on -loss o f  
N ationality’ law  
(1996)
■ Im prove im age o f  
M exicans and 
M exican-A m ericans  
in M exico
■ Forum for em igrants 
to com m unicate w ith  
their hom e states
PAN President Fox 
(2000-2006)
■ Sym bolic
■ Institutional
■ Bi-lateral 
negotiations
■ W elfare 
protection
■ R egionalism
■ Prom otion o f  
m igrants’ 
investm ent and 
remittances
■ Migrant 
political 
incorporation
■ Presidential O ffice  
for M exicans 
Abroad (in  2002, it 
becom es the 
National C ouncil 
for M exican  
C om m unities 
Abroad)
■ Institute o f  
M exicans Abroad
■ Cam paign for 
‘guest-w orker’ 
agreem ent with the 
U S (negotiations 
broke w ith 9 /11)
■ 2005  V ote Abroad 
Law
■ Representation o f  
M exican m igrants 
both in the U S  and in  
M exico
■ E lected  
representatives o f  the 
M exican
com m unities abroad 
that influence  
migration p o licy  
m aking
■ Co-ordinate activities  
to prom ote 
integration betw een  
the U S M exican  
com m unity and 
M exico
Own elaboration
I
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As we can observe in the table 3.2 above, in contrast to other periods, current state 
policies and programmes toward emigrants are incomparable in qualitative and 
quantitative terms. We can, however, find a few similarities with the ‘Repatriation 
period’ when policies on emigration and migrants’ return were part of the process of 
state consolidation and nation building. On the other hand, we can also argue that it 
has been precisely during the ‘Repatriation period’ and the contemporary one, when 
the Mexican state has been able to dedicate efforts towards the political construction 
of the nation and migrants’ participation, as in previous times defence and domestic 
economic matters were the highest priorities on the government’s agenda. Although 
in both phases, there has been a great emphasis on migrants’ incorporation in the 
reformulation of the notion of the Mexican nation, the main difference is that current 
state policies do not centre on return. In actual fact, Zedillo’s and Fox’ 
administrations have created governmental institutions in order to facilitate migrants’ 
political, social and economic participation from abroad. That is the case of the 
DGMCA, the state migrants’ offices, the Institute of Migrants Abroad and inter- 
ministerial cooperation on migrant issues. In the same vein, consulates’ activities 
have increased in order to provide social services abroad on a more extended scale. 
According to Carlos Gonzales, former head of the DGMCA, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ and consulates’ purpose is ‘to enhance the efforts of Mexicans in the US to 
improve their standard of living and to foster relations with their communities of 
origin’ (Gonzalez Gutierrez 1993, p. 228). These efforts presume a permanent 
community of Mexican residents, thereby implying that the repatriation of this 
community is not a goal of state policy.
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The current emphasis on migrants’ transnational presence is not only factual, but also 
symbolic. The idea of an extraterritorial Mexican nation not bounded by its 
geographical borders has continuously appeared in the speeches of the last three 
former heads of state. Salinas argued that the diversity among Mexicans abroad 
must be recognised, and that ‘the only thing they have in common, extraordinarily 
important for us, the Mexicans, are their roots, close or far’ (Sherman 1999, p.858). 
As Sherman argues, the notion of membership, rather than common residence has 
been key for the re-building of the Mexican nation (Sherman 1999). As we have 
seen, Zedillo bestowed the name ‘Mexican Nation’ on his programme of relations 
with the Mexican community abroad and in his State of the Union speech in 
September 1995 declared that ‘our Mexican Nation is no longer constrained by the 
limit of our borders’. Fox in his triumphal speech after his electoral victory 
proclaimed himself not only as the leader of 100 million Mexicans in Mexico, but 
also, of the 23 million living in the US. However, as Table 3.2 shows, the kind of 
policies adopted during the administrations of Salinas, Zedillo and Fox have differed. 
Although most of the policies implemented have survived to the following 
administration, each head of the state has sought to increase their scope and add more 
far-reaching initiatives. This pattern has also endorsed increasing initiatives at the 
sub-national level such as the state offices for attention to migrants. With Fox in 
office, however, the attention that Mexican migrants abroad received led to the 
creation of ministerial level offices and bureaucracies only dedicated to involve 
migrant representatives into migration policy making, as well as advocating migrant 
electoral participation.
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Yet while the contemporary Mexican state policies devise new strategies to transcend 
geopolitical borders it has been the formalisation of these efforts, through 
constitutional reforms in 1996 and secondary laws, that has formally permitted 
Mexicans abroad to participate in Mexican economic and political life without 
returning permanently to Mexico. I will now discuss this issue in further detail.
3.2 .4 . Dual nationality and citizenship and the 1996 federal legal 
reforms
Mexico, according to most scholars, historically rejected dual nationality at 
congressional debates (Trigueros Gaisman 1996; Vargas 1998; Fitzgerald 2005). 
The Constitution of 1917 stated that Mexican nationality would be lost when another 
nationality was adopted. As we have seen, it was only in the 1939 amendments to the 
Law of Nationality and Naturalisation that the Mexican nationality could be 
recovered by those Mexican nationals that had naturalised abroad, but only upon 
return. However, in the second half of the 1990’s, under Zedillo’s administration, the 
Mexican Congress commenced a series of debates on the possibility of extending 
economic and political rights to Mexican migrants.
In this section, I begin by again pointing out the distinction that the Mexican state
makes between ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’; I then illustrate the Congressional
debates that have taken place surrounding each term and lay emphasis on how each
political party has adopted a posture regarding dual nationality and political rights of
Mexican migrants. In this section, I argue that dual nationality rights in Mexico was
mainly an initiative of the executive and PRI party with the purpose of encouraging
Mexicans abroad to acquire the US citizenship in the context of restrictionist US
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immigration policies and the less official goal of securing a Mexican lobby group in 
the US. In contrast, the issue of political rights (and obligations) of Mexicans abroad 
has involved mainly non-PRI parties (particularly the centre-left PRD) and non­
governmental groups and this issue has been at the heart of democratization 
processes in the country.
According to the Mexican constitution, as I have mentioned earlier, nationality and
citizenship are two distinct attributes. While Mexican nationality establishes
membership to the nation as well as economic rights, Mexican citizenship refers to
political rights and obligations, such as voting and running for elections and carrying
out military service. Mexican nationality represents a mixed system of descent (jus
00sanguinis) and territory (jus soli) (Diario Oficial de la Federacion 5 February 
1917). On the other hand, citizenship in Mexico is not automatic. A Mexican 
national can become citizen, so to say, be able to participate in governance through 
the right to vote and hold office, when s/he turns 18 years old and lives an ‘upright’ 
life (Diario Oficial de la Federacion 5 February 1917, Article 34). Thus, whereas 
Mexican legislators have widely agreed on allowing dual nationality (granting 
economic rights), much discussion has been focused on agreeing to dual citizenship 
(granting political rights).
The first proponent of dual nationality at the federal level was the Mexican 
government itself. It was an essential part of Zedillo’s ‘Mexican Nation’ plan 
presented in May 1995, which I have referred to previously. Zedillo claimed that
22 It should be noted that the 1917 Constitution originally mentioned residency requirements for those nationals 
born in Mexico to foreign parents, as well as restrictions on certain rights.
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one of the main reasons for the nationality amendment was the ‘bounded-ness that 
Mexican migrants sustain with respect to their roots, culture, values, and national 
traditions’ (H. Camara de Diputados 1996). During congressional debates, the most 
cited reason was the hostile context of reception in the US and the historically lowest 
naturalisation rates of Mexicans in the US (see Figure 3.2.) . According to this 
logic, by allowing Mexicans abroad not to lose their Mexican nationality while 
acquiring the US citizenship, migrants could best protect their rights by voting in US 
elections against restrictionist measures24. Nonetheless, president Zedillo also had 
another reason in mind. Allegedly, he told a group of Mexican-American leaders in 
Texas that the purpose of this law was ‘to develop a close relationship between his 
government and Mexican Americans, one in which they could be called upon to 
lobby US policy-makers on economic and political issues involving the United States 
and Mexico’ (Cited in Corchado 1995, Fitzgerald 2003).
23 This is well documented in the work of Jones-Correa. See Jones-Correa, Michael ‘Institutional and Contextual 
Factors in Immigrant Naturalization and Voting’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 5, No. 1, 2001; Jones-Correa, Michael 
‘Under Two Flags: Dual Nationality in Latin America and its consequences for the US’, International Migration 
Review 3 (84): 34-67
24 This position is similar to other sending country initiatives. For instance, Turkey also granted dual nationality 
rights in order to encourage its Turkish diaspora in Germany to become German (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001)
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Figure 3.2 Mexican-born naturalised US citizen (1991-2007)
Mexican-born naturalised US citizens between 1991 and 2007
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Own elaboration. Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS, Table 21, 2004); (INS, Table 32, 2007).
To consider the presidential initiative on dual nationality, all the political factions of 
the Chamber of Deputies decided to organise a colloquium with the participation of 
various deputies, the director of the Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad 
(PCME), Roger Diaz de Cossio, the governors o f some of the main migrants’ 
sending states (i.e. Zacatecas, Jalisco, Baja California, Oaxaca, Campeche and 
Michoacan), as well as a few academics. In such colloquium, two blocks were 
identified in relation to their position on dual nationality and citizenship. On the one 
hand, Diaz de Cossio, president o f the PCME, and various PRI deputies supported 
Zedillo’s proposal, which allowed Mexicans to maintain their nationality even when 
gaining a new one and thus, exercise full rights to own property, but no political 
rights. In fact, as Santamaria mentions, the PRI version was directed only toward 
Mexicans who were naturalised US citizens ( 2003, p.284). In contrast, the PRD’s 
position was to grant all Mexican emigrants regardless o f their legal status the right 
to have dual nationality and also to vote abroad, so to say, to hold dual citizenship. 
As PRD deputy Cuauhtemoc Sandoval mentioned: ‘For the past fifteen years co­
nationality groups holding legal residence in the United States have requested that
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the Mexican government activate the legal modifications necessary for dual 
nationality...’. Therefore, the proposal of the PRD is all-inclusive, since these rights 
cannot be mutilated or segregated: dual nationality and dual citizenship’ (Cited in 
Sandoval 1995).
However, in accordance with fieldwork interviews, Zedillo’s non-loss of nationality 
initiative did not respond to the demand from Mexican migrant activists. According 
to Raul Ross, member of the Coalition of the Political Rights of Mexicans Abroad, 
‘when the non loss of nationality law comes into being [...], according to them, the 
Mexican migrants requested it, but it is not true! In reality what they wanted was that 
Mexicans nationalised in the US and voted here (in the US) not in Mexico’(Ross 
April 2008).
The ‘non loss of nationality’ ( ‘No perdida de nacionalidad’) constitutional reforms 
were passed 405 to 1 in the Congress of deputies at a time of increasing competitive 
politics. In the end, dual nationality was allowed for all migrants regardless of their 
legal status. This resulted in the new Nationality law on December 3rd 1996, which 
meant a revision and a modification of Articles 30, 32, and 37 of the Mexican 
constitution (and the amendment of at least 55 secondary laws). Specifically, the 
results of the legal reforms were that on the one hand, Mexican migrants could 
naturalise US citizens (or hold any other citizenship) without having to renounce to 
their Mexican nationality and could own property in Mexico even if they resided 
abroad (Articles 30, 37). On the other hand, it restricted dual nationality rights (jus 
sanguinis) to the first generation bom abroad, limiting the infinity extension of dual 
nationals (Article 30). In addition, the new version of Article 32 made special
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mention of dual nationals’ restriction from occupying public office. Firstly, it 
mentioned that other rules and norms are to be established in order to avoid dual 
nationality issues. Additional legislation such as the 1998 Law of Nationality, 
however, does allow dual nationals to occupy public office (Article 16, Diario 
Oficial de la Federacion 1998) by showing a Mexican nationality certificate (Article 
16), but this entails renouncing their second nationality (Article 17, Diario Oficial de 
la Federacion 1998). In second place, Article 32 limited dual nationals from 
occupying public office and functions for which the constitution shows as a 
requirement ‘to be Mexican by birth’ as these kind of jobs are ‘reserved to those who 
hold such quality and do not acquire another nationality’ (second paragraph, Article 
32). Examples of such public office positions which the federal constitution requires 
individuals to be Mexican by birth are: the presidency, federal senators and deputies 
(Articles 82, 58 and 55 respectively).
It is clear that dual nationals’ possibility of occupying public office was not a goal 
intended in the reform proposed by PRI President Zedillo. However, the ambiguous 
writing of Article 32 has been subject to contrasting interpretations (Cabral 2003; 
Editorial 2003; Najar 2003; Ross Pineda 2003; Moctezuma Longoria 2004), often 
according to divergent political motivations25. This study shows, however, that as the 
debate on emigrant political participation evolves, practice has come to differ from 
the actual law (see the cases of Zacatecas and Michoacan in chapters 7 and 8 
respectively).
25 For instance, Mexican-American Eddie Varon Levy, resident in Los Angeles, California, won a federal deputy 
position in the year 2000 supported by the PRI. However, for the 2003 mid-term elections for federal deputies, 
the PRI decided not to support two candidates for the party’s proportional seats, Felipe Cabral and Luis de la 
Garza, for having a second US nationality.
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We should also bear in mind that Mexico as a federal system gives rights to states 
(‘estados’) to define their own concepts of nationality and citizenship in their local 
constitutions, as long as they do not contravene with the federal constitution and laws 
(Article 40 of the federal constitution). In terms of direct political participation (i.e. 
eligibility for political office and government employment) states are able to make 
their own requirements such as period of residency as well as whether dual nationals 
can occupy public office according to the interpretation given to the first paragraph 
of Article 3226. For instance, in the case of the state of Zacatecas prior to the 2003 
constitutional reforms, Zacatecan citizenship (and therefore electoral rights) required 
effective residency in the state for at least five years (Art. 13 prior to the 2003 
constitutional reforms). In Michoacan, on the other hand, residency has not appeared 
as a requirement to occupy local public positions (Institute de Investigaciones 
Juridicas de la UNAM 1918).
The right to vote abroad, however, was not part of the ‘non loss of nationality’ law. 
Instead, it was a PRD and civil society initiative that appeared earlier and for the first 
time in the dialogue between the main political parties -  PRI, PAN, PRD and PT -  
which led to the federal electoral reforms in August 22nd, 1996. The national political 
accords envisaged during the PRI Zedillo’s administration were entrusted to the 
Ministry of the Interior (Secretaria de Gobemacion). The first phase of the dialogue 
took place in the Seminar of the Chapultepec Castle in Mexico City, which resulted
26 ‘The Law will regulate the exercise of those rights that Mexican legislation endows to Mexicans who hold 
another nationality, and will establish the rules to avoid dual nationality conflicts’. First paragraph, Article 32, 
Diario Oficial de la Federacion (5 February 1917). Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. 
Secretaria de Servicios Parlamentarios; Centro de Documentacion Informacion y Analisis, Camara de Diputados 
del H. Congreso de la Union.
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in a proposal for electoral reform that consisted of 60 points. Point 58 raised by 
Munoz Ledo, president of the PRD party, mentioned ‘to evaluate the possibility of 
establishing efficient mechanisms so that Mexican citizens residing abroad can 
exercise their right to vote’. According to fieldwork interviews, the vote abroad was 
initially part of the package proposed by Munoz Ledo, who was the first one to raise 
the issue of migrant political participation since 1976 and not necessarily the view of 
the party.
The final discussion on state reform ended with the Bucarelli Accords (in reference 
to the name of the street where the Ministry of the Interior was located) which 
contained 74 points divided into two sections -  constitutional and legal 
modifications. The vote of Mexicans abroad figured as point 14 of the constitutional 
reform. We should note that the PAN did not participate in the final phase of the 
Bucarelli accords and although its proposal included many of those precepts 
contained in the agreements, it did not refer to the vote of Mexicans abroad. During 
the discussions, however, the position of the Ministry of the Interior, led by Emilio 
Chauyffet Chemor of the PRI, was in favour of the status quo, that is, not allowing 
Mexican emigrants to vote due to ‘reasons related to logistics and sovereignty’ 
(unstructured interview, 2006). That is to say that the franchise should only take 
place within the national territory (Andrade 1997).
The constitutional reforms approved on August 22 of 1996 included a change to 
Article 36, which allowed citizens to vote outside their electoral districts. Indirectly, 
this opened the possibility for the vote abroad. However, migrants’ political 
participation (in the form of voting rights) was only permitted as long as migrants
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returned to Mexico to exercise this right. New secondary laws had to be created in
order to implement an absentee ballot system. The demand for the implementation of
an absentee voting system survived as transitory article 8 of the reforms to the
Federal Electoral Code (COFIPE) approved on 14 November 1996 that mentioned:
‘With the purpose of studying the modalities to allow Mexican citizens 
residing abroad to be able to exercise the right to vote in presidential 
elections, the General Council of the Federal Electoral Institute will 
design a commission of specialists to carry out the studies needed, 
proceeding to propose, if relevant, to the competing instances of the 
corresponding legal reforms once National Citizens’ Registry is created 
and in operation and the credentials of citizenship identity had been 
issued’ (published 22 November 1996).
The full exercise of dual citizenship rights, thus, became the main issue on migrants’ 
organisations’ and migrant activists’ political agendas. In particular, the ‘Coalition 
por los Derechos Politicos de los Mexicanos en el Extranjero’ (Coalition for the 
political rights of the Mexicans abroad) was created with the sole purpose of 
advancing this claim and ensuring that migrants had a voice in Mexican politics. The 
acknowledgment of the migrants’ right to vote by the head of the PRD during the 
Buccareli negotiations put migrant political participation at the heart of the 
democratic transition in Mexico.
3.3. Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that current state policies and legal 
reforms on migrants’ political inclusion and participation are historically 
unprecedented. For most of the 20th century the Mexican state maintained a low 
profile regarding migrants’ issues and even the most visible state initiatives were 
only those that promoted migrants’ return and settlement. In contrast, in the
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contemporary period current politically constructed state policies at the federal and 
state levels have not only been created to mediate the flows of transnational 
migration, as well as cultural production and human rights protection, but also 
increasingly political practice across borders. Such policies and legal reforms have 
been key elements through which Mexican transnational citizenship practices and 
state-migrants relationships are being constituted. These policies, as we have seen, 
have been mainly influenced by Mexico’s insertion in the global economy and, in 
particular, the approval of a free trade agreement with its Northern neighbours.
With the 1996 constitutional reforms, the idea of common ancestry -  even extending 
to Mexican-Americans -  rather than same residence has become central to the 
definition of the Mexican nation as one that transcends geopolitical boundaries. The 
shifting in the concept of Mexicanness from being one territorially-based to one 
centred on membership has been mainly borne out of competitive politics. Most 
importantly, dual nationality negotiations differed from early dual citizenship (or 
migrant political participation) debates in terms of who advocates them and why. 
Whereas the former was supported by the then-official-party PRI, as a way to 
promote the naturalisation of Mexicans abroad as US citizens and thus expand a 
migrant lobby in the US, the latter emerged from PRD and migrant civil society 
groups and became part of the Bucarelli’s electoral reforms, which were at the centre 
of Mexico’s democratic transition.
In the next chapter, I embark on the task of explaining how political rights at the 
federal level have been extended to Mexicans abroad. I show how political structures 
for migrants have opened up as a consequence of changes in the domestic
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institutional settings; in particular, a strong support from non-PRI political parties 
and the prominent advocacy role of a migrant lobby group -  the ‘Coalition para los 
Derechos Politicos de los Mexicanos en el Extranjero \
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Chapter 4
4. The transnational dimension of the vote abroad bill 
negotiations in Mexico
On July 2, 2006, for the very first time, Mexican expatriates were able to exercise the 
right to vote from abroad, in what has been described as the most competitive and 
bitter federal elections in the country’s post-PRI era. Although Mexican expatriates 
could only vote to elect a new president, domestic residents also voted to renew the 
entire 500-seat Lower Chamber and half of the 128-seat Senate. The novel exercise 
of Mexican citizenship beyond the legal territorial limits of the nation-state was 
preceded by a long and heated political debate in which not only the Mexican 
government and migrant groups were involved, but also civil society, the migrant 
business elite and domestic political parties. The vote abroad debate is a good 
example of how different political actors increasingly interact in a transitional 
democratic political arena and participate in the legal rewriting of the definition of 
the Mexican nation.
After having reviewed in the previous chapter how the Mexican state perspectives
and policies towards migrants have changed dramatically in the last few years and
argued that since 1988 the Mexican state has actively involved in policies and
activities to attempt to incorporate its migrant citizens in the cultural, social,
economic and political life of the state, without implying a need for a permanent
return to their homeland (efforts that were crystallised in the 1996 electoral and dual
citizenship constitutional reforms). In this chapter I analyse the causes that led the
vote abroad bill be approved in 2005 at the federal level, which is one of the most
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tangible expressions of how the notion of Mexicanness has shifted from being 
defined by territorial boundaries to one equivalent to membership. I try to answer 
the following questions: why was the vote abroad bill implemented? What actors 
and factors influenced and shaped this bill? Also, what kind of mechanisms did the 
different actors use?
Identifying the actors involved in the passage of the bill during the almost eight-year 
negotiation period -  since the first legal initiative was handed in at Congress in 1998, 
until the final bill was approved in 2005 - 1 argue that non-PRI parties and successful 
migrant groups’ involvement were the key determinants that led to the approval and 
final shape of the vote abroad legislation in 2005.1 show how the passage of the vote 
abroad bill is the reflection of how political opportunity structures for migrants have 
opened up as a consequence of democratisation and economic integration; whilst, on 
the other hand, Mexican migrant groups aware of their remittances’ economic 
leverage have become increasingly confident that they can affect political outcomes 
at home. In the past, migrant groups’ lack of interest was understandable, as it was 
believed many emigrants had crossed the border to escape ‘el mal gobiemo’ (bad 
government). A distinct type of migrant groups, I argue, is now being created with 
clear political goals and able to draw significant media attention having, in this way, 
a powerful impact on public opinion in both countries, highlighting the economic 
benefit they represent in the country of origin (sending remittances home), as well as 
the abuses to which they might be subject in a foreign land.
To date, the adoption of migrant political rights bills in countries of origin and the 
lobbying of expatriates for political rights have received uneven attention from
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scholars of democracy and regime change. Most scholarship has focused on the 
economic links of migrant populations to communities of origin and how they affect 
class structures at home and abroad. Less well studied, with a few exceptions, is the 
impact of emigration on the politics of the country of origin (Ostergaard-Nielsen 30 
June - 1 July 2001; Martinez Saldana 2003; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003; Ostergaard- 
Nielsen 2003). The following study provides an understanding on what the dynamics 
are behind the passage of bills that foster migrants’ political participation from 
abroad and what are the main actors that influence them. This study challenges the 
notions of ‘migrant-led’ or ‘bottom-up’ initiatives versus ‘state-led’ or ‘top-down’ 
approaches, used by many transnational scholars by giving the political system a 
more central role in the creation of a transnational public sphere (Goldring 1988; 
Smith R. 2001). Research on the vote abroad legislation in the Mexican case points, 
instead, to new bargain spaces where migrant groups, as new political actors in the 
domestic arena, meet revived political parties as a consequence of a political 
transition.
The innovative character of this chapter rests on providing an analysis of new types 
of migrant organisations which are not created to provide charitable contributions to 
their local communities (Delgado Wise and Rodriguez Ramirez 2001; Moctezuma 
Longoria 2001; Orozco and Lapointe 2004; Williams January 2004), but to actively 
lobby to further migrants’ political rights in their country of origin and to improve 
legislation in their host country, as well as furthering their motivations to create a 
transnational political sphere. Although migrant organisations have triggered the 
negotiation process on the vote abroad issue, research presented here shows that 
political parties’ and political blocs’ differences have nonetheless been decisive in
the approval of the vote abroad bill. I argue that political parties have not necessarily 
acted in a rational manner. Most of the time, they provide support for the vote 
abroad bill only when it matches their motivations and they predict to increase their 
votes with Mexicans abroad. Strategic interests, nonetheless, are blurred when parties 
go through phases of contestation, particularly over internal party candidacies. 
Although there are various points of divergence between the different political 
actors’ motivations to extend the franchise abroad, the main point of convergence is 
the belief that migrants’ voting rights are justified as part of Mexico’s 
democratisation, as well as the significance of their remittances, which could also be 
understood as a form of ‘buying membership’.
The arguments presented in this article are generated from print media, government 
data and interviews between 2005 and 2006 with key members of the Congress and 
Senate involved in the passage of the vote abroad bill, as well as members of the 
most active migrant lobby group, that is the ‘Coalition por los Derechos Politicos de 
los Mexicanos en el Extranjero (CDPME)’, leading figures from the main domestic 
institutions that were called to participate in the analysis of this bill at different 
events: the Federal Electoral Institute (IhE), Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME), 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE) and National Institute of Migration (INM), along 
with members of academia, migrant business elite and prominent migrant-rights 
advocates and opponents.
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4.1. The new transnational policy-making dynamics in 
Mexico
‘The negotiation of the vote abroad bill has been long and tough, a clear indication of 
the difficulties we are experiencing as a new democracy... it is only now that this is 
happening, with the PRI this would have never taken place’ (Jones July 2006) 
mentions the former PAN Senator Jeffrey Jones when questioned about the timing of 
the approval of the absentee vote bill. In turn, the director of the Centre of Migration 
Studies of the National Migration Institute (INI), Ernesto Rodriguez Chavez, affirms 
that the vote abroad initiative was part of the change presented in Fox’ migration 
policy, which also involved ‘boosting emigration in order to lower economic 
pressure, seizing remittances and negotiating a migration programme with the US 
(August 2006). Candido Morales, current president of the Institute of the Mexicans 
abroad and migrant leader in the US also mentions ‘... Fox had a crucial role 
supporting migrants political rights, but (the main actors) have been migrant groups 
themselves, the government is simply responding to migrants’ demands’ (Morales 
August 2006). These quotes summarise how the political scenario in Mexico is 
rapidly changing as democratisation and economic globalisation processes take place 
which have opened up political opportunity windows for national and bi-national 
actors such as opposition parties and migrant organisations.
In this section, I explore the factors that have favoured the adoption of policies that 
encourage Mexican migrants to participate in national development processes over 
the long term and from afar, policies that decouple residence and membership and 
extend the notion of the Mexican nation beyond state boundaries. I argue that 
Mexico’s democratic transition and its insertion in the global economy, mainly in the
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form of the adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have 
opened up political spaces for the three key players present in the transnational 
debate on migrants’ political rights. That is, opposition parties, US-based Mexican 
migrant groups and public opinion based in both countries.
First, Mexico’s democratic transition has meant the return of the policy-making 
process to the legislature, where the crystallisation of an initiative into law has to go 
through, more often than not, an intense negotiation. Political parties are then placed 
at the political centre stage and their positions and interests, as well as their number 
of seats in the legislature, are crucial for the adoption of new policies. To be true, the 
president still retains a significant influence on the policy-making process, but not as 
near as in the past. The Mexican authoritarian regime had two distinctive features, 
the hegemony of a single political party, the PRI and the concentration of power in 
the presidency. Throughout the years, the PRI president monopolised the other 
constitutional organs in the policy-making process as it also held a majority in both 
legislative branches of government.
Mexico’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy involved the dismantling of 
the hegemonic party system with two significant developments. First, in the 1997 
mid-term election, the PRI lost the absolute majority in the Congress for the first 
time since it was created in 1929. Second, in 2000 the PAN’s candidate Vicente Fox 
won the presidential elections, although his party failed to win the absolute majority 
in either chamber. Since then, Mexico has become a presidential democracy 
operating under divided government.
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However, what is the policy-making circuit operating in ‘el Mexico democratico’ 
(democratic Mexico)? The Mexican constitution establishes different policy-making 
procedures depending on the type of legislation. If the new policy is a constitutional 
reform, the bill has to gain the approval of two-thirds of both legislative chambers 
and be ratified by 16 of the 31 state legislatures. This procedure tries to provide 
constitutional law with a greater degree of stability than ordinary legislations. On the 
other hand, if the initiative does not require a reform to the Constitution, the 
procedure is less complicated. It involves only three actors: the Congress, the Senate 
and the president. The ordinary policy-making procedure requires only a majority in 
the Congress, a majority in the Senate and the president’s agreement in order for an 
initiative to become law. As displayed in the diagram below (Figure 4.1), the 
Mexican constitution imposes the necessity of bicameral cooperation and does not 
authorise the president to legislate by decree. Initiatives are often sent for analysis, 
workshops and discussions with specialists and authorities in the field before they are 
voted in the floor. During this burdensome process, commonly known in Mexico as 
‘la congeladora’ (‘the freezer’), initiatives can encounter deadlock if an agreement is 
not reached. During democratic contestation and with policy making taking place at 
the legislative level, this technique has become increasingly common27. However, 
these initiatives can still be recovered.
27 For instance, during the LIX legislature in the Congress, about 1,300 initiatives had been sent for analysis out 
of 1,600.
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Figure 4.1 Policy-making in Mexico (at the federal level)
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Thus, the initiative to extend voting rights to Mexicans abroad was an ordinary 
legislation as a previous 1996 constitutional reform to article 36 allowed Mexicans to 
vote outside their original electoral districts where they had been originally 
registered, as I previously explained in chapter 3 (22 August 1996). Thus, the legal 
initiatives presented by the different political actors -  executive, political parties and 
civil society groups -  since 1998 were mainly instructions of how to put this right 
into practice, in the form of amendments to the ‘Federal Code of Institutions and 
Electoral Procedures’ (COFIPE). In addition, several events and conferences were 
organised, reports were commissioned and specialist working groups were set up 
during those years28. Table 4.1 shows all 18 ‘vote abroad’ bills sent to the Lower
28 For instance, the IFE Special Commission set up in 1998; ‘Seminario Intemacional sobre el voto en el 
extranjero organised by the IFE in 1998; ‘Conferencia Trilateral Canada-Estados Unidos -M exico sobre el voto 
en el extranjero’ organised by the IFE in 1998; ‘Estudio Comparado sobre el voto en el extranjero’ organised by 
the IFE, the TEPJF and UN in 2002; IFE working group set up in 2004; ‘Aspectos cualitativos de los ciudadanos 
mexicanos en el extranjero durante la jornada federal del ano 2006 by ‘Colegio de la Frontera Norte’
140
Chamber between 1998 and 2005. With the exception of one initiative presented in 
1999 by opposition parties’ factions -  PAN, PRD, PT and PVEM, all the rest 
experienced deadlock. This initiative was supported by a majority in Congress (right 
after the PRI lost the absolute majority in this chamber) and was sent to the revision 
chamber. In the Senate, however, the PRI blocked it preventing migrants to vote in 
the 2000 presidential elections. What then explains why the ‘vote abroad’ bill was 
approved five years later even with the backing of the PRI? Understanding in general 
terms what factors trigger an ordinary legislation to be approved under divided 
government would help us to discover why the ‘vote abroad’ bill was eventually 
adopted and implemented for the first time in the 2006 presidential elections.
Table 4.1 Vote ab road  initiatives p resen ted  betw een  1998 and  2005
Status Year Political
Faction
Legislator(s)
Not
approved
1998 PRD Dip. Lazaro C a rd e n as  Batel
Not
approved
1998 PAN Dip. J o s e  d e  J e s u s  G onzalez  R eyes
Not
approved
1999 PAN Dip. Alberto Castilla P en iche
Not
approved
1999 PAN Dip. Alberto Castilla P en iche and  Jav ier 
A lgara C ossio
A pproved
in
C o n g ress
and
blocked 
in th e  
S e n a te
1999 PAN, 
PRD, PT 
and  
PVEM
D eputies from various parliam entary g roups
Not
approved
2000 PAN Dip. Felipe d e  J e s u s  P reciado  C oronado
Not
approved
2001 PRD Dip. Sergio A costa S a laza r
Not
approved
2001 PRD Dip. Gregorio Urias G erm an
Not
approved
2002 PRI, 
PAN, 
PRD and  
PVEM
S en . G enaro  Borrego E strad a  (PRI), S en . 
Jeffrey Max Jo n e s  (PAN), S en . Serafin  Rios 
A lvarez (PRD), and  S en . Emilia Patricia 
G om ez Bravo (PVEM)
Not
approved
2002 PRD Dip. Miguel Bortolli Castillo, Dip. Ram on Leon 
M orales, S en . J e s u s  O rteg a  M artinez and
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S en . Rutilio E scandon
Not
approved
2002 PAN S en . Luis Alberto Rico S am an iego
Not
approved
2003 PRI Dip. Irma Pineyro Arias
Not
approved
2003 PAN Dip. Eduardo R ivera P erez
Not
approved
2003 PRD S en . R aym undo C a rd e n as
Not
approved
2004 Federal
Executive
(PAN)
P residen t Fox
Not
approved
2004 PRD Dip. Ju an  J o s e  G arcia  O choa
A pproved
in
C o n g ress
2004 PRI Dip. Laura E lena M artinez Rivera
Not
approved
2005 PAN S en . C e sa r  Jauregu i R obles
Source: Own elaboration, information based on legal initiatives presented in the Congress and Senate between 
1998 and 2005
Nacif s model of policy-making under divided government in Mexico which relies 
consistently on Krehbiel’s model of pivotal politics is relevant here (Nacif 2005; 
Nacif March 2003). He argues that policy change in Mexico occurs when the 
political party controlling the executive branch is the same as the party in the median 
position regarding a policy issue, with the status quo and a liberal position at each of 
the extremes. That is, the number of legislators of the president’s party would be in 
the median position when it splits up the opposition in two halves and neither half 
has sufficient votes to form a majority. On the other hand, when the most-preferred 
policy of the president’s party is not median the picture turns more complicated as 
the president can exercise his/her veto power. According to Nacif s theory, in this 
case the outcomes vary depending on the position of the status quo policy with 
respect to ideal points of the president’s party and the median party.
Nacif s model, however, relies on the assumption of party coherence (among others), 
a political behaviour that does not correspond completely to the Mexican political
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reality. The belief that parties behave as unities and that there is a coherence within 
the parliamentary fractions of each party, between the factions at each legislative 
chamber, as well as between the presidency and party delegations, is based on the 
fact that Mexican politicians rely on the party label to advance their careers as 
running for re-election in consecutive terms is prohibited in the Mexican 
Constitution. However, as we will see in the discussion of the ‘vote abroad’ bill, in 
this transitional period personal interests often conflict with party interests and 
political loyalty is rare. During the approval of the ‘vote abroad’ bill in 2005, the 
PAN, a moderate supporter of migrants’ political participation, held the presidency 
and the median position regarding the stance on migrants’ political rights, with the 
PRI and the PRD at the conservative and liberal extremes both in the Congress and 
the Senate. However, as we will see, parties’ behaviour in the legislature was, more 
often than not, incongruent with their ideal points.
Moreover, this model of policy-making dynamics under divided government also 
excludes two players that have become more significant in democratic Mexico, that 
is, interest groups and the role of public opinion. The presence of interest groups and 
non-governmental organisations is also a feature of societies that have achieved a 
certain degree of openness and democratisation as the actual people and potential 
voters play a key role in the democratization movement (Whitehead 2003). In the 
transnational debate on migrants’ political rights, interest groups and public opinion 
acquire an international character because they are represented by US-based Mexican 
migrant groups and public opinion encompasses Mexicans in Mexico and in the US.
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It has been noted that the presence of international groups in Mexican politics is 
explained by regional economic integration. Lorena Cook argues that as Mexico 
embraces economic liberalisation, the formal recognition of this process in the form 
of the discussions surrounding the NAFTA facilitated transnational political action 
by non-state actors (Cook 14 May 2007; see also Fox 2004). As she mentions, ‘the 
NAFTA debate increased the contact points between international actors and the 
domestic political process in both the United States and Mexico and it expanded the 
possible arenas available to non-governmental actors for strategic action on a range 
of issues, not all of them pertaining strictly to NAFTA’. In fact, as we have seen, the 
Mexican government approached Mexican-Americans and Mexican migrant leaders 
in the US with the hopes that they could act as a ‘pro-Mexico’ lobby in Washington 
during the NAFTA negotiations. It should be noted, however, that it was not the first 
time that the Mexican government searched for a form of partnership with the 
Mexican community abroad, as Mexican migrant organisations had a long history of 
involvement in community development matching funds (‘3x1’) in partnership with 
local and state governments. However, the involvement of Mexican-American 
community leaders as a ‘pro-Mexico’ lobby stands out as the first time that a 
Mexican-origin migrant group aimed at impacting policy-making regarding Mexico 
in American territory.
US-based or bi-national based migrant groups have been key players in the 
transnational debate on migrants’ political rights and they have been able to lead the 
vote abroad campaign both in Mexico and the US. One of the most active groups has 
been the ‘Coalition por los Derechos de los Mexicanos en el Exterior’ (‘the 
Coalition for the Rights of Mexicans Abroad’). The role of the ‘Coalition ’ during the
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approval of the vote abroad bill in Mexico suggests that migrant groups’ political 
activity in their countries of origin is taking a more active tone. In the case of the 
‘Coalition’, this organisation was created with the sole purpose of advancing 
migrants’ political rights in Mexico. It was formed by the most prominent and active 
migrant leaders in the United States, successful entrepreneurs, as well as migrant 
rights’ activists and academics on the other side of the border. Members residing in 
Mexico were vital for successfully implementing the strategies and views from the 
rest of the group. As Raul Ross mentioned ‘the Coalition did not belong to any 
migrant hometown association or political party as it claimed to represent most 
migrants’ interests in being able to exercise their voice about Mexican political 
issues’ (Ross September 2006).
However, it would be misleading to suggest that all Mexican expatriates’ groups 
were in favour of and actively advocated political participation at home. The vote 
abroad issue divided public opinion, particularly among Mexican-American circles. 
Mexican-American or Latino groups, such as the League of United Latin-American 
Citizens (LULAC) and the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) originally 
manifested against dual nationals (whether Americans by birth or naturalised US 
citizens) voting in presidential elections in their country of origin in a survey carried 
out by the Mexican-American Solidarity Foundation {‘Fundacion Solidaridad 
Mexico-Americana’) in 1996 (Castaneda 2006, p. 143). Mexican-American 
organisations, nonetheless, have actively campaigned for the Latino vote in the US, 
in turn, supporting the Mexican absentee vote contravened their political interests. 
Specifically, according to the IFE Specialists Commission’s final report issued in 
1998, the reason why they opposed the absentee vote was twofold. Firstly, it raised
dual loyalty issues and advanced the debate on the lack of adaptation in the country 
of reception. Secondly, it could have a negative impact on the context of reception in 
the US. However, during final negotiations LULAC publicly supported the approval 
of the vote abroad bill (LULAC press release 2005).
It is necessary then to explore the motivations of these mainly Mexican migrant 
groups, in contrast to Mexican-American or Latino groups, in obtaining political 
participation in their home country, as well as to what extent they are able to 
influence policy-making and achieve their demands at home. The latter would also 
include the task of analysing how the state and different political parties and 
organisations in the country of origin may try to use such migrant rights lobby 
groups to further their own political agendas and vice versa.
(In addition, these two key political actors in the ‘vote abroad’ negotiations -  political 
parties and migrant groups -  have had to act in a transnational political field where 
public opinion encompasses Mexicans in Mexico and in the US. As a result of 
regional economic integration and the globalisation of communication technologies, 
public opinion in Mexico has become more aware of the fate of co-nationals abroad 
and vice versa. In particular, in recent years, Mexican media and Spanish-1 anguage 
media-networks in the US have focused on migrants rights’ abuses in the US, the 
difficulties Mexicans face abroad, the economic importance of migrants’ remittances 
and the pending US migration reform. Interestingly, a strong bi-national non-profit 
media has been developing in recent years that is produced or run simultaneously in 
communities in Mexico and the US (Fox November 4-5, 2005 ). For instance, the
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migrant-run Spanish language public radio network, ‘Radio Bilingue’ is broadcast on 
20 stations in Mexico and nearly 50 in the US29.
Thus, this discussion has argued that political parties, US-based migrant groups and 
bi-national public opinion have become important players in contemporary Mexico 
as a result of the democratisation processes that Mexico has experienced, as well as 
of the wider social effects of neo-liberal economic policies and economic integration 
embodied in the NAFTA. In particular, the policy-making process regarding 
migrants political rights has unfolded in a transnational field, where the debate in 
Mexico mirrors in the Mexican community in the US.
4.1.1. Main political actors’ positions on migrants’ political rights
The issue of migrants’ political participation from abroad has become a bone of 
contention in the course of the uneven democratic transition, embraced by some and 
resisted by others. Questions arise such as: What are the positions of the main 
political actors and their motivations? Why do the different Mexican political parties 
want to build a transnational political system? Who represents the migrant lobby 
group and why do they campaign for political participation at home? In this section, 
I suggest some explanations why the different political parties and migrant groups 
adopt particular stances on extending the franchise to Mexicans abroad. I note areas 
of convergence and divergence among the different political actors and I place their 
stances on a spatial dimension.
29 See www.radiobilingue.org
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At the time of legislative discussion, it was often predicted that around 4 million 
Mexicans could have with them an official voting credential and could potentially be 
able to cast a vote for the 2006 presidential elections. In turn, conceding the vote 
abroad represented a high-cost policy, both financially and politically. Thus, the 
political parties’ perception of migrant rights was mainly, I may argue, based on 
cost-benefit calculations. That explains why the PAN and the PRD have consistently 
supported extending the franchise and why the PRI has, for the most part, opposed it 
by fear of being voted against. Ideology nonetheless has also played a part and 
explains why the PRD, which has often proclaimed deepening democracy and 
incorporating previously excluded actors, has always favoured a more advanced 
migrants’ political rights bill. On the other hand, migrant groups lobbying for 
migrants political rights at home only started to emerge and grow in the last two 
decades, which coincides with the big increase in numbers of Mexican migrants in 
the US and the increasingly negative context of reception in that country. These 
migrant groups, I might argue, have been able to parlay the success of their collective 
remittances projects and the significance of their individual remittances for the 
country’s economy into greater political influence.
The Coalition's lobbying for political participation at home: (soy de aqui y soy de 
alia’30
The right to vote movement among the Mexican expatriate community notably 
emerged in the late 1980’s when migrant groups such as the ‘Asamblea Mexicana 
por el Sufragio Ejecutivo’ and the ‘Mexicanos por el Derecho al Voto en el
30 ‘I am from here and from there’
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Exterior\  (primarily based in California, Texas and Illinois), started lobbying among 
Mexican diplomats and visiting Mexican politicians. (Durand, 2004; Santamarfa 
Gomez, 2003: 74). Numbers of migrant lobby organisations multiplied in the 
following decade with groups like the ‘Coalicion Intemacional de Mexicanos en el 
Exterior (CIME) ’, ‘Organizaciones de Mexicanos en el Exterior' (OME), 
‘Asociacion Mundial de Mexicanos en el Exterior (AMME), ‘Fundacion Mexico\  
and the ‘Coalicion de Mexicanos en el Exterior Nuestro Voto en el 2000’ (Martinez 
Saldana and Ross Pineda 2002). The latter became one of the most active in the later 
stages of the debate and in 2001 was renamed the ‘Coalicion por los Derechos de los 
Mexicanos en el Exterior\  Efforts to achieve the expatriate vote, however, went back 
to 1926 when Ignacio Lozano, the founder of the Spanish-language newspaper 
published in the US -  ‘La Opinion’ -  advocated in his editorials the importance of 
maintaining this political privilege abroad (Truax 19 de junio de 2006).
In recent years, mobilisations to demand the vote abroad involved various strategies, 
from signing petitions handed in at consulates or directly sent to the Mexican 
congress, to organising social forums and conferences on the subject across the US 
and in Mexico. Moreover, the Internet and Spanish-language media were used as 
strategic tools to mobilise groups in a bi-national fashion. Virtual elections were 
organised in various US cities during presidential election time in Mexico before the 
right to vote abroad was approved. On 6th July 1988 more than 10,000 Mexican 
migrants voted in virtual elections carried out in California, Texas and Illinois. They 
were then repeated in 1994 and in the year 2000. In the latter, more than 16,000 
people participated (Martinez Saldana and Ross Pineda 2002). But who are the ‘vote 
abroad’ activists? Why do they want to participate politically in the country they left
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behind? Raul Ross replies: ‘we are envious here. With democratization emerges the 
reappraisal of the vote in Mexico. There is this natural desire to be part of something’ 
(April, 2008).
A noticeable dimension of political migrant organisations is their tendency to put 
organising in the hands of better-off, more-established expatriates. As associations 
with bi-national activities are formalised and directed more toward raising funds and 
lobbying for political support in both countries, leadership generally falls to migrants 
who have been in the US longer and are better established financially and 
professionally. They represent what has been described as ‘new elites’, which are 
formed by certain groups of migrants that have benefited by having migrated and 
have the time and resources ‘to live abroad and act at home’ (Goldring 1988; 
Guamizo 1998). I would argue that as political spaces open for their inclusion, we 
are seeing a realignment of political power, albeit to a limited extent, where migrants 
occupy more prominent political roles.
The ‘Coalicion por los Derechos de los Mexicanos en el Exterior’, which was the 
most active migrant lobby group during the ‘vote abroad’ negotiations in Mexico 
included not only some of the most prominent migrant leaders in the US, for instance 
Raul Ross, Jesus Martinez and Luis Pelayo and successful migrant entrepreneurs 
across various US cities such as Carlos Olamendi, who is now Mexico-US adviser to 
the California governor, but also academics and migrants’ rights activists residing in 
Mexico; for instance, Leticia Carderon Chelius and Miguel Moctezuma Longoria. 
Thus, the ‘Coalition’ is a bi-national association, whose founders and most active 
members in the US are able to engage with their migrant communities whilst
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members in Mexico raise awareness of their demands and put pressure on the 
Mexican congress.
It follows, then, that the bi-national composition of migrant lobby groups by 
experienced migrant leaders and migrants’ rights activists, as well as their 
connections with the Spanish-language media in the US and the Mexican media have 
made these groups able to influence transnational public opinion as well as Mexican 
policymakers. Firstly, migrant rights activists are not alien to the Mexican political 
culture. Migrant leaders have had exposure to government negotiations whilst 
discussing ‘two for one’ or ‘three for one’ partnership programmes and also through 
their participation in the Consultative Counsel of Mexicans Abroad. Secondly, 
migrants have the comparative advantage of being able to be a magnet for media 
attention in the US as much as in Mexico. As it is mentioned by interest groups 
scholars, the success of interest groups politics is contingent upon a group’s ability to 
expand or control an issue (Terkildsen 1998). I would argue that the ‘C o a lic io n as 
well as other advocacy migrant groups and hometown associations, were successful 
at defining the vote abroad issue over time and adapting it to fit the changing 
political and social climate.
Many of the members of the ‘Coalicion ’ led or had close connections to the Spanish- 
language media in the US. Raul Ross, for instance, was director of ‘MX Sin 
Fronteras’ a Spanish-language monthly magazine published in the US that addresses 
issues that concern the Mexican and Chicano community in the US. Dozens of 
articles have been written by the ‘Coalicion ’ members since 2001. The Coalicion’s 
strong connections to the Spanish-language media in the US were also a smart
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weapon to use when negotiations with the various political parties or individual 
policy-makers trembled. As Primitivo Rodriguez put it ‘when we realised that the 
vote abroad bill was about to be left out we threatened to tell the media who was 
really responsible for that. They would always say: please wait’ (Primitivo 
Rodriguez June 2006).
However, if migrant rights advocators are mainly Mexican-Americans already 
integrated in the US, why campaign for political participation at home? ‘bi­
nationality is wonderful’ begins to answer Primitivo Rodriguez, member of the 
‘Coalicion\  ‘it is not a matter of political loyalties... ‘I am from here and I am from 
there’. In the past, due to political and social discrimination, migrants used to say ‘I 
am not from here, neither from there’...But now what happens in both countries 
affects my life and in both countries I have enough reasons to be part of their 
democratic lives’. Most research done by Moctezuma Longoria also emphasises this 
bi-nationality dimension of Mexican migrants and explains that ‘due to transport and 
communication technologies, Mexican migrants are now able to be ‘here’ and ‘there’ 
at the same time; they travel back and forth, telephone their relatives constantly and 
also send remittances home regularly, they already exercise a social and economic 
bi-nationality, which should be compensated by a bi-national political dimension’ 
(Moctezuma Longoria September 2006). Migrant rights advocators emphasise the 
importance of bi-nationalism, a term coined to explain migrants’ simultaneous social, 
cultural, economic and political participation in both countries. Being able to 
participate in Mexico’s political developments from abroad is then seen as a 
complement to their social, cultural and economic exchanges. It is debatable; 
however, to what extent all Mexican migrants can participate in both countries. It
may be that the term bi-national could only apply to a small percentage that has the 
legal, economic and time resources to be able to engage simultaneously in two 
polities.
Migrant rights activists also portray themselves as agents of change. Consequently, 
they would often refer to the democratic transition in Mexico and argue that 
‘Mexican democracy would not be complete without (them)’ (Olamedi July 2006). 
In interviews, voting abroad activists spoke quite uniformly of their activities as a 
challenge to a well-established ‘clasepolitico.’ (political class) and argued that public 
officials have excluded them from politics for fear that they would be overwhelmed 
by migrant leverage and numbers. They spoke angrily about endemic corruption in 
Mexico, and about corporatist practices, whereby groups were used by politicians. 
Others mentioned that they would be indeed interested in participating politically in 
Mexico and open more channels of communication between their home country and 
Mexican migrant communities in the US.
Paradoxically, even though some of the ‘Coalition’s members have participated in 
Mexican politics -  some have actually run for elections, mostly with PRD 
candidacies -  the organisation is portrayed as a non-partisan political actor. As 
Primitivo Rodriguez said, ‘we do not have a president, a manifesto, secretary, main 
address or even a phone number, but most importantly we do not have ‘padrinos 
politicos’ (political godfathers)’ (Primitivo Rodriguez June 2006). As mentioned in 
several field interviews, very often political parties and individuals offered the 
Coalicion’s members to finance their campaign, but the latter always turn them 
down. Instead, the ‘Coalicion’s activities were financed by members’ donations and
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they also accepted funds if invited to conferences and events. As Raul Ross stated, 
by maintaining a political neutrality, the ‘Coalicion’ has worked as a ‘political 
bridge’ (Ross September 2006). ‘At the same time’, Ross mentioned on a different 
occasion, ‘we wanted all, but we had to focus on the absentee vote for presidential 
elections. The ‘Coalicion’ had to have a very concrete plan that could be carried 
forward. If we had a varied agenda, politicians would lead us up the garden path. We 
agreed on the lowest common denominator’ (Chicago, April 2008).
Thus, the ‘Coalicion’ like other ‘vote abroad’ lobby organisations has been careful to 
maintain a democratic structure and to create a large and unified base of active 
members. In fact, the ‘Coalition's ‘vote abroad’ proposal was the outcome of 
various forums in the US in which more than 500 Mexicans and Mexican-Americans 
in the US, as well as 60 hometown associations’ presidents and academics 
participated (fieldwork interviews). The proposal was finalised in April 2003 and 
was presented, three months latter, to the Mexican Congress, political parties, the 
CON AGO, the IFE and both the media in the US and Mexico. It contained the 
following main points:
• The vote abroad ‘does not harm the electoral system nor national sovereignty, 
instead it represents the Mexican state’s confidence and credibility’ (CDPME’s 
proposal, 2003)
• It requested migrants’ political rights by stages. First, vote abroad for president 
in 2006. Second, vote for congress members in 2009. Third, by 2012 vote to elect 
legislators in both chambers
• It supported the use of voting credentials as a proof of identification
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• It was also in favour of granting voting credentials in American territory
• It also supported the exercise of political campaigns abroad, although restricted 
the occurrence of donations by Mexicans residing abroad
• In terms of the modality of the vote, the proposal included mail, telephone, 
Internet, and electronic vote. It did not approve the use of the ballot box as it was 
considered more difficult to implement, costly and could facilitate fraud ((CDPME) 
2003).
The main characteristic of the ‘Coalition's proposal was the request for gradual 
political rights. In fact, the vote abroad for presidential elections was only the first of 
their demands, which should be complemented by, for instance, voting for legislators 
and being able to run for elections at a later stage.
Interestingly, the pattern of transnational politics described in this section poses the 
question of whether the intervention of migrants in their homeland politics changes 
its political order. The entrance of migrant associations like the ‘Coalicion’ into 
Mexican politics appears as a sign of the escalating power that migrant organisations 
have over government and legislative affairs in their country of origin, based on the 
increasingly visible individual and collective migrants’ remittances and the 
resonance of their message across transnational public opinion. However, their 
intention to secure voting rights in their home country might only satisfy a small 
percentage of migrants that can afford a bi-national life and participate in both 
countries’ developments at the same time. They are to be seen, nonetheless, as the 
true promoters of integration in the North American region. Also, as they are able to 
exert more pressure on the Mexican legislative, they can then improve their position
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vis a vis the American Congress. It should be noted, however, that some might also 
do it for more personal reasons, as they may be interested in launching a political 
career back home or attain leadership positions within Chicano circles.
The centre-left PRD party as main supporter of migrantsf political rights 
The centre-left PRD has been from the start one of the main advocators of migrants’ 
political rights. As has already been noted, ‘perredistas’ (PRD militants) claim to 
have existed in the US since the party was founded back in 1989 and from then on 
they have embarked on the task of gaining support amongst Mexicans abroad. At the 
beginning of the new millennium, the party did not only open up new state 
committees in the US, but has also institutionalised migrants’ participation within the 
party by reforming party manifestos and electoral programmes. In particular, it has 
included migrants in their ‘plurinominaT lists for congressional positions at both 
national and local levels and has widely advocated for migrants’ rights bills at the 
local level. As this study argues, the PRD has responded to migrants groups’ 
demands and has secured local migrants’ political rights bills in migrant-sending 
states where it has had control of the executive branch of government and has held a 
simple majority of seats in the local congress, such as the case of Zacatecas, and 
Michoacan or an absolute majority like the case of Mexico City.
However, why has the PRD endlessly promoted migrants’ political participation,
particularly the vote abroad bill at the national level? When asked this question, in
the first instance, all PRD legislators resorted to the democracy and human rights
argument. The former PRD senator Raymundo Cardenas mentioned that ‘our
‘paisanos' were forced to emigrate due to the lack of opportunities in this country. It
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was not their decision to leave (...) so, it is our obligation to include them in the new 
Mexico we want to build, an inclusive Mexico, a Mexico for all, for migrants, for 
women, for indigenous, for the youth’ (Raymundo Cardenas June 2006). Those 
discourses were often accompanied by complaints about the failure of neo-liberal 
policies to incorporate productive sectors of society. As the ex- legislator and former 
secretary of the Commission on Population, Borders and Migratory issues, Rosa 
Maria Aviles Najera, mentioned: ‘it is about time for the PRI to recognise that they 
could not offer those people the basic opportunities to prosper [...] but with Fox 
(PAN) things have not changed, about 3 million compatriots have left the country 
[...] this is a consequence of wrong neo-liberal policies that favour some, but affect 
others, especially the poor. So, it is for us to protect our citizens abroad to offer them 
what they are denied in the US [...] ’(Najera June 2006).
On the other hand, most responses also highlighted the significance of migrants’ 
contributions to Mexico’s development by sending remittances to their relatives back 
home, while a few referred to the dangers and human rights abuses that migrants 
might experience when crossing the border. The former PRD congress-man Emilio 
Zebadua (now aligned with the ‘Nueva Alianza’ party) argued that ‘it is our 
obligation to expand the franchise to Mexicans abroad. Those Mexicans have 
escaped poverty, but they have not forgotten about their families. They keep sending 
remittances home and that is how their own families survive. We failed them and we 
owe them this right’ (Emilio Zebadua June 2006). The former congressman and 
coordinator of the PRD faction in the Congress, Pablo Gomez Alvarez mentioned 
that ‘you cannot play with people that send 16 thousand million pesos a year. Mexico 
depends on remittances. It shows that they care and they are committed to participate
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in Mexico’s democracy and development from afar’ (Pablo Gomez Alvarez Summer 
2006).
Thus, the democracy and human rights discourse mentioned by most interviewees 
highlights the fact that the PRD’s support for migrants’ political rights satisfied the 
ideological underpinnings of the party. Even when the ‘vote abroad’ bill was 
attacked in congress due to its financial costs that would exceed more than 300 
million pesos, PRD legislators mentioned that the bill was nonetheless necessary 
(Becerril 25 February 2005). However, party legislators also perceived granting 
migrants’ right to vote in the presidential elections as a reward for the economic 
contributions in the form of remittances that migrants make, which can be interpreted 
as a form of ‘taxation without representation’.
In terms of cost-benefit calculations, the PRD predicted to be the party that would 
benefit the most from extending the franchise because of its long and persistent 
support for migrants’ political rights. Whilst the party looked for new adherents 
across the border, they realised the political potential that migrants represent in terms 
of votes. Although the first hometown groups in Los Angeles, San Jose and Chicago 
did not directly intervene in political activities, the leaders traditionally supported the 
former ruling PRI party. However, the virtual elections that took place in 1988 and 
1994 revealed that migrants were also sympathetic to the PRD and PAN. On both 
occasions the votes that went to the leftist PRD outnumbered the PRI’s, followed by 
the PAN in third place. Only in 1994 in Dallas, did the PAN succeed in getting the 
highest number of votes (Santamarfa Gomez 1999-2000).
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Therefore, the PRD’s early support for migrants’ rights can be understood as a 
reflection of a broader paradigm shift that is taking place in much of the Latin 
America left that oppose authoritarian regimes and calls for a deepening of 
democracy through the incorporation of previously excluded social actors by 
promoting, for instance, indigenous’, migrants’ or homosexuals’ rights. Migrants, 
however, are distinguished from any other excluded social group in terms of the 
contributions they make in the form of remittances.
Consequently, the centre-left PRD has also been the most ambitious to extend 
citizenship in practice. Their original legal initiatives emphasised migrants’ right to 
vote not only for president, but also for legislators; the right to vote abroad by ballot, 
mail, telephone and electronically; the right to obtain a voting credential in the place 
of residence without having to return to Mexico because as it was noted ‘many of 
them are undocumented’; and the right to have proportional representation in the 
Congress and Senate. In particular, it was the only political party (and faction in the 
federal congress) that proposed a migrant candidate for the 2006 elections (Gomez 
12 April 2004). The PRD legislators also advocated strict regulation of the electoral 
campaigns abroad (Sandoval De Escurdia and Paz Richard 2004; Dardon Velazquez 
July 2005 ). It was also mentioned, however, that the party was willing to negotiate 
with the other political factions to guarantee the absentee vote, as long as there was a 
commitment to secure the absentee vote for presidential elections and allow the 
issuance of new voting credentials abroad.
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President FOX and the PAN party’s vision of a North American community 
Former PAN President Vicente Fox caused heated controversy by calling economic 
migrants ‘heroes’ for providing the country’s second largest source of foreign 
income. PAN’s support for migrants political rights, especially the vote abroad, can 
be traced back to the Fox presidential campaign, when, as I have already mentioned, 
he encouraged migrants in California to call their relatives in Mexico and request 
them to vote for him; in return he promised to guarantee migrants’ human rights 
protection abroad and to support the migrant vote (Anderson May 9, 2000). As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the Fox administration has marked a shift in 
government’s attitudes towards Mexican emigrates that commenced with the PRI’s 
Salinas administration. Under his administration, the party began to build a 
representative structure in the US and similarly to the PRD, it encouraged migrant 
members to participate within the party ranks.
As Fox said ‘the vote of the Mexicans abroad means as a big step in the construction 
of a truly democratic society in Mexico, in which we would finish with unjust 
political discrimination’ (BBC. 16 June 2004). The former PAN Senator Jeffrey Max 
Jones who chaired the Borders Affairs Commission at the time of the ‘vote abroad’ 
negotiations also argued that ‘the support for the vote abroad responds to two 
phenomena. On the one hand, Mexico is achieving a democratic transition and Fox is 
the main engine of that, and on the other, these are difficult times [...] we are part of 
economic globalisation, Mexico has had to join in for its own benefit [...] during 
NAFTA negotiations, the PRI government had to rely on the Mexican-American 
lobby, we rely on Mexican expatriates’ remittances [...] it is also part of the
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commitments we have acquired signing the various international human rights 
treaties [...] Fox has been aware of all that’ (Jones July 2006).
In particular, most PAN respondents put special emphasis on the need to manage 
migration, instead of preventing it whilst promoting patriotic feelings among 
expatriates. Consequently, guaranteeing political rights would ‘provide migrants the 
means to be part of Mexico wherever they live’ (Jones July 2006). The former PAN 
deputy and member of the Commission on Population, Borders and Migratory issues, 
Jose Isabel Trejo Reyes, said in an interview ‘we don’t have to distress ourselves 
saying that we have to stop the migration phenomenon. I believe in the 
administration of the migration resources. I think that we have been integrated into 
the American economy as a matter of fact for 100 years and therefore we should 
search for the best way to channel those migration resources, a part or a percentage, 
such as the 4x1 projects [...] but that one who believes that the migratory flow can 
be stopped is being deluded [...]’ (Jose Isabel Trejo Reyes July 2006). Former 
deputy and also member of the Commission, Pablo Alejo Lopez Nunez argued that 
‘Mexican citizens will continue crossing the border until Mexico can achieve a 
similar level of development as our neighbouring country, but that will not happen 
for some years. There are 10 million Mexicans already there that will not come back, 
but many of their friends and relatives stayed behind and they continue to help them 
economically month by month. [As you have seen] there is a big majority that did 
not want to vote in Mexican elections, but we still had to grant them their right, that 
is the achievement, you cannot force them to vote’ (Pablo Alejo Lopez Nunez July 
2006).
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In a similar vein, former deputy and member of the Commission of External 
Relations, Rodrigo Ivan Cortes Jimenez, said that ‘it is evident that in the US there is 
a demand for labour. In Mexico, it is evident that there is a labour suply. What we 
need to do is to resolve this. Around 44 million baby boomers will retire in the US 
and that will imply maintaining an economy with ‘fresh blood and energy’, Mexico 
is losing its demographic bonus [...] the vote abroad is an instrument that strengthens 
the vulnerable situation of our countrymen that live and work there, so we can then 
demand the rights that they (Americans) deny them’ (Rodrigo Ivan Cortes Jimenez 
July 2006). Several PAN respondents placed the migration phenomenon as part of 
economic globalisation signalling both the push factors in Mexico, as well as the pull 
aspect of the American economy. In particular, during legislative negotiations when 
the PRD and PRI factions attacked the PAN and Fox administration for not providing 
a strong economic structure and job creation to deter migration, PAN legislators, 
most often than not, blamed all the political class in the country, specifically 
legislators, for not reaching agreements and affecting the country’s competitiveness.
In contrast to the PRD’s position on migrants’ political participation that might be 
seen as more ideology-based, the PAN perceived the vote abroad as a symbolic 
gesture that would foster patriotic sentiments among Mexican expatriates who would 
remain loyal to their home country and keep sending remittances home. Also, they 
saw it as a sign of commitment to protect migrants’ rights in the US considering that 
migration is not likely to decrease as economic integration and globalisation 
progress.
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The PAN, on the other hand, also acted on the belief that it could count on migrant 
electoral support. Although during the Fox administration, Mexico-to-US migration 
flows did not decrease as it is estimated that at least 2 million people emigrated 
during his term in office (Meza 24 Agosto 2006), the former deputy Rodrigo Ivan 
Cortes Jimenez rightly affirmed that ‘[Fox’] government had historic achievements 
in destroying the oblivion in which we had placed Mexican migrants’ (Rodrigo Ivan 
Cortes Jimenez July 2006). Indeed, as I have already described in the previous 
chapter, Fox multiplied existing programmes and policies towards migrants, as well 
as institutionalising channels of participation such as the Council of Mexicans 
Abroad which acts as a forum in which elected migrant leaders and Mexican 
politicians can discuss bi-national problems; as well as creating institutions such as 
the Institute of Mexicans Abroad, whose purpose is to liaise with Mexican 
communities abroad. In terms of electoral gains, although migrant preferences 
towards the PAN were uncertain, the party was aware that Fox was favoured by 
migrants during the 2000 elections and continued to have acceptance within the 
Mexican migrant community in the US during his time in office.
PAN’s legislative proposals were, nonetheless, cautious and restrictive and limited 
the number of migrants that could vote in the 2006 presidential elections. Most 
PAN’s legislators and president Fox’ proposals only supported a reform that granted 
the vote abroad to those migrants that already had a voting credential and rejected 
any other type of political participation such as migrants being able to stand for 
elections or count on parliamentary representation. In addition, presidential 
candidates could not campaign abroad (Noticias 16 June 2004). Once the modality 
of the vote was being negotiated, the PAN advocated the mail vote. Although more
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limited than PRD proposals, the PAN posture was consistent with the Fox campaign 
promises and migration policies.
The PRI’s divided support to extend democracy abroad
The PRI’s opposition to the expatriate vote can be read, at least in part, as fear of a 
widespread anti-PRI sentiment among migrant communities that still see the PRI as a 
source of seven decades of corruption and a stagnated economy that forced them to 
emigrate to the US in the first place. As it has been signalled, the turning point was 
the 1988 election which brought Carlos Salinas de Gortari to the presidency under 
accusations of electoral fraud which prompted mobilisation in the US (Levitt 4 July 
2003). According to the Mexican consul in Los Angeles, California at that time: 
‘one of the greatest marches against the outcome of the (1988) election took place in 
Los Angeles. This led to an awakening in Mexican political circles. The Mexican 
government realised that there are many anti-PRI Mexicans living in California who 
return periodically to their communities and have influence in Mexico. This 
recognition took place in the context of a radical reformulation of Mexico’s foreign 
policy. What we want to do now is build bridges with the Mexican community’ 
(Dresser 1993) p.94]. Since the early 1990’s, the PRI tried to extend strategies of 
political cooptation, albeit unsuccessfully, to migrant communities. In comparison to 
other parties, the PRI has lagged behind in building a party structure abroad, in 
particular, PRI committees abroad are still not officially recognised (Armando Reyes 
Mendez September 2006). Thus, the presence of the PRI in American territory is 
mainly symbolic and seems to diminish as the party looses Mexican votes abroad 
(see Chapter 5).
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This explains why the PRI did not submit any legal initiative to the Congress while it 
still had hold of the executive branch of government. However, after the party failed 
to win the presidency in the year 2000, the debate on migrants’ political rights 
divided the party among those who wanted the party to support the ‘vote abroad’, as 
a way to remedy past neglect of Mexican migrants and win their support and, on the 
other hand, a more conservative wing that felt the party could not do anything to 
prevent rejection and was better off by maintaining the status quo. Understandably, 
party members abroad supported the former. Armando Reyes Mendes, Vice- 
president of Migrant Vanguard in the Midwest and PRI member, mentioned that the 
PRI would only value ‘priistas ’ (PRI militants) abroad if the vote abroad was 
approved ‘it is a cruel reality but if we Mexicans abroad are treated as second-class 
citizens [...] with more reason ipriistas> abroad that even though we campaign for 
the political platform of the party, we do not exist in the party’s basic documents, not 
even by mistake’ (Armando Reyes Mendez September 2006). On the other hand, the 
former secretary of the Commission on Population, Borders and Migratory issues 
and PRI deputy Emilio Badillo Ramirez stressed: ‘but what migrants want to vote 
for? What they want is to have rights in the US. What do they want to vote for? What 
do we want them to vote for? They are not interested [...] the vote abroad was a true 
failure.. .1 told them... it was the wish of the few.. .migrants are simply not interested 
in voting’ (Emilio Badillo Ramirez Augoust 2006).
My research also reveals that the ‘vote abroad’ issue exacerbated a fracture within 
the PRI that arose during the primary elections to designate the party presidential 
candidate for the 2006 election, between those that supported Roberto Madrazo and 
those who aligned with the candidacy of Senator Enrique Jackson (fieldwork
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interviews with legislators, 2006). One prominent PRI politician interviewed 
mentioned that this created mainly a division between the two chambers, as while the 
Congress mainly supported the former, most ‘priistas’ in the Senate supported 
senator Enrique Jackson. As a consequence, I would argue, there was no coherence 
between the two party factions in both chambers. For instance, after having blocked 
a ‘vote abroad’ bill to be implemented for the 2000 presidential elections, the PRI 
legislator Laura Martinez went beyond most previous proposals by four years later 
submitting a legal initiative that supported the installation of ballot boxes in voting 
centres abroad, as well as in consulates and allowed the issuance of new voting 
credentials abroad. However, the version supported by the PRI faction in the Senate 
stood at the other extreme, PRI senators promoted the postal vote modality and a 
more restrictive absentee system.
PAN and PRD legislators, as well as migrant leaders, said that the bill presented by 
the PRI faction in the Lower Chamber was received with suspicion. Many legislators 
thought that it was a way to ensure its deadlock without having to be seen as 
accountable for it. Migrant leaders, in turn, argued that ‘the modality that the PRI 
proposed in the Congress did not favour (them), there are many undocumented 
Mexicans in the US that would not dare to vote in Mexican consulates without 
fearing 7a migra’ (border police) (Ross September 2006). As Primitivo Rodriguez, 
active member of the ‘Coalicion* put it: ‘we were in the middle of a war between 
two different wings of the party, Senator Silvia Hernandez repeatedly told us that we 
had to be careful of the ‘priistas’ in the Chamber; they did not want the vote 
(abroad)’ (Primitivo Rodriguez June 2006).
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All in all, the PRI did not have a unified position on extending the franchise to 
Mexican expatriates; while the most liberal wing of the party proved in favour and 
saw it as a strategy to improve the party’s image among Mexican communities 
abroad, more conservative party members, on the other hand, would mainly fear not 
only losing votes, but also opening the door of domestic politics to potential 
adversaries abroad.
To sum up, as we have seen, Mexico’s transition to democracy and political party 
competition has opened up spaces within which transnational political opportunity 
structures are constructed. In this way, political parties, as well as migrant lobby 
organisations, promote the construction of a transnational arena. However, migrants’ 
political participation in Mexican politics is moulded by different and sometimes 
conflicting interests. Migrants’ political rights might mainly fulfil the ideological 
underpinnings of the PRD or facilitate PAN’s advocacy of regional integration or it 
might prompt divisions within the once long-time ruling PRI, between those who 
want to make up for excluding ‘the migrant’ from the national memory and those 
who still fear anti-PRI widespread sentiment and debate national sovereignty over 
internal affairs. A point of convergence among all political forces, nonetheless, has 
been the significance of migrants’ remittances. According to all political factions, it 
justifies migrants’ political participation in home affairs and could be interpreted as a 
form of ‘buying membership’. Migrant groups, in turn, seek regional integration 
through the notion of bi-nationality that would eventually allow them to participate 
not only culturally, socially and economically in both countries, but also politically. 
Although bi-nationals might be small in number, they represent a new transnational
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elite with the power to influence transnational public opinion and thus pressure both 
governments.
Table 4.2 summarises the political parties’, migrant lobby groups’ and government 
institutions’ main postures on the issues related to Mexican migrants’ political 
participation from abroad. The information shown is based on an analysis of the 19 
legal initiatives presented to the Congress between 1998 and 2005, including a 
proposal from the ‘Coalicion’ and fieldwork interviews with the main proponents 
and supporters of the various bills. It also includes the position of the Federal 
Electoral Institute according to specialist reports and the comments made by IFE’s 
senior officials prior to the approval of the vote abroad bill ((Zarate, 6 April 2004; 
Ferrer, 24 February 2004). In a private meeting between the PAN party and the 1FE, 
most of the IFE’s councillors advised not to implement the absentee vote for the 
2006 elections, nor to issue new voting ID’s abroad. The main reasons given were 
operational constraints as they believed that the Institute did not have the time and 
the technological means as well as a sufficient budget (Zarate, 6 April 2004).
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Table 4.2 Main political actors’ stand on the vote abroad issue
Political parties Main position voting
rights
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No................
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supported  the  
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Mail vote
PAN-
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Y es Mail vote No No No
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electronic 
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Source: Own elaboration with information from 35 interviews with legislators and members of the CDPME and 
legal initiatives
4.2. The approval of the vote abroad bill
Thus far, we have highlighted the current policy-making dynamics in Mexico and the
interests and motivations of each of the political actors involved in allowing Mexican
expatriates political participation in domestic affairs by granting them the right to
vote for presidential elections. In this section, we analyse how political parties and
the ‘Coalicion’ were able to trade off interests during legislative negotiations,
highlighting what were the main determinants of political coalitions. In particular,
the main question is: What determined the legal approval of the national vote abroad
bill? Also, what accounts for the change in rhetoric and position of the PRI once the
‘vote abroad’ bill was being negotiated? I argue that PRD’s and PAN’s alliance with
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the ‘Coalicion ’ and their ability to trade their ideal points in order to defeat the status 
quo on the floor, as well as a political fracture within the PRI party due to differences 
arising during the internal elections for presidential candidate were the main factors 
leading to the passage of the bill. The latter discussion, then, shows that there was 
not only a division within the PRI, but also that organised labour in Mexico, mainly 
teachers’ and peasants’ unions, once the strongest pillar of support of the PRI, were 
also increasingly aware of the potential gains of allying with Mexicans abroad. 
Previous studies have shown how the adoption of liberal economic policies during 
the last PRI administrations had already been resented by labour groups (Schatz 
2000).
*Y todos ganamos!’ (and we all won!) recounts Primitivo Rodriguez, member of the 
‘Coalicion por los Derechos Politicos de los Mexicanos en el Extranjero * when he 
remembers the historical day in which the vote abroad bill was approved, the very 
last day amendments to the Federal Code of Institutions and Electoral Procedures 
(COFIPE) could be made. ‘We knew that the final bill was very restrictive and 
would be difficult to implement, but it meant the first step...’ (Primitivo Rodriguez 
June 2006). Indeed, the final bill approved on 30 June 2005 only allows Mexican 
expatriates to vote to elect the president in Mexico and to do so they need to already 
have an official voting credential. They also had to sign up for a new migrant voters 
register by certified mail attaching a copy of their official voting ID and a copy of a 
proof of address before the 15 January 2006 (in order to vote before 2 July 2006). 
Moreover, voting credentials could not be issued abroad and migrants could only 
apply for one if they returned to Mexico to do so. Political campaigns abroad were 
also restricted as well as any financial aid from Mexican nationals living abroad.
As we saw, since 1997 the Mexican Congress has slowly begun to evolve and 
conduct business as a true legislature when no single party has held the absolute 
majority in Congress and the opposition has assumed a greater role. Table 4.3 below 
shows the political composition of the Lower Chamber and the Senate between 2003 
and 2006, the main period in which the vote abroad bill was debated, where it can be 
observed that no single party held the absolute majority in both houses. As we know, 
for an initiative to become law in the Mexican context, it has to be approved by the 
Lower House and then by the Senate. If the latter makes any amendments, it has to 
be approved again by the Lower House.
T able 4.3 Allocation of s e a ts  in federal co n g re ss  and  th e  S e n a te  (2003-2006)
Allocation of Seats in the 59th Legislature (2003-2006)
Party Congress Senate
PRI 203 41% 57 45%
PAN 148 30% 47 37%
PRD 97 19% 15 12%
PVEM 17 3% 5 4%
Independen t 24 5% 4 3%
C onvergencia 5 1% 0%
PT 6 1% 0%
Total 500 100% 128 100%
According to Nacif s model of policy-making under divided government in Mexico, 
the vote abroad bill was likely to be approved in both chambers. Taking into account 
the different general political parties’ positions regarding the vote abroad issue that 
we have already discussed in the previous section and the number of seats that each 
party had, the PAN was both the political party controlling the executive and the 
party in the median position, with the status quo represented by the PRI faction and
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the liberal position embodied by the PRD at each of the extremes (see spatial 
representation below). However, it has already been pointed out that a division 
within the PRI caused the bill to be mainly opposed by PRI congressmen and only to 
have limited support from the PRI faction in the Senate.
Figure 4.3. Spatial representation of the vote abroad issue in both chambers
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It could then be well argued that President Fox’ initiative sent to the Lower Chamber
in June 2004, although not approved, provided the catalyst for legislative
negotiations for a final legislation. On 23 February 2005, the Lower Chamber
approved a proposal presented by the PRI deputy Laura Martinez by 301 to 5 and 22
abstentions, which opened the door to migrants to participate in the presidential
elections. Paradoxically, the PRI was not only in favour of migrants’ political rights,
but proved more radical than the PAN faction. Why had the PRI that always seemed
to oppose the vote abroad initiative now presented such a comprehensive bill? As
Primitivo Rodriguez from the migrant lobbying group the ‘Coalicion’ commented
‘all the objections that the PRI had, suddenly disappeared... and they (the PRI) came
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up with this “cruise”. The ‘Coalicion ’, PRD and PAN knew that we could not sail 
this “cruise” because it would sink, but we wanted to go ahead. It may be that in the 
Senate a “boat” remains, we thought’ (Primitivo Rodriguez June 2006). 
Understandably, the PAN was the only party that showed any disagreement, and it 
only supported the passage of the bill, but also specified its particular objections. The 
PRD aligned with the PRI and fully supported the bill. However, as has already been 
signalled, this advanced PRI initiative presented at the Lower Chamber was seen 
more as a tactic to prevent the bill from passing once it was reviewed in the Senate 
and opposed by the PRI faction there.
The bill was then received by the Senate on 24 February 2005 and sent to the 
Commissions of State; External Relations; North America; and Legal Studies for its 
further analysis. At the same time, various institutions -  IFE, TEPJF and SRE -  were 
invited to work in collaboration with the arbitrating commissions and provide a more 
technical input, according to their scope of work. These institutions, however, 
converged in the opinion that this particular bill presented big challenges in terms of 
legal content, budget and organisation, as well as the time required to organise an 
election abroad.
The Senate, however, was reluctant to approve such an advanced initiative. As 
expected, the PRI senators wanted a new bill to be rewritten. PAN Senators also 
showed their concerns. However, with the deadline for legislative changes 
approaching, it was evident that if a new bill was proposed it was not going to be 
approved in time. As mentioned in several interviews by former PRI senators, the 
PRI faction in the Lower Chamber did not want to appear as the main opponent of
173
the vote abroad, so instead, by presenting and approving such an advanced bill they 
expected the PRI faction in the Senate to bring it to a halt. The former PRI senators, 
however, did not want to do that. As one of the key participants, PRI Senator Silvia 
Hernandez states ‘that bill presented many problems that we had to address, 
otherwise, our electoral trust would have been jeopardised. However, we thought that 
if we modified the bill, it would still have good chances to be approved. The PRI 
senators were not going to prevent migrants from practicing their right to vote’ 
(Hernandez July 2006).
Thus, the ‘vote abroad’ bill sent from the Lower Chamber was modified and instead 
of the ‘vote in person’, the new absentee voting system was to rely on the postal 
vote. In addition, migrants could not obtain a new voting credential abroad and 
political parties were barred from campaigning abroad. The PAN backed this new 
PRI version, but the PRD faction was not content with the changes. As Carlos 
Olamendi recounts ‘the PRD was the faction that had more problems with the 
proposal but the ‘Coalition’ achieved to convince them as we had previously 
convinced the PAN in the Lower Chamber’ (Olamedi July 2006). The PRD, in the 
end, accepted the proposal in general, but expressed their particular objections. 
Although, what was the position of the ‘Coalition’ regarding such changes? ‘We had 
our goal that we exaggerated by saying ‘approve a bill authorising one single migrant 
to vote and we will accept it’ narrates Carlos Olamendi ‘the point was that we 
wanted the door to our political electoral participation opened. We did not want to 
lose that, because otherwise we would have had to wait 6 more years. That was just 
not an option’ (Olamedi July 2006). The Senate bill was eventually approved on 27 
April 2005 with only 2 votes against, and 34 absentees.
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The Lower Chamber received again the Senate bill for final approval on 26 May 
2005 and consequently, an extraordinary legislative period was granted only to 
discuss the vote abroad issue. However, the dramatic differences between the 
original bill and the one sent back by the Senate prompted negative reactions. As the 
PRI faction coordinator in the Lower Chamber, Emilio Chuayffet Chemor, 
mentioned ‘what the Senate sent us back was not the same bill modified, but a new 
bill. We sent a tiger and they send us back a cat and if we change it, they say that we 
will act unconstitutionally’ (Chuayffet Chemor June 2006). Two commissions were 
granted arbitrating power: the Commission of State and the Commission of
population and migration issues. Whereas in the former, the Senate bill was rejected 
as most PRI policy makers pronounced against and voted for a modified bill, in the 
Commission of population and migration issues, the Senate bill was adopted by 
unanimity. As previously pointed out, in the latter PAN and PRD formed the 
majority and PRI legislators only followed the trend.
Given the arbitrating commissions’ disagreement, the final voting was scheduled for 
28 June 2005, a decisive moment in which a partnership between PAN and PRD 
could not beat the union between the PRI and smaller parties, as not all legislators 
were present (there were 33 absentees in the actual final voting). As Coalition 
members pointed out, they knew there was a fragmentation within the PRI and 
decided to take advantage of it (Primitivo Rodriguez, interview Mexico City 2006, 
Raul Ross, interview Chicago 2008). They decided, then, to target one of the PRI’s 
strongest pillars of support, organised labour (Middlebrook 1995), in particular the 
teachers’ union (la ‘Union de Maestros’) and in addition, the peasants’ union
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( ‘Central Nacional Campesina’). Scholars have noted how the climate of 
democratization had strengthened workers’ rights to political representation outside 
authoritarian control (see Schatz 2000). As Primitivo recounts ‘we decided to target 
the CNC and the Teachers’ Union. We knew that Esther Gordillo was not a Madrazo 
supporter and we told her that she could end up being one of the greatest supporters 
of the vote. We also talked to Heladio Ramirez and Diodoro Carrasco and they also 
gave us their support, the same with Chuayffet. Then, we decided to spread the 
word’ (Primitivo Rodriguez June 2006). In the end, the bill as it was modified by 
the Senate was approved at the Lower Chamber with 455 votes, 6 against and 33 
absentees (see Figure 4.2).
Figure 4.2 Federal Congress’ voting on the ‘Absentee Vote’ bill (28 June 2005)
Figure 1.3. Voting at L o w er C ham b er 28 
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Own elaboration, source: Gaceta parlamentaria, 28 June 2005
The approval of the ‘vote abroad’ bill then does not correspond to Nacif’s theory o f  
policy making under divided government, which maintains that political parties align 
and trade off their ideal points in order to defeat the status quo. In particular, the
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PAN resented the initial advanced version passed in the Lower Chamber, whereas on 
the other hand, the PRD had to conform to the restrictive version approved at Senate, 
as well as the final version re-approved in the Lower Chapter. However, PRI 
legislators in both chambers did not behave coherently due to internal party divisions 
and thus they did not defend the party’s ideal point. In fact, the final version of the 
bill was rescued by PRI congressmen representatives of labour unions. What this 
illustrates is that at this stage of democratization political parties do not necessarily 
act rationally according to their strategic interests and internal competition, 
especially when the selection of (presidential) candidates led to fragmentation of 
political party unity with repercussions in policy and law making in the legislatures.
4.3. Conclusion
This chapter presents the argument that there have been two main institutional actors 
that led to the approval of the vote abroad bill in Mexico: political parties in the 
country of origin and migrant organisations -  in particular the ‘Coalition’ -  in the 
country of reception. The principal factor in the emergence of this pattern of 
transnational politics is the development of competitive party politics and the 
advancement of economic integration between both countries. However, there are 
different interests in building a transnational political arena. Whereas the PRD has 
steadily supported migrants’ political participation to fulfil the party’s ideological 
underpinnings, the ruling PAN, on the other hand, sees migrant political 
incorporation as part of Fox’ grand vision of a North American community and a 
logical step to foster economic integration. The divided position of the once-long 
time ruling party PRI over migrants’ electoral participation illustrates how the party
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is still readjusting to its reality as an opposition party and seeking reconciliation with 
the past. All main parties converge, however, on the belief that migrants’ 
remittances are a main justification for migrants’ political rights, which could also be 
interpreted as a form of ‘buying membership’.
This case study contributes to the research on the influence of migrant groups in the 
politics of the country of origin and the political economy of migrants’ remittances. 
As Mexico undertakes a democratic transition, policy-making dynamics under a 
divided government are extended across borders and affected by a transnational elite 
of bi-national activists. Remittances and votes originated beyond the limits of the 
state have placed this group at the centre stage of Mexican domestic politics.
In the next chapter, we will be able to see to what extent the absentee voting system 
has been able to create a political relationship between the home country government 
and the Mexican community abroad and whether the expectations of the main 
political parties have been met.
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Chapter 5
5. The Mexican absentee vote and its effects on 
transnational political engagem ent
In 2006, Mexican expatriates were for the first time eligible to take part in Mexico’s 
historic presidential elections via absentee ballot About one of every eight adults 
bom in Mexico now lives in the US, and they are by far the largest foreign 
population living in this country. As such, the new Mexican absentee voting system 
was the largest experiment ever undertaken of expatriates voting in one Western 
democracy whilst living in another. However, migrant political participation was 
minimal -  about 0.05% of Mexicans in the US actually cast absentee votes for the 
Mexican presidential elections in July 2006. Based on this, some argue that the 
Mexican absentee voting system failed in creating a political relationship between 
the home country government and the Mexican community abroad.
Mexico’s attempts to enfranchise expatriates are not unique in Latin America. As we 
have seen, Colombia, Peru, Argentina, Brazil and the Dominican Republic are some 
of the countries in the region that currently allow citizens abroad to vote, though the 
Mexican experience was more controversial in terms of potential numbers and 
because most Mexican emigrants are concentrated in one single neighbouring 
country. Voting turnout among expatriates has been generally low across Latin 
America too. Ecuador, like Mexico, allowed citizens to vote for the first time in its 
presidential elections in 2006, although it implemented a ballot system. Overall, it
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proved more successful than Mexico’s experience. 143,352 Ecuadorians abroad 
registered to vote in the elections -  the majority from Spain (about 89,000) -  
although it still represented 6% of all Ecuadorian migrant population. However, the 
case of the Dominican Republic shows that the number of migrant voters can 
increase over time. In the 2004 presidential elections 44,339 Dominicans registered 
to vote and 35, 342 eventually cast a vote. For the May 2008 presidential elections, 
more than 155,000 Dominicans registered to vote, that represented an increase of 
about 314% (Junta Central Electoral- Republica Dominicana 2008). This is relevant 
as most presidential elections in the Dominican Republic have been decided with a 
difference of less than 100,000 votes (Mendez 2008). Developed countries with large 
diaspora populations, however, have better voting turnout response. In the 2006 
Italian elections, around 1,133,577 Italians abroad sent a postal vote (out of about 3 
million that were registered) and in Spain more than 330,000 Spaniards living 
overseas voted in the 2006 elections, out of a total 1 million expatriates around the 
world (Torres 22 November 2006; BBC News 2006).
The main question in this chapter is not why most Mexican migrants failed to avail 
themselves of this opportunity for political action, but rather why some groups 
participated whereas others did not? The existing research leaves little doubt about 
why the Mexican absentee voting system failed to attract migrant voters -  unfriendly 
mechanisms to register and vote in the election, lack of an efficient and timely 
awareness campaign and to some degree lack of interest among Mexican expatriates; 
however, it says little about who actually participated in the elections from abroad. 
This analysis would allow us to find out if the intentions of legislators and 
advocators of this bill were met, and on the other hand, what political actors
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benefited as a result. This chapter attempts to build a demographic and socio­
economic profile of the Mexican migrant voter, finding that it is mainly well 
educated and affluent migrants with longer period of residence in the US that tend to 
vote. A finding that is consistent with other studies that try to uncover who are those 
migrants that engage in transnational political practices, although not necessarily 
electorally-related (Guamizo 1997; Fitzgerald 2000; Itzigsohn 2000; Guamizo 2001; 
Guamizo, Portes et al. May 2003). The socio-economic characteristics of the 
Mexican expatriate voter help explain why there was a marked preference for PAN’s 
Felipe Calderon’s over other political options, as higher income and education levels 
are predictors of PAN support31 (Lawson 2003; Klesner 2007).
This chapter is divided in three sections. In the following section, I discuss the 
mechanisms of the Mexican absentee voting system signalling how it failed to induce 
large numbers of migrant voters to participate in the 2006 election. The main 
argument here is that low voting turnout was not only the result of the restrictive 
character of the vote abroad bill, but also the outcome of its inefficient 
implementation as a result of lack of political support (mainly from government 
institutions and political parties). Secondly, I explore the demographic and socio­
economic profile of the migrant voter in the 2006 presidential elections. The 
research presented in this section employs an unpublished survey of a national 
sample of expatriates registered in the expatriate voters’ registry in 2006.1 show how 
migrant voters were mainly educated and affluent migrants with a longer period of
31 However, we should note that the opposite is not true for the centre-left PRD candidate Lopez Obrador’s 
supporters. Lopez Obrador received votes across all income and social groups and educational levels except from 
the richest Mexicans. See Klesner, J. L. (2007) "The 2006 Mexican elections: Manifestation of a divided 
Society?" PS: Political Science and Politics Volume, pp.27-32 DOI:
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residency in the US. Lastly, taking into consideration the profile of the migrant voter, 
I assess voting preferences among Mexicans abroad and compare them with the 
electoral results in Mexican territory. I conclude by arguing that despite the 
minuscule number of absentee votes, a clear preference for the official PAN party 
(based on higher income and education levels) could be an advantage for the 
replication of similar vote abroad bills at the local level.
5.1. The vote abroad mechanism for presidential 
elections
The national vote abroad law, as it was mentioned in the previous chapter, involves a 
highly restrictive system for absentee voting, which allows Mexicans residing abroad 
to vote only for presidential elections by post. As we have seen in chapter three, a 
constitutional amendment was not necessary as two sets of constitutional reforms 
approved in 1996 had already made the migrant vote a possibility. The immediate 
legislative antecedent was a reform to the constitutional article 36 (fraction HI) 
allowing Mexicans to be able to vote outside their electoral districts and on the other 
hand, a reform to articles 30, 32, 37 allowing dual nationality rights (Original 
document published 1917, last reform made in February 2007 ). The vote abroad bill 
is then a set of rules that put migrants’ electoral rights into practice, by adding an 
additional book to the federal electoral code entitled ‘the vote of the Mexicans 
residing abroad’ (Diario Oficial de la Federacion 30 June 2005).
In this section, I show why so few Mexicans abroad participated in the 2006
presidential elections in Mexico. First, I describe how the restrictive character of the
absentee voting system has mostly been blamed as the main cause of low electoral
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turnout among Mexican expatriates. To this I also add the lack of political 
willingness to implement this bill, evidenced in the delayed budgetary decisions, 
which had a clear impact on the unsuccessful awareness campaign of the vote abroad 
among the Mexican communities in the US and the rest of the world. Second, I 
compare these findings with the survey-based existing research that points out the 
main reasons that deterred migrants to vote in the past election.
Thus, in regard to the restrictions inherent in the vote abroad bill, the requirement of 
having a voting credential issued by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), the 
Mexican independent body that organises and oversees the elections, is one of the 
most significant constraints as otherwise Mexican expatriates have to return to 
Mexico to apply for one. The original bill proposed by the Chamber of Deputies, 
however, had allowed migrants to be able to obtain a voting credential abroad, but it 
was finally modified by the Senate on the basis of an IFE report that mentioned that 
the issuance of voting credentials abroad was temporarily and logistically impossible 
(Instituto Federal Electoral 14 March 2005). The voting credential requirement 
restricted the number of potential voters abroad from the estimated 10 million 
Mexicans (by birth) residing abroad, to an estimated 4.2 million Mexicans abroad 
with a voting credential according to the IFE, whilst the figure was 3 million 
according to the Pew Hispanic Center (Suro 14 March 2005; Instituto Federal 
Electoral June 2004; Instituto Federal Electoral June 2004). It should be noted that 
Mexicans that emigrate in an undocumented manner would, more often than not, 
avoid bringing any official documentation and also those that had emigrated before 
the IFE was founded in 1990 would not possess the right official voting credential.
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Secondly, the registration process found in the current vote abroad law is highly 
bureaucratic, time-consuming and expensive. Expatriates have to fill in the 
application form and enclose a signed photocopy of the voting credential and a proof 
of address such as a lease or a utility bill that established their residence abroad. The 
latter was particularly troublesome since many migrants would not have a utility bill 
in their name as they often share housing. This requirement was relaxed later on in 
the process allowing expatriates to send a utility bill showing their address, even if it 
was not in their name (Ballados 2006; Beltran May 2007). Some leaders of migrant 
organisations, however, complained about filling in a form that required a name and 
an address as this was particularly troublesome for the many Mexicans whose status 
in the US was undocumented (11 November 2005). Moreover, they had to send the 
application package by registered mail, for which they had to pay (the cost is 
approximately 8 dollars from the US). Consequently, as many migrant leaders 
pointed out, this process did not only limit the number to those that had the money to 
pay and the time to do it, but also to those who could speak enough English to send 
the application by registered post (Reforma 8 January 2006).
In addition, the registration period included in the vote abroad bill is extremely 
limited. Expatriates have to apply to be registered in the ‘registry of Mexicans 
residing abroad’ between 1 October and 15 January of the year of the election. In the 
2006 presidential election, if the absentee voter’s registration in the expatriates’ 
registry was successful, the IFE was obliged to send them a ballot with pre-paid 
postage between 21 April and 20 May. After emitting their vote, they had to send it 
back to Mexico City and had to reach the IFE by 1 July. An IFE survey carried out 
after the elections revealed, however, that many migrants that had successfully
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registered for the vote abroad elections never received the ballot (20% of a sample of 
580 expatriates registered) and thus could not emit their vote.
However, I also argue that the ‘first-ever’ absentee registration process was 
particularly troublesome due to inefficient policy implementation. Budget for 
promotional advertising in the US was not approved by the Congress until the end of 
2006, a few weeks before the application deadline. Up to that point, the IFE had 
primarily relied on embassies, consulates and migrant clubs to distribute application 
forms for the absentee ballot. Out of 5 million applications, approximately 3 and a 
half million were distributed, whether by ‘alternative means’ (88%) or by consulates 
and the Internet (13%) (Instituto Federal Electoral July 2005). Alternative means 
mainly refers to the system created by the IFE in which migrant organisations could 
register and help with the distribution campaign on voluntary basis. 197,200 
applications were distributed by 138 Mexican migrant organisations based in 11 
countries, although they were mostly concentrated in the American states of 
California (41), Texas (16), Illinois (11), New York (11) and Arizona (7) (Instituto 
Federal Electoral Last actualization realised 11 January 2006).
The IFE only launched the promotional campaign in the US cities with highest 
concentration of Mexican immigrants on 15 December 2006, one month before the 
application period would end (Opinion 8 November 2005; 11 November 2005; La 
Opinion 15 November 2005). Given that many Mexican migrants return to their 
places of origin during the Christmas holiday period, the awareness campaign was 
destined to have little results. To counteract these potential effects, the IFE set up 27 
booths at border crossing stations and airports (mainly in Tamaulipas, Coahuila,
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Chihuahua, Sonora and Baja California) to Mexicans who were going home for the 
Christmas period. There, 10, 843 applications for absentee voting with pre-paid 
postage were completed and sent to Mexico City, that represented 22.99% of all 
applications received (COVE 2005).
On the other hand, however, the vote abroad bill is not only restrictive for potential 
migrant voters, but also for presidential candidates and political parties. It prohibits 
political parties and candidates from campaigning abroad and from receiving private 
funds from Mexicans residing abroad. One of the only options for migrant voters to 
know more about their presidential candidates and political parties is to visit the IFE 
website. The ballot package for the 2006 elections also included a booklet with the 
political platforms of the different presidential candidates and a CD-ROM containing 
further information. It follows, then, that generating migrant interest in the 2006 
election was restricted to the US-based media and promotional material from the 
IFE.
Thus, to answer the question why so few Mexican expatriates registered and voted in 
the elections? The causes could be twofold: as we have seen the Mexican absentee 
voting system is highly restrictive and on the other, the IFE’s public information 
campaign for the 1996 elections was highly inefficient as budget (decided by 
Congress) was only available a few weeks before the deadline for registration. The 
IFE was particularly blamed for allegedly inhibiting the migrant vote. For instance, 
migrant groups’ representatives, civil society groups and centre-left PRD militants 
protested outside IFE offices in Mexico city complaining about the IFE’s limited 
electoral promotion (Solis 2005). Two surveys carried out separately after the
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elections by the IFE and the Pew Hispanic Center seem to confirm this. According to 
the survey carried out by the IFE in November 2006, a majority mentioned that the 
main reason why many expatriates could not vote in the past presidential elections 
was because they did not have an official voting credential, that is an ID with 
photograph granted by the IFE which is widely used in Mexico for official 
procedures, followed by the difficulty for applying for absentee voting and the lack 
of information on the process for seeking a ballot. 30% also mentioned that sending 
their application by registered mail was too expensive. In addition, the majority 
mentioned that a postal vote was not the best option to vote from abroad. The postal 
vote came third in the choice of preferred voting methods -  Internet vote (34%), 
ballot box in consulates (34%), postal vote (26%) and telephone vote (1%).
Similarly, the Pew Hispanic Center ‘Survey of Mexicans Living in the US on 
Absentee Voting in Mexican Elections’ carried out once the deadline for registration 
had passed in January and February 2006 and based on telephone interviews with a 
nationally representative sample of 987 Mexican-born adults living in the US also 
shows that lack of a voting credential and lack of information were the main reasons 
for not registering for absentee voting (Suro February 22, 2006). Also, about half 
said that they did not receive enough information about the procedure and 
requirements to register and 46% mentioned that the procedures were too difficult 
and complicated. This survey, however, also tried to find out whether Mexicans in 
the US were interested in voting for Mexican presidential elections at all. In response 
to the statement “I am making my life in the United States and the elections in 
Mexico are not important to me”, 28 % of Mexicans in the US agreed that was a 
reason why migrants did not register for the absentee voting, but 68 % disagreed,
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which implies that the number of Mexican emigrant voters could be higher if a 
modification to the bill took place.
Trying to find out to what extent Mexican expatriates would have voted in the 2006 
presidential elections if the requirements and registration procedure were easier, 
Wayne Cornelius and his associates carried out the Mexican Expatriate Study aimed 
at obtaining a representative picture of the current Mexican-born population residing 
in the US by interviewing 1,104 respondents by telephone and in person and 
compared the results with electoral attitudes of Mexicans residing in Mexico 
(Cornelius August 31- September 3, 2006). Cornelius and his associates presented 
the findings of the “untapped potential” for migrants’ electoral involvement in the 
2006 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Philadelphia. 
Thus, the main question was why Mexican expatriates did not vote, whether it was 
because they were not interested or was it because of the restrictive system for 
absentee voting? They found out that the same percentage of Mexican-born 
immigrants residing in the US followed the Mexican presidential campaigns as 
Mexicans residing in their home country. Also, around 20% Mexican expatriates 
discussed politics with friends and family at least a few times a week, although in 
Mexico this figure amounted to 35%. However, although they discovered that there 
was a greater potential of migrant voters than the minuscule number of expatriates 
that actually voted, they also recognised that close to half would have still not 
participated regardless what the rules were for absentee voting. It should be noted, 
however, that electoral abstention is also close to half in any developed country.
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To sum up, it could be said that migrant electoral participation is unlikely to increase 
in the future, unless there is a reform to the current absentee voting system or if it is 
implemented in a more efficient manner, which requires political willingness of the 
main political parties. This is not only because of the system’s limitations, but also 
because the expatriates’ registry is only provisional, that is, a new expatriates’ 
registry has to be created for each presidential election. After the election, migrant 
voters are registered again in the original electoral district in which they obtained 
their voting credential (Ballados 2006). In fact, votes emitted abroad are counted 
with those votes from the same electoral district where the expatriate voter obtained 
his or her voting credential. Thus, those expatriates that managed to comply with the 
requirements and succeeded to be registered in the expatriates’ registry in 2006 will 
have to go through the same application process all over again in order to vote for 
future elections. On the other hand, migrant leaders have mentioned that if there had 
been a more timely public information strategy and campaign, the number of voters 
abroad would have been higher since many of them were not even aware of the 
absentee voting system and for some it was too late when they found out (fieldwork 
interviews, 2006 and 2008). This first experience says that Mexican institutions 
failed at planning and executing the logistics necessary to efficiently create a new 
absentee voting system.
5.2. Who voted from abroad? -  Describing the new 
members of Mexican democracy
“... The 40,000 that succeeded at registering and the 33,000 that managed to vote are
not only the new members of Mexican democracy, but their best members... the
effort to vote abroad was a thousand times the effort to vote in Mexico” says
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Primitivo Rodriguez, migrant leader and member of the ‘Coalition por el Voto de los 
Mexicanos en el Extranjero \ “How many Mexicans will vote in Mexico if they had 
to go somewhere to pick up an application, fill it in even if you cannot distinguish 
anything, have to pay and then you have to speak Russian or English to be 
registered? Not even the presidential candidates would have voted” (Primitivo 
Rodriguez June 2006). Undoubtedly, much of the explanation for the low electoral 
turnout abroad lies in the highly restrictive system for absentee voting and its 
implementation. Out of a total adult population of 10 million Mexicans living in the 
US, only 56,749 ballots applications were received by the IFE in Mexico City and as 
many as a fifth of those applications were rejected because they were submitted 
improperly (information supplied by the DFE, 2006). Among the main reasons for 
rejection, ballot applications were not sent by registered post and many did not 
enclose the additional documents (photocopy of voting ID and/or proof of address). 
In the end, the expatriates’ registry was made up of 40,879 Mexican citizens residing 
in 80 different countries from the five continents, although the vast majority lived in 
the US.
A total of 33,111 expatriates actually voted in the election, which is 81% of those 
Mexican expatriates registered for absentee voting, according to official IFE figures. 
That represents about 1% of all the adult Mexicans in the US and less than 0.5 % of 
the total voters in Mexico32. Thus after predictions of 400,000 migrant voters by the 
IFE (10% turnout of those who are eligible to vote and have a voter credential)33 and
32 Based on figures from the 2000 Census
33 The 4 million Mexicans with an official voting credential abroad was calcuted based on the people that did not 
reply to the invitation by the IFE to work in the polling stations. In the 2003 mid-term elections, the IFE sent the 
invitation to a random sample of 10% of those registered to vote. 363,078 did not receive the invitations because
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125,000 to 360,000 voters according to Marcelli and Cornelius (based on a 2001 
survey with Mexicans living in Los Angeles County who had voted in the 2000 
Mexican presidential election), much fewer expatriates actually voted (Marcelli and 
Cornelius 2005). Considering that the IFE was granted 26.4 million dollars in 2005 
and 106.2 million dollars in 2006 to carry out the exercise of absentee voting and 
around 5 million absentee voting applications were printed out for this purpose, the 
turnout results were met with much public disappointment on both sides of the 
border34. Considering that the IFE utilised 38.42 million dollars of the total budget, 
every migrant vote cost the exorbitant amount of 1,160 dollars. It can be said that it 
would have been cheaper to fly Mexican emigres back to Mexico to cast their vote in 
person.
After assessing why so few Mexican expatriates voted for the presidential elections, 
in this section I explore who actually voted from abroad. Building a demographic 
and socio-economic profile of a migrant voter does not only allow us to identify 
those political actors that have benefited with the migrant vote, but also whether the 
outcomes have matched the intentions of the legislators that approved the bill, as 
well as whether this national vote abroad bill could be replicated at the local level. In 
addition, despite the fact that an increasing number of countries are granting voting 
rights to their expatriates and in many of those (mainly developed) countries the 
migrant vote has, at times, been key to define electoral results (for instance, Italy in 
2006, Spain in 2006 and the US in the year 2000), there is non existent data about the
they lived abroad. However, it must be noted that despite estimates by the IFE of 4  million Mexicans with an 
official voting credential living abroad, only about 1.5 million of citizens registered in the electoral roll had 
changed their address to another country by 2003 (information provided by the IFE according to 2003 figures).
34 In 2005, the IFE only utilised 11.920 million dollars and in 2006 their budget was reduced to 26.5 million 
dollars (using $1=10 Mexican peso exchange).
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demographics of emigrant voters. That is mainly because most countries do not 
differentiate those votes cast by citizens at home and abroad (Mexico is one of the 
exceptions). Even in the case of the US, very few initiatives have been carried out to 
count absentee votes at the county level but the results have not been made available 
to the public (Dark 2003). The demographics and socio-economic characteristics of 
expatriate voters are a key variable to analyse their political behaviour in home 
country’s elections since in most cases (where figures are available) votes cast from 
abroad differ greatly from votes cast at home (Fidrmuc and Doyle 2004).
Thus, this study is the first to explore the characteristics of a country’s electorate 
abroad. I attempt to find out what groups of Mexican expatriates voted in the 2006 
Mexican presidential election relying on the findings from an official IFE survey 
with migrants that registered in the expatriates’ registry carried out in November 
2006. The results of the survey have not been analysed or published before and 
special permission was granted for this study. This survey was sent to all the 
Mexicans abroad that filled in a registration form for the absentee vote and provided 
an email address, which was a total of 19,571 people35. The first invitation to answer 
the survey was sent on the 22nd of November followed by two later reminders (on the 
24th and 28th of November). By the deadline on the 30th of November, 580 replies 
were received from 29 different countries, although the vast majority came from the 
US (64% or 435 respondents). The survey contained 75 questions mainly addressed 
to their own experiences with and opinions about the first election abroad -  mainly 
focused on registration and voting procedures and the registration campaign. 
However, a number of questions were also included to find out demographic and
35 That was 19,571 out o f 40,879 people that registered in total or 48% (IFE figures, 2006).
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socio-economic characteristics of Mexican migrant voters (see Annex 5 for a 
complete questionnaire translated in English).
In spite of the novelty of the data, we should be aware of the weakness of this 
exercise. The main shortcoming of this survey is that it might not represent a fair 
sample of Mexican migrant voters as it is limited to the 38% of Mexican emigrants 
that applied for registration and also supplied an email address. The 580 absentee 
voters (2.96%) that answered, then, represent a biased sample of those Mexican 
expatriates that had an email address at the time of registration and had access to the 
Intemet36.This reliance on email and on-line resources probably biased the sample 
towards more settled, affluent populations and away from low-skilled migrant 
workers.
Bearing in mind that many Mexican expatriates did not vote due to the restrictive 
system for absentee voting, as well as logistic problems and also taking into account 
that a number of Mexican migrants might simply not be interested in participating in 
their home country’s politics, questions then arise about what is the migrant 
population that actually voted in the first experience of absentee voting for 
presidential elections and whether the outcomes of the electoral reform on the vote 
abroad actually matched the intentions of the legislators and migrant groups that 
lobbied for this bill. In the previous chapter, we identified three main reasons for 
extending the franchise to Mexicans abroad apart from the human rights and 
democracy argument, those are: to secure migrant remittances sent back home; offer
36 Out of the total number of expatriates that were registered for absentee voting for the 2006 presidential 
elections, 62.30% did not provide an email address whereas 37.7% did provide one. 80.36% also reported to 
count with a telephone line, in contrast to 14.69% that did not have one. IFE figures, 2007.
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political participation to Mexican citizens that would not have this right in the US; 
try to build and maintain a Mexican-American lobby group in the US; and/or 
eventually win more votes. Also, identifying the demographic and socio-economic 
profile of the migrant voter allows us to understand the impact this reform has and 
which political actors it has eventually come to benefit.
Five groups of Mexican migrants are analysed in this section according to the 
available literature on transnational political participation, assimilation theory and 
conventional theories of political participation: 1) general demographics (age and 
gender groups); 2) context of migration (places of origin and destination); 3) 
engagement in other forms of cross-border activities (economic, political and social); 
4); period of residence and citizenship status abroad and; 5) human capital (education 
and occupational skills). In this section, I posit that well-educated affluent migrants 
that are not necessarily remittance-senders and most likely to have a longer period of 
residence (but less than 10 years) in the US might have been those that actually voted 
in the elections. These results contrast with the original intentions of Mexican 
legislators to attract more remittances-senders or to offer political participation to 
temporary and illegal immigrants. It might, however, coincide with the argument that 
absentee voting could benefit a Mexican-American lobby as permanent migrants 
(although with a residence period abroad of less than 10 years) seem to participate 
more. This finding allows to understand why the votes cast by migrant voters 
significantly differed from the electoral results in Mexico, which is analysed in the 
next section.
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General demographics -  Age and gender
In particular, the transnationalist approach to international migration highlights the 
role of gender in transnational activities, especially those directed to influencing the 
home country politically. Jones-Correa, in particular, shows how first generation 
Latin American males in the US are more likely to be involved in their home 
country’s political affairs than women, whereas women participate more in political 
and community developments of the country in which they live (1998). That is 
mainly explained by the occupational downward mobility that most Latin American 
males suffer when they immigrate to the US in contrast to their female counterparts, 
whose insertion into the job market can make them experience financial 
independence for the first time (Femandez-Kelly and Garcia 1990).
Thus, I begin by identifying age and gender groups of migrant voters in the last 
Mexican presidential election. According to IFE figures, those registered for 
absentee voting were mainly young (22% were between 30 and 34 years old and 
18% were between 35 and 39 years old) and 57% were males. Age has a non-linear 
effect, it increases in young-middle age and declines with old age. On the one hand, 
these characteristics seem to reflect general demographics of the Mexican population 
abroad (see figures 5.1 and 5.2 below). That is, the biggest age group that cast an 
absentee vote (between 30 and 44 years of age) coincided with the highest proportion 
of Mexicans residing abroad that are in that same age bracket. The same can be said 
about gender, more than half of male voters might be a reflection of the higher 
proportion of Mexican males abroad (56% of total Mexican migrant population) 
compared to women. On the other hand, however, higher male participation in home
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country’s elections might also confirm Jones-Correa’s argument indicating that Latin 
American migrant men engage more in transnational political activities than women.
Figure 5.1 Mexicans abroad and Mexican voters abroad by age groups
M exicans ab ro ad  an d  Mexican vo te rs  ab road  by ag e  g ro u p s
EJ M exicans abroad
■  Mexican voters abroad (*18 
years old and older)
0-14 15-29 30-44 45-64 More than
years old* years old* years old years old 65 years
of age
Age groups
Own elaboration. Source: Mexicans abroad by age group, CONAPO (2007) and Mexicans abroad that voted in 
the 2006 presidential election abroad, IFE (2006) figures (* Minimum voting age in Mexico is 18 years old)
Figure 5.2 Mexicans abroad and Mexican voters abroad by gender
Mexicans abroad and Mexican voters abroad by gender
■ Men 
01 Women
Mexicans abroad Mexican voters abroad*
Own elaboration. Source: Mexicans abroad by gender, CONAPO (2007), Mexicans abroad that voted in the 2006 
presidential election by gender, IFE (2006) figures (*Mexican voters are 18 years old and older)
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Context of migration - places of origin and reception
Recent theories of voting behaviour in Mexico reveal changing patterns of electoral 
participation in Mexico since the 1990’s, when gradually citizens living in urban 
centres, rather than rural areas, started to vote more (Klesner and Lawson 2001; 
Temkin, Salazar et al. 2004). This was mainly attributed to many changes that have 
accompanied Mexico’s democratic transition, such as urban residents increasingly 
putting their trust in electoral institutions, less political clientelism in rural areas and 
thus, fewer incentives for rural residents to vote. Klesner and Lawson have shown 
that higher turnout rates take place in electoral districts that are mainly urban, whose 
residents have higher levels of education and with a lower proportion of people 
working in the agricultural sector (2001).
Regarding the context of reception, conventional theories of political participation 
tell us that education increases political participation generally (Lipset 1960; Olsen 
1980). Following this line of argument, it is expected that most well-educated or 
highly-skilled emigrants vote. In turn, highly skilled migrants are less geographically 
concentrated than their low-skilled co-nationals and, more often than not, do not 
settle in places where a high proportion of their co-nationals live (Bartel 1989). In 
contrast, most low-skilled immigrants in the US choose locations with a high 
concentration of their fellow countrymen.
In particular, the Mexican absentee vote in 2006 also revealed interesting voting 
turnout behaviour regarding places of origin and of reception. This information was 
provided for academic purposes by the IFE in 2007. The majority of Mexican 
migrant voters that participated in the 2006 presidential elections were originally
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from traditional or highly-migrant sending states such as Mexico City or Distrito 
Federal (15.4%), Jalisco (12.3%), the state of Mexico (10.2%), Michoacan (8.2%) 
and Guanajuato (6.8%). However, compared to their migrant population, (according 
to estimates from the 2000 Mexico’s official census) there was more electoral 
participation among migrants coming from Distrito Federal, Nuevo Leon, the state of 
Mexico, Quintana Roo and Tabasco. This tells us that migrants’ electoral 
participation from traditional migrant sending states, in proportional terms, was not 
high. Instead, the migrant population that came from the capital city (DF) and other 
urban states, such as the state of Mexico and Nuevo Leon, participated more 
confirming voting turnout behaviour theories in contemporary Mexico.
Looking at the other side of the border, the place of residence of migrant voters, the 
vast majority of migrant voters unsurprisingly resided in the US (28,346 or 85.61% 
of total absentee votes), followed by Canada (2.49%). According to figures provided 
directly from the IFE, the highest numbers of absentee votes came from the US states 
of California (40 %), Texas (15 %) and Illinois (10 %), where the majority of 
Mexican immigrants live abroad. However, compared to the estimated number of 
Mexican migrant residents in each state according to 2006 estimates from the 
‘Colegio de la Frontera Norte ’ (Colef for its acronym in Spanish) , there was more 
electoral participation amongst immigrants residing in American states with the 
smallest share of Mexican-born population, such as DC where about 4 percent of the 
estimated Mexico-bom population voted and Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
where migrant voters amounted to about 2 % and 1.5% respectively of the estimated 
Mexican-born immigrants residing in each state. In the American states with the
37 Colef estimates, 2006, box 3.3a
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highest concentration of Mexican immigrants, California, Texas and Illinois, there 
were participation rates of only 0.3, 0.2 and 0.4 % respectively. The reason for this 
result might be twofold. Firstly, as we have seen, Mexicans living in American states 
with the lowest concentration of co-nationals tend to be more highly skilled -  mainly 
migrants in professional occupations and students. In addition, education, as we have 
seen, is also a determinant of electoral participation in Mexico (Klesner and Lawson 
2001). Secondly, Mexicans living in these states also tend to be more settled and 
with longer periods of residency. For instance, in the case of DC, where the highest 
proportion (4%) of the Mexican migrant population voted, the majority of Mexicans 
living there arrived before 1990 (73%) compared to the national average of 44% of 
Mexican-born arriving to the US prior to that year (according to Colef figures). 
However, this last reason is not conclusive; a more in depth analysis taking into 
account survey results is provided below.
Engagement in other forms of economic, political and social transnational 
participation
Although there is a general conception in transnationalism theories that migrants that
engage in electoral and non-electoral forms of transnational political participation
also engage in other forms of economic and social cross-border activities
(Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003; Engbersen 2007; Guamizo, Portes et al. May 2003), there
is no conclusive evidence that cross-border activities are a determinant for electoral
participation in the home country’s elections. Indirectly, in their study of
transnational entrepreneurs, Portes et. al. show that Dominican immigrants that start
an enterprise in the reception country are more likely to vote in home country’s
elections, whereas Salvadoran immigrants engage more in transnational
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entrepreneurial activities and participate more in ‘hometown civic activism’ (Portes, 
Guamizo et al. 2002, p.287 f. 2).
In order to examine to what extent Mexican migrant voters also take part in other 
transnational (cross-border) activities a number o f questions in the survey prove 
useful. Transnational activities are then distinguished between those mainly 
economic, political and social. Firstly, to assess migrant voters’ involvement in 
cross-border economic activities affecting the country of origin, respondents had to 
answer a question on how often they send remittances to family and friends back 
home (see Figure 5.3 and Table 5.1 below).
Figure 5.3 How often Mexican absentee voters send remittances to Mexico
On a v e rag e , how  m any tim es hav e  you  s e n t m o n ey  to M exico in 
th e  las t th ree  m o n th s?  (N=580)
80
70
CL
Has not sen t Between 1 and 4 Between 5 and More than 10 No answ er 
tim estim es 10 times
O U S-based respondents R=371 
■  R espondents based  in the rest of the world R=209 
O Total number of repondents
Own elaboration. COVE survey (2006)
2 0 0
Table 5.1 How often Mexican absen tee  voters send rem ittances home
O n av e rag e , how m any tim es you have se n t m oney to Mexico in the  last th ree  m onths? 
(N=580)
Total
R esp o n d en ts  in US 
(R=371)
R est of the  world 
(R=209)
Num ber P ercen tag e Num ber P erce n tag e N um ber P e rce n tag e
H as not se n t 284 49 139 37 145 69
B etw een  1 
an d  4 tim es 180 31 145 39 35 17
B etw een 5 
an d  10 tim es 64 11 52 14 6 3
M ore than  10 
tim es 35 6 23 6 6 3
No an sw er 17 3 12 3 17 8
580 100 371 100 209 100
Own elaboration, COVE survey (2006)
The survey’s results show to what extent migrants that voted in the elections are also 
those that send remittances back home, that is, whether transnational economic 
involvement would equal transnational political participation in the country of origin. 
The results shown in figure 5.3 and table 5.1 are mixed. The total sample reveals that 
about half of Mexican absentee voters do not send remittances home. About 31% 
send remittances between one and four times every three months and only 17% do it 
very often, that is, more than five times every three months. However, results from 
US-based Mexican voters and those residing in any other country seem to diverge. 
Whereas 37% of Mexicans voters in the US do not send remittances home, 69% of 
those living in the rest of the world do not maintain an economic bond with their 
country of origin through the practice of remittances. Of those living in the US, 145 
or 39% send money home between 1 and 4 times every three months, 14% do so 
between 5 and 10 and 6% make transfers back home more than 10 times in a period 
of three months. The results might be explained by self-selection, those emigrating to 
other countries further than the US might have higher financial means and their 
reason for migrating might not have been an economic one. This, then, shows that
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transnational economic support is not clearly linked to cross-border political 
participation.
The survey also aimed at revealing to what extent Mexican voters engaged in other 
informal forms o f political engagement, such as participating in migrant 
organisations or whether they followed their home country’s news. Respondents 
were then asked: 1) if they followed developments in M exico through newspapers 
and magazines; 2) if they were members of any Mexican migrant organisation in the 
place where they reside (see results in figures 5.4 and 5.5).
Figure 5.4 Migrant voters and membership in migrant associations
Do you belong to an association of Mexicans here where you 
reside? (N=580)
Own elaboration. COVE survey (2006)
Figure 5.5 Migrant voters and awareness of developments in Mexico through the media
Do you read new spapers or m agazines to keep informed about 
developments in Mexico or not? (N=580)
2%
□ Yes 
■ No
□ No answer
88%
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Own elaboration. COVE survey (2006)
The responses to these two survey questions show contrasting results. Whereas the 
majority o f Mexican absentee voters (88%) follow developments in their home 
country by reading newspapers and magazines, very few are active members of 
Mexican migrant organisations (19%). Lastly, social transnational activities are 
mainly rated by a question on how often migrant voters call family and friends in 
Mexico.
Figure 5.6 How often Mexican migrant voters call home
On a v e ra g e , how  m any  tim es  h av e  you  te le p h o n e d  so m e o n e  in 
M exico in th e  la st m o n th ?
Has not called Between 1 and 4 Between 5 and More than 10 No answer 
times 10 times times
m US respondents N=371 ■ Respondents in the rest of the world N=209 □ Total respondents (N=580)
Own elaboration. Source: Cove survey, 2006
The survey shows that absentee voters are indeed in touch with their relatives and
friends in M exico -  more than 90 % have telephoned someone in M exico in the last
month and about 26% telephone home more than 10 times a month. Furthermore,
results tend to differ little between Mexican voters in the US and in the rest of the
world. It shows that those Mexican emigres more aware about developments in their
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country of origin, whether by calling friends and relatives back home or following 
the news, are more inclined to have a say about political matters there.
Period of residency abroad
Assimilation theory has often referred to period of residence as a determinant for 
assimilation in the country of reception. According to this line of argument, time 
increases migrants’ ability to adopt to a new cultural identity and forge an allegiance 
to the country of reception while abandoning previous ones (Kessler 1998; Pickus 
1998; Schuck 1998). Therefore, according to this theory it can be implied that the 
longer time an emigrant spends in the country of reception the less likely they will 
cast a vote in their home country’s elections. On the other hand, as it has already 
been mentioned in the introductory chapter, the transnationalist perspective questions 
specifically the assumption that a person residing in one country cannot be engaged 
in cross-border activities affecting their country of origin regardless of period of 
residence abroad. In fact, Guamizo et. al. demonstrate that emigres that are involved 
in transnational activities are longer residents in the country of reception (Guamizo, 
Portes et al. 2003).
The survey sample shows how long those Mexicans that cast an absentee vote in 
2006 have lived in a foreign country and how many of them have acquired, or are in 
the process of adopting, the nationality of their host country.
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Figure 5.7 Time of residence abroad of migrant voters
How long have you been living outside Mexico? (R=580)
£  30
® 20
Less than 1 year Between 1 and 5 
years
Between 6 and 10 More than 10 years 
years
Own elaboration. Source: Cove survey, 2006. *2% did not provide an answer.
As we can observe in the graph (Figure 5.7), about half o f migrant voters have been
residing abroad between 1 to 5 years, about 30% between 6 and 10 years and 20%
more than 10 years. A small percentage (2%) mentioned to have been living abroad
for less than a year. Again, this is a non-linear relationship, electoral participation in
home country’s elections increases between the first and five years abroad and
gradually decreases after that. What it shows, however, is that temporary migrants
(less than 1 year abroad) do not generally tend to participate in the elections o f their
country of origin, instead the survey results show that migrants that cast an absentee
vote are more likely to be permanent residents abroad. Although we cannot confirm
from the survey results that permanent migrants with legal status are more likely to
have voted in the elections, it could be said that the longer a migrant has been
residing in the US, the more likely it is (although not always) that their status is
regularised. In addition, the survey also included a question about migrants’ degree
of interest in Mexican politics. It reveals that migrant voters’ interest in home
country’s politics over time follows the same pattern as transnational electoral
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participation (see Figure 5.8 and Table 5.2. below). A non-linear effect, in which 
interest in home country’s politics is high in the first five years, but gradually 
decreases over time.
Figure 5.8 Cross-reference: Period of residence abroad; interest in home country’s politics
C ross-reference - How long have you been living ou tside 
Mexico? and How in terested  are you in Mexican politics? 
(R=580)
More than 10 years
Between 6 and 10
0 )o> years
o! Between 1 and 5 years
Less than 1 year
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
□ Very interested in Mexican politics □ Interested, but not much
Own elaboration. Source: Cove survey, 2006
Table 5.2 Cross-reference: Period of residence abroad; interest in home country’s politics
How long have you been living outside Mexico? (R=580)
Very interested 
(R=476)
Interested, but not 
much (R=93)
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
Less than 1 year 12 2 6 1 6 1
Between 1 and 5 
years 261 45 226 39 35 6
Between 6 and 10 
years 180 31 151 26 29 5
More than 10 
years 116 20 93 16 23 4
No answer 12 2 0 0 0
Total 580 100 476 82 93 16
Own elaboration. Source: Cove survey, 2006
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In addition, according to the survey about 72% of absentee voters are only Mexican 
citizens, whereas 14% are dual citizens and 11% are processing their second 
citizenship (see Figure 5.9 below).
Figure 5.9 Acquisition of dual citizenship among migrant voters
Have you acquired the nationality of the country where you 
reside? (R=580)
3%
14%
m Has dual citizenship
11%
■ Is processing a  second 
citizenship 
□ Has only Mexican citizenship
□ No answer
72%
Own elaboration. Source: Cove survey. 2006
These results show that a quarter o f absentee voters, then, would eventually be able 
to participate politically in two countries. In addition, only a minority (1%) reported 
to have been bom in the US, whilst the vast majority o f absentee voters are Mexican- 
born. Although, the survey shows that there is not strong association between having 
a second citizenship and applying for Mexican elections, a quarter o f migrant voters 
potentially having a second citizenship is significant nonetheless.
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Human capital
Human capital, measured in years of education and high occupational skills, is often 
referred as a determinant for both assimilation in the host country and engagement in 
politics in the home country. Assimilation theory says that human capital facilitates 
adjustment to the new context of reception as makes it easier to transfer allegiances 
and political interests away from the home country (Pickus 1998). On the contrary, 
transnationalism scholars, in particular Guamizo et. al., show that Latin American 
immigrants in the US that engage in cross-border political activities are, more often 
than not, better educated (2003).
According to the survey among those Mexicans that voted from abroad we find that 
their level of education and type of occupation stand out as particularly significant 
(see Tables 5.3 and 5.4 below). A majority of absentee voters are highly educated: 
75% had graduate or postgraduate experience whereas; on the other hand, 13% have 
completed preparatory school and 11% have secondary or primary education. 
Equally, absentee voters that responded to the survey seem to perform more skilled 
jobs. The majority work in the private sector (32%) or are entrepreneurs (16%), 
whereas only 5% mention they are labourers, 1% are self-employed (taxi driver, 
stallholder, street vendor, etc.) and 1 % report to work on the land.
Table 5.3 Education of expatria tes reg istered  for a b se n te e  voting in 2006
Until w hat year did you study? (R=580)
Total
U S -based  vo ters 
(R=371)
P o stg rad u ate  d eg re e  
holder 226 39% 115 31%
University d eg re e  
holder 209 36% 137 37%
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P reparato ry  education 75 13% 63 17%
S econdary  education 29 5% 19 5%
T echnical secondary  
education 23 4% 30 8%
Prim ary education 12 2% 7 2%
No an sw er 6 1% 0 0%
Total 580 100% 371 100%
Own elaboration. Source: Cove survey, 2006
T able 5.4 O ccupation of expatria tes reg istered  for a b s e n te e  voting in 2006
W here do you work or w hat do you do?  
(R=580)
Private sec to r em ployee 186 32%
E ntrepreneur 93 16%
Public sec to r or 
governm ent 41 7%
Housewife 41 7%
Self-em ployed (dentist, 
doctor, lawyer) 35 6%
O w ns a  sm all b u s in ess 29 5%
W orker 29 5%
T each e r 29 5%
S tudent 23 4%
Self-em ployed (taxi 
driver, stallholder, s tree t 
vendor...) 6 1%
U nem ployed 6 1%
Farm er 6 1%
P ensioner 6 1%
O ther 52 9%
Total 580 100%
Own elaboration. Source: Cove survey, 2006
These findings suggest that it is not the least educated or more recent arrivals or
temporary migrants who are most prone to have voted in the 2006 Mexican
presidential election. While running contrary to conventional expectations by the
legislators that approved the vote abroad bill, some reflection suffices to make sense
of the results. Educated and more affluent migrants can be more capable of following
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political developments in their country of origin and can also be the ones that have 
the time and economic resources to deal with the restrictive procedure to register and 
cast an absentee vote. Also, greater stability associated with permanent (and legal 
settlement) might favour migrants’ political participation in their home country’s 
elections. In the same way, the acquisition of US citizenship does not necessarily 
reduce interest in maintaining ties with their home country politics. In particular, 
these findings are consistent with transnationalism literature and conventional 
theories of political participation, but run contrary to assimilation theory.
5.3. Voting preferences among migrant voters
Despite not being influential on the final electoral outcome, the official expatriate 
voting count showed that the PAN’s Felipe Calderon outpolled his contenders by 
substantial margins; he received about 58% (19,016) of all votes emitted abroad. 
Whereas the centre-left PRD was preferred by about 34% (11,090) and the PRI was 
less popular obtaining about 4% (1,360) of expatriates’ votes. This differs markedly 
from votes emitted in Mexico, where electoral results were much contested between 
the PAN and PRD -  36.67% of votes went for the PAN, 36.09 % for the PRD and 
about 23% for the PRI (see Figure 5.10 below).
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Figure 5.10 Results of the 2006 presidential election (in-country and absentee votes)
Electoral re su lts  (2006 presidential election)
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D em ocrata yC am pesina '
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□
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I Vote abroad □  National territory
Own elaboration. Source: COVE, 2006
At first, the PRD was widely expected to gain most support among migrants. This 
was one reason why other parties were unsympathetic to the migrant voting rights 
campaign, as we have seen in the previous chapter. What factors then explain this? 
Why are electoral preferences different between Mexicans abroad and in Mexico? 
Why did Mexicans living abroad disproportionably favour the PAN over other 
political alternatives? In this section, I present the argument that the socio­
demographic profile of Mexican voters abroad that we discussed in the previous 
section -  more educated and affluent permanent migrants -  explains why electoral 
preferences among Mexicans abroad were significantly different from Mexicans in 
Mexico because education and high income levels are predictors o f support for the 
PAN (Klesner 2007; Lawson 2007). We would then expect that given the current 
electoral system and political context in Mexico, the PAN would be the political 
party that would benefit the most from absentee voting, for which it might also 
support similar vote abroad initiatives at the local level.
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As we have seen in previous chapters, Mexican political parties have a long history 
of courting Mexican migrants, from campaigning among expatriates in order to gain 
their political favour and financial support, to opening committees in Mexican 
migrant settlements in the US and support migrant candidatures in Mexico. The 
recent development of competitive politics has indeed increased this pattern of 
transnational politics. As we have seen, nonetheless, the main political parties have 
differed on their stance on migrants political rights, whereas the centre-left PRD has 
been the key advocator of migrants’ political participation and has embarked on a 
crusade to win support among Mexican communities in the US, the PRI seemed to 
have opposed migrants’ political engagement for fear of a widespread anti-PRI 
sentiment abroad. The PAN has stood in between; ‘Panistas ’ (PAN supporters) have 
not completely endorsed PRD’s advanced stance on migrants’ political rights, but 
instead their middle-ground posture successfully shaped the final absentee voting bill 
for presidential elections.
Equally, parties’ efforts to expand their presence abroad have differed from party to 
party; the PRD has taken the lead followed by the PAN. Consequently, the PRD and 
PAN have been more successful at attracting more support abroad, whereas the PRI 
is still seen by many migrants as the embodiment of corruption and anti-democratic 
practices of the past. Only recently political parties’ activities abroad have started to 
receive more attention from academia, challenging the conception that political 
parties mainly operate within the domestic terrain. Political parties’ representation 
abroad is more advanced in industrialised countries that have also granted electoral 
rights to their expatriate communities, such as the cases of the US and Britain (Tether
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1994; Dark 2003). In the case of the US, ‘Democrats Abroad’ and ‘Republicans 
Abroad’ were created in the late 1980’s when the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens 
Voting Rights Act was amended by Congress allowing all American citizens abroad 
to vote for federal elections (Dark 2003). In contrast, Mexican political parties’ 
organisation and representation abroad has varied from party to party, but it has 
rapidly increased with the rise of competitive politics in recent years and the 
adoption of migrant political rights at the national and sub-national levels. Thus, the 
table (5.5) below shows what activities have been carried out abroad by the three 
main Mexican political parties, mainly relying on fieldwork interviews, parties’ 
manifestos and electoral programmes.
Table 5.5 Main political p arties’ transnational activities
Political party Presence abroad Support for migrant 
candidacies
Migrant 
participation in 
internal party 
decisions
PRD Institutionalised 
p rese n ce  since  
2002:
S ta te  C om m ittees 
se t up in five US 
s ta te s : California, 
T exas, Illinois, 
W ashington S ta te  
and  New York
Migrants should  be 
included in 
‘plurinominal’ lists 
and  should b e  
g ran ted  cand idacies
P residen ts of the  
S ta te  C om m ittees 
ab road  participate in 
th e  Party National 
Counsel. Party 
m em bers residing 
ab road  ch o o se  their 
own cand idacies
PAN Institutionalised 
p re se n ce  since 
2004: S ta te  
C om m ittees a re  
being officially se t up 
in various US cities. 
T here  is an  ‘Office 
for O rganisation 
A broad’
Not officially. But it 
hap p en s  in practice
T here  is an 
international 
C onsultative 
C ounsel. Party 
m em bers ab road  can 
also  vote internally 
for presidential 
cand ida te
PRI Only symbolic:
A su p p o rte rs’ 
com m ittee ex ists in 
California
Not officially. But it 
hap p en s  in practice
No
Source: Own elaboration, information based on interviews and political parties’ official manifestos and electoral
programmes (last updated in 2007)
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Given the significant number of Mexican citizens abroad and the fact that they could 
potentially impact on electoral results in the national territory, a number of scholars 
tried to forecast how Mexican migrants would vote for president in 2006 (Lawson 
2003; Marcelli and Cornelius 2005; Cornelius, Leal et al. 2006). However, research 
on migrant voting behaviour in Mexican elections is almost unique. In contrast to 
research on voting patterns among immigrant and ethnic communities in countries of 
reception, there is very limited research on migrant voting behaviour in home 
country’s elections (Fidrmuc and Doyle 2004; Battiston and Mascitelli 2008). The 
only relevant study looks at the cases of Polish and Czech citizens abroad and their 
electoral participation in recent national elections in their home countries (Fidrmuc 
and Doyle 2004).
In general terms, most research on electoral participation is divided between those 
who argue that voters’ demographics and socio-economic status are key determinants 
of voting behaviour and those who attribute more importance to the external 
environment as a factor that conditions voters’ political beliefs, values and eventually 
electoral behaviour (political socialization) (Fidrmuc and Doyle 2004). In regards to 
the former, by carrying out a survey on political values among Mexicans in the US 
and their counterparts in Mexico, Lawson argued that the demographic profile of 
Mexicans abroad varied greatly from the characteristics of Mexicans living in 
Mexico. According to him, Mexicans abroad are on average mainly young, better- 
off and have more years of education (Lawson 2003). Thus, Lawson predicted that 
education levels among migrants would be a key determinant of their electoral 
behaviour together with media messages and consequently the Mexican migrant vote 
would eventually benefit the PAN (Lawson 2003). Although the present absentee
voting system for presidential elections prevents political parties and candidates from 
campaigning abroad, Spanish-language TV network available in the US widely 
covered the 2006 Mexican presidential race. It is also worth noting, then, that 
coverage of PAN’s Felipe Calderon in the US was generally positive in contrast to 
other candidates.
From the perspective of political socialization, some studies have either referred to 
the context of reception or the political context in the place of origin as significant 
variables that shape migrants’ choice of vote. On the one hand, some have tried to 
show that political values and democratic attitudes alter as soon as Mexican 
emigrants step across the northern border (Ai Camp 2003; Klesner 2003). Thus, 
many predicted that the PRI would suffer the most as migrants would punish the 
party for not having provided enough opportunities in Mexico, which might have 
forced them to emigrate to the US in search of a better future. However, it becomes 
more complicated to explain why migrants would prefer the PAN to the PRD at the 
time of elections. Fidrmuc and Doyle’s study on migrant political behaviour in home 
country’s elections shows that the external environment influences how emigrants 
vote. In particular, by looking at voting behaviour of Polish and Czech emigrants in 
all countries from where they cast an absentee vote, they conclude that those living in 
full democracies with an open economy are more likely to vote for a right-wing 
political party in their home country’s elections. However, the main shortcoming of 
this study is that it does not look at migrant voters’ demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics. On the other hand, in the case of the 2006 Mexican presidential 
election that was carried out abroad some forecasted that migrants’ electoral 
preferences would be determined by Mexico’s political environment. In particular,
decisions would be shaped by communication with relatives and friends back home 
or by Spanish-language TV news coverage. Based on this, some predicted a ‘mirror 
vote’ (Beltran Miranda 2004).
Looking at the results from the past election (see Figure 5.10 above), we find that 
Roberto Madrazo of the PRI was less popular in the US than in Mexico, a finding 
consistent with earlier survey research on expatriate partisanship. Those votes 
appeared to have been diverted to the PAN that won more than half of the expatriate 
electorate, whereas the PRD alliance ‘Bien de Todos’ (‘Good for All’) seemed to 
have maintained a similar percentage of votes abroad as in the Mexican territory. 
Small and more recently created political parties such as the moderate-left 
‘Altemativa Social Democrata y Campesina’ (‘Social Democratic and Peasants’ 
Alternative’) and the centre-right ‘Nueva Alianza’ (‘New Alliance’) generated 
similar support abroad as in Mexico. If we analyse the results by state, however, we 
find that in 11 states in which the PRD had won the majority of votes in Mexican 
territory, most residents abroad favoured the PAN, including highly migrant-sending 
states with a record of PRD leaning such as DF (Mexico City), the state of Mexico, 
Michoacan and Zacatecas. In fact, according to the absentee voting count, the PRD 
was victorious in only 4 states, that is, Chiapas, Guerrero, Hidalgo and Oaxaca. It is 
then clear that most Mexicans living abroad are more pro-PAN than their 
counterparts back home and thus closer to an ideological side, whereas Mexicans in 
Mexico tend to be spread all over a left-right scale and represent stronger extremes.
Considering the demographic and socio-economic profile of the migrant voter that 
we built in the previous section, these results do not seem surprising. More affluent
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and educated migrants most likely to live permanently abroad (perhaps with 
regularised status) would generally tend to favour the PAN. Although this 
description would not encompass all Mexicans abroad, it would describe the small 
minority that might have had the time, resources as well as interest in the Mexican 
elections to deal with the cumbersome registration and voting procedure. This 
conclusion, however, would not rule out the possibility that the US media covering 
the Mexican presidential race could have had a significant influence on voting 
behaviour among expatriates, as it was the only means of awareness about 
candidates’ positions once campaigning abroad was forbidden. On the other hand, it 
cannot be inferred from this conclusion that political preferences and attitudes could 
change according to time of residence abroad and being in contact with a diverse 
political culture, as Fidrmuc and Doyle point out (2004).
As this first experience of the vote abroad might serve as indicative of PAN 
preference among Mexican migrants, it might trigger the approval of similar bills at 
the local level or even prompt a reform to this bill expanding migrants’ political 
rights for future national elections. A positive note is that the postal vote in this last 
presidential election was proved safe and was not questioned, as was the ballot vote 
in Mexican territory. Interestingly enough, when Mexican legislators were asked to 
evaluate the exercise of absentee voting for the 2006 presidential elections, most PRI 
congressmen mentioned that it was a failure in contrast to the positive response given 
by PAN and PRD legislators38. However, the minuscule number of absentee votes 
registered in the 2006 presidential elections does not represent a threat to the PRI and
38 Interviews realised with a sample of approximate 35 legislators involved in the approval o f the 2005 vote 
abroad bill
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might not deter this party from offering support for the approval of similar bills at the 
local level from now on.
5.4. Conclusion
The first Mexican vote abroad experience was deemed a failure in many quarters 
because of the minuscule number of votes cast abroad, which can be mainly 
attributed, on the one hand, to the restrictive character of the absentee voting 
mechanism and, on the other hand, to ineffective implementation of the bill due to 
lack of political willingness, as demonstrated in delayed budgetary decisions, 
logistical problems and an ineffectual awareness campaign. The evidence presented 
in this chapter, however, suggests that the new members of Mexican democracy are 
mainly educated and affluent permanent migrants that are most likely to have legal 
status to work in the US. At the same time, Mexican migrant voters do not 
necessarily engage in cross-border economic activities such as sending remittances 
home, but they do engage in other transnational political and social practices such as 
often calling friends and family back home and following the news to keep aware 
about developments in their home country. However, they do not seem to be part of 
migrant clubs in the places where they reside. It is logical that more educated and 
affluent migrants could be more capable of following developments in their country 
of origin and could also be the ones that had the time and economic resources to deal 
with the restrictive procedure to register and cast an absentee vote. As we will see 
now in the case of Zacatecas that offers its expatriates a more direct form of political 
participation by allowing migrant candidacies; it is equally affluent and long-term 
residents in the US that take up the opportunity to run for elections back in their
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hometowns, sometimes leaving their American families behind. These results, in 
turn, might explain the lopsided conservative migrant vote. Voting preferences 
among Mexican expatriates in the 2006 presidential elections distinctly differ from 
Mexicans in Mexico as there was a marked preference for the PAN, even among 
those expatriates coming from “perredistas” (PRD supporters) states such as 
Zacatecas and Michoacan.
The minuscule migrant turnout in the Mexican elections, however, is often contrasted 
with the huge attendance in the US rallies to demand reform of immigration laws, 
which unfolded simultaneously as the Mexican absentee voting registration was 
taking place. About a million migrants, many of them Mexican, joined rallies in 20 
US cities in May 2006 to request better treatment for the estimated 12 million illegal 
immigrants (of which an estimated 4 million are Mexican) and a path to 
regularisation (BBC 2 May 2006). This shows that the foremost priority for Mexican 
migrant workers is not to have a voice over political developments in the country 
they left behind, but to obtain legal residence and political rights in the country 
where they now reside. It would be misleading, however, to believe that they would 
rule out maintaining a political relationship with their country of origin altogether. 
Perhaps what the results in this chapter reveal is that greater stability associated with 
permanent and legal settlement might favour migrants’ political participation in their 
home country’s elections. Also, at a time in which the fate of millions of Mexicans 
with illegal status in the US is at stake, possibly it would not be mistaken to foresee 
that more Mexicans would in the near future turn their sights on the country they left 
behind. In the same way, the acquisition of US citizenship does not necessarily
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reduce interest in maintaining ties with their home country politics (Jones-Correa 
1998; Barreto 2003; Escobar April 2004).
Paradoxically, the positive aspect of the low turnout in the first Mexican vote abroad 
experience, nonetheless, was that it did not represent a threat to political parties as it 
did not influence electoral results. The postal vote was proved safe and was not 
target of controversies and questioning as was the ballot vote in Mexican territory. 
This then gives power to migrant activists to push even harder to expand these rights 
for future national elections and replicate similar vote abroad mechanisms for local 
elections. These developments, thus, seem to be taking Mexican politics into a 
transnational dimension, albeit to a limited extent.
In the following chapters, I address the second level of analysis of this thesis. That 
is, how formal forms of emigrant political participation are adopted at the sub­
national level in Mexico and what are their implications. What is relevant about this 
analysis is the asymmetric development of emigrant political inclusion among 
migrant sending states ( ‘estados’) and the distinct emigrant political participation 
formulas that are advocated by migrant groups and local political actors and finally 
adopted at local legislatures. Controversy has surrounded sub-national emigrant 
political participation formulas as they seem to conflict with federal legislation.
Having explored how the vote abroad for presidential elections came into being at 
the federal level helps us assess to what extent this federal initiative shapes migrants’ 
demands at the local level. Are the same migrant groups involved in the lobbying of 
the vote abroad bill also advocating similar bills at the local level? Also, what is their
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strategy? At the same time, what are the local political actors’ intentions in 
supporting the political inclusion of emigrants at the local level? One of the findings 
presented in the latter chapters is that the network of migrant activists that actively 
lobbied for the vote abroad for presidential elections have also, in parallel, put 
forward migrant political rights’ demands at the sub-national level. However, they 
tend to rely on the support from migrant organisations or hometown associations 
from that particular state and, at the same time, the opening up of political spaces due 
to party politics, as well as a centre-left PRD elected government. The next chapter, 
then, focuses on the case of the adoption of the “ Migrant Law” in Zacatecas.
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Chapter 6
6. Zacatecas as the first bi-national state - the 
adoption of the 2003 Migrant Bill
The Mexican migrant state of Zacatecas has often been referred to as the ‘first bi­
national state’ in the national and international news. That is because thousands of 
Zacatecans are believed to interact transnationally in the economic, social and 
political life of two polities (their places of origin in Zacatecas and their places of 
reception in the US). Since 2003, they are legally entitled to do so, since a bill known 
as ‘la ley migrante’ (the ‘Migrant Law’), formulated by a migrant lobby group, was 
approved by the state legislature. Zacatecan emigrants count with one of the most 
advanced sets of political rights in Latin America that is only comparable to similar 
laws implemented in Colombia, Ecuador and Panama, as we have seen in chapter 
one. Two main features stand out in the Zacatecan migrant bill: the notion of bi­
national residency which allows migrants from this state to run for elections as 
municipal presidents, ’sindicos ‘regidores’ and deputies (the only exception is the 
governorship). Second, it ensures that migrants are represented in the local congress, 
where two legislators out of thirty have to qualify as ‘migrant deputies’, which 
means that they have lived abroad for a period of time.
It has been noted that Zacatecan migrants appear now as new actors in Zacatecan 
politics (as candidates and legislators), that is, as part of an experiment that aims at 
finding the right formula for migrant political participation in the country (Bakker 
and Smith 2003; Smith and Bakker 2005; Smith and Bakker 2008). However, we
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should bear in mind that in the Mexican constitutional system, federal states are 
allowed to define their own terms of membership and those requirements to occupy 
public office at the local level (except for the governorship). Thus, the notion of 
migrant candidates is not new. Migrants have already occupied public positions in 
states where a residency period is not compulsory such as Michoacan. Nonetheless, 
Zacatecas is at the time of writing the only federal state where Mexican migrants, 
apart from being able to occupy public office, have also representation at the 
legislative level making it an interesting case study to analyse transnational political 
engagement.
A number of scholars have mentioned that the ‘Migrant Law’ has institutionalised a 
practice -  bi-national residency -  that already existed among Zacatecan migrants 
(Delgado Wise and Rodriguez Ramirez 2001; Moctezuma Longoria 2001; Goldring 
2002; Moctezuma Longoria 2004; Moctezuma Longoria 2004; Moctezuma 2004). 
Approximately half of the state population of Zacatecas, 1.3 million, lives in the US, 
spread across 20 American states. However, as Moctezuma Longoria signals 
emigrants have often been seen as ‘absent but always present’ (Moctezuma Longoria 
2004) because of the strong ties that they keep with their place of origin, which is 
illustrated by the amount of remittances they send back home and the large number 
of Zacatecan hometown associations based in the US that have been actively 
involved in public works in their communities of origin.
Thus, what are the factors that have led to the institutionalisation of transnational 
political practices in Zacatecas? Why does the Zacatecan formula of migrant political 
rights differ from other bills adopted at the sub-national level in Mexico? The
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purpose of this chapter is to explore the dynamics that led to the implementation of 
the ‘Migrant Law’. The main argument here is that the creation of a legal instrument 
that allows the political involvement of Zacatecan migrants (including first 
generation Zacatecan descendants) from abroad was created as a response to the 
cross-border migrant lobby action and the support of non-PRI political parties, in 
particular the centre-left PRD. In a similar way as the vote abroad bill at the national 
level, the issue of emigrant political participation has been part of the 
democratization process and the rise of party politics in the state. Exploring the case 
of the state of Zacatecas I show that, at the sub-national level, three steps are 
necessary for the passage of a migrant political rights bill. That is, the size and 
organization of the migrant community, a significant flow of collective remittances 
and the experience of a democratic transition, along with the emergence of party 
politics. These three components have only converged in Zacatecas and Michoacan, 
but we could expect to see similar developments in other Mexican migrant-sending 
states.
The bi-national activism of Zacatecan migrants has been in recent years subject of 
many studies that focus on the meaning of citizenship practices and social inclusion 
during Mexico's democratic transition (Bakker and Smith 2003; Moctezuma 
Longoria 2004; Moctezuma 2004; Smith and Bakker 2005; Smith and Bakker 2008). 
In contrast, however, I explore how Zacatecan political institutions -  such as political 
parties and the local government -  have responded to migrants’ demands and how 
their interests are negotiated in the local legislature. The reason for this is to 
determine to what extent domestic (political) institutions shape migrant political 
involvement in their home country’s affairs. The Zacatecan ‘Migrant Law’ in
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particular shows how the centre-left PRD local government and the PRD faction in 
the legislature directly favoured the initiative proposed by the Zacatecan migrant 
lobby group, which guaranteed a much more advanced migrants’ political rights bill 
than any other similar legal instrument to date.
This chapter is divided in two main sections. Section one builds on the main 
determinants of the institutionalisation of migrant political participation in Zacatecas. 
That is, the size of the Zacatecan migrant community and the changing pattern of 
migration dynamics in the state. Second, I provide an overview of the growing 
organisation of Zacatecan migrants in the US and their involvement in public sector 
projects in their communities of origin, which has helped them gain public 
recognition at home and increasing economic and political leverage vw a vis local 
political elites. Finally, I show how Zacatecan migrant clubs have played a 
significant role during the change of government in Zacatecas. In particular, I 
illustrate how the re-birth of party politics in the state resulted in the formation of the 
first US-based migrant groups with clear political goals. In the second part of the 
chapter, I analyse the passage of the ‘Migrant Law’ in the local congress, where I 
argue that its successful approval was the result of the cross-border coalition formed 
between US-based migrant lobby groups and non-PRI parties in the local legislature. 
As Levitt and de la Dehase argue national level dynamics for the adoption of new 
policies that aim at migrants political inclusion depend on ‘the political cost-benefit 
calculations for different kinds of political actors’ (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003, p. 
106). That is indeed clear in the Zacatecan case, as migrants associations have 
mainly received support from the centre-left PRD party once it gained the 
governorship and the simple majority in congress. The passage of the ‘Migrant Law’
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in Zacatecas illustrates how cross-border political formation takes place contributing 
to the emerging literature on transnational political engagement.
6.1. Determinants of formal emigrant political 
participation in Zacatecas
In this section, I explore how Zacatecan migrant associations’ economic leverage has 
translated into political power within the state’s affairs. I argue that migrant 
associations and their leaders have gained significant political power in the last 
decade due to the growing number of Zacatecan emigrants and the remittances sent 
to their relatives and friends back home and, in parallel, the increase in the 
‘collective remittances’ they send to their communities of origin, that is, the amount 
of money donated by migrant organisations for the completion of public works in 
local communities39. I agree with the growing literature on the political economy of 
collective remittances, which shows how the ‘collective migrant’, as a transnational 
political class, has been able to construct ties with the state and local governments, 
which have evolved from coordinated action for the implementation of community 
projects to being able to have a greater say about how politics is done at home 
(Delgado Wise and Rodriguez Ramirez 2001; Moctezuma Longoria 2001; Bada 
2003; Goldring 2004; Rivera-Salgado, Bada et al. 2005). This has also been possible, 
however, due to the political transition experimented in Zacatecas, in which political 
parties and the local government tend to view migrant organisations as a platform to
39 For an insight into collective remittances see Delgado Wise, R. and H. Rodriguez Ramirez (2001). The 
Emergence of Collective Migrants and their Role in Mexico's Local and Regional Development, Red Iternacional 
de Migracion y Desarrollo, Moctezuma Longoria, M. (2001). Clubes Zacatecanos en los Estados Unidos. Un 
capital social en proceso, Goldring, L. (2004). "Family and collective remittances to Mexico: A multidimensional 
typology." Development and Change 35(4): 799-840.
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gain political support, votes at home and funds for development projects in local 
communities.
Let us begin by analysing the main factors -  an increase in migrant numbers and 
individual and collective remittances -  which have contributed towards the growing 
political influence of Zacatecan migrant organisations south of the border.
6.1.1. The changing nature of Zacatecan emigration to the US
Zacatecas has sent the highest proportion of its population to the United States than 
any other Mexican state. There are 1.5 million people in Zacatecas today and another
807,000 in the US (INEGI statistics, 2000 XII Census). Counting American sons 
and daughters of Zacatecans there are probably close to 1.3 million in the US. 
Zacatecan migrants are spread over 20 US states, although the majority live in 
California, Texas and Illinois. The city with the greatest number of Zacatecans is Los 
Angeles, followed by Chicago and, only in third position, Zacatecas, the state capital.
Initially, the reasons to emigrate followed an economic logic -  a poor economy 
aggravated by the state’s geographical position. However, after decades of 
experiencing the migration phenomenon, younger generations have found it easier to 
emigrate due to established Zacatecan migrant networks, that is, kin, friends and 
acquaintances in the US. The economic situation in Zacatecas is stagnant compared 
to other Mexican states, the annual growth in the state between 1995 and 2000 was 
only 0.2 percent (INEGI statistics, 2000 XII Census), and the geographical situation 
of the state does not help either. Zacatecas is situated 600 Km (8hrs) from Mexico
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City and 700 Km from the border region and coastal exits are still further away. The 
economy is mainly rural; agriculture represents 25.14 percent of the state GDP, 
although the national average is only 6.47 percent (INEGI statistics, 2004 Economic 
Census). In fact, Zacatecas is the major agricultural producer in the country. 
However, with NAFTA, production of the most important agricultural products has 
significantly diminished. In addition, the industrial sector in Zacatecas represents 
only 5 percent of the state GDP, whereas the national average is 20.28 percent 
(INEGI statistics, 2004 Economic Census). The ‘maquiladoras’ (assembly plants) 
industry, which was popular in other migrant sending states such as Aguascalientes, 
Durango and San Luis Potosi did not have so much success in Zacatecas.
Zacatecan migration has been until mid-1990s mostly male and rural. Migratory 
movements have caused a fundamental reduction in the male population, especially 
in remote rural communities. The indicator of male population in the state is 92.82 
(INEGI statistics, 2000 XU Census), nonetheless in places like Tepetongo, Nuria de 
Los Angeles and other highly migrant sending communities it is below 85 (INEGI 
statistics, 2000 XII Census). However, recent research has found that Zacatecan 
emigration has increasingly shifted from seasonal emigration to permanent 
settlement, in a similar fashion as the rest of the country (Massey, Durand et al. 
2002; Leite, Ramos et al. 2003). At the same time, migration dynamics have 
increasingly changed from involving mainly males from rural regions to also include 
population from urban areas (Durand, Massey et al. 2001), a process that has also 
been accompanied by more female emigration. However, whereas men emigrate 
mainly for work, women do so mostly for family reasons as in the majority of cases 
they follow their husband or a parent (Cerrutti and Massey 2001). If a married man is
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documented, it increases the odds that he will be joined later by his wife (Cerrutti 
and Massey 2001). As US authorities progressively militarised the border over the 
1990s, men adapted to their higher costs and risks of border crossing by staying 
longer and increasingly they have arranged for the entry of their wives and children 
(Durand, Massey et al. 1999; Durand, Massey et al. 2001; Massey, Durand et al. 
2002).
This, in turn, has an effect on the remittances market. Margarita Mooney finds that 
the kind of social ties that migrants have north of the border influence the nature and 
form of the investments they make in Mexico (2003). Those migrants that travel 
alone and live with their kin and friends in the US tend to stay for shorter time and 
return with all their savings to invest in housing and productive projects. In contrast, 
migrants that travel with their families, more often than not, stay longer in the US 
and tend to remit money monthly. The latter joins US-based social clubs with other 
migrants to make investments in community infrastructure, in order to claim status 
and continued membership in their communities of origin, a practice that has been 
particularly relevant in the Zacatecan context (Mooney 2003).
The Zacatecan economy depends on migrants’ individual remittances, which is the 
first source of income with an estimated 610 million dollars per year, that is 9.5 
percent of the state’s GDP, according to the Bank of Mexico (2007 figures). This 
amount exceeds the general state budget (2005 figures)40. In second place, Zacatecas 
receives an income from agriculture and in third position from the mining industry.
40 The Zacatecan state budget for 2005 was around 11 million dollars. Gobierno del Estado de Zacatecas (2006). 
Cuenta Publica 2005. Zacatecas, Zacatecas.
229
The graph below (Figure 6.1.) shows the growth in migrant remittances in the last 
four years. It should be noted that an increase in individual remittances is also related 
to better recording standards and increasing use of official transfer channels. The 
main purpose of migrant remittances is family subsistence and only a small share of 
remittances is spent on truly productive investments.
Figure 6.1 Individual remittances sent to the state of Zacatecas (2003-2007)
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Migrant remittances are received in Zacatecas by 12.2 percent of the households in 
the state, from which remittances amount for approximately 70 percent in terms o f  
the total family income (Bank of Mexico, Informe Annual 2004, p. 54). 
Nevertheless, scholars have warned about the so-called ‘remittance-based 
development model’, that is, economic dependence on migrants’ remittances 
(Delgado Wise and Marquez Covarrubias 2007). This is partially because as the 
pattern o f migration becomes permanent, that is, family members reunite in the 
country o f reception (Deans, Lonnqvist et al. 2006), and if the US experiences an 
economic slowdown, remittances might tend to diminish in the near future.
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6.1.2. The collective migrant
The donations that migrant clubs make towards public work projects in Zacatecas 
have rapidly increased in recent years. In a trend that began in the early 1990’s and 
accelerated since the beginning of this century, more than a hundred development 
projects are funded by Zacatecan clubs a year. This group of migrants have been 
denominated as ‘collective migrants’, as they are represented by migrant clubs 
integrated by members that belong to the same local community, which can, in turn, 
unite with other clubs from different localities but with similar objectives. To quote 
Delgado Wise and Rodriguez Ramirez collective migrants are characterised ‘by 
having a relatively permanent formal organization; using that structure to strengthen 
ties of cultural identity, belonging, and solidarity with their communities of origin; 
establishing the possibility of dialogue with different public and private entities, in 
both Mexico and the US; and having significant financial potential for carrying out 
projects to benefit communities, by means of collective funds capable of overcoming 
the limitations and rigidity of individual or family remittances’ (Delgado Wise and 
Rodriguez Ramirez 2001).
Migrant organisations have different layers of institutionalisation (Zabin and Escala-
Rabadan 1998; Moctezuma Longoria 2001). In the first level, members group
together according to their communities of origin in Mexico. These kinds of
hometown associations are active sponsors of social events in their communities in
the US and provide economic support to their places of origin during emergencies
and economic crises. Thus, there could be as many informal village organisations as
there are migrant sending communities in Mexico. The second level appears when a
formal leadership committee is established and liaises with other migrant clubs from
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the same community of origin. The third level of organisation of migrant clubs is the 
federation, which is practically a coalition of hometown associations from the same 
state in Mexico and from the same state or region in the US. It is mainly at this level 
where the efforts of Mexican consulates, the Institute of Mexicans abroad and local 
governments have been concentrated.
According to the Institute of Mexicans Abroad, at present, Zacatecas has around
40,000 members spread over 200 clubs (fieldwork interviews, IME, 2006). These are 
grouped together in ten federations: South California, Chicago, Oxnard, Denver, 
Dallas, Las Vegas, Atlanta, Houston, Waco, Florida and North California. However, 
although Zacatecas counts with the highest number of migrants participating in 
migrant associations, they only represent 3 percent of the total population of 
Zacatecan origin resident in the US. This percentage seems very low, but if we 
compare it with the levels of participation of migrants from other Mexican states the 
number is nonetheless significant. In addition, if we look back at the origins of the 
collective migrant class we find that it is still at an embryonic stage. According to 
Gonzalez Gutierrez, several Zacatecan hometown clubs operated in South California 
in the 1950s and 1960s, but it was not until 1972 when Zacatecan clubs united to 
form the first regional grouping: the ‘Federation de Clubes Zacatecanos del Sur de 
California’ (Federation of Zacatecan Clubs of Southern California) (Gonzalez 
Gutierrez 1995). In 1985, the organization was called ‘Clubes Zacatecanos Unidos’ 
(United Zacatecan Clubs). The number of clubs in the federation grew from six in 
1986, to twenty-two in 1989 and to approximately forty in 1996 (Institute of 
Mexicans Abroad, fieldwork interviews 2006).
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Hometown associations from the very beginning were seen as social clubs, but often 
carried out fundraising activities. Many of the earlier projects of which a register has 
been kept, involved renovations to churches or sponsorship for celebrations of saints’ 
days, but they were often followed by infrastructure projects (Orozco and Lapointe 
2004). Although in a few cases, municipal governments made contributions in-kind, 
most of these initiatives were carried out on solo-basis. In the early 1990’s, 
nonetheless, Zacatecan hometown associations commenced to work in partnership 
with governments at the local and state levels. This trend relied at the start on 
informal relationships with government officials on a project-by-project basis, but 
increased once state programmes were formalised. In 1986, the federation and the 
state government under the PRI Governor Genaro Borrego reached an agreement 
whereby migrant associations and the state government would jointly fund public 
works. As Moctezuma notes, in 1993, migrant associations and government officials 
agreed to implement a ‘2x1’ program, which meant that for each peso sent by the 
Zacatecan Clubs in the US for community projects, the Mexican government at the 
federal and state levels allocated another two (Moctezuma Longoria 2001).
As we can see in the table below (Table 6.2), collective remittances have been 
escalating since such partnership was formalised in 1993 in the form of a ‘2X1’ 
project with the participation of the federal and state government. In 1998, however, 
the programme was expanded to involve municipal funding (becoming ‘3X1’), 
which also led to an increase in the number of projects carried out. This same year 
the state experienced a change of government to the centre left PRD party. It is 
important to note the difference between investments and the number of public 
works carried out prior and post the change of government in Zacatecas. As we can
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see in Table 6.1, the change o f government contributed to the significant increase in 
migrant investment and in the number of projects funded.
Figure 6.2 Collective rem ittances in Z aca tecas betw een 1993 and 2002
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Own elaboration Source: Based on Rodolfo Garcia Zamora, 'El programa 3X1 y los retos de los proyectos' 
(Chapter 10); Secretaria de Planeacion y Finanzas, State Government of Zacatecas.
Table 6.1 Allocation of ‘3X1’ program m e funds in Z aca tecas  (1993-2005)
Year Investm ent Projects
Municipalities
benefited
1993 187742 7 N/A
1994 376918 30 N/A
1995 390535 34 N/A
1996 694603 61 17
1997 1682594 77 27
1998 77228 8 7
1999 4817900 93 27
2000 6000000 108 28
2001 7200000 130 30
2002 17000000 240 35
2003 14777124 324 40
2004 12594753 282 40
2005 19972593 387 43
Total 85771990 1781
Own elaboration. Source: Rodolfo Garcia Zamora, ’El programa 3X1 y los retos de los proyectos'; Secretaria de 
Planeacion y Finanzas, State Government of Zacatecas.
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The success of the ‘2/3X1’ programmes led other states to implement similar 
initiatives, which culminated with the official implementation of the ‘iniciativa 
ciudadana 3x1 ’ (Citizen Initiative programme ‘3X1’) at the federal level in 2002 (for 
a detailed account on collective remittances in the country see Annex 4). According 
to the data recorded by the Social Development Ministry (SEDESOL), since 2002 
Zacatecas receives approximately 40 percent of the total share of the programme at 
the federal level (see Table 6.2), which confirms that Zacatecan collective migrants 
are some of the most active in the country. In recent years, the Federation of 
Zacatecan Clubs of South California has also initiated a ‘4X1’ programme adding the 
private sector; in which First Data, owner of the leading international transfer 
company, Western Union, has donated around $1.25 million to make an estimated $5 
million available for public works in 2006 (Federacion Zacatecana del Sur de 
California 2005).
T able 6.2 Distribution of ’3x1’ funds by s ta te  in 2002  (thousands of dollars)
S ta te A m oun t P e rc e n t
G uanajuato 2,054 4.7
Ja lisco 5,199 11.9
M ichoacan 4,151 9.5
O ax a ca 1,504 3.5
P u eb la 557 1.3
S an  Luis Potosi 1,717 3.9
Z a c a te c a s 16,316 37.5
O ther S ta te s 12,056 27.7
TOTAL 43,554 100
Own elaboration. Source: SEDESOL statistics, 2003
However, apart from being initiators of funding programmes such as ‘2X1’ and 
‘3X1’ and currently even ‘4X1’, Zacatecan clubs have also supported other 
initiatives such as the ‘Paisano programme’, granting public medical services to
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migrants’ relatives through the IMSS, lobbying for the acceptance of dual nationality 
at the national level and recently the approval of the ‘Migrant Law’ in Zacatecas and 
the ‘vote abroad’ initiative at the federal level (fieldwork interviews, 2006)
Here we get the nub of the controversy. The dramatic changes that have led 
Zacatecas to rely on its expatriates’ remittances raise questions not only about 
whether these actions take away responsibilities that would seem to be exclusively of 
the state, but also about how migrants’ economic leverage translates into political 
power. As Williams points out ‘(...) while immigrants economic power is important, 
it is public investment that transforms the relationship between migrant communities 
and governments’ (Williams January 2004). Certainly, collective migrants, after 
providing charitable contributions to the state might find their demands for political 
power and voting rights as being justifiable, as well as being essential to secure basic 
democracy.
6.1.3. The political role of migrant organisations
The federations have become the political places per excellence for those Zacatecan 
migrants that are interested in a political career in their places of origin, as well as 
obligatory visiting points for Zacatecan politicians. ‘The Federation meets in a drab 
grey building in the City Terrace section of east Los Angeles that looks more like an 
abandoned warehouse than a transnational seat of power’ eloquently describes 
Ginger Thompson from the New York Times (Thompson February 23, 2005). 
Southern California is the capital of the Mexican diaspora with the biggest 
concentration of Zacatecans and a breeding ground of Mexican politics. ‘La
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federation’ is, as we have seen, the oldest union of migrant clubs. According to 
interviewees, it is also the one that sends most of the funds for developing projects in 
Zacatecas -  about 70 percent of the total (fieldwork interviews, 2006). One of the 
main reasons is that most important leaders of the federation are also successful 
entrepreneurs in Los Angeles area.
The Federation like most migrant clubs proclaims to be apolitical. Registration as a 
charity in the US prevents them from being involved in political campaigns. I would 
argue, however, that it is precisely migrant clubs’ ties with the centre-left PRD party 
and the PRD government of Zacatecas that have helped them to strengthen their 
political position in their home state and to help some of their members to become 
successful cross-border politicians and, on the other hand, to become some of the 
most successful migrants clubs in the US. In particular, Zacatecan migrant 
organisations have seen the opening of opportunities that have emerged as a result of 
the political transition and the (re) emergence of party politics in the state.
A few scholars have pointed out the growing political involvement of HTA’s in 
Zacatecas before the Migrant Law came into being (Moctezuma Longoria; 
Moctezuma Longoria 2001; Goldring 2002; Goldring 2004; Moctezuma Longoria 
2004; Moctezuma Longoria 2004; Moctezuma 2004; Orozco and Lapointe 2004). 
Matching funds programmes such as the ‘3X1’ offers migrant leaders an opportunity 
to voice their concerns and formulate solutions in ways in which they can be best 
addressed. As we can see in the figure below, which describes the way in which the 
‘3X1’ scheme works, migrant clubs are able to come up with their own proposals 
which are then assessed by local and federal institutions and subject to community
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approval. When projects are completed, there is a public recognition of the role that 
migrant clubs play. Orozco, thus, mentions that as HTA’s are increasingly linked 
with mayors and other local government officials, they have demanded higher levels 
of transparency and accountability in the projects that they fund (Orozco and 
Lapointe 2004). Goldring, on the other hand, argues that the partnership developed 
by Zacatecan transmigrant organisations and the state and federal governments to 
build community projects was based on a corporatist and semi-clientelist 
relationship. This is because of the corporatist nature of the ‘Federation o f 
Zacatecan Clubs’ and migrant leaders’ support for candidates back home and vice 
versa only on the basis of monetary support (Goldring 2002).
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Figure 6.3 Schem e of operations of the ‘3 for 1 ’ matching funds programme
Migrant C lubs
Present project proposals
SEDESOL
Issues approval; gives an 
advance for the project
C om m unity’s
C om m ittee
Reviews project
Migrant clubs, state and 
municipal governments 
deposit funds
Execution of Project
Public or private 
companies, municipality 
or state
Project Implementation
Project coordination; 
project submitted for 
community approval
COPLADE
Migrant clubs 
SEDESOL COPLADE 
Project executor 
Community
Project Delivery
Com m ittee of Validity 
and Attention to  
Migrants
Validates and prioritise 
projects
By local governments; the Committee for 
Development Planning (COPLADE); 
Ministry of Social Development 
(SEDESOL); or consulates and 
government representation abroad
R eception of prop osa ls
Own elaboration. Source: Based on information provided by the General Coordination of micro regions, Ministry 
of Social Development (SEDESOL for its acronym in Spanish), 2006
It follows then that migrants’ economic leverage has indeed played a key role in 
building and maintaining a relationship between migrant associations and the 
Zacatecan government. However, it is not the only factor that has strengthened 
migrant clubs’ political leverage. The second factor, I posit, has been the support of
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an opposition party -  the centre-left PRD -  which became the political party in 
power after the 1998 elections. Political parties especially after Monreal’s victory as 
Governor of Zacatecas, could perceive the political influence that migrant 
associations and their members could have on the electorate back home and the role 
that migrants could play in local politics.
There are two main instances in which Zacatecan migrant clubs took decisive steps 
to gain entrance into home politics, that is, during the 1998 governorship election in 
which an opposition (non-PRI) political party candidate was elected governor and 
during the mid-term local 2001 elections in which a migrant candidate ran for the 
municipal presidency of Jerez. I now analyse each of these events. First, Monreal’s 
election as governor of Zacatecas is relevant to our discussion for two reasons. On 
the one hand, the PRI’s loss of the ‘gobernatura’ (governorship) in Zacatecas also 
meant a breakage in the Federation, in which a dissident group saw in the change of 
government the opportunity to gain more autonomy and bargaining power. On the 
other hand, Monreal’s political campaign generated a new Zacatecan organisation in 
Los Angeles with an explicit political agenda, which later was going to be crucial for 
the lobbying and passage of the ‘Migrant Law’.
6.2. The 1998 change of government and the 
Zacatecan Civic Front
For decades, Zacatecas was well-known for its loyalty towards the political party in
power; the PRI. So, when the PRI crumbled in the state in 1998, two years earlier
than at the national level, the public eye closely followed the unfolding events.
Although, it is difficult to determine to what extent migrants played a role in this
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political transition. Some argue that migrant political action was key to electing the 
first opposition governor of Zacatecas (Lizarzaburu 2004). According to fieldwork 
interviews, prominent Zacatecan migrant leaders also helped Vicente Fox win the 
support of Mexican migrants in his historic bid to become Mexico’s first 
democratically elected opposition president.
‘When the political change took place in Zacatecas it was reflected in the Federation’ 
claims Rafael Barrajas, a fumiture-store owner in Santa Ana and a former federation 
president (Cited in Quinones 2002). Mexican migrants, one could argue, were 
generally apolitical -  many could not vote in the US or become American citizens 
and also many chose to live apart from Mexican politics. A big proportion of 
Zacatecans blamed the PRI for having to leave their places of origin and the country 
and had also deep suspicious of Mexican politicians and the party. To a certain 
extent, that began to change in 1998, when a politician with strong migrant contacts 
left the PRI and joined the centre-left PRD, taking his team with him. Ricardo 
Monreal was a well known politician not only in Zacatecas, but also among 
Zacatecan communities in the US as he had served as federal deputy and senator for 
his state, jobs that commonly require getting to know the main Zacatecan migrant 
organisations abroad and prominent migrant leaders41. In particular, he was able to 
gain the support of Zacatecan migrant leaders through one of his main allies in the 
US, Manuel de la Cruz, who was a former president of the Federation of Southern 
California (Cano 2001). Migrant leaders say that Monreal was elected governor of 
Zacatecas in 1998 because he campaigned hard among the clubs in Los Angeles and
41 Prior to the governorship of Zacatecas, Ricardo Monreal Avila was federal deputy for Zacatecas in the LIV 
legislature (1988-1991) and in the LVII legislature (1997-1998), deputy senator in the LV legislature and senator 
for Zacatecas in the LVI legislature (1991-1997).
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Chicago (Jolly 2005). It also meant that he could raise funds for his campaign among 
Zacatecan hometown associations and migrant groups, which was still not banned by 
current legislation (Maciel 2002). In addition, migrants could not vote, but according 
to fieldwork interviews, their economic importance to their villages gave them 
influence over how people voted back home.
It could be said that the transnationalisation of the Zacatecan 1998 gubernatorial race 
was the result of a series of conjectural events (for another insight see Smith and 
Bakker 2008). Rigoberto Castaneda, president of the Federation of Zacatecan Clubs 
of Southern California when the Zacatecan elections took place, expressed public 
support for Monreal assuming he would be the PRI candidate for the gubernatorial 
race. Although, when the state-level PRI committee did not choose Monreal as 
candidate, Castaneda quickly retracted his public support raising doubts and protests 
among members of the Federation who argued that its executive council was being 
manipulated by the PRI and the state government. The Federation split between those 
who still supported the PRI and the way in which it handled the matching funds 
programmes and those who wanted a political change in Zacatecas. A dissident 
group that opposed PRI ‘2X1’ and ‘3X1’ government requirements, advocated the 
need to have more transparent mechanisms such as having the money raised by 
migrant clubs deposited in accounts controlled by their representatives in Zacatecas 
and having a greater say in how to allocate the funds, as it had been done at an earlier 
stage. This dissident group saw in Monreal the opportunity for a change of 
government in Zacatecas and for gaining more autonomy in the negotiations over 
new HTA’s-funded projects with the government in the future (Quinones 2002).
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The ‘Frente Civico Zacatecano’ (Zacatecan Civic Front -  FCZ for its acronym in 
Spanish) was created to support Monreal’s campaign by two strong migrant leaders 
who formed part of the dissident group -  Manuel de la Cruz and Guadalupe Gomez 
(de la Cruz, Zacatecas, 2006). The former was a Federation's founder and past 
president, the latter was an immigrant from the town of Jalapa and an accountant in 
Santa Ana, also past president of the Federation. Although the FCZ was created in a 
similar fashion as Monreal’s mass support organisation in Zacatecas called the 
‘Alianza Ciudadana por la Dignidad y la Democracia’ (Civic Alliance for Dignity 
and Democracy), as it grew, it became a registered political action committee 
capable of supporting politicians and political initiatives in California, as well as 
Zacatecas (fieldwork interviews). Manuel de la Cruz mentioned in an interview that ‘ 
(during the 1998 elections) there was political friction between members of the 
Federation [...] (the Federation) was almost like a subsidiary of the PRI. The Civic 
Front of political action was the first of its kind that someone remembers in the 
US...some people still do not forgive me for that’ (de la Cruz 2006). On the other 
hand, Felipe Cabral and other Zacatecan migrant leaders affiliated with the PRI later 
responded with the creation of the California-based political organisation 
‘Zacatecanos PRImero’ (Zacatecanos First) that publicly supported this party 
(Roman Cabral, 2006). According to Roman Cabral, this was the first PRI 
organisation officially established in the US (interview, 2006).
Monreal’s campaign clearly targeted Zacatecan migrants in the US, where he 
travelled several times giving radio interviews on Spanish language stations and 
meeting with the Federation and the FCZ, Zacatecan business leaders and a few 
Latino politicians. In his campaign, Monreal offered to advocate for a clear set of
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political rights for migrants. At the federal level, he mentioned that he would 
support the vote abroad in presidential elections. In Zacatecas, he stated that he 
would change the state constitution to have migrant representatives in the local 
congress. Although Monreal’s active involvement to make those promises happen is 
debatable, Monreal’s victory, nonetheless, represented for migrant clubs more 
independence to operate from the state and local authorities. In particular, most of the 
dissident group’s claims were achieved. With the new requirements of the ‘2X1’ and 
‘3X1’ programmes, clubs could deposit their funds in Zacatecas in accounts 
controlled by their representatives rather than the state treasury and, on the other 
hand, clubs no longer had to conform to the decentralization guidelines. Monreal also 
named one the FCZ founders, Manuel de la Cruz, as his liaison with Zacatecans in 
the US. Based in Norwalk, de la Cruz travelled all over the US organising Zacatecan 
migrant clubs (de la Cruz 2006),
In addition, the Federation and the recently created FCZ were clearly given specific 
roles; whereas the Federation continued concentrating on community projects and 
raising funds, the FCZ acquired a completely political tone. After campaigning for 
Monreal, the FCZ took up the task of facilitating encounters between Governor Gray 
Davis of California and Monreal, as well as campaigning for several Latino leaders 
or Latinos’ rights advocators in the US such as Luis Correa (Congressman for 
California); Jesse Loera (Mayor of Norwalk); Gray Davis and Cruz Bustamante 
(Governor and vice-Govemor of California); Grace Napolitano (Congressman for 
Washington D.C.) and Al Gore (Presidential Candidate) (Frente Civico Zacatecano, 
fieldwork interviews 2006).
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In the aftermath of Monreal’s election the political instability in Zacatecas was also 
reflected in the other half of the population in the US. As we have seen, two different 
political organisations were created by Zacatecan migrant leaders in California 
during the elections: the FCZ (PRD group) and Zacatecanos PRImero (PRI group). 
Subsequently, a separation between the two founders of the FCZ took place after 
Gomez and his allies claimed that de la Cruz, on Monreal’s behalf, was trying to 
control the Federation in a similar fashion as PRI politicians used to do so (Cano 
2001; Quinones 2002). This also led to 13 Zacatecan clubs to leave the Federation of 
Southern California and form the Orange County Federation (Quinones 2002).
The change of government, nonetheless, brought to migrant leaders and clubs the 
opportunity to support whoever they wanted and influence party politics dynamics in 
their state of origin. Monreal might not have been able to fulfil migrant leaders’ 
expectations, but, nevertheless, he granted the autonomy needed by significant 
migrant clubs like the Federation and the FCZ to become independent political 
entities in the Zacatecan political landscape and in the US. How the migrant political 
influence was actually going to materialise became the job of a migrant businessman 
who became the first migrant candidate.
6.3. The lobbying for migrant political rights in 
Zacatecas
6.3.1. The case of Andres Bermudez ‘the tomato king’
Andres Bermudez became known in the international and national mainstream media
as the ‘tomato king’ as he had become a successful tomato grower and labour
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contractor in Winter, California (Becerra 2001; Cano 2001; Vacio 2001; Valadez 
2001; Aguirre 2002; El Universal 2004; Los Angeles Times 2004; Miami news 
2004; Rodriguez 2004). Originally from the town of Jerez, Zacatecas, Bermudez 
emigrated in search of better opportunities more than two decades ago. However, in 
2001, he decided to run for mayor in his hometown, winning the election. His victory 
sparkled a new debate about whether migrants were entitled to run for public office 
and their increasing electoral appeal as candidates. His victory, however, was 
invalidated by the federal electoral court. The once official political party, PRI, filed 
a complaint to the federal electoral court arguing that Bermudez was a US national 
and not a Mexican. The court overturned the Bermudez victory and determined that 
he was indeed ineligible to hold the post of municipal president, not because he was 
not a Mexican national, but rather because he did not comply with the residency 
requirements of living in the state of Zacatecas one full year prior to running for 
elections. Once the Zacatecan constitution was modified in 2003, allowing ‘bi­
national residency’ for a period of six months, Andres Bermudez was able to run for 
mayor again in 2004 winning the local election. Without serving the entire period as 
mayor (2004-2007), he ran for election once more, but as federal deputy. Bermudez 
currently represents the district of Zacatecas in the federal legislature for the period 
2006-2009.
Bakker and Smith have written extensively on the case of Andres Bermudez and the 
transnational character of his political campaigns with a clear emphasis on his 
portrayal as investor instead of political representative (Bakker and Smith 2003; 
Smith and Bakker 2005; Smith and Bakker 2008). The case of Bermudez, however, 
also demonstrates how the notion of a migrant candidate, during his first candidacy
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in 2001, has been the result of the dynamics of transnational coalition politics, where 
opposition groups and the centre-left PRD party in Zacatecas and the Federation, 
migrant associations and migrant political groups north of the border played a 
determinant role. In addition, the subsequent Bermudez’ candidatures show how 
other political parties have also tried to take advantage of the popularity of migrants 
as local candidates. In this section, I explore first the factors that led Bermudez to 
win the 2001 local election — the formation of a coalition with the centre-left PRD 
party and the FCZ— then, I discuss what represented Bermudez' candidacy for the 
institutionalisation of migrant political rights in Zacatecas.
Bermudez' candidacy demonstrates how migrants in contemporary Mexico are able 
to draw political support from both US-based supporters such as migrant clubs and 
Mexico-based political actors such as political parties and civil society groups. In the 
US, Bermudez relied on the support of the FCZ, migrant leaders and presidents of 
Zacatecan Federations. As Smith, P. shows, the only debate between the candidates 
for mayor of Jerez took place in Montebello, California, where Bermudez was the 
only candidate to present formally his political platform (Smith 2005). In Zacatecas, 
Bermudez allied himself with the centre-left PRD party and received support from 
Zacatecas-based members of the FCZ. In particular, Bermudez’ candidature was 
supported by the PRD governor Monreal who, according to fieldwork interviews, 
invited him to represent his party in the elections. However, according to Castaneda, 
Monreal might have invited Bermudez only as a gesture towards Zacatecan migrants 
(Castaneda Gomez del Campo 2003; Castaneda 2004, p.73). As we have seen, 
during his campaign as governor Monreal mentioned he was committed to the 
adoption of migrant political rights. Bermudez also gained the support of the PRD
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mayor of Zacatecas city and a sector of the PRD in Jerez. Initially, at least, 
Zacatecas-based members of the FCZ, such as the scholar and migrant rights activist 
Miguel Moctezuma Longoria and his colleagues from the Autonomous University of 
Zacatecas also showed support for the Bermudez’ campaign.
As a result of these alliances, a well-funded campaign and the growing popularity of 
successful migrants as political candidates at home, Bermudez won in July 2001, but 
not without creating disputes between and within local political parties. The PRI, as I 
have already mentioned, questioned Bermudez’ legitimacy as a Mexican national, as 
well as a candidate, and officially presented a legal complaint. The PRI’s main 
objection was that Andres Bermudez had acquired the US citizenship and, thus, 
could not occupy the municipal presidency of Jerez. Bermudez, on the other hand, 
tried to prove that although he had acquired the American citizenship, he had 
requested to recover his Mexican nationality in accordance with the 1996 Non Loss 
of Nationality Law. He showed his Mexican birth certificate, his voting credential -  
that requires residency verification in order to be issued — and a letter from the 
Mexican consulate in California in which Bermudez had requested to recover his 
Mexican nationality.
Nonetheless, despite the fact that most discussion centred on contrasting 
interpretations of the 1996 Law, what was a stake was the role of migrants as active 
actors in the local political landscape and the fear that they could draw significant 
support, both politically and financially, from US-based migrant associations 
allowing them to easily win local elections. As we have seen in previous chapters, 
the PRI was aware of the negative political support among Mexican migrants, as
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demonstrated in the few symbolic polls that had taken place in the US. Its position, 
thus, was to reject the transnationalisation of Zacatecan politics and attempt to 
restrain the migrant phenomenon in local elections. The PRD, on the other hand, 
which benefited, as we have seen, by its linkages with migrant leaders and by its 
presence abroad, saw in migrant candidates the opportunity to win more elections in 
the near future, particularly in migration-stricken municipalities like Jerez.
The reaction of the PAN was initially ambiguous. However, after Bermudez’ victory 
was cancelled and the ‘Migrant Law’ was approved in 2003, Bermudez stood for 
elections again in 2004. For the 2004 elections, Bermudez and his local and regional 
allies left the PRD party altogether and decided to align with the PAN. This alliance 
allowed Bermudez to obtain a position in the ballot box after he had lost a primary 
election to another PRD migrant candidate who was supported by Monreal. On the 
other hand, it was beneficial for the PAN, as supporting a candidate with verified 
electoral support could improve its record of limited electoral success in Zacatecas. 
In 2006, Bermudez was also able to run for federal deputy as PAN candidate.
Bermudez’ 2001 candidacy for mayor of Jerez had a clear impact on party politics 
and cross-border coalition formation. As I have mentioned, Bermudez’ participation 
in the first electoral race could not have occurred without the support of Governor 
Monreal and the centre-left PRD party and might not have succeeded without the 
support of the migrant leaders and associations in the US. Having all the actors in 
place, a momentum emerged for the institutionalisation of Zacatecan transnational 
political life. After the reversal of Bermudez’ victory in 2001, the FCZ took up the 
job of lobbying for migrant political rights in Mexico and formulating the ‘Migrant
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bill’ which would legalise bi-national residency and migrant candidacies for popular 
elections, as well as ensuring migrant representation in the state congress.
6.3.2. The approval of the ‘Migrant Law’
Having argued that the trigger that led towards the institutionalisation of migrant 
political rights in Zacatecas was the union of a non-PRI party and the FCZ, a 
political arm of the most powerful association of Zacatecans in the US, the 
Federation of Zacatecan Clubs of Southern California. I now describe how these 
actors reacted in the final step towards the acceptance of migrant political 
participation with the passage of the ‘Migrant Law’. Here, I argue that the support of 
all political factions in congress was ultimately the result of the lobbying efforts and 
reformulation of the FCZ as a non-partisan migrant group. However, the support of 
the centre-left PRD party — as a political faction in the Zacatecan congress and in 
control of the local government -  determined the approval and final shape of the bill.
The ‘migrant bill’ was a grass-roots initiative. It was formulated by the FCZ and 
drafted by Moctezuma and his colleagues at the University of Zacatecas. This 
process, nonetheless, took a period of two years, during which a few bi-national 
forums were organised in Zacatecas, as well as in California. During interviews, 
members of the FCZ often mentioned how they required legal advice in order to 
translate all demands into the legal language. One of the main goals of the FCZ was 
to be recognised as a migrant political rights movement with the legitimacy of 
representing this social sector (fieldwork interviews, 2006).
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The bill, initially called ‘Bermudez Law’, was presented on December 10th 2002 in 
Los Angeles. The FCZ’s original proposal, whose language was to be mostly kept 
until its final approval as a Law, cited as the motives the long history of emigration, 
individual remittances, the organisation of Zacatecans abroad and their community 
and social works in their communities of origin. The latter was interpreted as a form 
of political participation: ‘some of the first actions in which the organisations of 
Mexican clubs have won national recognition have been through the achievement of 
social works in their communities of origin. In practice, this is a form of political 
participation, from which it is necessary to reformulate the dominant concepts of 
community, belonging, membership and social, political and cultural participation’ 
(Frente Civico Zacatecano 2003). The ‘migrant bill’ was also officially delivered to 
the Zacatecan congress (LVII legislature) on January 9th 2003 by the president of the 
FCZ, Francisco Javier Gonzalez and the president of the Federation of the Zacatecan 
Clubs of Southern California, Guadalupe Gomez, where the latter mentioned ‘we do 
not forget this land, we are also political individuals who are interested in 
democratization’ (Cited in Luevano, Norma 2003).
It can be said that the successful reception of the ‘Migrant bill’ was partly due to the 
new image of the FCZ as an organisation without any political party lines, 
renouncing to its PRD roots and to any former nexus to the then Governor Monreal, 
which made it able to convoke plural negotiation and to reach out to all political 
parties, party representatives in congress, the state government and even church 
representatives. Nonetheless, it was mentioned that although most actors (a few 
deputies, political party representatives and Governor Monreal amongst others) 
expressed their support in several meetings held in the US, in Zacatecas, negotiations
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were harder and it was only possible to negotiate separately (Moctezuma Longoria 
September 2006).
In Zacatecas, the FCZ needed to secure enough support in the local congress. The 
thirty legislative seats in the LVII legislature were evenly distributed between the 
PRD and the PRI and its allies -  not a single party held the absolute majority. The 
PRD had 13 seats; the PRI 10; the PAN 4; and ‘Convergencia’ 1. Furthermore, the 
legislative environment was unstable as political parties distinct to the PRD were 
going through a phase of confrontation with the executive and tried to build an 
opponent block.
Once the FCZ-version of the ‘Migrant Bill’ reached the Congress, it was turned to 
the Commission on Constitutional Issues on January the 22nd, 2003. Three different 
versions were later presented by political parties -  the PT, the PAN and the PRD -  
as well as an initiative formulated by the Commission on Electoral Issues (2003; 
2003; 2003). As it can be observed in Table 6.3 below, it was the PRD proposal by 
deputy Carlos Pinto Nunez, also advisor of the FCZ and promoter of the ‘Migrant 
bill’ that endorsed trustworthily the FCZ’ proposal. This indicates that the PRD was 
still committed to implementing migrant political participation. In particular, the 
PRD initiative not only included migrant representation in the local congress and the 
figure of the migrant candidate, but also extended citizenship and the rights it entails 
to first generation Zacatecan descendants bom abroad.
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Table 6.3 Initiatives presented on migrant political participation in Z acatecas
D ate P olitical F ac tio n L eg is la to r(s) R e fo rm s
27 February  2003 PT Deputy Filom eno 
R ojas and  12 m ore
Art. 52
To include m igrant 
depu ties
25 March 2003 PAN Deputy C arlos 
Enrique H ernandez 
E scobedo
Art. 53 and  118 
To allow m igrants to 
occupy public office
22 July 2003 PRD Deputy C arlos Pinto 
N unez
Art. 1 2 ,1 3 ,1 7 ,  18,
51, 52, 53, 54, 118 
To include m igrant 
depu ties
To allow m igrants to 
occupy public office
Extending citizenship 
and  the  right to 
occupy public office 
(except for th e  
governorship) to first 
generation  Z aca tecan  
d e sc e n d e n ts  born 
ab road
19 A ugust 2003 Com m ission on 
Electoral Issu es
V arious d epu ties  
(non-PRD  majority)
Art 14,52, 53, 118 
To include m igrant 
depu ties
To allow m igrants to 
occupy public office
Own elaboration. Source: Legal initiatives 1323/2003; 1392/2003; 1249/2003; 1894/2003
The discussion on the final bill, which retrieved most points from the four legal 
initiatives submitted and presented by the Commission on Constitutional Issues, was 
also going to be held in an extraordinary period, which added time constraints 
(2003). The FCZ, however, put pressure on Governor Monreal to create a propitious 
environment for the passage of the bill and two days before its approval it called for 
permanent assembly, with the purpose of evaluating from Los Angeles ‘any 
hesitation from the part of the Congress and act accordingly’ (Frente Civico 
Zacatecano, fieldwork interview, 2006).
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The ‘Migrant bill’ was to be discussed in the legislature on the 22nd of August, the 
same day that Zacatecan legislators were to agree on an initiative to include in 
golden letters the name ‘El Migrante’ (‘the migrant’) on the wall of the legislative 
precincts, as part of a tradition to include the names of renowned personalities from 
Zacatecan political, social, and cultural life (Zacatecas Legislature LVII 2nd year, 
extraordinary period). Having secured the support of the PRD, PAN and PT parties, 
the ‘Migrant Bill’ was approved in general terms. It was mentioned during fieldwork 
interviews that once two thirds of the Congress (members of the PRD, PAN and PT) 
agreed to support it, PRI legislators then followed behind, as it was too politically 
costly to publicly oppose this bill. Taking advantage of the positive outlook, the PRD 
deputy Antonio Gonzalez Esparza also proposed two further reforms to articles 52 
and 18, which referred to the formula of ‘plurinominaV deputies (according to 
proportional representation) and residency requirements (Zacatecas Legislature LVII 
2nd year, extraordinary period). In particular, the latter involved shortening from 
one year to six months the period of effective or bi-national residency as a 
prerequisite to be considered a Zacatecan citizen42. The migrant bill was finally 
unanimously approved with these modifications on the 23rd August.
The ‘Migrant Law’ meant reforming Art. 12; 13; 14; 17; 18; 51; 52; 53; 54 and 118 
of the state constitution. Although the implications of this Law in the Zacatecan 
political landscape is the topic of the next chapter, it is worth noting now that the 
most far-reaching measure included in the bill is the incorporation of the notion of 
bi-nationality, revealing the situation of thousands of Zacatecan migrants who 
simultaneously inhabit and participate in the political, economic and cultural life of
42 The FCZ’ initiative mentioned one year
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two places, as the case of Bermudez demonstrated. As one of the Zacatecan 
legislators stated, ‘if in our state, both the phenomenon of migration as well as the 
legal occurrence of bi-nationality are a social reality, thus it is necessary to recognise 
that the current requirements to be able to participate in the political life of the state 
are obsolete and incompatible with this reality, such as the use of the ‘effective 
residence’ among others’ (Rodriguez Santoyo 28 August 2003). This shift from 
‘effective residence’ -  as the rigid notion of an individual living in one single context 
-  to ‘bi-national residence’ -  that an individual can migrate from one place to 
another and be aware of two contexts -  opens up opportunities to Zacatecan migrants 
to run in elections. In order to facilitate the condition of bi-nationality, the ‘ ‘Migrant 
Law” recognises as Zacatecans ‘(...) those Mexicans neighbours of the state, with 
residency of, for at least, six months, including bi-national and simultaneous 
residency (...)’ (Para n, Art 13 Zacatecas Constitution). Bi-national Zacatecans and 
yet those Zacatecans that were not bom in Mexico but have Zacatecan parents, can 
run for elections as deputies and municipal presidents as well as other local 
authorities positions (except for the governorship). Another feature of the Law is 
parliamentary representation -  two migrant candidates have to be elected according 
to pluri-nominal lists. On the other hand, however, an absentee ballot system has still 
not been implemented. Consequently, Zacatecan migrants, at present, in order to be 
able to vote for the local elections have to return to Zacatecas and show their official 
voting credential.
The analysis of how this bill came into being indicates the manner in which the 
political transition in Zacatecas empowered new political actors such as the 
Zacatecan migrant federations in the US, facilitating in this way the formation of
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new cross-border coalitions and cross-border civil society response. Although, as I 
have argued, the emergence of a strong civil society organisation representing 
migrants’ interests was the result of the previous partnership of migrant associations 
with the centre-left PRD, the final path towards the passage of the bill relied more on 
presenting a bill with a neutral tone outside the influence of any political party, but 
with the support from the then Governor Monreal and making use of the importance 
that this issue played in bi-national public opinion.
6.4. Conclusion
This chapter presents the argument that the institutionalisation of migrants’ political 
rights at the sub-national level is a response of a newly formed state (‘estado') -  
experiencing the revival of party politics and the emergence of new social actors -  
and its interaction with migrant organisations across the border. In particular, the 
case of Zacatecas illustrates how cross-border political coalition formation -  between 
a migrant lobby group and a centre-left PRD party -  has led to the implementation of 
the ‘Migrant Law’, which places migrants at the political centre stage. Migrant 
political participation is then co-related to local democratization processes that vary 
from state to state and economic integration between the both neighbouring countries 
in which the main agents are diaspora communities.
This indicates that migrants and migrant groups have been present in economic and 
political processes that have led to the re-emergence of party politics at the sub­
national level. At the time when political change was taking place in Zacatecas, local 
democratization processes and the emergence of party politics was also gradually
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appearing all over Mexico, with the exception of a few PRI enclaves. Migrant 
presence and campaigning during political shifts was also reported in other migrant 
sending states such as Michoacan, Guanajuato, Guerrero and Jalisco. Thus, this 
finding corroborates a recent study on the effects of emigration at the micro-level, 
which shows that between 1983 and 2007 municipalities where a high proportion of 
households that receive remittances were more prone to vote for non-PRI political 
parties (by 15 percent when party preferences are controlled) leading to political 
change (Pfutze 2008).
Moreover, the processes that accompanied the first change of government in 
Zacatecas to a non-PRI party were also reflected among the Zacatecan migrant 
communities in the US. Political division among migrant leaders resulted in the 
creation of political support committees for the PRD -  the ‘Frente Civico 
Zacatecano’ and for the PRI -  ‘Zacatecanos PRImero \  The former went on to lobby 
for migrant political rights in the local congress as the PRD occupied the local 
governorship and enjoyed a large presence in the local legislature. This study also 
shows that during lobbying, the FCZ was able to re-invent itself as a neutral political 
organisation that did not align with any political party. This, as we have seen, was 
also a characteristic of the ‘Coalition por los Derechos Politicos de los Mexicanos 
en el Exterior’ (CDPME) that advocated migrant voting rights at the federal level. 
Despite negotiations and alliances with political parties behind closed doors, migrant 
lobby organisations try to maintain a non-partisan line, in order to gain more 
adherents among hometown associations and migrant groups, as well as local 
political parties and social actors.
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Looking at the causes that have led to the implementation of a migrants’ political 
rights bill makes us conclude that initiatives to allow political participation across 
borders have emerged at the sub-national level following a set of necessary steps, 
from the growing economic leverage and political influence of migrant associations 
to the formation of alliances with an opposition party -  up to now, the centre-left 
PRD -  ultimately resulting in the creation of legal instruments that establish new 
transnational political dynamics and as the case of Zacatecas illustrates, the construct 
of a bi-national state.
Yet, the ’Migrant Law’ implemented in Zacatecas in 2003 and the ‘vote abroad’ 
initiative approved at the national level in July 2005 are recent legal mechanisms that 
can lead to the materialisation of new legal proposals with distinct formulas for 
migrants’ political participation in other Mexican states. At the sub-national level, as 
the case of Zacatecas shows, a migrant political rights formula responds to a specific 
local context and political forces. The notion of bi-national residency, for instance, 
emerged to replace the strict residency requirements to occupy public office in 
Zacatecas, which prevented more than half of the population living abroad to 
participate politically in local affairs. An absentee voting mechanism for Zacatecan 
local elections was not part of the Zacatecan formula as, during negotiations, issues 
arose about whether it was viable under federal Law. In the same way, a PRD- 
dominated state and the momentum that migrant political participation gained in 
public opinion strengthened the leverage position of migrant lobby groups, whose 
legal initiative was approved without any major changes by the local legislature.
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In the following chapter, I analyse the implications of the ‘Migrant Law’ in the 
Zacatecan political system. In particular, I show that the institutionalisation of 
emigrant political participation, by allowing migrant representation in the local 
congress and migrant candidacies, opens up the local political system to new political 
actors -  migrants and migrant organisations -  that are able to act across borders. As 
we will see, this has implications for both the local political structure and on the 
other hand, the perception of who is to be considered part of the constituency.
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Chapter 7
7. The institutionalisation of transnational politics in 
Zacatecas
This chapter focuses on the impact of the implementation of the ‘Migrant Law’ as a 
formula to ensure emigrants’ participation within the political life of Zacatecas. 
Having explained in previous chapters that the current emergence of transnational 
political linkages and the efforts to institutionalise migrants political participation in 
Mexico and in particular in Zacatecas has been linked to the need to secure a flow of 
remittances, the economic and political leverage of Mexican migrant organisations in 
the US and the consolidation of competitive politics in the country and region of 
origin; the questions addressed here are whether the institutionalised intervention of 
emigres in local politics changes its political order and to what extent this is 
transparent and compatible with democratic principles.
The evidence presented in this chapter, based on the 2004 local elections in 
Zacatecas, suggests a clear change in the political dynamics of the state with the rise 
of two new political actors, that is, migrant organisations and migrant candidates and 
the transformation of the roles of domestic political institutions such as local political 
parties and the state government. In particular, I argue that this shift constitutes a 
challenge to the structures of power and the socio-political hierarchies that existed 
before, albeit only to a certain extent. The main finding is that the Zacatecan 
‘Migrant Law’ has, nonetheless, institutionalised some already existing forms of 
cross-border political participation in the region, although normative and practical
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questions arise about how and to what extent institutionalised transnational politics 
can be regulated and by whom. The ‘Migrant Law’ in Zacatecas presents an effort to 
incorporate transnational political participation into the local political system; 
however, as I will show this formula presents a number of problems which indicates 
that further modifications to the Law are likely to be made in the future. It is 
debatable, for instance, if the implementation of the original Zacatecan formula for 
migrant political participation is fully consistent with the incipient local democratic 
context or if old clientelist practices are re-created within a transnational political 
field.
Recent literature on transnationalism and migration has emphasised how migrants’ 
transnational political practices try to influence political events, as well as domestic 
and foreign policy in their countries of origin (Goldring 1988; Smith R. 1995; 
Mahler 1998; Faist 2000; Mahler 2000; 0stergaard-Nielsen 2000; Smith R. 2001; 
Goldring 2002; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003; Smith 2003 ; Smith and Bakker 2008; 
Escobar April 2004). Earlier research described how migrants had an impact on 
events at home through their regular interactions with their home country at the 
societal level or through their participation in international social movements without 
being directly involved with home country’s political institutions (Kaiser 1971; 
Keohane and Nye 1971; Wapner 1995). However, what most earlier and recent 
research have in common is that they have focused on informal forms of emigrant 
political participation in their country of origin (electoral and non-electoral), that is, 
migrants’ cross-border political practices outside any legal national or local
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framework43. By overlooking how migrants respond to formal or institutionalised 
channels for emigrant political participation, scholarship has failed to provide 
answers to important questions such as whether or not the institutionalisation of 
cross-border political participation has an effect on the sending country’s political 
system. Who does it benefit in the local political scenario? Also, how does 
emigrants’ political participation have an impact on democratic practice?
This deficiency has also affected the construction of appropriate terminology. 
Emigrant political participation is often reduced to those lobbying activities carried 
out by migrant groups to gain more political and economic rights in their country of 
origin, which involves a clear demarcation between actors of the country of origin 
and settlement. It is also often mentioned that such practices represent a challenge to 
the nation-state (Soysal 1994; Rubio-Marin 2006). In the same vein, but from a 
different angle, early studies that analysed sending countries’ integrative policies 
towards nationals abroad referred to the ‘deterritorialization’ of the nation-state (See 
notably Basch L., Glick Schiller et al. 1994). An insight into institutionalised 
emigrant political participation in domestic affairs demonstrates that both approaches 
are indeed misleading. By legitimising and institutionalising cross-border political 
practices, countries are in fact adapting to new globalising and transnationalising 
phenomena and accommodating new non-resident actors with different political 
interests back within their political system and structure. Enshrining the extension of 
political rights to emigrants in constitutional and electoral rules promotes its 
continuity and makes it immune to the political intentions of future governments
43 For an insight into the definitions of formal and informal forms o f transnational political participation see 
Chapter 1.
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(Gamlen 2008, p.9). At the same time, as Baubock points out, sustained transnational 
political practices can only take place if emigration patterns persist as second and 
third generations bom abroad are often less interested in following and influencing 
political developments in their country of descent (2003). Thus, cross-border 
political engagement is dependant on and reinforced by both actors: the state and the 
diaspora.
As discussed in chapter 2, formal forms of emigrant political participation are not 
restricted to sending countries with developing economies. Dual nationality and 
voting rights have been implemented in a number of industrialised countries for 
many years and it has become common practice in the Western world. Still, the 
participation of emigrant communities in developed countries’ political affairs is far 
from controversial mainly because it is (perhaps wrongly) believed that they would 
not have an impact on homeland political affairs as emigrant populations are not 
considerably large and are expected to have low voting turnout levels. The expatriate 
vote in Spanish and Italian elections proves this assumption is incorrect. For 
instance, in the 2005 regional elections in the north-western province of Galicia, the 
postal vote was decisive for the Socialist Party (PS for its acronym in Spanish) to 
defeat the right-wing Popular Party (PP) and create a coalition government between 
the Socialist Party (PSO) and the Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG). About 305,000 
Spanish emigrants were eligible to vote, which represented 12 percent of the 
electorate (National Statistic Institute 2005). In Italy, about 1 million Italians abroad 
voted for the general election of 2008 (Ministero dell'Intemo 2008).0n the other 
hand, however, the extension of political rights to non-resident citizens has been an 
issue that has attracted great attention in middle-income and low-income sending
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countries that also represent some of the youngest democracies. Indeed, the political 
opening to previously excluded migrant groups has been a common element of 
democratization processes in many countries that have large proportions of their 
populations living in the developed world.
Thus, the study of institutionalised forms of emigrant political participation is 
relevant for three main reasons. First, albeit not the focus of this study, migrants’ 
participation in their home country’s political developments can also determine their 
level of political engagement in the country where they live (Ostergaard-Nielsen 30 
June - 1 July 2001; Soysal 1994; Jones-Correa 1998; Jones-Correa 2001; Jones- 
Correa 2002; Portes, Guamizo et al. 2002; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003; Escobar April 
2004; Guamizo, Portes et al. May 2003). Baubock rightly observes that migration 
‘becomes transnational only when it creates overlapping memberships, rights and 
practices that reflect a simultaneous belonging of migrants to two different political 
communities’ (2003, p. 705). Consequently, the study of migrants’ transnational 
political practices requires a multi-sited perspective in both the country of settlement 
and of origin as ‘external citizenship often also means dual or multiple memberships’ 
(Rubio-Marin 2006, p. 120). Secondly, emigrant political participation directly affects 
the political system of the country of origin, where political structures and 
institutions have to transform themselves to accommodate new political actors and 
their interests. Importantly, when different forms of emigrant political participation 
are implemented at the distinct levels of territorial governance (national and state 
levels) such as the case of Zacatecas, the dynamics become even more complex.
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Thirdly, at least in the case of sending countries with recent experience of 
democratization, the analysis of how formal cross-border political practices are 
implemented within an incipient democratic system is of paramount importance. 
Here, the focus is not to what extent emigrant political participation is consistent 
with democratic theory. Legal and political theory scholarship has mainly argued that 
migrants’ participation in political affairs of the country of origin is democratic per 
se and consistent with the international human rights and democracy discourse (Spiro 
15 March 2006; Itzigsohn 2000; Barry 2006; Rubio-Marin 2006; Gamlen 2008), 
disagreement arises about the weight that should be given to non-residents’ votes. In 
practice, however, sending countries and, specifically, regions of origin that attempt 
to regulate emigrant political participation and contain it within an existing and still- 
evolving democratic framework do so with different results.
This chapter is therefore divided into three main sections. This first section gives a 
short introduction reviewing the main characteristics of the ‘Migrant Law’ -  
specifically describing the requirements to become a migrant candidate or bi-national 
legislator in Zacatecas. Second, I elaborate on the institutional structure of migrant 
politics in the state and address the question of who are the main political institutions 
in Zacatecan transnational politics and how their roles have an impact on the political 
order in Zacatecas. Here, I argue that despite the legal reform on migrant political 
participation included in the local constitution, alternative and additional 
responsibilities and tasks have been taken up by the main transnational political 
actors, that is, the local government, local political parties and hometown 
associations or migrant organisations. Third, I analyse to what extent migrant 
candidates displace traditional political classes both during the campaign phase and
once they become elected. I argue that old social and political hierarchies are 
challenged by migrant candidates and politicians, albeit to a limited extent, that is 
because they can bring more investment into their communities while they are not 
bound to those characteristics normally associated with upper political classes in 
Mexico such as corruption, deception and vote buying. Finally, I discuss the political 
mismatch that is created between territory and citizenship practices, specifically 
whether migrant political representatives are meant to serve the interests of their 
constituencies abroad or at home and consider what are the consequences that derive 
from this.
7.1. The Zacatecan legal formula for migrant political 
participation
The ‘Migrant Law’, as I have already mentioned in the previous chapter, ensures 
migrant political participation in local politics in two ways: as candidates for local 
elections (except for the governorship44) and parliamentary representation (two seats 
out of thirty) by reforming articles 12, 13, 17, 18, 51, 53, 54 and 118 of the state 
Constitution and the state electoral code. Despite the novelty of this formula, one of 
its main shortcomings is that, at the time of this writing, it does not yet implement a 
vote abroad mechanism for local elections. Let us explore, however, the notions of 
migrants as candidates and as legislators separately as they involve different parts of 
this Law.
44 Zacatecan Electoral Code, Article 14
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Migrants are able to run for elections as ‘bi-national candidates’ thanks to the notion 
of bi-national residency adopted in the Migrant Law. The Zacatecan Electoral Code 
defines a ‘migrant candidate’ as ‘a person who meeting the requirements stipulated 
by the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States and its law that regulates 
on the issue of nationality and citizenship, occupies a position of public election, 
possessing Zacatecan citizenship and bi-national residency’ (Art. 5). Bi-national 
residency cancels then the previous requirement of living for one entire year in 
Zacatecas to be able to run for local elections. In addition, it also extends this 
political entitlement to first generation Zacatecans who were not bom in the state. 
Previously, the constitution required first generation Zacatecans by descent to live 
within Zacatecan territory for three subsequent years. Thus, both Zacatecas-bom 
migrants and first generation Zacatecans bom-abroad can claim bi-national 
residency.
In accordance with the Zacatecan Electoral Code, ‘bi-national residency is the status 
that a person assumes to possess simultaneously a residence abroad; and at the same 
time, a residence and vicinity within the territory of the state, maintaining in it a 
home, family and interests’ (Art. 5). Therefore, it mainly refers to those Zacatecan 
nationals that have emigrated alone and have left their families behind. In practical 
terms, however, bi-national residency entails different requirements. The local 
constitution (Art. 12) points out that to be able to claim simultaneous residency in 
Zacatecas and abroad (beyond Mexican borders), Zacatecan-bom migrants and first- 
generation Zacatecans of descent have to comply with the following requirements:
• To have an address in Zacatecas even though they might hold another address 
in any other country
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• To be registered as a tax payer (to be included in the Federal Register of 
Taxpayers)
• To be included in the National Population’s Register and count with a unique 
population registry code ( ‘clave unica de registro de poblacion ’)
• And to have an official voting credential granted by the Federal Electoral 
Institute
In other words, a bi-national resident could be a Zacatecas-bom or first generation 
Zacatecan who might live permanently or temporarily in another country and yet, 
have a second address in Zacatecas, have all official documents (which would have 
entailed having had to go back home to process them) and be a registered tax payer 
for at least six months. Thus, a bi-national lifestyle seems to represent an expensive 
endeavour that only few can afford. It might also be a factor that enhances inequality 
among the migrant community, closely related to the legality issue in the US, 
creating a gap between those who have both the legal and financial means to move 
freely between the two countries and enjoy fully economic and political rights in 
both countries and those who do not.
On the other hand, the ‘Migrant Law’ also ensures migrant representation at the local 
congress, where at least two migrants are appointed migrant legislators. However, in 
contrast to migrants running for local political positions, migrant legislators are not 
elected through competitive elections, but through a mechanism denominated 
‘plurinominal ’ lists. Out of the thirty legislators at the Zacatecan Congress, eighteen 
are elected and twelve are appointed through proportional representation. From the
268
latter, two must ‘be migrant or bi-national’45. That is to say, that after each political 
party includes a candidate for migrant legislator in the last place of their lists, two 
migrants or bi-nationals from the two political parties that had won the majority of 
seats become legislators (even when the political party that received the highest 
number of votes secures a total of 18 seats).
Although the legislative representation provisions of the ‘Migrant Law’ are similar to 
those of other countries such as Colombia, Italy and India, the Zacatecan formula, 
however, diverges in three ways: it only applies to a region within a country
(Mexico); it does not implement a vote abroad mechanism for local elections and it 
adopts the notion of bi-national residency, which also allows migrants to run for 
elections. The main paradox of having two migrant seats by the principle of 
proportional representation and a lack of an absentee voting system is: who gets to 
elect those migrant representatives in the first place? We will turn to this discussion 
in the final section of this chapter.
In the 2004 local elections, the first time that the ‘Migrant Law’ was implemented, at 
least five Zacatecan migrants claimed bi-national residency and ran for local 
elections, two of them were then elected municipal presidents. Andres Bermundez 
from the PAN party won by over two thousand votes in the town of Jerez and Martin 
Carbajal from the PRD party became mayor of the town of Apulco by 45 votes 
(Instituto Estatal Electoral 2006). In addition, the PRI and PRD parties were the ones 
that gained the highest number of votes in the local legislature. In this way, the two 
migrant seats, which as we have seen are granted according to proportional
45 State constitution, Article 51
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representation, were assigned to Roman Cabral, who was included as migrant 
representative in the PRI ‘plurinominal’ list and Manuel de la Cruz, who was 
supported by the centre-left PRD.
Looking at the bi-national participants of the 2004 local elections, we can find 
similar attributes. Firstly, bi-national candidates were not ‘return migrants’, so to say, 
they did not reside in Mexico prior to elections nor had any intention to return 
permanently to this country. Zacatecan bi-national candidates thanks to the new legal 
requirements were able to operate from the US, where they maintained a home, 
family and business. It is important to note that the five migrants running for 
elections in 2004 were already naturalised US citizens or had permanent residency in 
that country (‘green card holders’). Most of them immigrated into the US illegally in 
the 1970’s in their late twenties (fieldwork interviews, Zacatecas, 2006). Taking into 
consideration that most migrant candidates were already settled in the US where they 
had their families and business, we should consider that their participation in their 
homeland elections and eventual victory would not necessarily entail their permanent 
return, albeit a couple were actually interested in pursuing a political career in 
Mexico. The PRD migrant deputy, in particular, mentioned ‘today I feel that there is 
a void in Mexico because there are rules that you cannot break, today my only wish 
is to look for a municipal presidency...the only close position to the people are the 
municipalities...otherwise I will go back again to the US’ (fieldwork interview, 
2006). In fact, most of them decided to go back to the US once they completed their 
term in office with the exception of Andres Bermudez, who was elected in 2006-as 
federal deputy for Zacatecas. Secondly, we should note that most bi-national 
candidates were successful entrepreneurs in the US and had previously held
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important leadership positions within migrant organisations. The bi-nationals running 
for local elections in Apulco and Jerez (Martin Carvajal and Andres Bermudez) had 
their own business in the US and often participated as donors in the 3x1 government 
funding programmes. Migrant legislators, on the other hand, were prominent 
migrant leaders who had held important positions within the Federation of Zacatecan 
Clubs of Southern California and governmental positions as representatives abroad, 
as in the case of Manuel de la Cruz Ramirez.
In fact, those migrant or bi-national candidates did not necessarily meet the legal 
definition of ‘having a home, family and interests in Zacatecas’ (Art. 5, Zacatecan 
Electoral Code) as their homes and families were all along based in the US. What 
they did have, on the other hand, was a motivation in achieving a higher level of 
economic and political development for their communities as demonstrated by their 
membership in hometown associations with a record of involvement in infrastructure 
and development projects in their communities of origin and by their candidacies 
back home. A more recent legal initiative presented by the PRD migrant candidate 
Manuel de la Cruz in 2005 attempted to add three more requirements to those 
candidates that aspired to ‘bi-national legislative seats’ such as ‘to demonstrate active 
membership in a Zacatecan hometown association in the US; show a proof of 
economic activity and a curriculum of activities that strengthen the bi-national bond’ 
(Cruz 2005, p. 5). What was relevant in this proposal, widely discussed, but not 
approved by the local congress, was that it attempted to narrow down those 
Zacatecan migrants that could consider a political career back home to those that had 
already a career within the migrant political circles in the US; creating in this way a 
political bond between the local political system and the net of Zacatecan hometown
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associations and migrant clubs that could complement the economic ties already in 
place with the governmental matching funds.
To sum up, despite efforts to regulate who is allowed to participate in politics at 
home, the debate still continues. While the government attitude is to foster loyalty 
and genuine interest for local economic development among its growing community 
abroad, more emphasis is placed on the economic-political link even by migrant 
candidates themselves. As I will demonstrate in subsequent sections, bi-national 
residency not only encourages investment and capital mobility to communities of 
origin, but also promotes brain circulation among political circles.
The inclusion of migrants as new political actors, however, also tests the ability of 
the current local political institutions to accommodate their interests, give them a 
political voice and ultimately allow their participation in and adaptation to the local 
political scenario. Yet, in order to identify the challenges that the Zacatecan formula 
faces we should analyse how the legal language translates into practice.
7.2. Main institutions in Zacatecan transnational 
politics
Empirical investigation and theorising on migrants’ political practices has focused
more on the reasons for participating than on analysing what are the implications of
migrants’ engagement in their home country’s politics. However, the lack of research
may also stem from the fact that there are very few advanced legal structures that
institutionalise transnational political practices, such as in the case of Zacatecas and
the fact that they are also quite recent. Itzigsohn explores migrant politics in
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Dominican Republic, Haiti and El Salvador and identifies political parties and 
hometown associations as the main actors in the transnational political field (2000). 
He states that what is new in transnational politics is not the occurrence of this 
phenomenon, but ‘the inclusion of political organisations organised by immigrants 
abroad in the democratic political competition of the sending countries’ (Itzigsohn 
2000, p. 1144). Nonetheless, he goes on to argue that those organisations do not 
really alter the local balance of power in the communities where they are linked. 
Goldring, on the other hand, argues in her study entitled ‘Power and Status in 
Transnational Social Spaces’ that migrant organisations serve as the vehicles by 
which Zacatecan migrants from the village of Las Animas are able to claim a 
different social status and express their meaning of community (Goldring 1998). The 
political leverage that these institutions hold realigns political power in the 
community vis a vis other political actors.
I agree with the latter; however, analysing the recent implementation of the migrant 
reform in Zacatecas I argue that the implementation of a legal structure for migrants’ 
political participation has meant the institutionalisation of both the extension of 
political competition beyond the limits of the state and the inclusion of political 
actors which reshape old structures of power and social hierarchies in local 
communities. Firstly, I discuss the roles of political parties and hometown 
associations in migrant politics focusing on the process of selection of migrant 
candidates and how their campaigns are supported. Then, I discuss some of the main 
challenges for the local political system that derive from that, such as to what extent 
are migrant associations representative of the migrant population and the vicissitudes 
that this represents for an incipient democratic transition.
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In the ‘Migrant Law’ provisions, as we have seen, there is no mention of the role of 
migrant associations in local politics, as it was assumed that political parties as the 
main institutions for political participation for Zacatecan citizens would also act as 
representatives of the political interests of Zacatecans abroad. Normative questions 
arise, however, as to what extent are political parties allowed to run activities in 
receiving countries and gather adherents among expatriates. In practical terms, on the 
other hand, for citizens abroad participating politically in their country of origin 
might not be a priority (unless there exists an adverse regime at home), as we have 
seen with the minimal participation in the Mexican vote abroad experience for 
presidential elections in 2006 analysed in chapter 5, as it is to express socially and 
culturally. In particular, when facing a disadvantaged position in the country of 
reception, migrants try to retain ties and identities associated with their home 
countries and communities and build and maintain kinship and friendship networks.
Although, how can migrants interested in participating in politics in their local 
communities and willing to run for elections get the support from political parties in 
the first place? Despite Mexican political parties having engaged in new forms of 
extension of their activities in the receiving country, as we have seen in previous 
chapters, their sphere of influence and power among the Zacatecan migrant 
community is limited, contrary to Itzigsohn’s findings in other countries (2000). The 
main Mexican political parties -  PRI, PAN and PRD -  have opened up offices in the 
main destination cities for migrants, but they have not been successful in attracting 
high numbers of affiliates in comparison to migrant organisations (see chapter five). 
‘Zacatecanos PRImero\  the PRI organisation created to get support for the 2004
local elections based in the US counted on about 200 members in that year (Alvarado 
2004).
Migrant organisations, on the other hand, have acted and continue to act as 
intermediaries between the state and the Zacatecan communities abroad and have 
fulfilled a central role in involving the migrant communities in local politics. An 
average of 40,000 Zacatecans are members of hometown associations. Migrant 
organisations, I argue, play a central role in selecting migrant candidates that would 
run for local elections or become migrant legislators, serving as intermediaries 
between Zacatecans abroad and local political parties. One of the main Zacatecan 
migrant political organisations is the Zacatecan Civic Front (FCZ), which represents 
the political arm of the Federation of Zacatecan Clubs of Southern California. As it 
has been mentioned in the previous chapter the FCZ is a civic society organisation 
originally created to support the campaign of Monreal, the first non-PRI governor 
elected in 1998 and, subsequently, its central purpose was to lobby for the approval 
of the ‘Migrant Law’ at Congress. In a controversial interview with the then 
president of the FCZ, Javier Gonzalez, he explained that the organisation would 
select the candidates that truly represent the Zacatecan migrants. At the same time, 
he disengaged from party politics and stated that: ‘we have broken various myths, 
such as the one that the PRD was the migrants’ party; we migrants do not have a 
party’ (Amador 2003). In an interview, the migrant deputy for the PRI party Roman 
Cabral also affirmed that the selection of migrant deputies for proportional 
representation, to be included in the PRI list in 2004, had been carried out within the 
migrant political club, ‘Zacatecanos PRImero’. ‘It was quite simple. Four candidates 
were registered, but there was no need for a vote, two of them did not qualify as they
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did not have a voting credential. So, then it was Rigoberto Castaneda and I. [...] At 
the beginning I wasn’t sure, all that time against the government and now to do 
government, no. But then, we have always complained about the government taking 
advantage of the ‘3X1’ and migrants’ work in their communities, providing services. 
There were incentives to participate’ (fieldwork interview, 2006).
It is the case that despite the fact that Zacatecan migrant organisations portray 
themselves as politically neutral in regard to their party loyalties, they still have a 
strong effect on the political environment. One could even argue that, after the local 
political transition, migrant leaders and their organisations have endorsed a public 
position of political neutrality as a joint strategy to open up new political spaces. 
Migrant organisations view as the main advantage of their neutrality their ability to 
win candidacies supported by different political parties, increasing in this way their 
sphere of influence. As Landolt and her collaborators mention analysing Salvadoran 
migrant organisations in the US: ‘In spite of their self-professed neutrality and their 
emphasis on the humanitarian nature of the agenda, the hometown association is a 
political actor’ (Landolt, Autler et al. 1999, p. 308). As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, migrant organisations play an important role challenging traditional political 
actors through their economic influence and interest in local development, which on 
the extreme is illustrated with cases in which donations from migrant clubs supersede 
the governmental budget at the municipal level.
The passage of the ‘Migrant Law’ has marked, however, the beginning of a new 
phase in Zacatecan politics, as hometown associations do not only get involved with 
local politicians to plan a development agenda, but they also nominate those citizens
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that can become local leaders. As we have seen in the previous section, bi-national 
participants in the 2004 local elections were either powerful migrant leaders, 
members of migrant clubs or successful businessmen who often participated in ‘3x1’ 
government development programmes in their communities of origin. Bi-nationals 
included in the plurinominal lists of the main political parties, for instance, had been 
members of the Federation of Zacatecan Clubs of Southern California. Manuel de la 
Cruz (PRD migrant legislator) was president of the Federation from 1993 to 1998 
and a strong supporter of Governor Monreal (Valadez Rodriguez 2004 ; Website 
2006). Roman Cabral, PRI migrant legislator, was also a member of the Federation 
from 1985 to 1995 and then participated in the PRI organisation ‘Zacatecanos 
PRImero’. The two bi-nationals that were elected municipal presidents in the towns 
of Jerez and Apulco were also respected businessmen among the migrant population, 
as well as members and benefactors of the Federation of Southern California and the 
Federation of Fort Worth, Texas, respectively.
In most of the cases cited above, Zacatecan hometown associations and migrant 
political groups based in the US supported migrant leaders or even supported them 
for political positions in Zacatecas. In all cases, migrant candidates had already a 
well-established career within their migrant clubs, which allowed them to foster 
networks with the government and political parties during the local political 
transition, in particular, by negotiating remittances projects. The main finding, thus, 
is the new role of these organisations and the weight of their political decisions 
versus local political institutions.
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The transnationalisation of Zacatecan politics, however, also required new de facto 
responses and responsibilities carried out by local branches of political parties and 
the local government. For instance, the local governments of PRD governor Monreal 
and his successor PRD governor Amalia Garcia named a government representative 
abroad at the start of their time in office, who was a migrant leader or ex-president of 
Zacatecan federations. The local branches of political parties, on the other hand, have 
lacked the same degree of involvement in migrant political affairs and often recurred 
to hometown associations and migrant organisations to reach out for supporters. 
Fieldwork interviews revealed that migrant leaders often complained about the lack 
of real support from political parties, including those that were leaders of political 
committees abroad. As we have seen in the previous chapter, it was not until the 
local political transition in Zacatecas when the first PRI and PRD supporting 
committees in Los Angeles were created. Even then there were complaints about the 
absence of legitimacy that they badly needed from the local branches of their 
political parties. Comparing the PRI party’s activities abroad with those of other 
parties (such as the PRD and PAN), the PRI migrant deputy Federico Cabral 
complains ‘there is much dissatisfaction with our party, our party abroad does not 
have a representative, we don’t have any migrant in a federal deputy position in 
Mexico’ (fieldwork interview, 2006). In 2004, Zacatecan political parties’ 
committees became the most dependent on migrant organisations to help them select 
candidates for the bi-national legislative seat. However, candidacies for municipal 
presidencies in towns with high emigration such as Jerez and Apulco often resulted 
from a common agreement between hometown associations and local political 
parties’ committees (fieldwork interviews, Zacatecas, 2006). Table 7.1 illustrates
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what are the main activities of the state, political parties and hometown associations 
in the inclusion of emigres in Zacatecan politics.
T able 7.1 Main institutional ac to rs in th e  practice of m igrant politics in Z a c a te c a s
Main actors Official roles according to 
the ‘Migrant Law’
Additional activities 
undertaken (not stipulated 
in the ‘Migrant Law’)
Local governm ent Legal structure tha t allows:
Bi-national residen ts to run 
for elections.
Two m igrants to b e  appointed  
to the  s ta te  C ongress.
G overnm ent rep resen ta tive  
ab road  to dea l with m igrant 
o rgan isa tions and  m igrant 
leaders.
Political parties They can  support bi-national 
can d id a tes  to  run for local 
elections.
They m ust include a  m igrant 
legislator in their 
‘plurinominal’ lists.
Main parties (PRD, PRI and  
PAN) count with b ran c h es  in 
the  US cities with high 
num ber of M exican 
(Z aca tecan) m igrants.
P arties mobilise political and  
financial support ab road .
Hom etown assoc ia tions None Migrant o rgan isa tions 
nom inate possib le  m igrant 
can d id a tes  to political parties.
They support m igrant 
c a n d id a te s ’ cam paigns 
through real investm ents or 
b u s in e ss  p rom ises.
They m aintain a  strong link 
with m igrant or bi-nationals in 
local governm ents.
T hey support bi-national 
investm ent projects in 
com m unities run by m igrants.
Source: Own elaboration (Based on fieldwork interviews 2004; 2006; Zacatecan Constitution)
It is not difficult to conceptualise that hometown associations and migrant clubs have 
more access to Zacatecan migrant communities abroad than US branches of Mexican 
political parties as they provide places that fill in cultural and social aspects of the 
migrant life. Leaders that emerge from these organisations are well-respected by the
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migrant community and the main hosts when Zacatecan politicians visit US cities. It 
is seen as natural that hometown associations and migrant clubs have the faculty to 
propose or approve those migrant candidates for the position of migrant deputy that 
political parties have to include in their ‘plurinominal lists’.
This pattern of migrant political transnationalism described here also raises 
democracy-related questions such as: to what extent migrant organisations represent 
the migrant population abroad, which Ostergaard-Nielsen has already signalled 
previously, as well as to what extent migrant political networks are based on 
democratic principles. In regards to the former, Ostergaard-Nielsen argues that ‘(•••) 
part of the difficulty with assessing the contribution by transnational political 
networks to democratization in homelands relates to the lack of accountability of 
transnational political networks. It is, for instance, difficult to determine ‘who 
represents who’ in terms of political organisation of migrants’. (Ostergaard-Nielsen 
30 June - 1 July 2001, p. 19). As we had previously seen, members of hometown 
clubs are only a minority of the emigrant population in Zacatecas, representing two 
percent of the total. In the description of hometown associations’ activities, it is also 
notorious that not all of them have the same political leverage vis a vis the state and 
local governments. The most powerful hometown associations such as the Federation 
of Zacatecan clubs from Southern California are those that have the biggest share in 
the investment for local development projects.
It is not only a question of how representative they are, but to whom. In other words, 
what are the main purposes of migrant associations -  to advance migrants’ interests 
at home or in the US? The current decade has witnessed a vast number of hometown
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associations created specifically to participate in the government remittances 
matching funding programmes or to mobilise their own investment to foster 
economic development in their local communities; activities that are also fostered by 
the local and federal governments. However, the current events in regards to 
immigration issues in the US have prompted Zacatecan migrant associations to 
switch their focus toward defending the interests of the immigrant community in the 
country of reception. Thus, we should bear in mind that migrant associations do not 
only serve political interests in their regions of origin, as they also have a political 
impact in their country of reception.
In addition, we should also question to what extent migrant political networks are 
based on democratic principles. In spite of the fact that migrant associations often try 
to advance migrants’ human rights in the country of reception and their political 
rights in the country of origin, it has been pointed out that their structures are often 
corporativist and non-transparent (Goldring 1999). In recent years, Mexico has 
focused on creating and enforcing norms that regulate political party competition and 
parties’ internal structure, as well as setting up transparent and democratic forms of 
selecting representatives and candidates. These norms do not apply to hometown 
associations and migrant political organisations that seek to represent politically 
Mexicans residing abroad and support their candidacies for local political positions 
in Mexico. It follows that these associations, which are registered as charitable 
organisations in the US, are not accountable in their countries of origin. More 
research is indeed needed into how these organisations work and how their leaders 
are selected. Fieldwork interviews revealed that in the case of the Federation of 
Zacatecan Clubs of Southern California, which is made up of approximately 75
Zacatecan local clubs, the board of directors, composed of 16 people in different 
positions, is elected every two years. However, nominations of those that can aspire 
to these posts are at the discretion of current clubs representatives. Regular members 
only vote from a list of pre-selected candidates (fieldwork interviews, Zacatecas, 
2006).
To sum up, our discussion suggests contradictions in the role of migrant 
organisations in comparison with political parties in the institutionalisation of 
Zacatecan transnational politics. In one sense, we can argue that migrant 
organisations play a central role in Zacatecan local politics as their sphere of 
influence has reached beyond borders, as they are the vehicles by which potential bi­
national candidates can be recruited for local elections. Migrant organisations play a 
more effective role in involving migrant communities in local politics than political 
parties. On the other hand, however, a number of normative and practical questions 
arise in regards to how legitimate is the political influence of these organisations. In 
particular, three key questions arise: how representative they are of the migrant 
population?; how they can have a decisive political role in their home communities 
in spite of being located across the national border?; also, are they based on 
democratic principles without being held accountable? This discussion is incomplete 
without analysing the role of migrant candidates in comparison with the traditional 
political elite.
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7.3. Bi-nationals in local politics
Having explained the transnational political structure that supports the practice of 
migrant politics in Zacatecas, by highlighting the role of migrant associations and 
their relationship with political parties and the local government, this section aims at 
addressing the questions: what does migrants’ participation as candidates in local 
elections mean? Also, what effects does this have on the realignment of power in 
local politics? Answers to these questions make it possible to determine the role of 
migrant candidates in the ongoing saga of democratization in contemporary Mexico 
and specifically their significance in the political developments in Zacatecas. I argue 
that the inclusion of migrant candidates in local migrant sending communities 
challenges old social hierarchies, specifically the traditional political classes, 
although only to a certain extent. I begin with an explanation of the major approaches 
salient to Mexican migrant political transnationalism. Secondly, I re-take the 
discussion on the characteristics of bi-national candidates running for the 2004 
Zacatecan local elections and what advantages they represented against traditional 
political classes. Finally, I assess both bi-nationals’ political campaigns and the 
political and economic developments experienced in their communities following the 
election.
A number of scholars have debated on the characteristics of the participants in
transnational political practices and they seem to agree on the fact that they might be
well-educated, wealthy men with increased economic clout and relative
independence from the coercive apparatuses of the state (Itzigsohn 2000; Guamizo
2001; Portes, Guamizo et al. 2002; Guamizo, Portes et al. May 2003). The analysis
of the participants in the first exercise of the vote abroad for the 2006 presidential
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elections constructed in chapter 5 revealed similar findings. Migration scholars, 
however, seem to differ on the effects of migrants’ direct political participation on 
the practice of democracy. Bakker and Smith seem to summarise this debate well in 
regard to Mexico’s transition to democracy. They termed these frameworks: an 
‘emergent transnational elite’ approach and a ‘transnational democracy’ perspective 
(Bakker and Smith 2003). Whereas the former refers to an emerging transnational 
political class, who operate through the traditional avenues of political power 
distribution and who are uninterested in transforming the unequal power structures 
and social hierarchies in their countries or communities of origin, the latter envisages 
an emerging cross-border community that want to transmit the political and 
economic opportunities of developed countries -  that is, more democracy and jobs -  
to their home countries. Itzigsohn, as representative of the first approach, affirms that 
‘transnational politics reflects the social mobility of certain groups of immigrants 
abroad, creating new elites’ (Itzigsohn 2000, p. 1146). But he goes on to argue that 
regardless of the elite members’ intentions, the inclusion of new political actors 
constitutes a new form of democracy and political opening by itself. As I try to 
illustrate here, bi-national candidates in Zacatecan local elections demonstrate to 
what extent both approaches are consistent. Whereas Zacatecan bi-national 
candidates portray themselves as cross-border agents that want to promote more 
democracy and economic opportunities, they also often make use of traditional 
clientelist techniques. They are successful to a certain extent, nonetheless, at 
challenging established political elites in their communties of origin.
In section one I highlighted the general characteristics of the 2004 migrant 
candidates -  their economic clout and improved social status -  which can help us
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understand the success of their political campaigns at attracting the imaginations and 
hopes of local populations, that having relied for several decades on the traditional 
political elite with poor results, were ready to look for solutions beyond state 
boundaries. In section two, we have seen how migrant candidates are supported, 
more often than not, by hometown associations and migrant clubs, which are able to 
place them according to their preferences among the different local political parties. 
Let us, then, analyse how migrants’ attributes and characteristics play a key role 
during their political campaigns and during their term in office.
Migrants’ attributes, as Bakker and Smith argue, showing the case of the candidacy 
of Andres Bermudez in the town of Jerez, played a key role in his political 
campaigns in 2001 and 2004 in relation to those of home candidates (Bakker and 
Smith 2003; Smith and Bakker 2005). Bi-national candidates, in contrast to ‘home’ 
candidates do not belong to a traditional class and it is particularly this fact that is 
exploited the most in their campaigns (Smith and Bakker 2005). In contrast to the 
traditional political class, the general public in migration-stricken communities sees 
migrant candidates as their equals, people that experienced poverty, which forced 
them to emigrate in the first place. Migrant candidates in the 2004 Zacatecan 
elections were home-grown Zacatecans that emigrated in the 1970’s taking 
advantage of better job opportunities abroad, which allowed them to enjoy an 
affluent economic situation that translated itself into a higher social status in their 
communities of origin. For instance, Andres Bermudez often mentioned in several 
interviews that he entered the US illegally in 1974 and had made a fortune selling 
tree and vegetable seedlings to the US Forestry Service and Wal-Mart. Martin 
Carvajal continuously narrated how he had crossed the border illegally, but was now
a naturalised American citizen and an entrepreneur with a furniture store in Texas 
(fieldwork interviews, Zacatecas 2006).
It was, thus, these particular skills gained during their time living and working 
abroad that helped them become successful businessmen and entrepreneurs in the US 
that were exploited by migrant candidates during their campaigns. Bermudez’ 
campaign slogan in 2001 was very clear: “If I made it ‘there’, with your vote I will 
confirm it here” ( ‘Si alia lo logre, aqui, con tu voto, lo confirmare’) (Cano 2001). 
Bermudez also claimed in his first campaign for the municipal presidency of Jerez 
that he was not part of the upper social stratus in Mexico. Citing his own words: ‘I 
am a peasant like you, I do not know how to talk in public, but here I am trying to do 
the politician as I want to help my people’ (Cano 2001). By differentiating from the 
traditional political elites, bi-national candidates portray themselves as corruption- 
free and benefactors with alternative sources of financial resources (Smith and 
Bakker 2005). During his subsequent campaign for the municipal presidency of Jerez 
in 2004, Bermudez also mentioned in a media interview: ‘I will personally invest $1 
million in two canneries that will create 600 jobs if I win...you have my word on 
that’ (Los Angeles Times 2004). Carvajal’s political platform included campaigning 
with a Washington-based NGO’s to obtain matching funds to train migrant workers, 
create new investment opportunities in Apulco and promote open markets to trade 
local products such as honey (Corchado 2004). Migrant candidates appeared in the 
2004 local elections as both the embodiment of democratic ideals -  free of corruption 
and genuinely interested in local development- and of economic integration -  
promoters of foreign investment and free trade.
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Migrants’ campaigns not only differed in their content, but also in the form they were 
carried out. Migrants’ campaigns seem to prove more effective than home-based 
candidates’ for four main reasons. Firstly, in the first Zacatecan local elections in 
which the ‘Migrant Law’ was implemented, it was mainly non-PRI political parties 
that supported migrant candidacies. In the towns of Jerez and Apulco, where migrant 
candidates were victorious, the 2004 elections marked a political transition with a 
first non-PRI municipal government. As we have seen, Andres Bermudez ran twice 
for the municipal presidency of Jerez, the first time with the centre-left PRD and in 
2004 with the PAN and both times he won the elections. The candidacy of Martin 
Carvajal in Apulco was supported by an alliance between the PRD, the PAN and 
Convergence for Democracy (fieldwork interviews, Zacatecas, 2006). Thus, it is 
non-PRI political parties that seem to benefit the most from migrants’ political 
inclusion.
Secondly, their campaigns are transnational, that is to say, campaigning takes place 
physically in different locations both sides of the border where the community is 
concentrated or/and make use of the Internet and other media published in multiple 
locations to keep the community informed. For instance, the main debate among 
candidates running for the municipal presidency of Jerez took place in California, 
where most of the constituents live. In addition, political platforms of candidates 
running for municipal presidents in Jerez and all events related to the campaigns and 
the elections appeared on an Internet portal created to serve as a virtual meeting point 
for Jerezianos abroad and at home46. The Internet has served as a means of identity 
formation and participation in domestic politics for old diasporas and new migrant
46 www.ierez.com.mx
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groups (Koslowski 2004). New media technologies also allow Zacatecan migrants to 
be engaged in political developments at home, despite the most recent ban on 
Mexican candidates’ political campaigning abroad. As Manuel de la Cruz argues, 
‘the national law that bans political campaigns abroad does not impact the activities 
of migrant organisations. The Zacatecan Civic Front can face the people and can 
raise awareness, even through video-conferencing with candidates in Mexico’ 
(fieldwork interview, Zacatecas, 2006). Migrants’ hometown clubs in the US, as we 
have seen, also support migrant candidates politically and at times financially from 
abroad. That is the case of the Federation of Migrant Clubs of Fort Worth, Texas, 
which campaigned among its members in this American state for Martin Carvajal to 
become municipal president of Apulco (fieldwork interviews, Zacatecas, 2006).
Thirdly, foreign investment and collective remittances play a significant role in bi­
national campaigns, both symbolically (in the form of promises) and with tangible 
investments. As the PRI migrant deputy mentioned ‘... in these towns, there is not 
enough money. That is why ‘3x1’ investment is so important in the (political) 
campaigns. Here nobody is going to vote for the old man that has never done 
anything for the town. They will vote for someone young that is able to attract the 
money from abroad, someone that will ultimately have to keep going there and 
coming back’ (fieldwork interviews, 2006). Whereas Andres Bermudez promised to 
ensure free bus rides for students and open a campus of the University of Zacatecas 
in Jerez, Martin Carvajal promised to start an apiculture project with foreign 
investment in Apulco (fieldwork interviews, Zacatecas, 2006). It is clear, however, 
that investment promises and development projects used as a strategy to win more 
votes falls into a new form of vote buying developing across borders. Bermudez, for
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instance, in addition to his promises for new jobs being created in Zacatecas, gained 
significant support because of his role as a potential large-scale employer in the 
United States. During his early campaign, he claimed that he was able to provide up 
to 300 temporary visas to fellow Jerezianos (Mena 2001).
Fourthly, the Americanization theme is another one of the political positions that was 
introduced by bi-national candidates in their campaigns, albeit to a lesser extent (see 
also Smith and Bakker 2008). It has been mentioned that given Mexico’s historically 
antagonistic relationship with the United States, bi-national candidates’ attempt to 
‘Americanise’ their local communities seems an especially risky campaign proposal. 
Bermudez used to mention in his 2001 campaign: ‘we should have a government 
with American ideas, not Mexican’ (fieldwork interview, 2006). However, the 
success of the Americanization theme perhaps arises from the characteristics of 
migrant-sending communities, where half of their residents live in the US and might 
also have strong historic ties with that country.
The political success of bi-nationals in comparison with ‘home’ candidates signals 
how they have a clear impact on the realignment of power in their migrant-sending 
communities. The image migrants present together with the transnational nature of 
their campaigns are able to challenge the traditional political elite, albeit to a limited 
extent. In the 2001 local elections, when asked what was the difference between her 
campaign and Bermudez’, the PRI candidate Alma Avila responded that ‘it was the 
money’ illustrating the role that ‘migradollars’ (migrants’ finances) play in local 
politics. She elaborated further in another interview saying: ‘I do not oppose the fact 
that emigrants come here to participate, what I do not like is the way in which they
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are campaigning’ (Cano 2001), referring to the clientelist practices that had taken 
place. It is not only the role of migrants’ economic leverage, but also the political 
context with a weakened PRI in which this phenomenon has developed.
From a theoretical perspective, evidence presented above suggests that bi-national 
candidates have been successful at presenting themselves as new democratic agents 
operating across borders, at the same time as making use of traditional vote buying 
techniques, suggesting the limitations of strictly applying an elitist interpretation or a 
transnational democracy perspective, as Smith and Bakker also indicate (2003). In 
contrast, the nature of migrants’ campaigns, as well as their democratizing practices 
and plans create a more complex outcome, which as a result, it is difficult to place 
them at either extreme of the democratisation range. The election of bi-national 
mayors in the 2004 Zacatecan elections proves a potential tendency that could spread 
to other migrant-sending regions. However, this analysis would be incomplete 
without exploring what are the main implications of having ‘bi-nationals’ occupying 
public positions at home, whether serving as public representatives or as migrant 
legislators.
7.4. Walls falling -  constituencies at home or abroad?
‘T il be the mayor for constituents in two countries’ Martin Carvajal affirmed when 
his victory as municipal president of the town of Apulco was announced (Corchado 
2004). Months later, Bermudez held his swearing-in ceremony at a bullfighting ring 
decorated with US and Mexican flags -  while the outgoing mayor and City Council 
were waiting for him at an auditorium (Rodriguez 2005). These events illustrate a
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paradox in the Zacatecan formula, that is, once migrants are elected for office in their 
home communities, who are they meant to serve? Is it their constituencies at home, 
or also those abroad? The fact that the right to eligibility for public positions is not 
matched by a vote abroad mechanism complicates the panorama. The same can be 
said about the impossibility to vote for migrant representatives in the state 
legislature, as it is political parties’ task to include migrant candidates in their 
plurinominal lists. I illustrate this debate by discussing both issues separately.
Bi-nationals that now hold public office positions in Zacatecas were elected by their 
constituencies at home, as it is not yet possible to cast votes from abroad. However, 
as I have mentioned above, external citizens and migrant organisations played a key 
role in their political campaigns by granting financial support and encouraging 
relatives and friends at home to vote for them. Also, in a limited number of cases, 
external citizens returned home to cast their votes. Yet, bi-national mayors of the 
towns of Jerez and Apulco seem to play both roles as representatives of their 
constituents at home and abroad -  external citizens in the two cases exceed those that 
have remained. Bermudez and Carvajal often visited their ‘paisanos* abroad as 
counting on a US citizenship allowed them free movement between the two 
countries.
However, they are not only promoters of political integration, but also economic 
unification, as they seem to engage both constituencies in bi-national business 
projects. Taking a closer look at the apiculture project in Apulco, for instance, 
foreign and national investment converge with governmental funds from the federal, 
state and municipal levels to benefit both Zacatecan investors abroad and
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approximately sixty families at home (Gonzalez 2005). Martin Carvajal mentioned 
how in just three months after being elected, he was invited by the newly elected 
governor Amalia Garcia to visit the Zacatecan community in Dallas, Texas where the 
majority of ‘Apulquehos’ live. He explained how it was an imperative to meet 
regularly with the members of the Federation based in Fort Worth to discuss projects 
and social development programmes. ‘Economic development in Apulco can only be 
possible with partnerships between Apulquefios here and our community and 
entrepreneurs there [...] even with the support of US institutions’, he affirmed. ‘For 
instance, one of the main projects carried out during my time as municipal president 
is the ‘Abeja de Oro’ project, an apicultural company, which was the result of the 
support of several actors: the Mexican federal, state and municipal government, the 
Federation of Zacatecan Clubs of Fort Worth, Texas, and the Inter-American 
foundation, an independent American charity that donated an investment 
administrated by a Mexican NGO based in Mexico city, Migracion y Desarrollo A O  
(fieldwork interview, 2006). In the same way, Bermudez through his international 
business contacts has been able to aid Jerezian peasants to sell their products (mainly 
chilli) to entrepreneurs in California, a project that, according to him, has 
economically benefited dozens of families in Jerez (fieldwork interviews, Zacatecas, 
2006).
On the other hand, nonetheless, it is claimed that bi-national candidates are not really 
aware of the problems that experience their local communities after having resided 
most of their adult life abroad, as well as being unfamiliar with new political, 
economic and social contexts. For instance, the PRD migrant deputy Manuel de la 
Cruz said in an interview: ‘I have spent 34 years in the US and have been a PRD
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militant for a long time... I forgot a bit about what the system was like (in Mexico) 
in comparison with the US. Here, very personal interests are handled and the 
people’s issues are left out’ (fieldwork interview, 2006). This debate is the cause of 
clashes between local populations and bi-national leaders and we would expect it to 
exacerbate as more migrants return to Mexico to hold public office positions. In the 
first interview with Andres Bermudez when he was still municipal president of Jerez, 
he mentioned how many people opposed him and wanted him to give up his 
municipal presidency. He continuously referred to the fact that he was a ‘migrant’ 
and wanted to do things very differently (fieldwork interview, Zacatecas, 2006). 
Andres Bermudez was accused in various occasions of corruption, nepotism and 
transgressing laws (Reynoso 2006). In particular, he was accused of faking official 
documents from a federal governmental department (SEDESOL) in order to build a 
campus of the University of Zacatecas in the Sports Unit located in Jerez. This issue 
also affected the Federation of Zacatecans in California that had agreed to finance the 
building work.
The responsibility of migrant legislators to oversee the interests of migrants and their 
families is not as controversial as they are nominated to represent precisely those 
Zacatecans abroad and their relatives. As the ‘bi-national’ legislator for the PRI, 
Roman Cabral mentioned in a personal interview: ‘we are the voice of Zacatecans in 
the US and our job is to make that voice heard in the [Zacatecan] congress and try to 
convince the other deputies to create better laws for migrants and their families’ 
(fieldwork interview, 2006). Manuel de la Cruz, PRD ‘bi-national’ deputy, stated 
that ‘what brought me back to Zacatecas was not the money or the power, but instead 
the interest in protecting my own people abroad, and protect their families, all of
these to beneficiate our people and our communities in Zacatecas and abroad’ 
(fieldwork interview, 2006). However, the fact that migrant legislators are not 
elected through competitive elections is a major setback. As we have seen, the 
candidates for the two ‘bi-national’ legislative seats, that each political party has to 
include in its ‘plurinominaV list, is jointly agreed with Zacatecan hometown 
associations and migrant clubs. Migrants’ representation in the local congress 
combined with the possibility for external citizens to cast a vote from abroad would 
resemble more advanced mechanisms for migrants political participation such as the 
cases of Colombia and Italy.
The two migrant legislators appointed for the first time in 2004 aimed at serving 
migrants’ and migrants’ families interests by promoting a series of initiatives in both 
countries. In Mexico, most migrants’ legislative work concentrated on regulating 
pending payments to Zacatecan ex-braceros and their relatives; the creation of fiscal 
incentives to promote migrants’ investment in productive projects at home; promote 
resources assigned to 3 for 1 projects; facilitate migrant political participation at 
home (absentee voting, granting voting ID’s abroad, etc.); observance of migrants’ 
human rights abroad and at home, amongst other migration issues. In the US, most 
initiatives focused on requesting the Mexican federal executive to be more involved 
in judicial processes against crimes perpetrated against Zacatecan migrants crossing 
the border (i.e. vigilante activities and murders on the Mexico-US frontier); 
supporting a veto against a anti-migrant legal proposal in California; supporting a 
comprehensive immigration reform in the US; campaigning for a labour migration 
agreement within the NAFTA and establishing legal regulations that would facilitate 
and cut the costs of remittances’ transfers. A closer analysis of all the legal
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initiatives, points of agreement, resolutions (‘exhortativas’) and declarations 
authored by the migrant legislator Manuel de la Cruz during his participation in the 
58th legislature of Zacatecas is included in Annex 6. As we can see, by gaining direct 
access to foreign policy making, migrant representatives directly influence their 
state’s and country’s position on US domestic issues that affect Mexican 
communities abroad. What is relevant in this analysis is that those activities carried 
out from an official public office position, nonetheless, ultimately favour more 
economic integration and political coordination between the two countries.
It is not only paradoxical that bi-nationals (and dual nationals) may hold an elective 
or other public office in two countries, but considering the number of fellow 
Zacatecans abroad it becomes more controversial who are they meant to represent 
and serve when they get appointed for leadership positions at home? Evidence 
suggests, however, bi-nationals in public positions facilitate the creation of new 
circuits of capital and human resources, which provide the context in which migrants 
and residents construct and maintain new transnational political, social and cultural 
interconnections.
7.5. Conclusion
International migration creates a mismatch between territory and citizenship, which 
initiatives like the ‘Migrant Law’ in Zacatecas attempt to overcome by facilitating 
external citizens to participate in the political life of their state of origin, despite the 
fact that they might reside in another country or have acquired a second citizenship. 
Migrants’ right to eligibility in the Zacatecan transnational context eliminates a
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necessary territorial tie among citizens, which contradicts with liberal theories of 
democracy. As Spiro explains political theory until recently presumed that if a 
government is largely a territorial enterprise ‘then the absent citizen will not have 
cause either to be protected from, or participate in, the home government’ (Spiro 15 
March 2006, p. 102).
Novel initiatives that aim, however, at extending political rights to external citizens 
abroad present two main problems. The first question is what sort of rights can be 
assigned to their emigrants without interfering with the host state’s territorial 
sovereignty. Many countries now accept dual nationality and the right to vote for 
local elections from abroad. In addition, as our case study illustrates there exist 
recent innovative laws that also guarantee migrants’ right to eligibility in their 
countries of origin or local communities. The second question, which has been the 
subject of our study, is to what extent migrants’ political participation -  by being 
able to occupy public positions and having legislative representation in their regions 
of origin -  affects the political scenario at home. Looking at the case of Zacatecas, I 
have argued that this has as a result the transformation of political communities, not 
only due to the inclusion of new political actors (migrant organisations and migrant 
candidates), but also challenging old social hierarchies and realigning power 
structures at home, as well as lifting borders between constituencies at home and 
abroad. The findings in this study then support Baubock’s theory of transnational 
citizenship, which recognises migrants’ overlapping political affiliations which result 
in linkages between states (Baubock February 2002). Legal and policy developments 
like the one presented in this study only prove how political integration seems to
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accompany increased economic interconnectedness between Mexico and the United 
States.
Scholars sceptical of Mexican transnational politics tend to cite survey data that is 
systematically biased against the undocumented and recent arrivals, who, in their 
view, are probably most likely to maintain links with Mexico (Huntington 2004). 
This study of Zacatecan transnational politics has shown that the opposite is actually 
the case. Bi-nationals that have been elected mayors and have been nominated 
migrant legislators are in most cases US citizens or permanent residents, who are 
either successful businessmen or migrant leaders. As Guamizo asserts migrants’ 
political participation is positively correlated with length of residence in the US 
because long-term residents are more likely to enjoy the legal status and level of 
economic well being that facilitates cross border travel and political activities (see 
also Itzigsohn 2000; Guamizo 2001; Guamizo, Portes et al. May 2003). We should 
also bear in mind that the current legal debate in the US could allow millions of 
Mexicans a path to acquire US citizenship, which as a result would facilitate more 
Zacatecans abroad to engage in local politics if they so wish.
However, as we have seen, the institutionalised intervention of immigrants in local 
politics enters into conflict with democratic principles. Firstly, it does not regulate 
the selection of candidates abroad as it cannot enact any regulation that would have 
an impact beyond the national and state borders. Migrant organisations are the main 
vehicles by which potential bi-national candidates are selected, as political parties’ 
offices abroad do not have significant levels of involvement. Graham describes a 
similar pattern in the case of Dominican migrants (2001). It is questionable, however,
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to what extent migrant organisations represent the migrant population and their 
workings are transparent and democratic. Secondly, bi-national campaigns fall into 
past corporativist and clientelist practices, although reinvented in a transnational 
form. A third dimension is what constituencies they tend to serve -the people who 
live in the municipalities or those that have emigrated. That is not the case with 
migrant legislators whose responsibilities are clearly to represent emigrants and their 
families as well as those that that had immigrated to Zacatecas. However, it 
represents an issue in migrant-sending communities that might have more than half 
of their populations in the US. Nonetheless, as long as there is a continuous flow of 
emigrants or migrants’ loyalty persists, we would expect transnational economic and 
political structures to remain. ‘Bi-national’ legislators and politicians are in the case 
of Zacatecas a driving force of political and economic integration between both 
countries.
In the next chapter, we will be able to compare the case of the ‘Migrant Law’ in 
Zacatecas with the case of Michoacan showing what are the main determinants of the 
formula for emigrant political participation adopted by local legislatures in Mexico 
and whether the findings presented in this case study can be extended to other 
regions in Mexico.
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Chapter 8
8. Migrant political participation in Michoacan
In chapter 6, we have seen that the events that led to the implementation of the 
‘Migrant Law’ in the state of Zacatecas suggeted that the interaction of different 
political factors -  party politics, the rebirth of civil society and growing 
empowerment of migrants’ hometown associations -  are necessary ingredients to 
create legal recognition of migrants’ political rights. Chapter 7 has explored the 
central features of the transnationalisation of local politics in Zacatecas where the 
‘migrant’ and migrant organisations have a place at the centre stage. Would that, 
then, imply that in a state in which similar dynamics take place, migrants’ political 
rights could be legally recognised? Would it be right to expect the 
transnationalisation of political dynamics at the local level in other Mexican migrant 
sending states? Also, what does determine the formula for migrant political 
participation?
This chapter proposes to account for the adoption of migrants’ political rights in the 
Mexican migrant sending state of Michoacan, the second Mexican state where a law 
that explicitly grants migrants’ political rights at the state level has been 
implemented in February 2007. This Law allowed Michoacano migrants to be able to 
cast a vote for governorship elections, for the first time, in November 2007. I put to 
the test the argument that the interaction of a centre-left PRD government with a 
strong presence in the local congress and politically active migrant organisations in a 
context of a democratic transition and increasing economic integration between the
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US and Mexico would guarantee the implementation of a migrants’ political rights 
bill at the state level. This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I analyse the 
factors that triggered the approval of the local vote abroad in Michoacan and 
compare them to the case of Zacatecas. Here, I argue that the case of Michoacan 
corroborates the argument that a coalition between a centre-left party and migrant 
lobby groups in the US triggers the approval of a migrants’ political rights bill at the 
sub-national level in Mexico. Then, I discuss why the Michoacano ‘vote abroad’ bill 
differs from the “ Migrant Law” implemented in Zacatecas. I argue, however, that 
despite those differences, the Michoacano formula has also a strong effect on the 
local political order, extending party competition beyond the country’s borders and 
allowing the inclusion of new transnational political actors such as migrants and 
migrants groups. Finally, I discuss whether we can forecast the approval of similar 
migrants’ political rights bill in other migrant sending states in Mexico.
Although this chapter undertakes a comparative approach, the analysis is based on 
information compiled during fieldwork visits in Michoacan and Zacatecas in 2006 
and 2007, consultation of local legislative archives and media sources over a period 
of three years. In Michoacan, a number of in-depth interviews were carried out with 
Michoacano migrant activists and legislators involved in the passage of the local vote 
abroad bill and telephone communication was established with Michoacano migrant 
leaders based in the US and personal interviews carried out in Chicago in April 2008. 
Unstructured interviews were also carried out during the implementation phase of the 
vote abroad mechanism with members of the vote abroad commission, part of the 
Michoacan’s Electoral Institute.
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8.1. Migrant politics and the emergence of party 
politics in Michoacan
Michoacans like Zacatecans have been engaged in migratory movements to the US 
for over 100 years. Located in west-central Mexico, Michoacan is one of the main 
Mexican migrant sending states with an estimated 1.06 million Michoacans living in 
the US by 2003, representing 11 percent of the total state’s population ((CONAPO) 
2007 ). Michoacano migrants mainly reside in the US states of California, Texas, 
Illinois, Indiana, Arizona, Nebraska, Nevada, Washington and Alaska. The effects of 
emigration in this Mexican state are clearly visible -  it is, for instance, the only 
Mexican state that reported a negative annual population growth between 2000 and 
2005 (Consejo Estatal de Poblacion (COESPO) 2007). The migration phenomenon in 
Michoacan has led to the reduction of the work force, as well as the desertification of 
rural communities and concentration of Michoacans in urban centres (Michoacan 11 
July 2007). Michoacan, however, is still the biggest receiver of remittances in 
Mexico -  in 2007, it received 2.26 billion dollars, which represented more than 9 
percent of total remittances received (Banco de Mexico 2008). Last reports from the 
Mexican central bank, nonetheless, show that remittances sent to Michoacan are 
starting to stagnate, which could be attributed to a shift in the state’s migration 
dynamics and weakened US economy (see Figure 8.1. below).
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Figure 8.1 Individual remittances sent to Michoacan (2003-2008)
R em ittances s e n t to  M ichoacan from 2003 to  2008 q uaterly  (in 
USD million)
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Source: Bank of Mexico, 2008.
The question here is how the state of Michoacan came to reconcile its position as a 
migrant sending state with its democratic and electoral processes opening the doors 
to Michoacano emigres to participate in the local political sphere. In particular, what 
were the factors that secured the approval o f migrants’ political rights bill at the local 
level? Also, why does this kind of emigrant political participation differ from the 
Zacatecan “ Migrant Law” ? In this section, I argue that the proposal to take into 
account those Michoacano citizens residing abroad in political processes at home 
arose as the result of gradual cross-country political interaction linking Michoacano 
migrant groups in the US and opposition parties in Michoacan. As in the case of 
Zacatecas the trigger that led to the inclusion o f migrants in the political map, I 
would argue, was the political transition and the (re)emergence of party politics in 
the state combined with economic changes in the region influenced by international 
migration. I will then, in turn, examine how Michoacano migrant groups have 
progressively emerged as transnational political actors and how opposition parties 
have benefited from migrants’ increasing political leverage, attempting to attract not 
only collective remittances, but also their votes.
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8.1.1. The political role of Michoacano migrant organisations
A number of scholars have pointed out the significant civic and political involvement 
of Michoacano hometown associations in their communities of origin. Most of the 
available migrants’ collective action literature, however, focuses on the impact of 
these groups in fostering development at home and advocating migrants’ rights in the 
US (Rivera-Salgado, Bada et al. 2005). From an anthropological perspective, 
extensive ethnographic work has been undertaken in migrant sending regions such as 
Gomez Farias, Jaripo, Chamitlan, Tzintzuntzan and the Tarascan zone that focus on 
the effects of the international migration phenomenon on community and family 
dynamics (Dinerman 1978; Fonseca 1984; Lopez 1986; Massey 1991; Kemper 
1995). These studies, however, fall short to explain migrants’ motivations to be 
involved in community political affairs. Fitzgerald, on the other hand, has carried 
out the first ethnographic study published in the year 2000 that looks into migrants’ 
transnational identity formations and how this phenomenon shapes their relationship 
with their communities of origin. He shows how Michoacano migrants from the 
municipalities of Sahuayo and Jiquilpan and the village of El Granjenal claim 
citizenship in their places of origin through public displays and using moral 
justifications (Fitzgerald 2000). From a political science perspective, however, this 
study attempts to complement the existing gap in the literature by offering a 
systematic study that helps explain what has been the role of Michoacano hometown 
associations and migrant groups in the legal recognition of their political rights at 
home and to what extent they have been responsible for the approval of this bill vis a 
vis local political actors. That is to say, how they have evolved from being cross­
border charity organisations to becoming transnational lobby groups with enough 
political leverage to assert their claims and how, on the other hand, domestic political 
actors have tried to shape migrants’ political interests. The insertion of the 
Michoacano migrant in the public imagination has not only been the result of their 
tangible contributions to their communities of origin, but also, as in the case of 
Zacatecas, a consequence of media attention in both countries -  an expanding 
Spanish-1 anguage media in the US run by Michoacano migrants, as well as local 
newspapers’ increasing interest in migration issues. For instance, the local 
newspaper ‘La Voz de Michoacan ’ has a supplement on migrant affairs entitled lAl 
Otro Lado, La Voz de los Migrantes’ (On the Other Side, the Voice of the Migrants). 
‘La Diligencia Michoacana ’ is a weekly newspaper that is distributed simultaneously 
in Michoacan and in various US cities.
According to figures provided by the Institute of Mexicans Abroad, Michoacano 
migrants currently have over 200 hometown associations distributed across 13 
American states. Migrants from this state have a long history of involvement in 
community organisations, which in many respects resembles the case of the Mexican 
state of Zacatecas. In accordance with fieldwork interviews, the first Michoacano 
hometown association was created in the 1960’s, whose main purpose at that time 
was to function as a meeting point for social and sports events. Similarly, various 
migrant clubs were created by Michoacano migrants from different communities of 
origin and living in different locations. All these migrant clubs grouped together for 
the first time in 1997 to form the ‘Federation of Michoacano Clubs in Illinois’ 
(FEDECMI), Chicago. By the beginning of this century, Michoacans in the US had 
already four federations; two in Illinois and two in California. In 2007, the number of
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federations almost tripled. There are now eleven Michoacan federations: four 
federations in California that are grouped together under the ‘Confederation of 
Organisations in California and Migrant Clubs in Michoacan’, two federations in 
Chicago and four federations in US states with less or more recently-arrived 
Michoacano migrants such as Texas, Nevada, Washington, Indiana and Alaska (see 
Table 8.1 below) (Summer 2007). We should bear in mind, however, that the 
multiplying number of federations should not be translated into growing cohesion 
amongst the Michoacano population in the US, but quite the opposite. Fieldwork 
interviews revealed that sometimes new federations emerged out of fractures of 
already existing ones. This tendency does show, nonetheless, the organisational 
character of the Michoacano community in the US.
T able 8.1 F edera tions of M ichoacano Migrant C lubs in the  US
US s ta te F ederations N um ber of 
M ichocano 
Hometown 
A ssociations
C hicago ‘F ederation  of 
M ichocano C lubs in 
Illinois’
37 clubs
‘A ssociation of 
M ichocano M igrants’ 
C lubs in Illinois’
19 clubs
California ‘A ssociation of 
M ichoacano clubs in 
California’
15 clubs
‘Californian 
Federation  of 
M ichoacans ‘Lazaro 
Cardenas del Rio’
13 clubs
'Federation  of 
M ichocans from the  
O range County and  
S a n ta  Ana, 
California’
3 clubs
‘O rganisa tions of 
Agricultural W orkers’
N/A
T exas ‘F ederation  of 
M ichoacans in 
T ex a s’
13 clubs
N evada ‘Federation  of United 
M ichoacans in
21 clubs
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Nevada’
Washington ‘Association of 
United Michoacans 
in Washington’
N/A
Indiana
Alaska ‘Federation of United 
Michoacans in 
Alaska’
7 clubs
Own elaboration. Source: Institute of Michoacans Abroad (2007), Institute of Mexicans Abroad (2006).
As Michoacano migrant clubs reach maturity in the level of their organisation, this 
has had an impact on the increase and resonance o f their activities in the US, as well 
as in Mexico. Focusing on the South side o f the border, Michoacano organisations 
like migrant groups from other Mexican states have been increasingly involved in 
development projects in their communities of origin. If we measure collective 
remittances, that is, donations sent by hometown associations to support public 
works in their home communities, in terms o f their participation in the governmental 
programme ‘Citizen initiative 3X 1’, we observe that the programme’s budget for the 
state of Michoacan has doubled in only four years -  from 4 million dollars in 2002 to 
8 million dollars destined for development projects in 2006 -  making a total of 
almost 30 million dollars spent on 538 projects during this time (see Figure 8.2 
below).
Figure 8.2 Collective remittances sent to Michoacan (2002-2006)
Own elaboration. Source: Eneida Reynoso Acosta, Instituto Michoacano de los Migrantes en el Extranjero, 2007
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In addition, as the number of hometown associations grows, so does the number of 
communities that benefit from donations sent by those community members living 
abroad. Out of 113 municipalities that exist within Michoacan’s territory, 30 
participated in the ‘3X1’ programme in 2002 and more than 72 did so in 2006. 
According to Eneida Reynoso Acosta from the Institute of Michoacans Abroad, ‘20 
percent of Michoacan’s population has benefited from the ’3X1’ programme 
covering around 80 percent of all municipalities’ (Summer 2007). ‘3X1’ projects in 
Michoacan are being increasingly implemented in smaller, more vulnerable 
communities less connected to urban centres, rather than town centres or ‘cabeceras 
municipales’ (heads of municipalities) (Reynoso Acosta, Summer 2007). We should 
bear in mind that most communities that experience high emigration in Michoacan 
are mainly rural with a population of less than 20,000 inhabitants (Verduzco 1998).
In contrast to the controversial debate on individual migrants’ remittances and their 
impact on development, collective remittances sent by hometown groups and 
supported by matching funds from the different levels of government are normally 
perceived as one of the most successful ways to foster the implementation of 
infrastructure and productive projects in stricken communities. Here, the debate turns 
to whether migrant groups should carry out activities that are mainly responsibilities 
of the state. In fact, those collective remittances sometimes exceed the local 
governments’ budget allocated for public works in small and remote communities, as 
we have also seen in the case of Zacatecas (fieldwork interviews, SEDESOL, 2007; 
fieldwork interviews, Michocano hometown associations, 2007 and 2008). As 
Rivera-Salgado and his associates carefully formulate: *[ ] it can not be denied that
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this program has empowered migrant communities, helping them to build more and 
better social capital networks as well as to restore the shattered social fabric of many 
communities of origin’ (2005, p. 15). Ethnographic studies in Michoacan’s 
communities -  such as Gomez Farias by Gustavo Lopez and Copandaro by Luis 
Rianda -  have indeed described that communities that experience intense migration 
and receive donations by groups of residents abroad look different. In a study carried 
out by Gustavo Verduzco and Kurt Unger using statistical techniques they found out 
that in 1998 of all the municipalities in Michoacan with the best housing conditions 
(56 municipalities), 41 percent experienced intense migration conditions (Verduzco 
1998). A more recent study reveals that remittances have a positive impact in 
recipient communities, which tend to have better public infrastructure such as drain 
access (Adida and Girod 2006).
Through their participation in ‘3X1’ programmes, migrant groups, have not only 
formalised alliances with their communities of origin and contributed to a sense of 
belonging to migrants, but have also reinvented migrants-state relationship to a 
degree that was previously unthinkable. As Levitt and Landolt have noted, helping 
finance local development projects represent effective mechanisms to uphold high 
status and political influence in the communities of origin (Levitt 4 July 2003; 
Landolt 2001). Rivera-Salgado and his associates, on the other hand, show how 
Michoacano migrant groups are, sometimes, able to implement projects that do not 
fall directly into municipal responsibilities such as rodeo rings and churches, 
convincing state and federal governments to fund them through the ‘3X1’ 
programme. In particular, as I have already argued elsewhere, the negotiation of 
‘3X1’ projects with all the different levels of government -  federal, state and
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municipal -  have given these groups a place for political expression. A platform 
they utilise for making demands on both the town political elite and the national 
government on a whole range of issues from project ownership, decision-making and 
allocation of funds to issues such as transparency and more democratic standards. At 
the municipal level Michoacano hometown associations seem even more assertive in 
exercising their political demands.
On the other hand, it is not only a one way relationship. Local governments also 
make direct investments in their migrant communities, to the extent that privileged 
relations are compromised by the fact that they might rely on the state government as 
a source of funding. For instance, in 2004 the Federation of Illinois received a 
donation to buy a building in the neighbourhood of Pilsen in Chicago. This building 
would offer a space to Michoacano hometown associations and other Michoacano 
organisations, as well as counting with a representative of the state’ General 
Coordinating Office for Michoacano Migrant Attention to provide services to the 
Michoacano community (fieldwork interviews, 2006; fieldwork interviews, Chicago, 
April 2008).
It follows, then, that migrant organisations’ involvement in activities that were until 
recently carried mainly by governments seems not only to portray migrants as 
benefactors, but also and most significantly to place them in the political sphere as 
community leaders, altering in this way traditional hierarchies at the municipal level. 
A few community studies have pointed out how in migrant sending towns, political 
decisions are often taken on both sides of the Mexico-US border. Fitzgerald, for 
instance, describes this as ‘transnational migrant collective action’. In his own words:
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‘the political structure of El Granjenal has been transplanted 1500 miles to a ‘satellite 
community’ in Santa Ana that is bigger than the community of origin’ (Fitzgerald 
2000, p. 12). He shows how the main public positions in this community are held by 
long-term migrants that have houses in Santa Ana, California and El Granjenal, 
Michoacan, and travel back and forth to reach their constituency on both sides of the 
border. Migrant participation in this community is not only political, but also 
economic as the committee in charge of public works counts with a fund-raising 
committee based in Santa Ana (Fitzgerald 2000). This example illustrates how 
economic involvement seems to lead to political participation.
8.1.2.  Migrant political influence and the change of government in 
Michoacan
I would argue that these events, however, have been part of the democratization and 
economic liberalisation processes that have shaken the country and the state of 
Michoacan in the last two decades. Michoacan experienced an alternation of 
government control, a year later than at the federal level, having a different political 
party in power after more than seven decades. Michoacan, nonetheless, is the 
birthplace of the centre-left PRD party and ‘Cardenismo ’ (Bruhn 1995; Bruhn 1999). 
The PRD had won half of the contested state legislatures and 52 municipal 
presidencies in 1989, the same year that the party was founded. Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas Solorzano, a former PRI governor of Michoacan and son of the prominent 
PRI Mexican president in the 1930’s Lazaro Cardenas, was the founder of the PRD 
party and the first PRD presidential candidate. His son, Lazaro Cardenas Batel, 
became the first PRD governor elected in Michoacan in 2001.
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The cases of Michoacan and Zacatecas show that participation of migrant groups in 
the economic and political development of their communities of origin, thus, seem to 
coincide with the opening up of political spaces for previously excluded social 
groups. Mexican migrants present a working class challenge to the traditional 
political class. Those migrant activists that have taken the lead in the voting rights 
movement are frequently professionals or self-made businessmen in the US, but with 
a working class or agricultural background before they left Mexico. Migrants, in that 
respect, together with indigenous groups, young people, etc., are part of wider 
prospects for democratization from social movements.
As migrants’ significance grew both in economic and political terms, local political 
actors, in particular those from the opposition, saw in them the opportunity to win 
important allies. It was not a coincidence that the first opposition government of 
Lazaro Cardenas Batel had resorted to migrant support just as his father Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas Solorzano had done during his various presidential campaigns in 1988, 
1994 and 2000 (fieldwork interviews, 2006; fieldwork interviews, Chicago, 2008). 
During his political campaign for the governorship of the state of Michoacan, 
Cardenas Batel assured Michoacano migrant leaders in the US that they would have 
a voice in Michoacan’s political affairs if he was victorious. During his several visits 
to the US he reiterated that he would promote a legal initiative to allow Michoacan 
migrants to vote and be voted (fieldwork interviews, 2006). Cardenas Batel was a 
leading figure in Mexican politics with a proven commitment to migrants’ political 
rights -  being the first one to send an initiative to allow Mexican migrants to vote for 
presidential elections from abroad when he served as federal deputy representing the 
state of Michoacan in 1998 (see chapter 4).
Even before the PRD party won the governorship of the state of Michoacan, the PRI 
government had already started efforts to reach the Michoacano migrant community 
in the US. Government initiatives dealing with migrant issues under a PRD 
government, nonetheless, were unprecedented not only in numbers, but also in scope. 
In 2002, the General Coordinating Office for Michoacano Migrant Attention 
(COGAMIM for its acronym in Spanish) was created and followed in 2006 by the 
Institute of Michoacano Migrants. This Institute provides both migrants and 
members of their families with a range of services (advice on remittances transfers, 
matching funds, health, education and legal and administrative services), as well as 
providing useful contacts of migrant organisations in the US. Several innovative 
services for migrants have also come into place. For instance, Michoacan has been 
the first state in Latin America to launch distance-learning education for its migrant 
population in the US. Since 2005, the Michoacano Institute for Job Training 
(ICATMI for its acronym in Spanish), which has two educative spaces in the US, in 
Chicago, Illinois and San Diego, California has trained around 700 Michoacano 
migrants and has provided them with studies that are valid in both countries 
(Michoacan 6 August 2007; Morelia 23 Julio 2007 ). Cardenas Batel’s administration 
has also made available government-sponsored migrant medical insurance under the 
programme ‘Vete Sano, Regresa Sano’ (‘Go Healthy, Come Back Healthy’), which 
provides medical services to Michoacano migrants when they return to or visit 
Michoacan (Michoacan 6 August 2007; Health 9 October 2003).
What the above suggests is that migrants’ insertion in the economic and political 
development of their places of origin and the political transition evolving in the state
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are not simple parallel events, but they reinforce one another and should be seen as 
two complementing aspects of democratization experienced at the sub-national level. 
That is to say, from the top-down involving an alternation of power and on the other 
hand, perhaps more efficient processes that take place from the ‘bottom-up’ similar 
to the actions carried out by previously marginalised social groups such as the 
migrant population.
Political involvement of migrant groups in home processes, like the case of 
Michoacan demonstrates, thus, a contradiction of the notion that migration provides a 
‘safety valve’, that is, people discontent with the political and/or economic context of 
their countries of origin ‘vote with their feet’. In contrast, current technological 
advances in communication and travel provide migrants with a transnational 
platform to make their political claims. As we have seen, Michoacano migrants 
might have first silently tried to find economic solutions to economic problems, by 
emigrating and sending remittances home, as well as supporting public works, but 
after gaining enough public recognition they have been able to exert pressure on the 
local political leadership.
On the other hand, the rise of party politics in the state has strengthened migrant 
groups’ political leverage not only in comparison with traditional political elites, but 
in particular, in relation to the opposition. As we have seen, the centre-left PRD 
government succeeded at attracting more migrants’ political support, firstly by 
creating a network of services for them and their families and helping them organise 
themselves better in the US; secondly, by putting more investment into matching 
funds programmes for local public works and productive projects in more vulnerable
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regions. We shall see, however, how the different Michoacano political actors have 
responded to migrants’ demands, translating their symbolic support into the legal 
language by providing them with a comprehensive bill that included electoral 
participation and representation at the local congress. We now turn to this discussion.
8.2. The Vote Abroad Negotiations
In the previous section, I have argued that Michoacan’s change of government and 
the economic participation of US-based Michoacano migrant groups in their 
communities of origin have opened up political spaces for the three key players 
present in the transnational debate on migrants’ political rights. That is, opposition 
parties, US-based migrant groups, and public opinion based in both countries. I will 
now analyse how these actors reacted in the final step towards the institutionalisation 
of Michoacano migrants’ political participation from abroad through the passage of 
the local absentee vote bill. Here, I corroborate my thesis that the trigger that 
institutionalises the political participation of migrants at the sub-national level is a 
cross-country coalition, between the most prominent US-based migrant lobby group 
-  in the case of Michoacan that is the FREBIMICH, the political arm of Michoacano 
hometown associations -  and the centre-left PRD party -  both the government and 
legislative faction of the party. However, the main question is why the Michoacano 
migrants’ political rights formula was different from the one advocated and 
implemented in Zacatecas. As I show, this was the result of the timing of the 
negotiations, the local legal framework and the main advocates of the bill in the 
Michoacano congress.
314
In order to understand what the dynamics were that led to the long-distance 
incorporation of the Michoacano migrant population into the state’s political affairs, 
we should first bear in mind the government composition at the time legislative 
negotiations began. As I have already mentioned, the post-PRI era in Michoacan was 
burdened with a divided government and a fragmented legislature, where not a single 
party held an absolute majority. The centre-left PRD won the governorship in the 
year 2001 (for a period of 6 years according to the constitution) under an alliance 
known as ‘Coalition Unidos por Michoacan' ( ‘United for Michoacan’ Coalition, 
CUPM for its acronym in Spanish), with two small parties, the Workers’ Party (PT 
for its acronym in Spanish) and the Green Party (PVEM for its acronym in Spanish). 
The PRD, however, only held 18 seats in the Michoacano congress out o f the total 
40, and the PRI followed closely with 17 local deputies (see figures 8.3 and 8.4).
Figure 8.3 Results of the 2001 election in Michoacan to renew the local legislature
V ote a llocation  by  political party  o r coalition  in th e  2001 elec tion
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Figure 8.4 Composition of Michoacan’s local legislature between 2001 and 2004
Composition of the local congress 2001-2004 according 
to political faction
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Source: Instituto Electoral de Michoacan, Memoria del Proceso Electoral 2001, Morelia, 2002
The local elections to renew the state’s congress that took place in 2004 did not 
change the political scale. The PRD’s ‘Unidos por Michoacan’ (United for 
Michoacan) emerged with 17 deputies and the PRI-PVEM alliance with 16. The rest 
was distributed amongst the PAN and the PT (see figures 8.5 and 8.6 below). From 
the onset, the first non-PRI government in Michoacan knew that it faced a changing 
political context in which political power has become dispersed and divided. Political 
parties, however, as we have seen, seem to play roles according to cost-profit 
calculations taking into consideration migrants’ voting preferences, economic 
contributions and public opinion, but during phases of party fragmentation they do 
not necessarily act in a unified and rational manner (see chapter 4). The negotiation 
of the vote abroad bill in the Michoacano congress shows that whilst aware they will 
not be able to obtain all their demands at the negotiating table, the main political 
parties still hope to ‘make a dent in the government’s armour’.
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Figure 8.5 Results of the 2004 election in Michoacan to renew the local legislature
Vote allocation by political party or coalition in the 2004 election
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Figure 8.6 Composition of Michoacan’s local legislature between 2004 and 2007
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The case o f Michoacan corroborates how transnational civic mobilisation drives and 
spreads the debate on migrant political rights across Mexican states. Similarly to the 
case of Zacatecas, local legislative negotiations on Michoacano migrants’ political 
participation was preceded by various debates organised by migrant groups and 
migrant rights’ activists in Mexico and the US since 2002. The foros de consulta ’ 
(consultative forums) on migrants’ political rights held in this new millennium
317
evoked to a great extent the ‘consultas ciudadanas’ (citizenship referendums) on 
indigenous rights issues held in the second half of the 1990’s. Civic mobilisation in 
this respect seems to offer more effective democratic means to discuss and make 
decisions on issues that directly concern and affect a social group. These bi-national 
forums -  as they took place in various US and Mexican cities -  were organised by 
US universities in California, Texas and Chicago, as well as by the University of 
Michoacan (fieldwork interviews, 2006). They provided a meeting point for different 
political actors such as Michoacano migrant leaders, migrants’ rights advocates, 
government representatives, deputies and academics from both sides of the border to 
discuss tete-a-tete their different positions and interests. As Gonzalo Badillo Moreno 
mentions ‘the general characteristics of the Michoacano vote abroad initiative 
emerged there’ (Badillo Moreno, 2006). He recounts how participants formulated 
and voted for the main components of a migrants’ political rights initiative in the 
forum that took place in the city of Hidalgo in May 2003. The main points were that 
the Michoacano migrants should be able to elect governor and deputies according to 
the principle of proportional representation; electoral campaigns should be regulated 
by the Michoacano Electoral Institute and contributions towards local electoral 
campaigns from abroad should not be allowed. Also, there was an agreement on ‘the 
right to vote and be voted according to what the national and state constitution 
establish’ (Badillo Moreno, 2006).
However, even though the many bi-national forums organised in both countries 
represent innovative participatory structures, only a fraction of Michoacano migrants 
were willing or able to participate in such consultations. Questions arise about who 
are the main promoters of migrants’ political participation in Michoacano politics
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from afar and over the long term and what were their motivations? Similarly to the 
case of Zacatecas, a migrant lobby group was created with the task of advocating 
migrants’ political rights in Michoacan, as well as in the US. The idea of the Bi­
national Michoacano Front (‘Frente Binacional M ich o ca n o FREBIMICH for its 
acronym in Spanish) arose during the VI Michocano Binational Forum in Hidalgo, 
Michoacan in May 2003. It was mentioned that many migrant leaders disagreed on 
the composition of this organization as ‘not all migrant groups were admitted, the 
founders of the ‘Frente* established some sort of right for admission’ (fieldwork 
interviews, 2006). Such disagreements led to the formation of another independent 
organisation the ‘Frente Civico Michoacano BinacionaV by a group of Michoacano 
migrant group from California (Najar 25 April 2004).
We should bear in mind that hometown associations and federations are legally 
prohibited from getting involved in electoral or campaigning activities. At the same 
time, they are aware that political differences can jeopardise the unity of the migrant 
club, as well as its relations with local and national governments as it has occurred in 
the past. As we have seen, during the 1998 elections in Zacatecas, for instance, 
differences erupted within the Zacatecan Federation between those that supported the 
PRI and those that favoured the opposition. Thus, by creating new groups with 
solely political goals, migrant leaders are able to uphold the neutrality of their 
hometown associations whose focus is mainly social and economic. Michoacano 
migrants that lead hometown associations, however, have become influential 
political activists and the ones that make up the leadership of migrant lobby groups. 
As Jose Luis Gutierrez explains ‘El Frente’ is an organisation in which the most 
renowned Michoacano migrant leaders in the US participate. 'El Frente’ is a
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complement to what the Federations do in the social and economic ambits; we should 
make the next step because we now want political representation’ (Najar 25 April 
2004).
The goals of the ‘Frente Michoacano’ as other migrant lobby groups are merely 
political, although, they claim they do not ally with political parties in any country. 
Like the case of the CDPME (at the national level) and the FCZ (in Zacatecas), the 
FREBIMICH’s main aim is to advocate migrant political participation in Mexico and 
in the US. They do so in two forms, lobbying in the local and national congresses for 
the implementation of migrants’ political rights and on the other hand, supporting the 
candidature of migrants for public positions in the two countries. As Jose Luis 
Gutierrez explained when asked about the support offered by migrant groups to 
emigrant candidates in Michoacan: ‘we support Michoacanos with American 
citizenship who want to stand up for public positions in the US, or those who aspire 
to become mayor or congressman in Mexico. The only requirement is that the 
candidates are members’ (Unstructured interview, 2006). By not allying with any 
political party, they believe they have a competitive advantage. As Gutierrez puts it, 
‘we create a list with whoever aspires to become local deputy that we give to the 
parties; then we do the final ‘tying up’ with each one so that the candidature takes 
place ... if we become ‘partidistas ’ (politically biased) we will spoil the movement; 
we cannot afford to take that risk’ (Unstructured interview, 2006). Therefore, 
migrant lobby groups are not only authors of the reforms or policies they advocate, 
but they also serve as a bridge between the different political parties and Mexicans 
abroad.
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The vote abroad initiative sent to the Michoacano congress (LXIX legislature) by the 
PRD Governor Cardenas Batel in July 2003 was elaborated by one of the main 
migrants’ political rights advocators, Gonzalo Badillo Moreno, based on the points 
agreed in the various bi-national forums (Marquez 27 December 2003). Badillo 
Moreno was also member of the CDPME that advocated the vote abroad bill at the 
national level, which shows how the people behind the migrants’ political rights 
movement might be the same. The FREBIMICH with the backing of a large number 
of Michoacano hometown associations supported the PRD government initiative 
(fieldwork interviews, 2007). We should also consider that the Michoacano debate 
on migrants’ political incorporation from abroad took place at the same time as a 
similar bill had been approved in Zacatecas under a PRD government and several 
initiatives on absentee voting for presidential elections had been sent to the federal 
congress.
Batel’s initiative would have allowed Michoacano migrants to participate in local 
elections for deputies according to proportional representation that took place that 
same year. It consisted mainly in the following points: Michoacano migrants would 
be able to vote from abroad for state governor and for deputies according to 
proportional representation. The latter could be possible as all votes emitted in 
Michoacan, as well as abroad by Michoacano migrants would be taken into account 
to determine the number of deputies assigned to each political faction according to 
this principle (at present, 16 out of 40 deputies are elected by proportional 
representation). Political campaigns could be carried out abroad, but funds and 
donations for campaigns that did not come from the national territory would be 
forbidden (15 July 2003). In regards to ‘migrant candidates’, this initiative mentioned
that ‘the Michoacanos outside the national territory that want to be candidates for any 
public position should comply with the requirements established in the Political 
Constitution of the United States of Mexico, the Political Constitution of the State of 
Michoacan, (the State Electoral) Code and other applicable legal requirements. The 
application to register the candidature should include an address within the state’ (15 
July 2003). This ambiguous statement meant that Michoacano migrants that were 
bom in the state or were descendents of Michoacano parents do not have to comply 
with residency requirements according to the state constitution (art. 5, chapter IE), 
also supported by article 36 of the federal constitution (after the 1996 reform). 
Migrant candidates only had to include, nonetheless, an address in Michoacan.
Batel’s initiative was brought to a standstill at the local congress as the PRI and PAN 
decided not to take any action. When the bill was read in the legislature on August 
12, 2003, however, it prompted a heated debate that displayed the conflicting 
positions of the main political factions. The PRI intervened establishing the position 
of the party, which is unusual during the analysis of a bill, as well as calling on an 
agreement to send the bill for further analysis to the state electoral bodies, specialists 
on the subject and state political parties’ leaderships, that is, to be stopped (7a 
congeladora ’). The PRI Martin Acosta Rosales in an ambiguous address advocated 
for migrants’ well-being, which could be enhanced by the approval of a multilateral 
agreement with the US and possibly an amnesty, the implementation of services and 
migrant policies and productive projects that address the causes of the migration 
phenomenon. However, Martin Acosta signalled that the PRI opposed the migrant 
vote on the grounds that the bill was a populist tactic with the end of attracting more 
political support. In his own words: ‘We should not fall in the populist trap that they
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pose in the name of democracy by means of an initiative that anybody that reads it 
realises that it does not correspond to the ambit of this congress’. He then mentions 
“We “priistas” are concerned about the lightness with what the Congress wants to 
address the migrant vote. We think that it is only a resource to attract media attention 
“ con tintes partidistas electoreros” (with the end of gaining more votes) (12 August 
2003). In addition, the PRI argued against the migrant vote by arguing that it led to 
dual citizenship and dual allegiance and it would grant rights to Michoacano 
migrants who want ‘all the benefits of democracy, but none of its obligations’ (12 
August 2003). The PRI legislator also mentioned that this bill did not pertain to the 
ambit of the local congress as it contravened federal constitutional rules47.
The PRD position on the migrant vote was visibly in favour. In response to the PRI 
intervention, the legislator Efrain Garcia Becerra pointed out ‘(...) today we have 36 
municipal presidents out of 113 municipalities in Michoacan that are migrants! 36 
municipal presidents! And I would not be surprised if our fellow Martin has also 
been a migrant! And some of us migrants! And that is how you have accessed elected 
positions! There are many deputies that were there, in the United States, and that 
were working there as migrants! And we should not be ashamed of saying it! And 
here they are as deputies! About dual nationality, dual citizenship, I am not saying 
that we should put it aside. No. Only that we should always do it in positive, 
affirmative, the vote of the Michoacanos abroad’ (12 August 2003). The PRD 
governor, Cardenas Batel, justified his initiative as a response to the ‘(...) many 
contributions from Michoacano migrants: the promotion of our culture, their 
economic contributions for investment and social development, among others. The
47 In particular he mentioned articles 32, 89,117, 121, and 133 of the federal constitution
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latter is an unquestionable proof of their affection to their roots’ (15 July 2003). In 
several interviews, Cardenas Batel affirmed that the PRD was in favour of the 
migrant vote not only because it responded to democratic processes, but also because 
they were obliged to do so in response to Michoacano migrants’ interest in the 
economic (and political) development of their places of origin.
The PAN faction in the XXIX legislature, aligned with the PRI not to have a vote on 
the bill. It emerged during fieldwork interviews that the PAN awaited for the 
developments of the vote abroad for presidential elections in order to define its 
position on the issue. It was mentioned that ‘there was a widespread fear that if a 
vote abroad bill was first implemented at the state level, it would determine the form 
of the mechanism implemented for presidential elections. We had to see how things 
evolved in the federal congress first and what the results were’. At the same time, as 
we have seen, the PAN did not favour an advanced migrants’ political rights bill.
Many Michoacano migrant groups showed publicly their discontent against the PRI 
and PAN for their lack of support for the political participation of Michoacano 
migrants in local elections. Jose Luis Gutierrez leader of the Federation of 
Michoacano Clubs in Illinois and member of the FREBIMICH mentioned: ‘we do 
not want to be second class citizens, because for many the dollars we sent are 
welcome, but our rights are ignored’ (Unstructured interview, 2006). Other migrant 
leaders claimed that some local political actors were trying to stop the democratic 
change (La Jornada 20 July 2003). Given the amount of international and national 
coverage, it was evident that migrants’ political participation in Michoacano politics 
had already become a public debate strengthening the position of the FREBIMICH.
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Since the local vote abroad bill was dormant in the Congress, the FREBIMICH and 
other Michoacano migrant organisations decided to lobby for an agreement with the 
main political parties to include a migrant candidate in their lists of deputies 
according to proportional representation with realistic possibilities of winning in the 
2004 local elections. The figure of a migrant legislator would represent the migrant 
population in the LXX legislature. The FREBIMICH proposed three candidates to 
the main political parties: Californian businessman Rodrigo Ruiz Fernandez; Roberto 
Chavarria Cornejo, head of the Michoacano migrant clubs in Texas and Martinez 
Saldana, a Mexican academic based in California. While the PAN rejected Rodrigo 
Ruiz Fernandez, the PRI, on the other hand, placed Roberto Chavarria Cornejo in the 
6th position of its ‘plurinominal’ list, that is, with no chance of occupying a 
legislative seat. The PRD was the only political party that responded to the requests 
of Michoacano migrant groups by including Martinez Saldana, a professor in 
‘Chicano and Latin American studies’ from the University of California in Fresno, 
and Reveriano Orozco, president of the Association of United Michoacans in 
Nevada, as his substitute, in the 3rd place of its list of deputies according to 
proportional representation (Najar 24 October 2004). Martinez Saldana and his 
substitute were the only ones that had a clear chance to become legislators.
The presence of a PRD migrant deputy in the newly formed LXX legislature, I 
suggest, became the symbol of a coalition between the centre-left party and the 
Michoacano migrant lobby in the US. The main goal of having a migrant deputy was 
to keep alive the migrant debate and guarantee the approval of the local vote abroad 
bill on time for the next governorship elections. As Cardenas Batel mentioned in an
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interview in 2004: ‘I think the presence of Jesus Martinez will be very important as 
catalytic element in this sense’ (Prensa 4 February 2005). In regards to the PRI and 
the PAN response to the vote abroad initiative in the Michoacano congress, he said: 
‘Not a single political party would want to fail to recognise this right, which is why 
the opposition did not reject the initiative. They just put it aside without discussing it’ 
(Prensa 4 February 2005). As in the case of Zacatecas and the vote abroad bill for 
presidential elections, the Michoacano vote abroad bill became a priority issue for 
public opinion where not a single party would want to carry the political costs of 
rejecting it publicly.
The second condition that was to guarantee the approval of the vote abroad bill in 
Michoacan, I would argue, was the passage of the vote abroad bill at the federal level 
in 2005 and its implementation in 2006. As we have seen, the first experience of the 
vote abroad for presidential elections failed to attract a large number of Mexican 
citizens abroad. Even if that same number of Michoacano migrants voted for local 
elections -  that is 2,670 -  it would not have much influence in the results. In this 
way, it could be said that not even the PRI could fear an impact from the 
participation of Michoacano migrants in the governorship elections. As an 
interviewee stated: ‘it was more (politically) costly to oppose the bill than have a few 
votes against’ (fieldwork interviews, Summer 2006).
A new version of the Michoacano vote abroad initiative was presented to the LXX 
Michoacano legislature for voting in February 9, 2007. It was part of a larger reform 
to the state electoral rules, which was known as the ‘electoral justice’ bill as apart 
from implementing the absentee vote, it included limits to local campaign spending
326
and management of campaigns (such as disqualification of candidates), as well as 
reducing the number of advisors within the Electoral Institute of Michoacan from 
seven to five (Jornada 11 February 2007) (Michoacan 11 February 2007). The vote 
abroad mechanism would be added to the state electoral code as a ninth book entitled 
‘the vote of Michoacanos abroad’. It differed from the original PRD bill as it 
allowed Michoacano migrants to vote only for state governor and not deputies 
according to the principle of proportional representation. In addition, political 
campaigns abroad were forbidden. On the other hand, it did not specify if 
Michoacano migrants could stand for public positions. As we have seen earlier, the 
condition of citizenship for Michoacanos by birth is not linked to residency 
requirements.
As it had occurred before, there was opposition from the PRI and PAN, only this 
time the position of the PRD was not well defined. In particular, ‘the PRI was 
against, the position of the PAN was halfway, and suddenly the PRD seemed to 
change its mind’ (Unstructured interview, Raul Ross, Chicago, April 2008). 
According to Raul Ross from the ‘Coalition’, the coming elections for governor in 
Michoacan led to disagreement in the PRD party, between those that supported the 
internal candidate, Leonel Godoy and those that supported Enrique Bautista for party 
candidate (apparently Cardenas Batel’s choice). However, he goes on to explain that 
local deputies do not decide by themselves and they would act according to the party 
label. ‘It is the head of parties that decide, not the deputies. The ‘Frente’ had 
meetings with each party and both the PAN and PRI wanted something in return48.
48 According to Raul Ross, the PAN wanted that 1) the sta te  and federal elections took place in the 
sam e year, 2) that the governm ent had to guarantee the resources and 3) the S ta te  Electoral Institute
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In the end, due to pressure from the PRD leadership, the PRD internal candidate, 
Leonel Godoy, and his followers supported the initiative’ (Unstructured interview, 
Raul Ross, Chicago, April 2008).
During the vote on the floor, the PRD faction was the only one to praise migrants’ 
political inclusion guaranteed in the ‘electoral justice’ bill. The PRD and migrant 
lobby groups’ arguments in favour of the migrant vote can be summarised in 
Martinez Saldana’s address to the legislature, where he mentioned that the migrant 
vote improves local democracy; guarantees political electoral rights that migrants are 
denied of in their country of reception and is a response to migrants’ participation in 
the region’s development. He then mentioned that ‘...three years ago, the 
Michoacano PRD opened its doors to a migrant and included me in its list of 
‘diputados plurinominales’ in a privileged position. Two years ago, I started working 
with the other 16 members of our parliamentary faction. Since then, I have not been 
denied any support to carry out the leading works to the migrant vote and that firm 
position reflects its democratic vocation” (9 February 2007).
This account on the vote abroad bill negotiations in Michoacan corroborates the 
thesis that an organised migrant community that is involved in economic investment 
at home, together with a political transition taking place in the state are necessary 
preconditions for the institutionalisation of migrants’ political participation at home. 
Cross-country negotiations have taken place in the form of transnational political 
coalitions between a centre-left party and Michoacano migrant lobby groups in the
has to consider the initiative as feasible. On the other hand, the PRI asked  for 1) a  change in the 
legislative vote from absolute majority to relative majority and 2) keep the  control of the electoral 
institution
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US. However, despite the similarities in the determinants that led the Zacatecan and 
the Michoacano bills to be approved, migrant political rights implemented in both 
cases differed greatly from each other. Migrant political participation advocated by 
the FREBIMICH and supported by the PRD party in the Michoacano context, was 
based on assimilated representation, that is, voting rights according to the last 
electoral district of residence. In contrast to the discrete representation formula 
implemented in Zacatecas, that involved special representation of the particular 
interests of citizens abroad in the local decision-making process. That was in the 
form of two seats in the local congress reserved for migrant representatives and the 
reform of residency requirements for public office-holding (on assimilated and 
discrete representation see Spiro 15 March 2006, p. 118-123).
Why did the FREBIMICH and the PRD propose absentee voting rights instead of 
migrant representation in Michoacan’s local congress? Three main reasons stand out. 
First, in Mexico’s federal system, local constitutional structures vary from one 
another and local residency requirements to occupy public office are not an 
exception. As we have seen, according to Michoacan’s local constitution, 
Michoacano citizens by birth do not have to meet any residency requirements to run 
for elections. In the case of candidates for state governor, Mexicans not bom in the 
state have to live in Michoacan for a period of five years (Art. 49, Constitution of 
Michoacan). Second, as there were no legal impediments to prevent external citizens 
from holding office, the Michoacan migrant lobby did not consider special migrant 
representation in the local congress a priority. It was often mentioned during 
fieldwork interviews that Michoacano migrants increasingly held legislative seats -  
by election and according to proportional representation. In addition, the Michoacano
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migrant political rights’ lobby was more aligned with the national movement for 
absentee voting rights led by the CDPME. As Raul Ross, member of the CDPME, 
mentioned: ‘the bi-national residency in Zacatecas was just an invented concept that 
made things more complicated and messy. Residency requirements could have 
disappeared from the (Zacatecan) constitution. For us, voting rights were definitely 
more important and only a stepping stone in our struggle’ (unstructured interview, 
Chicago, April 2008). Lastly, the timing of the negotiations was key to shape the 
outcome of the Michoacano migrant political rights’ bill with the PAN delaying any 
pronouncement until the fate of the vote abroad bill at the federal level had been 
decided.
It is clear from the above discussion that local political actors make cost-benefit 
calculations mainly in terms of remittances and votes, which may be disguised under 
their view of democracy. Both opponents and supporters of the migrant vote made 
use of the democratic ensign to sustain their views -  whereas the PRI argued back in 
2003 that the migrant vote infringed the democratic principles of equal rights and 
obligations and favoured dual allegiances; the PRD, on the other hand, sustained that 
migrants’ electoral participation improved local democracy as it extended the 
franchised to a previously excluded social group. Michoacano migrant groups, on 
the other hand, have used their economic and political leverage in terms of 
remittances and votes to gain participation in Michoacan’s political affairs. However, 
why did Michoacano migrants in the US choose to get involved in Mexican politics? 
What is it in Mexico for them? From the above discussion, it is evident that migrant 
groups aim at translating their economic power into political weight, being able in 
this way to make decisions over issues that affect them directly or indirectly.
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Whether that is choosing the administrators of their donations or appointing 
representatives that will focus on issues relevant to Michoacano communities in the 
US. The ultimate goal, then, is to improve the well-being of their migrant 
communities and foster integration between their communities of origin and 
reception. A number of migrant activists, however, would do so to be able to launch 
a political career back home. I now analyse how Michoacano migrants respond to 
these opportunities of political participation at home and how it affects the local 
political scenario.
8.3. Migrant voting rights and local transnational
politics
It is hard to argue that the local vote abroad bill per se can have significant effects on
the transnationalisation of Michoacano politics. In many respects, it resembles the
bureaucratic and cumbersome bill implemented at the national level in 2005 that
allows all Mexicans to vote for presidential elections by post. I would argue in this
section, however, that the implications of this bill go beyond Michoacan’s
governorship elections carried out abroad as it has opened the debate on other direct
forms of migrants’ political participation, that is, parliamentary representation and
the figure of the migrant candidate. I will explain how, in turn, each of these aspects
transforms the political power balance as party competition is extended beyond the
country’s physical frontiers. I will argue, however, that this legislation creates
controversies in the implementation of Michoacano migrants’ right to participate in
political process at home by creating a constituency outside the national territory and
giving unregulated political power to migrant associations, similarly to the case of
Zacatecas. I divide this section into two parts; first I describe the main aspects of the
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Michoacano vote abroad bill for governorship elections and the outcome of the 2007 
governorship elections. I show how the absentee voting system for governorship 
elections in Michoacan recreated the same limitations of the 2006 presidential 
election. Second, I discuss how this bill institutionalises other forms of transnational 
political participation and whom it seems to benefit the most.
Firstly, the first experience of migrants’ participation in the 2007 governorship 
elections failed to induce large numbers of Michoacano migrants. Only a very small 
proportion of the Michoacano migrant population actually registered to cast an 
absentee vote, that is, 980 people out of an estimated 1.06 million. That is even 
much lower than the number of Michoacanos that voted to elect Mexico’s president 
in 2006, as I have already mentioned, 2,670 Michoacano migrants voted for president 
by postal vote (Instituto Federal Electoral 2007). Why did Michoacano migrants 
choose not to participate in the local election? I would argue that the same reasons 
that apply to the lack of participation in the presidential elections from abroad can be 
applied to the Michoacano case. It can be mainly attributed, on the one hand, to the 
lack of political willingness on the Mexican side -  due to the restrictive character of 
the absentee voting mechanism, no voting credential issuance abroad, logistical 
problems and lack of an efficient awareness campaign -  and on the other, to the lack 
of interest among Michoacano expatriates to participate in the elections, albeit only 
to a certain degree.
The Michoacano formula for migrants’ electoral participation to appoint the state 
governor generally coincides with the vote abroad bill for presidential elections. It is 
also based on a postal system with a temporary registry of ‘Michoacan citizens
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residing abroad’. Michoacano migrants have to apply to be included in this registry 
by filling in an application form and enclosing a photocopy of their voting credential 
issued in an electoral district within Michoacan 130 days prior to the elections 
(2007). If the application is successful, they are sent a ballot package by post. Apart 
from the ballot and an instructions leaflet, this electoral package includes the 
candidates’ proposals which is the only means for Michoacano migrants to 
familiarise themselves with the candidates’ political platforms since political 
campaigning outside Mexico is barred. The ballot has to be returned to the electoral 
institute of Michoacan using the provided pre-paid postage envelope and received at 
least 24 hours before the day of the local elections.
Given that this bill was adopted after the vote abroad for presidential elections was 
implemented, there were a number of initiatives to make this bill less restrictive and 
time-consuming (fieldwork interviews, State Electoral Institute, Morelia, July 2007). 
In this respect, there are three main differences between the vote abroad mechanism 
implemented in Michoacan and the federal vote abroad bill. First, Michoacano 
migrants do not need to include a proof of their address abroad and only have to 
mention their address in their application form. This has been one of the main 
complaints of migrant groups that argued that it was particularly cumbersome for 
migrants who were sub-letting for a short period of time, or had an irregular status, to 
get hold of a document that establishes their address. Second, the applications to 
register in the absentee voters’ registry do not have to be sent by certified mail, as 
was the case with the absentee vote applications for presidential elections. This was a 
response to migrants’ complaints about the cost of certified mail, which was about 8 
dollars from the US. Third, perhaps more significant was the fact that this vote
abroad mechanism was implemented and entirely managed at the local level. Even 
the budget for this task has to be completely allocated by the state. Some might argue 
that absentee voting in local elections should be regulated at the national level by the 
federal electoral institute that might count not only with a greater budget but also 
more expertise and technical knowledge in the field (Interview with Yuri Beltran 
May 2007).
Nonetheless, One of the main obstacles for migrant voters remained, that is, the 
requirement to have a voting credential issued by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) 
as the only form of identification. Migrant leaders attribute the failure of initiatives 
like the Michoacano absentee voting system to attract a large number of voters to the 
fact that a large majority of Michoacano migrants do not have one (Truax 22 July 
2007; Delgado July 2007). The decision that voting credentials cannot be issued 
outside Mexican territory narrows the potential number of votes in Michoacan from 
the 1.06 million of Michoacano migrants living legally or illegally in the US to an 
estimated 200,000 according to figures from the LEE of Michoacan (interviews, State 
Electoral Institute, Morelia, July 2007). Of course, perhaps this number is 
overestimated as Michoacano migrants’ voting credentials have to be issued in an 
electoral district within Michoacan, otherwise migrants from this state are unable to 
cast an absentee vote for state governor. It has been mentioned that during the last 
presidential elections, Michoacano migrants applied for voting credentials in border 
cities or in Mexican states other than their places of origin, curtailing their chances to 
participate in the Michoacan’s local elections (Interview with Salvador Esparza 
August 2007). In addition, other logistical problems remained, for instance, the 
awareness campaign only took place a couple of months before the deadline for
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registration, as happened with the vote abroad campaign for president in 2006. We 
should bear in mind that the Michoacano vote abroad bill was also implemented at 
the very last moment when reforms could be made to the local electoral code ahead 
of local elections. It is not surprising, then, that such a small number of Michoacano 
migrants would participate in the elections. Unless a further reform allows the 
issuance of voting credentials abroad, logistical problems are tackled and an effective 
awareness campaign is in place, the number of Michoacano migrant voters is 
unlikely to increase in future governorship elections. However, the reversal of these 
policies and reform is also highly unlikely depending on the political composition of 
Michoacan’s government.
However, migrants’ electoral participation, I would argue, has also institutionalised 
other forms of cross-border political interaction such as the figure of the migrant 
candidate and migrant representation at the local congress. Migrants in political 
positions were already common in Michoacan prior to the approval of the local vote 
abroad bill. It is estimated that under Batel’s administration about 38 percent of 
municipal presidents had lived for a certain period of time in the US and in addition 
to the official migrant legislator Martinez Saldana other 5 PRD legislators have also 
lived and worked in the US for several years (fieldwork interviews, Summer 2006).
It was also mentioned in fieldwork interviews that, more often than not, Michoacano 
migrants’ first allegiance is with their migrant organisations, which have provided 
them a political platform to enter politics at home (Chicago, April 2008). By barring 
political campaigns abroad, the present local legislation on migrants’ political rights 
strengthens the power of migrant groups, which, as we have seen, negotiate with
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political parties both in the country of origin and reception to support migrant 
candidatures. According with fieldwork interviews, political parties’ chapters abroad 
still fail to attract enough migrant support (Chicago, April 2008). In this way, 
migrant groups, such as the FREBIMICH, serve as US based clubs for the rising 
transnational Michoacano elite by promoting the inclusion of their members in public 
office positions in both Mexico and the US.
It follows, then, that the transnationalisation of Michoacano politics has as a 
consequence the transformation of the Michoacano expatriate community into an 
extra-territorial constituency. By giving them the right to choose their government 
representatives, local political actors have to hear the voice of those Michoacano 
citizens living outside the country’s territory. As Martinez Saldana rightly asserted 
during his address when the local vote abroad bill was approved: ‘now we are 
creating the means to exert a real power, whilst participating as voters in the next 
election, necessarily obligating candidates and political parties to include in their 
political platforms and government proposals, issues that are important to the 
migrant population’. Especially, migrant politicians that have been elected to govern 
migration-stricken communities have the dual responsibility of representing and 
serving those at home and abroad. Those campaigning to become migrant legislators, 
a figure that is still not part of the Michoacano legislation, have the specific 
responsibility to represent, in particular, the interests of the Michoacano migrant 
population.
What we can conclude from this discussion is that the opening up of the local 
political system does not only extend political competition past the physical frontiers
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but also institutionalises the presence of new transnational political actors such as 
migrant groups that are better enabled than local political parties to represent a rising 
transnational political elite. Their competitive advantage is the use of networks to 
guarantee their presence in public positions which allows them to increase their 
political power within national and local circles but also mirror it in the United 
States. Although, it is only a minority that undertakes transnational political action, 
they have become the main promoters of regional integration. This analysis of 
Michoacano transnational politics, thus, seems to coincide with Guamizo’s view that 
frequent transnational political participation is only undertaken by a small minority 
of people who have benefited economically from migration (Guamizo, Portes et al. 
May 2003).
8.4. The determinants and consequences of the 
adoption of a migrants’ political rights bill at the sub­
national level
Mexico is currently the only Latin American country in which the political inclusion 
of its migrant population has also taken place at the sub-national level. The ‘Migrant 
Bill’ approved in Zacatecas in 2003 was a constitutional reform that changed the 
notion of residency and allowed Zacatecan migrants to run for elections and have 
parliamentary representation in the local congress. And in 2007, the local vote 
abroad in Michoacan reformed the local electoral code to grant migrants from this 
state the right to participate in governorship elections by absentee voting. This poses 
the question -  could we expect that more Mexican migrant-sending states adopt 
similar legislations? In order to answer this, we should first look at other Mexican 
states in which the necessary conditions for the approval of a migrants’ political
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rights bill have taken place, that is: 1) intense migration and high flow of 
remittances, 2) organisation of the migrant community and participation in public 
work projects in their regions of origin and 3) experience of party politics and in 
particular a centre-left PRD government and a significant PRD presence in the 
legislature. The matrix below (Figure 8.7) -  that only includes Mexican states that 
experience intense migration and receive a high flow of remittances -  shows what 
states fulfil these criteria49.
Figure 8.7 S e lected  m igrant-sending s ta te s  and  collective rem ittances-receivers in Mexico
Change of
government Nayarit(pRI)
Guerrero (PRD)
San Luis Potosi
Zacatecas (PRD)
Michoacan (PRD)
(PAN)
Jalisco (PAN) Aguascalientes (PAN)
No strong DF (PRD) 
presence of Guanajuato (PAN) Strong
I JS-hased presence of
migrant
organisations
Durango (PRI)
US-based
migrant
Oaxaca (PRI) organisations
Hidalgo (PRI)
Puebla (PRI)
Colima (PRI)
No change of
government
49 The migrant-sending states shown in Figure 8.7 were selected according to the following parameters (except 
for Mexico City): 1) states that experience ‘very high’ and ‘high’ emigration levels according to the migration 
index of CONAPO (sample from 2000 Mexican census); 2) main participant states in the ‘3X1’ programme 
according to SEDESOL (2008 data). The variable ‘strong presence of US-based migrant organisations’ has been 
defined according to data provided by the Institute of Mexicans Abroad (IME for its acronym in Spanish) and 
interviews carried out there in 2006. According to the IME the states with the highest number of hometown 
associations are: Zacatecas, Jalisco, Guerrero, Michoacan, Guanajuato, Puebla, Oaxaca, Nayarit and 
Aguascalientes.
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Own elaboration. Sources: (CONAPO, index of migration, 2000); (SEDESOL ‘3X1’ by state, 2007); (Institute of 
Mexicans Abroad, data and interviews, 2006)
Local political changes in Mexico are occurring fast, so is the collective organisation 
of migrants from other Mexican states. Thus, as economic integration and migratory 
movements continue, we would expect more Mexican migrant-sending states to 
move to the first quarter of this matrix. What we can predict is that it is more likely 
that the institutionalisation of migrants’ political participation would occur once the 
state undergoes a change of government and there is a strong presence of US-based 
migrant organisations in the political and economic life of the state. What we can 
observe in the figure above is that at the moment five migrant-sending states have 
experienced both a change of government and a strong involvement of US-based 
migrant organisations in community projects. It is in these states where the debate on 
migrants’ political participation has taken hold. In the PAN-govemed migrant state 
of Jalisco, for instance, migrant organisations from this state have recently made 
public their demand to have a migrant deputy in the local legislature (Partida 18 
September 2007).
However, as we have seen, it is in the PRD governed states of Zacatecas and 
Michoacan where migrants’ political rights legislations have been approved in the 
local congress. Most recently, in December 2007 an absentee voting system to elect 
the head of government (of the Federal District) was approved in Mexico City and 
will be implemented for the first time in the 2012 local elections (Notimex 2008; 
Vargas 2008). Mexico City, however, can be considered a special case as with a 
PRD government and an absolute majority in the legislative assembly (2006-2009
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period), it has become a scenario where most centre-left PRD proposals are tested. 
Why has this not occurred in Guerrero? Guerrero has a PRD government since 2005 
but does not hold an absolute majority in the local congress. In contrast to Michoacan 
and Zacatecas, Guerrero differs in two aspects. It is not a traditional migrant sending 
state, as it is only in the last decade that it has experienced increasing levels of 
migration (CONAPO, 2006). On the other hand, although it has an organised 
migrant community in the US, hometown associations from this state were created 
mainly in the 1990s, more than two decades after Michoacano and Zacatecan 
migrants had commenced to set up their own hometown associations in the US 
(fieldwork interviews, IME, 2006). Thus, migrant groups from Guerrero lack the 
degree of involvement in and exposure to governmental programmes such as the 
‘3X1’ over a long period of time. Furthermore, at the time of writing, a migrant 
lobby group has not yet been created that consistently lobbies for migrant’ political 
rights in Guerrero’s local congress. However, political involvement in home politics 
among migrants from Guerrero should not be underestimated. Thousands of 
migrants from this state showed their support for the PRD governor Zeferino 
Torreblanca Galindo in various US cities during his campaign in December 2004 ( 
December 30, 2004), when campaigning abroad was still not banned by the 2005 
electoral reforms, which demonstrates the existence of a strong migrant activity 
during Guerrero’s change of government.
8.5. Conclusion
As we have seen in this chapter, the case of Michoacan resembles Zacatecas both in 
terms of migratory activity to the US and local political environment. Michoacan,
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like Zacatecas counted on a highly organised migrant lobby such as the ‘Frente 
Binacional Michoacano whose members have frequently interacted with the PRD 
government for the implementation of public work projects under the matching funds 
programme. In addition to our main thesis other dynamics that took place in 
Zacatecas have been replicated in Michoacan. First, hometown associations from the 
same state unite to create a political arm whose aim is to lobby for migrants’ political 
participation in both countries -  whether advocating the passage of migrants’ rights 
bills in local congresses or supporting the candidature of migrants for elected 
positions. That was the case of the ‘Bi-national Michoacano Front’ (FREBIMICH) in 
Michoacan and the ‘Zacatecan Civic Front’ (FCZ) in Zacatecas and at the national 
level, the ‘Coalition for the Political Rights of Mexicans Abroad’ (CDPME). Second, 
migrant lobby groups have enough assembling power to attract media and public 
support from both sides of the border. That is illustrated by the several bi-national 
forums organised with the support from Mexican and American academic 
institutions to discuss the ‘Migrant Bill’ in Zacatecas, the local vote abroad bill in 
Michoacan, and the vote abroad bill for presidential elections. Thirdly, both local 
migrants’ political rights’ bills have been formulated by migrant rights activists and 
academics and were the product of bi-national collective action. As we have seen, the 
‘Migrant Bill’ in Zacatecas was elaborated by the migrants’ rights activist and 
academic Miguel Moctezuma Longoria, whereas the local vote abroad bill in 
Michoacan was authored by the migrant rights activist Gonzalo Badillo. In turn, both 
of them were members of the CDPME. Fourthly, a migrant public figure in the local 
political scenario has been the symbol of the local migrants’ political rights 
movement and has been able to trigger and keep alive the debate on migrants’ 
political inclusion. That was the case of Andres Bermudez, a migrant mayor in
Zacatecas, and Martinez Saldana, a PRD migrant legislator in the Michoacano 
congress. What we can conclude from both cases is that the migrants’ political rights 
movement is a grass-roots transnational movement authored by civil society groups 
on both sides of the border, but perhaps led by a handful of transnational political 
activists. However, it is worth noting that they were not able to mobilise voters in the 
abroad.
Despite the fact that the local vote abroad bill in Michoacan differs greatly from the 
Zacatecan migrants’ political rights formula, both reforms seem to transnationalise 
local politics through the inclusion of new political actors (migrant organisations and 
migrant candidates) and through lifting borders between constituencies at home and 
abroad. The reason, however, why the two formulas differed from one another was 
threefold. Firstly, the local context and constitutional rules impact the form of 
emigrant political participation. For instance, residency requirements and the 
cancellation of the victory of a migrant candidate in the municipal presidency 
elections of Jerez, led Zacatecan migrant groups to campaign for the 
institutionalisation of ‘bi-national residency’. On the other hand, Michoacan’s local 
constitution did not include residency requirements for local candidatures. Secondly, 
the timing of the legislative negotiations and the approval of the vote abroad bill for 
presidential elections has influenced the type of emigrant political participation 
advocated at the sub-national level. The Zacatecan ‘Migrant Law’ was a pioneer 
entitlement for emigrant political inclusion, whose supporters’ intentions pre-dated 
the federal negotiations on the migrant vote. On the other hand, the vote on the 
Michoacano bill was postponed at the local legislature as mainly the PAN party 
waited for a decision on the vote abroad initiative at the federal level. Michoacan’s
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local absentee voting system, thus, resembles in large part the vote abroad 
mechanism for presidential elections. Thirdly, the migrant lobby group was more 
consolidated during the negotiations of the vote abroad bill in Michoacan. In 
particular, this electoral bill satisfies the migrant lobby agenda of gradual migrant 
political rights -  the migrant lobby network has centred first on achieving voting 
rights before securing representation at the local legislatures. The approval of a 
similar vote abroad mechanism to elect the Head of Government in Mexico City in 
December 2007 proves this point.
This chapter further demonstrates that transnational political participation is only 
carried out by a handful of transnational political activists who are interested in 
challenging old social hierarchies and realigning power structures at home and 
eventually achieving more regional integration between Mexico and the US.
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Chapter 9
9. Determinants and implications of emigrant political 
participation in Mexico
This thesis is the first major study of the politics of Mexican migration to the US and 
the impact of emigrants’ electoral involvement in their home country’s affairs 
presented in political and institutional terms. My analysis has shown that the 
adoption of constitutional reforms and electoral norms that guarantee emigrants’ 
participation in domestic affairs has been the result of democratization and 
decentralization processes that have unfolded in the country in the past decades, as 
well as Mexico’s recent insertion in the global economy. These two events have, in 
turn, given place to the three main determinants for the approval of migrants’ 
political rights legislations at the national and sub-national levels. That is, a 
continuous inflow of family and collective remittances; the rise of political migrant 
groups that lobby for political rights and promote migrants’ political involvement at 
home; change of government and a centre-left PRD party that has favoured the 
implementation of migrants’ demands. Thus, the three migrant political rights’ bills 
that were analysed and compared in this thesis have been formulated, proposed and 
advocated by specific political migrant groups and civil society organisations and 
approved as the result of the formation of a cross-border political coalition between 
these groups and non-PRI political parties (mainly the centre-left PRD).
At the same time, the case of Mexico demonstrates that it is not so straightforward to 
re-include citizens abroad back into the domestic political sphere. Most of the
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migrant political rights’ bills approved by national and local legislatures in Mexico 
have been extremely limited and complicated, and their implementation has been 
hampered by the lack of support from electoral institutions and other domestic 
political actors, having as a result a minuscule number of citizens abroad availing 
themselves to these opportunities of political engagement at home. For instance, in 
the case of the federal absentee voting mechanism, less than half percent of Mexican 
emigres voted in the first presidential election carried out abroad in 2006. At the 
same time, the difficult implementation of electoral mechanisms for emigrant 
political participation creates new challenges to Mexico’s incipient democratic 
practice such as the insertion and growing influence of migrants and migrant 
organisations in domestic politics, the complexities of representing and being 
accountable to constituencies abroad and to a limited extent, the transformation of 
traditional political power structures especially in communities that experience high 
levels of emigration. In addition, institutionalised forms of emigrant political 
participation have often contravened previous constitutional and electoral rules 
making them, at times, subject to different interpretation. That is the case, for 
instance, of whether dual-nationals can run and occupy public office positions in 
Mexico.
Migrant political engagement in home country’s affairs also raises questions about 
whether this influences political participation in the country of reception. This is 
particularly important in the case of Mexico-US migration, as Mexican-Americans 
are one of the fastest growing electorate in the US; more than one million Latinos 
have registered to vote since 1996. Latinos are currently the majority in California 
and are expected to outnumber white Americans in Texas by 2008. However, as we
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have seen, it is not recent immigrants the ones that participate the most in political 
developments at home, but rather Mexicans that have lived in the US for longer, are 
more educated and have the financial means to engage in cross-border activities. For 
which, this study has supported transnational theories to international migration, that 
is, the belief that migrants are able to participate in social, economic and political 
activities in two polities, the country of origin and of reception without hampering 
their integration in the country of reception, in contrast to assimilation theories.
9.1. Determinants of formal emigrant political 
participation
The first scope of analysis addressed in the preceding chapters was how formal 
emigrant political participation was implemented in Mexico. I defined ‘formal 
electoral emigrant participation’ as institutionalised cross-border channels of political 
participation that focus on migrants’ right to vote or to be voted in their country or 
region of origin’. Research that addressed this first question revealed three important 
findings. First, how and when Mexico’s emigration policy shift took place and what 
were the factors that contributed to that. Secondly, the interconnection between 
migrant politics and local democratization processes in Mexico. And finally, the 
formation of novel migrant political groups that have been especially created to 
advocate the institutionalisation of migrant political participation in their country of 
origin and also of destination and support migrant candidatures for public office 
positions.
Mexican emigration policy shifted from mainly non-institutionalised initiatives that
focused on consular protection and the maintenance of Mexican culture and values
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among Mexican communities abroad which allowed, in the view of the state, to assist 
Mexicans in their temporary journeys to the neighbouring country to new state 
emigration policies implemented since 1988 with PRI’s Salinas’ administration. 
New emigration policies aim for the first time at incorporating those Mexicans 
abroad into the economic, social, cultural and increasingly the political life of the 
country without necessarily expecting them to return. This policy shift has converged 
with decisive economic and political national decisions, as well as a globalising and 
transnationalising international environment, in which advances in travel and media 
technologies have allowed people to be ever more connected challenging space and 
time barriers.
In particular, the case of Mexico shows that initial policies and programmes that 
facilitated Mexicans abroad to participate in social, cultural and economic aspects of 
their communities of origin were mainly the result of the last two PRI 
administrations’ agenda on economic liberalisation. For Salinas and Zedillo, a 
Mexican-American lobby abroad and migrants’ remittances were instrumental for 
Mexico’s insertion in the global economy, which included the adoption of the 
NAFTA. That was for instance some of the main motivations behind the dual 
nationality reform adopted in 1996. On the other hand, however, as I have argued, 
electoral and constitutional reforms that guarantee Mexican migrants’ political 
participation in domestic affairs have been mainly the direct result of democratic 
contestation and decentralisation processes. As we have seen, the precursor of 
migrants’ political rights was the modification to constitutional article 36 which 
allowed citizens to vote outside their electoral district, Mexican migrants could then 
vote but only if they returned to Mexico to do so. This was part of the 1996 political
reform, which was key to guarantee more transparent and fair elections in Mexico, 
which combined with unfavourable political conditions paved the way to change of 
government and the re-emergence of party competition in the country.
9.1.1.  Democratization and migrant politics
The empirical findings of the analysis of the extension of political rights to Mexicans 
abroad also add to the theory of democratization and in particular how 
democratization and decentralization processes have unfolded in the Mexican case. 
Indirectly, this thesis has shown that migrant politics has been part of Mexico’s 
democratization processes from the start. At the sub-national level, change of 
governments in migrant sending states have often been accompanied by US-based 
hometown associations’ fragmentation, the formation of support groups abroad, 
and/or mobilization among Mexican communities in the US. For instance, during 
the change of government in Zacatecas, two migrant groups were created by 
Zacatecans abroad -  a PRD-support committee (the Zacatecan Civic Front) and a 
PRI-support group ( ‘Zacatecanos PRImero’). In this regard, democratization at home 
has not only given migrants reasons to mobilize abroad, but also to increasingly 
value political participation in their country of origin. Thus, migrant lobby groups 
have taken advantage of the political openings, albeit limited, as well as processes of 
contestation that have resulted from Mexico’s unfinished democratic transition. In 
particular, the return of policy-making to the legislature(s), political decisions taken 
at the party level and political party fragmentation especially during internal 
elections (for the selection of party candidates) have been decisive for the 
institutionalisation of emigrant political participation. As we have seen, the vote
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abroad bill for presidential elections was approved as the result of the last minute 
support from the moderate wing of the PRI party. I have agued that at this stage of 
democratic transition in Mexico political parties do not necessarily act rationally 
according to their main interests.
9.1.2. Political migrant groups and cross-borders lobbying 
strategies
As I have demonstrated in the preceding chapters, migrant groups matter more than 
political party chapters abroad among Mexican migrant communities in the US, at 
least up to now. Although Mexico’s main political parties are expanding their 
structures to include party militants in the US, that is opening up chapters and 
committees in the main US cities with high concentration of Mexican nationals and 
including migrant militants in internal decision-making structures, their efforts are 
still at an embryonic stage. An important empirical finding is that specific migrant 
political groups are created with clear political goals addressed to the country or 
origin, that is, to advance migrant candidatures and advocate for political rights at the 
national and sub-national levels. Their presence and pressure has been decisive for 
the extension of political rights to Mexicans abroad. At the same time, political 
migrant groups serve as a bridge between migrants interested in participating 
politically in their country of origin and domestic political parties in Mexico that 
agree to formalise migrant candidatures.
Another significant characteristic of migrant lobby groups is their ability to carry out
cross-border strategies to gain domestic political actors’ support and win public
opinion both at home and among their migrant communities. Their transnational
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strategies consist first of a position of neutrality. The migrant lobby groups studied 
in this thesis, have either re-formulated themselves or funded as non-partisan in the 
first place and have been careful not to be publicly associated with any political 
party. Yet, they often got involved in negotiations and formed coalitions with local 
political parties behind closed doors. Secondly, migrant lobby groups have been 
successful at using the mainstream media in Mexico and the transnational media, that 
is Spanish-language local media published simultaneously on both sides of the 
border and often run by migrant leaders themselves, to win the support of the public 
in Mexico and their communities in the US.
One of the main questions raised was how were these migrant lobby groups 
constituted? The three groups studied (CPDPME at the national level, the FCZ in 
Zacatecas and the FREBIMICH in Michoacan) were in fact formed by well-known 
migrant leaders, some of whom were ex-presidents of hometown associations and 
federations, who had exposure to negotiations with government officials on 
collective remittances projects (under the ‘3X1 ’ programme). It was relevant that the 
majority of founders and leaders of these organisations were also long term residents 
in the US and some had already acquired American citizenship. Most importantly, 
most members of these migrant groups knew each other and often coordinated their 
activities according to what other migrant lobby groups planned in other Mexican 
states. Thus, we can conclude that migrant political rights in Mexico have been 
advanced by a network of a few transnational activists acting in diverse localities 
both in the US and in Mexico who also see it as a way to further integration between 
both countries. A finding that is consistent with earlier research on transnational
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practices among Latin American immigrants in the US (Itzigsohn, Dore Cabral et al. 
1999; Guamizo, Portes et al. 2003; Itzigsohn and Villacres 2008).
9.2. Implications of emigrant political engagement
Our second scope of analysis was to explore what were the main implications of 
migrant political rights’ legislations in Mexico. We should bear in mind that the three 
migrant political rights formulas analysed differed from one another. In particular, 
the shape and scope of a migrants’ political rights bill depend on the (local) context, 
the migrant lobby group’s strategy, as well as the degree of support from political 
parties and its level of significance for bi-national public opinion. Of the three 
migrant political rights’ bills analysed, two were electoral reforms that permitted 
emigrants to cast an absentee vote -  for president in the case of the national vote 
abroad bill and for governor in the case of Michoacan. The third was a local 
constitutional reform that allowed migrants from the state of Zacatecas to have 
special representation in the local congress (two migrants deputies) and allowed 
migrants to run for public office by implementing the new notion of ‘bi-national 
residency’ -  simultaneous residency in two different countries.
Although emigrant political participation is rapidly expanding at the sub-national 
level in Mexico -  in less than five years three migrant sending states have adopted 
some sort of migrant political rights and proposals have reached many other local 
legislatures -, their political influence is certainly very limited. Absentee vote abroad 
mechanisms in the Mexican case, specifically, have had a very low turnout. In the 
presidential elections carried out abroad only 33,111 people cast an absentee vote out
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of the estimated 4 million of Mexicans abroad that had an official voting ID (EFE 
figures, 2006). In the case of the local election in Michoacan to elect state governor, 
only 980 Michoacano migrants voted out of the estimated 1.06 million Michoacanos 
residing abroad (CONAPO, 2007). As we have seen, the main causes for such a 
small number of migrant votes were not only the restrictive character of the bills and 
their inefficient implementation, but also the lack of political will from electoral 
institutions to implement an efficient awareness campaign, as well as from the 
legislatures to approve timely and sufficient resources. What is more interesting is to 
identify who were ‘the new members of Mexican democracy’, that is, those people 
that engaged in cross-border electoral participation. Chapter five, in particular, has 
revealed that those Mexicans abroad that self-selected themselves to be part of this 
new experiment of absentee voting tend to be well educated, affluent migrants with 
longer periods of residence in the US. They do not necessarily engage in economic 
cross-border practices such as sending remittances home, but they keep aware about 
developments in Mexico by often telephoning kin and friends in their home country 
and following the news (social transnationalism). The demographic and socio­
economic profile of the migrant voter helps explain the lopsided results of absentee 
elections, in which the PAN candidate proved to be the favourite among Mexicans 
abroad, as income level and education are predictors of PAN support. It is worth 
noting, nonetheless, that mechanisms for migrant political participation are still at an 
early stage and more time is necessary to see whether migrants’ electoral 
participation increases over time, although legal modifications will be most likely 
required.
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On the other hand, however, the minuscule electoral results of Mexicans voting 
abroad has removed a potential threat to political parties as emigrant electoral 
participation does not seem to influence electoral results. At the same time, most bills 
that allow migrants’ electoral participation seem to curtail political parties’ activities 
abroad to a certain extent. In the case of Michoacan’s absentee vote system and the 
national vote abroad bill, political campaigns abroad, which as we have seen became 
increasingly common among Mexican candidates since the 1990’s, were forbidden. 
Once elected, however, Mexican politicians still make those unavoidable trips to visit 
their expatriate communities in the US. Financial support for domestic campaigns 
received from external sources has also been banned in some migrants’ rights 
legislations. However, as we have seen, migrant candidates often publicly refer to 
future investment opportunities available through their contacts with hometown 
associations and other US-based non governmental groups if they become elected.
9.2.1.  Ambiguities in Law and practice
Emigrant political participation legislation is particularly difficult to implement, not
only because it often conflicts with existing constitutional and electoral rules
bounded by a nation-state logic but also because it presents new challenges to the
practice of democratic citizenship. That was mainly observed in the case of the
‘Migrant Law’ in Zacatecas, which offers a more advanced formula of emigrant
political engagement and representation. In particular, two main problems were
identified, these are, what rights can be granted without interfering in the host
country’s sovereignty and secondly, what are the effects on the home country’s
political scenario. In regards to the former, the institutionalised intervention of
emigrants in domestic politics does not regulate the selection of emigrant candidates
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in the first place as it cannot enact any regulation that could have an impact beyond 
the national borders. On the other hand, I argued that one of the main implications of 
emigrant political participation on the domestic political scenario has been the 
transformation of political communities with high levels of emigration for three main 
reasons. First, emigrant political participation in the case of Zacatecas and to a lesser 
extent in Michoacan has opened up the political system to not only Mexican citizens 
abroad, but also to the migrant organisations that represent them. Migrant 
organisations are the main vehicles by which potential bi-national candidates are 
selected and then presented to political parties. Secondly, the insertion of these new 
political actors challenge, albeit only to a limited extent, old social hierarchies and 
political structures at home. Last but not least, the presence of migrants in public 
office and in representative positions in the local legislature (as in the case of 
Zacatecas) increasingly lifts borders between constituencies at home and abroad. 
That is because the distinction between local constituencies and natives living abroad 
becomes increasingly blurred.
At the same time, constitutional and electoral reforms that guarantee emigrant 
political participation tend to be extremely ambiguous. Although Mexico granted 
dual nationality rights in 1996, it has also restricted the participation of dual nationals 
in Mexico’s domestic affairs at least in print. Article 32 of the Mexican Constitution 
and the 1998 Law of Nationality ban dual nationals from occupying public office 
unless the second nationality is given up. However, in practice, dual nationals often 
run for public office or are invited by political parties to join their ‘plurinominal’ 
lists, as we have seen in our cases studies at the sub-national level. Even, in the case 
of Andres Bermudez, a Mexican and US national whose victory of the municipal
354
presidency of Jerez was revoked in 2001, the federal electoral court did not cancel 
his victory because of his dual nationality, but instead on the grounds that he did not 
comply with the residency requirements stipulated in the Zacatecan local constitution 
(prior to the 2003 reform). Emigrant political participation laws, thus, are often 
subject to changing interpretations, as, at times, local political actors do not want to 
appear as opponents to migrants’ or dual nationals’ participation in domestic politics.
9.3. The Mexican case in comparative perspective
The case of Mexico has not developed in isolation, as we have seen, the extension of 
political rights to citizens abroad has become a worldwide phenomenon in the past 
two decades (currently about 115 countries have granted voting rights to non-resident 
citizens (IDEA 2007)). Decoupling political participation from national territory has 
been especially significant in the Latin American region, where most countries have 
high proportions of their populations living outside their national borders and their 
national economies depend, to different degrees, on family remittances.
How does the case of Mexico differ from other countries in the region? To begin 
with, the main point of convergence is the context in which migrants’ political rights 
are implemented. Like Mexico, the majority of Latin American countries that have 
extended the franchise to nationals abroad or have adopted other forms of emigrant 
electoral participation are young democracies, which are, to some extent, integrated 
in the global economy50. Emigrant political participation goes hand in hand with
50 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Peru and Venezuela. In El Salvador, absentee voting rights exist but have not yet been implemented.
355
internal democratizing processes, as well as with the restructuring of the global 
economy in a similar way as other policies and programmes that sending countries 
have formulated in order to re-build and strengthen their relationship with their 
migrant communities. The fact that emigrant political rights are enshrined in 
constitutional and electoral laws reveal to what extent incipient democratic systems 
are adapting to the reality of international migratory movements in the long term 
(Gamlen 2008).
The main points of divergence, however, are the ways in which migrants’ political 
rights are implemented and the actors that are involved. I identify two main models 
in which the institutionalisation of emigrant political participation has taken place in 
Latin America. The first model applies to those countries in the region in which 
migrants’ political rights have been proposed and favoured by national governments 
without the involvement of migrant leaders or migrant groups abroad -  that is, 
government-led formal emigrant political participation. In particular, the expatriate 
population does not represent a challenge to the status quo either in terms of numbers 
or political activism, neither is this issue significant for public opinion. This group 
can be sub-divided, on the one hand, into those countries in which political rights 
have been extended to nationals abroad as a symbolic gesture and part of the state 
efforts to re-formulate the notion of the nation during democratic transitions such as 
the cases of Colombia and Argentina (Hazan 2001; Torres 2006; Margheritis 2007). 
On the other hand, some Latin American countries have extended political rights 
(mainly in the form of voting rights) to their emigrant communities as part of a 
regional and international trend. As we have seen in the opening chapter, migration 
organisations in the Latin American region (such as the South American Conference
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on Migration and the Regional Conference on Migration) have in the last few years 
adopted the view of an ‘enlarged citizenship’, which they see as the consequence of 
political rights being enjoyed in both the country of reception and of origin; a view 
that is also supported by the UN International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. Countries that fit in 
this category are the cases of Bolivia and Panama.
The second model comprises those countries in which migrants’ political 
participation in their home country’s affairs has been the result of cross-border 
coalition formations between political parties and migrant groups such as the case of 
Mexico. That has also been the case of Dominican Republic, Ecuador and El 
Salvador, even if in the latter, voting rights’ provisions have not yet been 
implemented. In particular, countries that fall in this group have experienced out­
migration for a long period time and their emigrant communities are well organised 
and with a proven record of involvement in their home country’s economic and 
political affairs. In addition, the issue of widening democracy to include non-resident 
citizens back in the political map has played significant importance for public 
opinion. As we have seen in the Mexican case, emigrants’ involvement in their home 
country’s and communities’ affairs only took place once the socio-economic profile 
of the Mexican community abroad commenced to change. As shown, most Mexican 
migrant leaders and activists were long-established residents in the US with 
economic and time resources to engage in cross-border political lobbying. At the 
same time, the rise of competitive politics in the sending country and the interest of 
‘opposition’ political parties in extending the franchise is a central factor. Despite the 
corporatist attitude of the PRI federal governments between 1988 and 2000 that
adopted policies and programmes to gain the loyalty of Mexican communities 
abroad, legal initiatives to grant migrants’ political participation remained curtailed 
and opposed by the PRI party (Goldring 2002). The migrants’ right to vote in 
domestic elections was proposed by the opposition centre-left PRD party during the 
1996 political reform and adopted as the party’s project since then. Similarly, in the 
case of the Dominican Republic, migrant activists maintained active links with the 
two main opposition parties, the Party of Dominican Liberation (Partido de la 
Liberation Dominicana -  PLD) and the Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido 
Revolucionario Dominicano -  PRD). Temporary coalitions formed between US- 
based migrant groups and the main political parties, as well as groups of returnees in 
the Dominican Republic (Itzigsohn and Villacres 2008). The precursor of migrants’ 
voting rights was the retention of nationality Law in the new 1994 constitution, 
however external voting rights were not put into practice until an electoral reform 
was approved in 1997 (Itzigsohn and Villacres 2008). Table 9.1 shows what routes 
Latin American countries have followed to extend political rights (mainly the right to 
vote) to their non-resident citizens.
Table 9.1 D eterm inants of em igrant political participation in Latin A m erica
Government-led Coalition formations 
Migrant groups/leaders and 
political parties
Argentina Mexico
Bolivia Dominican Republic
Brazil Ecuador
Colombia El Salvador
Honduras (Chile)
Nicaragua (Uruguay)
Panama
Peru
Venezuela
Own elaboration. *Legal provisions exist but have not been put into practice. In Chile and Uruguay migrants’ 
voting rights are still being discussed in the legislature.
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What makes the case of Mexico unique, however, is the scope of migrants’ political 
rights, which have been implemented both at the national and sub-national levels. 
This, I have argued, has been the result of decentralization processes that have taken 
place in the country in the last few decades. A clear example is the collective 
remittances matching programmes implemented in migrant sending states, which, as 
I have shown, have been a determinant for the increasing political leverage of 
migrant associations at the local level.
The effects of institutionalised forms of emigrant political participation in other Latin 
American countries also show some similarities with the Mexican case. Firstly, 
Latin American countries that have allowed their expatriate citizens to vote for 
national elections have generally experienced low voting turnout rates. For instance, 
the first vote abroad experience among Dominican expatriates in the 2004 
presidential election was as controversial and received the same amount of coverage 
as the Mexican absentee vote for the 2006 presidential race. Yet, only about 50,000 
Dominicans registered to vote abroad, which represented about one percent of the 
total expatriate population. The main reasons cited to explain such a low voting 
turnout abroad was emigrants’ lack of trust in electoral institutions and fear that their 
vote would be manipulated (Itzigsohn and Villacres 2008). Nonetheless, the 
Dominican experience has also shown that the migrant vote can indeed increase over 
time. For the 2008 election, the number of Dominican migrants registered to vote 
more than tripled and reached 155,000 (Junta Central Electoral- Republica 
Dominicana 2008).
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Importantly, the Mexican case also resembles cross-border political practices among 
migrants from El Salvador, the only Latin American country where a governmental 
collective remittances matching programme has also been put into practice -  4Unidos 
por la Solidaridad’ (United for Solidarity). As I have shown, the local emigrants’ 
political rights’ bills in Michoacan and Zacatecas have been partly the result of 
translocal political migrant groups’ activism. These political migrant groups were 
created by migrant leaders with long experience in hometown associations and 
participation in ‘3X1’ matching programmes. In the case of El Salvador, albeit 
formal local migrants’ political rights bills do not exist, scholars have recently 
illustrated how Salvadoran hometown associations’ involvement in public works in 
their communities of origin challenge local political elites and lead to the formation 
of more participatory institutions (Itzigsohn and Villacres 2008).
9.4. Contributions to the field and opportunities for 
further research
The novel empirical research presented in this thesis raises a number of significant
normative questions in an area that has been under-researched in political studies. By
showing how the Mexican state has gradually legitimized cross-border political
participation of its non-resident citizens by implementing constitutional and electoral
reforms, I demonstrate how sending countries have, if not permanently at least in the
lung-run, opened up their political systems. Understanding why this takes place and
what are the main consequences is of paramount importance as this phenomenon
challenges traditional concepts such as National territory’, 'citizenship practices’,
‘nation-state’ and the limits of democracy. Some of these normative and practical
questions are, for instance, how does international migration impact democratic
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developments in the country of origin? What are the determinants of migrants’ 
political participation at home? How does international migration impact the political 
behaviour of those that have stayed behind? What is the country of reception’s 
response to immigrants’ participation in their country of origin’s political 
developments? How can emigrant political participation be better regulated? Thus, 
the phenomenon of emigrant political participation provides opportunities for further 
research from many different disciplines and perspectives, such as political theory, 
political economy, public policy and political sociology.
In particular, this thesis has sought to advance the development of two specific areas, 
namely, the transnationalist approach to international migration and democratization 
studies. From the transnationalist perspective, this thesis proposes the study of 
institutionalised or formal forms of emigrant electoral participation, as different from 
informal forms of migrants’ cross-border political practices that have been mostly 
emphasised by earlier research in this field. From the democratization viewpoint, this 
thesis has proposed to view the extension of political rights to citizens abroad as an 
intrinsic part of recent democratization movements in migrant-sending countries, 
especially in the Latin American region.
The analysis presented raises the comparative enquiry of whether migrant politics 
have had similar effects in other Latin American countries and suggests analytic 
directions for future research. First, this work can be complemented by also 
including the perspective of the country of reception. What is the reception 
country’s position regarding immigrants’ participation in the political developments 
in their countries of origin? What actors are in favour and which oppose it and on
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what grounds? Secondly, the Mexican case could be enriched by a comparative study 
with other countries in which government-sponsored collective remittances 
programmes take place such as El Salvador.
International migratory movements create ambiguities on who gets to participate in 
domestic political affairs and from where. In particular, it raises the question of 
whose responsibility is it to ensure migrants’ political participation, the state of 
origin or of residency? In contrast to individual human rights, whose universalistic 
nature supersede national legislation (Soysal 1994), political rights, on the other 
hand, as the maximum expression of membership to a nation-state, depend ultimately 
on the approval of national governments. Emigrant electoral participation in the 
home country’s domestic politics goes hand in hand with democratization processes 
and the adoption of an open economy that are experiencing an increasing number of 
sending countries. As these tendencies deepen and expand to other sending countries 
and regions, we will expect more people that have engaged in migratory movements 
to be able to participate in elections at home, for instance, by casting an absentee 
vote, having parliamentary representation or being able to run for public office in 
their country of origin without having to fulfil any residency requirements. 
International migration, thus, transforms how domestic politics are practiced and 
understood.
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Appendices
Annex 1. Government institutions, political parties, and migrant organisations in 
which unstructured interviews were conducted
Selected interviews conducted in Mexico City in 2005/2006
Government institutions
Federal Electoral Institute, Coordination of the Vote Abroad (1FE-COVE)
Ballados, Patricio. Coordinator of the COVE
Beltran, Yuri. Advisor
Palma Rangel, Manuel. Director of Planning
Polanco Gomez, Ana Maria. Sub-director of Outreach and Promotion 
Lopez Margalli, Patricio. Sub-director of Postal Logistics and Follow-up 
Sanchez Seabrook, Susana. Chief of the Department of Promotion and Outreach 
Support
Institute of Mexicans Abroad
Morales Rosas, Candido. Director 
Gonzalez Gutierrez, Carlos. Executive Director 
Medina Mora, Luisa. Director of Attention to Advisors 
Flores Diaz, Margarita. Sub-director of Attention to Advisors
National Institute of Migration, Coordination of Migratory Studies
Rodriguez Chavez, Ernesto. Director
Calleros Alarcon, Juan Carlos. Advisor and researcher
Cortez Perez, Daniel. Legal studies
Ministry of Social Affairs (SEDESOL)
Mejia Guzman, Luis. Sub-minister of Social and Human Development 
Palafox Palafox, German. Chief of the Micro-regions Unit
Legislators in the Senate and the Lower Chamber 
Senators
Ortega Martinez, Jesus. PRD 
Luebbert Gutierrez, Oscar. PRI
Rios Alvarez, Serafm. PAN, Michoacan representative and Rodrigo Franco his 
adviser
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Max Jones Jones, Jeffrey. PAN 
Hernandez, Silvia. PRI 
Cardenas, Raymundo. PRD
Borrego Strada, Genaro. PRI, but later he switched to the PAN party 
Corral Jurado, Javier. PAN
Federal deputies
Chauyffet Chemur, Emilio. Coordinator of the PRI parliamentary group 
Guajardo Anzaldia, Juan Antonio 
Ramirez Badillo, Emilio. PRI
Fernandez Caracho, Jaime. PRI and Francisco Gonzales his adviser
Hernandez Martinez, Ruth Trinidad. PAN
Aviles Najera, Rosa Maria. PRD
Mora Cipres, Francisco
Rodriguez Rocha, Ricardo. PRI
Torres, Enrique. PRD
Alejo Lopez Nunez, Pablo. PAN
Molinar Horcadita, Juan. PAN
Trejo Reyes, Jose Isabel. Representative for Zacatecas
Gonzalez Carrillo, Adriana. PAN
Garcia Ochoa, Juan Jose. PAN
Zebadua, Emilio. PRD but then he joined ‘Nueva Alianza’
Espinoza Perez, Luis Eduardo. PRD
Gomez Alvarez, Pablo. Coordinator of the PRD parliamentary group 
Hernandez Perez, David. PRI 
Cortez Jimenez, Rodrigo Ivan. PAN
Migrant groups
Coalition for the Rights of Mexicans Abroad (CPDPME) 
Rodriguez, Primitivo
Ross, Raul (also interviewed in Chicago in April 2008)
Calderon, Leticia
Olamedi, Carlos
Badillo, Gonzalo
Martinez, Jesus
Pelayo, Luis
Selected interviews conducted in Zacatecas and Los Angeles in 2006 and 2007
Legislators
Pinto Nunez, Carlos. PRD 
Cabral Banuelos, Ramon. PR 
De la Cruz Ramirez, Manuel. PRD
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1Bi-national '  municipal presidents
Carvajal, Martin. Municipal president of Apulco and his main advisers 
Bermudez Viramontes, Andres. Former municipal president of Jerez and currently 
PAN federal deputy and President of the Commission on Migratory Issues.
Migrant groups
Zacatecan Civic Front (FCZ)
Moctezuma Longoria, Miguel.
Gomez, Guadalupe 
Gonzalez, Francisco Javier
Federation of Zacatecan Clubs of Southern California
Hurtado, Rafael. Current president 
Gomez, Guadalupe. Former president.
Reyes Mendez, Armando. Vice-president of ‘Vanguardia Migrante’ in Mid West
Other interviews were carried out with members o f the academia
Garcia Zamora, Rodolfo 
Delgado Wise, Raul
Selected interviews carried out in Michoacan in 2007 and in Chicago in 2008
Government institutions 
Institute of Michoacans Abroad 
Reynoso Acosta, Eneida and assistants 
State Electoral Institute 
Esparza, Salvador 
Migrant groups
Binational Michocano Front (FREBIMICH)
Badillo Moreno, Gonzalo 
Gutierrez, Jose Luis
Martinez Saldana. Also PRD local deputy.
Federation de Clubes Michoacanos en Illinois
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Chavez, Ruben. Presidente (Chicago, 2008)
Asociacion de Clubes Michoacanos en Illinois (ACMMI)
Estrada, Jesus. Presidente. (Chicago, 2008)
Other interviews cited:
Martinez, Erasmo Roberto. Mexican Mission to the UN agencies and the Human 
Rights Council in Geneva, 12 March 2005
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A nnex 2. Descriptive statistics on M exico-US migration over history
Figure 1. Population of Mexican-origin residing in the US from 1900 to 2007 by ‘M exican-born’ and 
‘second and third generation of M exican-origin’
M exican-origin population  resid ing in the US betw een  1900 and  2007
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Table 1. Mexican-origin population residing in the US (1900-2007)
M exican-orig in  population  resid in g  in the U S betw een  1900 and 2007 (in thousands)
Year Total
M exican-origin
M exican-
born
M exican- 
origin 
(second and 
third 
generation)
Second and third 
generation
Second
generation
Third
generation
1900 463 103 360 — —
1910 718 222 496 — —
1920 1 210 480 730 — —
1930 1 729 640 1 089 — —
1940 1 904 377 1 527 — —
1950 2 573 451 2 122 — —
1960 3 671 576 3 095 — —
1970 5 422 788 4 634 — —
1980 9 071 2 199 6 872 — —
1990 14 094 4 447 9 647 — —
2000 23 208 8 072 14 428 7 029 7 398
2001 23 997 8 494 14 855 7 303 7 552
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2002 25 487 9 900 15 983 8 151 7 832
2003 26 663 10 237 16 797 8 116 8 681
2004 26 871 10 740 16 641 8 302 8 339
2005 28 059 11 027 17 465 8 650 8 815
2006 29 307 11 132 18 175 9 204 8 971
2007 30 266 11 812 18 454 9 632 8 823
Source: CONAPO 2008. From 1900 to 1990 based on: Corona Vazquez, Rodolfo. Estimate of Mexican-origin 
population that resides in the US, Colegio de la Frontera Norte, November 1992. From 2000 to 2007 based on: 
Estimates from the CONAPO based on Bureau of Census, Current Population Survey (CPS), March, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2003, 2004,2005, 2006 y 2007.
Table 2. Characteristics of the working Mexican-born population in the US (by gender)
Mexican-born population of over 15 years old residing in the US by labour characteristics and
gender (2007)
Labour characteristics Total
Gender 
Men Women
10,946,36 6,153,02 4,793,34
Working status 2 3
5,387,02
0
2,275,83
Economically active population 7,662,853 0
5,111,17
2
2,130,09
Working 7,241,266 4 3
Unemployed 421,586 275,847 145,740
2,517,50
Economically inactive population 3,283,510 766,002 8
Working status (percentage) 100 100 100
Economically active population 70 88 47
Working 66 83 44
Unemployed 4 4 3
Economically active population 30 12 53
Working hours per week 100 100 100
34 or less 10 5 24
From 35 to 44 hours 75 78 67
45 or more 14 16 9
Average working hours per week 40 41 37
Type of work 100 100 100
Paid work 94 94 94
Other 6 6 6
Annual salary in dollars 100 100 100
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Less than 10 000 11 7 20
From 10 000 to 19 999 34 32 40
From 20 000 to 29 999 28 29 23
From 30 000 to 39 999 14 16 8
From 40 OOOor more 13 15 8
Average annual salary in dollars 24,270 26,265 19,237
Number of employees 100 100 100
Less than 10 people 27 28 23
From 10 to 24 personas 17 19 11
From 25 to 99 people 17 18 15
From 100 to 499 people 14 13 15
From 500 to 999 people 4 4 4
From 1 000 people or more 22 18 32
Type of economic activity 100 100 100
Primary sector 4 5 2
Secondary sector 41 50 18
Third sector 55 45 80
Type of job 100 100 100
Professional occupation 7 6 11
Job in services, sales and administration 15 8 31
Cleaning and preparation of food products 23 20 32
Agriculture, fishing 4 5 2
Construction, maintenance and repairing 28 39 2
Transport and production 23 23 21
Extraction 0 0 0
Source: CONAPO, Table III.3.4, 2007
Table 3. Main destinations in the US
Rating of main US states where Mexican- 
born immigrants reside (in absolute numbers)
State of residence in the 
US
Mexican
population
California 4,319,797
Texas 2,311,450
Illinois 715,174
Arizona 593,954
Florida 289,455
Georgia 274,331
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Colorado 245,161
North Carolina 228,256
Nevada 201,212
New York 196,961
Washington 196,284
Oregon 147,988
New Mexico 119,651
Utah 94,923
New Jersey 91,654
Indiana 83,804
Michigan 83,038
Oklahoma 77,331
Wisconsin 76,149
Kansas 69,291
Tennessee 62,972
Minnesota 62,623
South Carolina 58,179
Virginia 55,715
Idaho 54,111
Arkansas 50,601
Pennsylvania 47,063
Missouri 42,546
Iowa 40,728
Ohio 40,728
Nebraska 39,633
Alabama 36,101
Maryland 34,272
Kentucky 24,712
Connecticut 18,572
Delaware 15,937
Mississippi 14,686
Louisiana 13,536
Wyoming 5,971
District of Colombia 3,492
South Dakota 2,581
Alaska 2,412
Virginia 1,851
Montana 1,278
Source: CONAPO, Table m.1.3, 2007
A nnex 3. Family remittances
Figure 1. Average remittance value by type o f transference (2007)
Average remittance sen t to Mexico (in US dollars)
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Figure 2.
Type of remittances sent to Mexico in 2007 (in millon dollars)
a Electronic Transferences 
■ Money Orders
□  Personal Cheques
□  Cash
Source: Bank of Mexico, 2008
Table 1.
Type o f  remittances sent to M exico
Concept Annual January-September Variation Variation
2007
2007 2008 Relative Relative
(A) (B) 2007 (B/A)
Total
Remittances (in 
m illion US 
dollars) 23,969.53 18,198.26 17,525.67 0.96 -3.7
Electronic
Transferences 22,715.38 17,234.68 16,744.83 3.11 -2.84
M oney Orders 859.67 685.86 464.77 -36.78 -32.24
Personal
Cheques 0 0 0 N/E N/E
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Cash 394 .48 277.73 316 .07 11.7 13.81
Num ber o f  total 
rem ittances (in 
m illions) 68 .78 51 .76 50 .19 1.3 -3 .04
Electronic
Transferences 66.41 49.95 48 .56 3.11 -2 .78
M oney Orders 1.59 1.26 1.06 -44.25 -15.65
Personal
Cheques 0 0 0 N /E N/E
Cash 0.78 0.56 0.57 21.71 1.97
Average
Rem ittance (in 
U S dollars) 348.51 351 .57 349.21 -0 .34 -0 .67
Electronic
Transference 342.05 345 .04 344 .83 0 -0 .06
M oney Orders 542 .08 545.33 438.11 13.41 -19.66
Personal Cheque 0 0 0 N /E N/E
Cash 504 .63 499 .9 557 .96 -8 .22 11.61
Source: Bank of Mexico, 2008
Table 2.
Fam ily rem ittances received by state in  
2007 (in m illion dollars)
M exican states
Rem ittances
received
M ichoacan 2262 .7
Guanajuato 2142 .2
Estado de M exico 2022 .4
Jalisco 1937.1
Puebla 1495.3
Veracruz 1473.3
Distrito Federal 1371.5
O axaca 1271.8
Guerrero 1239.1
H idalgo 9 5 2 .2
Chiapas 7 7 9 .4
San Luis Potosi 669.1
Zacatecas 595 .6
M orelos 5 8 1 .2
Sinaloa 4 9 5 .4
Tamaulipas 488 .3
Queretaro 436.1
Chihuahua 4 2 6 .3
Durango 399.5
Nayarit 349 .3
N uevo Leon 349.1
A guascalientes 338 .8
Baja California 332 .5
Sonora 330 .8
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T laxcala 282
Coahuila 281 .7
C olim a 186.8
Tabasco 164.3
Yucatan 124.4
Quintana Roo 95.3
Cam peche 64 .8
Baja California Sur 31.5
Total 23969 .8
Source: Bank of Mexico, 2008
Annex 4. Collective remittances through ‘3X1’ programme (information compiled 
during interviews and data provided by SEDESOL in 2006 and 2008)
Objectives o f the ‘3X1 ' programme
The ‘3X1’ programme is a federal government’s response to migrants’ demands to 
carry out community projects, adding the participation of the three levels of 
government, as well the clubs and federation of migrants.
a. to channel collective remittances for social projects
b. to benefit communities of origin directly, many highly marginalized and poor
c. to promote and strengthen the creation of Mexican clubs settled in the US
d. to increase the interaction between society and government
e. to create migrants’ identity bonds with their communities in Mexico and the 
country
Requirements for eligibility 
Projects that:
1. respond to initiatives of groups and organisations settled abroad
2. that have the financial participation of migrant groups or organisations and 
the three levels of government
3. that contribute to solve shortages in basic infrastructure and services, as well 
as how to generate more jobs and income for the population
Types o f projects:
a. drinking water, drainage, and electrification
b. Paving and construction of roads
c. Education, sports and health infrastructure
d. Streets and roads
e. Community productive projects
f. Community centres
Types o f project financing
1. Normally SEDESOL give 25%, migrants 25% and the state and municipality 
governments give 50%
2. SEDESOL con give a maximum amount of 800,000 pesos per project
3. In 2008, the rules of operation allow financing 1X1 (SEDESOL-Migrants) 
when migrants do not have state or municipal support
4. Also, ‘4X1’ and ‘5X1’ schemes can be implemented when other federal 
institutions or private sector companies participate
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Statistics
27 state participants: Aguascalientes, Campeche, Colima, Chiapas, Chihuahua, 
Durango, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Jalisco, Oaxaca, Puebla, Queretaro, 
Quintana Roo, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, Mexico, Michoacan, Morelos, Nayarit, 
Nuevo Leon, Sonora, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, Yucatan, Zacatecas.
Table 1.
E valuation according to main indicators
Indicators Description
Results (in 
percentage)
Rate o f  approval
Number o f  approved projects 
(1 0 72)/ number o f  projects 
presented (1222) 87.70%
Percentage o f  social infrastructure projects
Social infrastructure projects 
(7 94)/ total o f  approved  
projects (1072) 74.10%
R esources used in localities o f  high or very  
high m arginalization
Federal budget applied to  
localities w ith high or very 
high m arginalization  
(39.7)/Federal budget in the 
programme (479 .6) 8.30%
Table 2.
Participants o f  '3X1' programmes (2002-2007)
200 2 2 0 0 3 200 4 2005 200 6 2007
Projects 942 899 1436 1691 1274 1613
M unicipalities that participate 247 257 383 425 417 443
M exican states that participate 20 18 23 26 26 27
M igrant groups that participate 20 200 527 815 723 857
U S states o f  residence 8 17 31 35 34 37
Table 3.
B udget in m illion  dollars (10  p eso s= l dollar)
2002 2003 200 4 2005 2006 2007
Federal (assigned to '3X1' projects) 11.37 9 .99 17.59 23.21 19.2 25.77
State, M unicipality and Migrants 26.65 27 .77 46 .18 61.97 55 .69 69.08
Table 4. T ypes o f  projects im plem ented with '3X1' funding (2002-2007)
T y p es o f  p rojects 200 2 200 3 2 0 0 4  20 0 5  20 0 6 2007
Drinking water, drainage, and electrification 226 274 547 4 4 0  236 376
Roads and streets 67 57 83 100 58 77
Health, Education and Sports 190 113 114 151 122 186
Urbanization and Paving 276 282 477 591 45 2 623
Scholarships '3X1' 0 0 0 15 25 66
Com m unity centres 127 143 160 298 317 220
Productive projects 40 22 53 77 45 50
Other 16 8 2 19 19 5
T ota l 294 4 2902 344 0  3696  3280 3610
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Annex 5. COVE survey questionnaire (translated into English)
Sample size: 580 people (2.96% response rate) 
People that received the questionnaire: 19,571 
Date: December 2006
Gender groups
Female (42%)
Male (55%)
Age groups
20-24 4%
20-25 20%
30-34 26%
35-39 18%
40-44 13%
45-49 7%
50-54 5%
55-59 2%
60-64 1%
65 or more
Questions:
1. How did you find out you could vote for the presidential elections in 
Mexico abroad this year?
• TV ad (29%)
• News (25%)
• Internet (12%)
• Print media (12%)
• Friends and family in Mexico (11%)
• Embassy or consulate (8%)
• Friends and family (7%)
• Radio ad (2%)
• Don’t know. Don’t remember (2%)
• Other (3%)
2. The time you had since you found out you could vote and apply for 
registration, was it enough? You had time but not enough? Or you did 
not have time at all to carry out the process?
• Enough time (73%)
• Not much (13%)
• Not enough (14%)
• Don’t know; don’t remember (1 %)
3. How did you obtain the application to be able to vote?
• On Internet (59%)
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• In paper (39%)
• Don’t know (2%)
4. If in paper, where did you get it from?
• Consulate (17%)
• Mexican embassy (5%)
• By mail (4%)
• Airport (4%)
• In a store (2%)
• You sent it to me (1%)
• Home address (1%)
• Mexican shop (1%)
• Other (6%)
5. If in paper, how easy was to get it?
• Very easy (28%)
• Not very easy (7%)
• A bit difficult (4%)
• Very difficult (1%)
6. What conditions they set for you to get it?
• None (32%)
• Don’t know; don’t remember (7%)
7. If by Internet, How easy was to navigate in the webpage?
• Very easy (36%)
• Not very easy (16%)
• A bit difficult (5%)
• Very difficult (1%)
• Don’t know, depends (1%)
8. When you found the webpage, how easy was it to find the 
application?
• Very easy (37%)
• Not very easy (17%)
• A bit hard (6%)
• Very difficult (1 %)
• Don’t know, depends (1%)
9. Together with your application you were given a booklet with 
instructions on how to fill it in and send it. You, personally, did you 
think that the booklet was clear in the instructions or not?
• Yes (77%)
• In some cases, in others not (14%)
• Not (4%)
• Did not receive any instructive (2%)
• Don’t know; don’t remember (1 %)
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10. Did the booklet have complete instructions? Or were there some 
missing?
• Full instructions (80%)
• Some things missing (11%)
• Don’t know; don’t remember (5%)
11. About the required documentation for you to vote. Did you have your 
voting credential with photograph before or had you to process one 
for this election?
• Yes, I had it with me here (93%)
• I had to process it (2%)
• Yes, but in Mexico (3%)
12. About your proof of address. Did you have the proof of address or did 
you have to process it?
• Yes, I had it (90%)
• I had to process it (8%)
• Don’t know, don’t remember 2%)
13. About sending your application by certified post (registered). Are the 
Post Offices accessible and easily found?
• Yes, they are accessible (80%)
• No, they are not and they are not easily recognized (6%)
• Yes, they are accessible but not easily recognized (5%)
• Yes, they are easily recognized but not accessible (4%)
• Don’t know, depends (3%)
14. What did you think about the cost of sending the application by 
registered post: Accessible, not very accessible, or expensive?
• Accessible (43%)
• Not very accessible (21%)
• Expensive (29%)
• Don’t know. Don’t remember (5%)
15. Did you receive any notification from the Federal Electoral Institute 
(lFE) about problems with your application because your 
documentation was incomplete?
• No (67%)
• Yes (31%)
• Don’t know; don’t remember (1 %)
16. If you received a notification. What was the problem?
• Sending application by ordinary post (16%)
• A signature was missing on the copy of the voting credential 
(3%)
• Proof of address was not valid/ not accepted (2%)
• Proof of address was missing (1%)
• A copy of the voting credential was missing (1%)
• Application was not signed (1%)
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• Other (7%)
17. If you received a notification. After the notification, could you 
reinstate your application or not?
• Not (21%)
• Yes (10%)
18. Did you receive your Electoral Postal Package (PEP) with all the 
necessary to be able to cast a vote from where you reside? (Only the 
ones that could reinstate their application)
• Yes (8%0
• No (2%)
19. Did you send your vote by post to Mexico? (Only the ones that could 
reinstate their application)
• Yes (9%)
• No (1%)
20. If you could not reinstate your application. Why were you not 
successful at reinstating your application?
• The deadline had passed (10%)
• Other (2%)
21. If you could not reinstate your application. Why did you not try to 
reinstate it?
• Lack of time (7%)
• Other (2%)
22. Did you receive any notification from the IFE saying that you could 
not be registered to vote?
• No (72%)
• Yes (22%)
23. If you received a notification. What was the problem?
• Ordinary post (9%)
• My details were wrong (1%)
• The application was received after the deadline (4%)
• Other (5%)
24. Were you requested to change some details in the application?
• No (15%)
• Yes (6%)
25. If you were requested to correct your details. After that, were you 
able to register?
• No (5%)
• Yes (1%)
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26. The 1Tb sent a package called PEP (Electoral Postal Package) that 
included a ballot and other materials and about that we will ask you a 
few questions. Did you receive the PEP at your home address or did 
you pick it up at a Post Office?
• At home address (49%)
• From a Post Office (25%)
• I did not receive the PEP (20%)
• Other (1%)
27. If you received the PEP, When did you receive it?
• Before 1 June (32%)
• Between 2 and 7 June (5%)
• Between 8 and 22 June (4%)
• After 23 June (3%)
• Don’t know; don’t remember (30%)
28. The time you had to check the contents of the package, to reflect your 
vote and to send it, was it enough?, enough but a bit tight?, or not 
enough? (the ones that received the PEP)
• It was enough (62%)
• Not enough (2%)
• Enough, but a bit tight (9%)
29. To find out whether the PEP arrived complete, select the material that 
had the package that you received.
• Ballot (419)
• Envelop to send it to Mexico (422)
• Instructions on how to vote abroad (420)
• International response coupons or stamps for postage (375)
• Booklet and CDs or DVDs with information about political 
parties and candidates (413)
• CDs or DVDs with candidates’ videos or audios (407)
• Commemorative bracelet (346)
30. Was the PEP’s booklet with instructions on how to vote clear?(only 
the ones that received the PEP)
• Yes (68%)
• Some thins, others not (4%)
• Not (1%)
31. Was the information about the parties and candidates clear? (only the 
ones that received the PEP)
• Yes (58%)
• No (3%)
• Some things, others not (11%)
• No, I did not receive any information about political parties 
and candidates (1%)
• Don’t know; don’t remember (1 %)
32. Do you think that the information about political parties and 
candidates was enough or not? (only the ones that received the PEP)
• Yes (38%)
• No (18%)
• Some things, others not (16%)
• Don’t know. Don’t remember (1%)
33. To what extent did the information contained in the booklets, CDs or 
DVDs influence you vote? (only the ones that received the PEP)
• It did not influence it (38%)
• Influenced it, but not much (24%)
• Influenced it very much (24%)
34. At the moment in which you crossed the ballot, were you alone or 
accompanied? (only the ones that received the PEP)
• Alone (62%)
• Accompanied (9% -- Family 8%, Friends 1%)
35. Was the prepay that the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) gave you 
enough to be able to post the vote? (only the ones that received the 
PEP)
• Yes (61%)
• Not enough, but in the end I could send it (9%)
• Don’t know, depends (2%)
36. In the case of the coupons. Did you have any problem for their use or 
exchange?
• Didn’t have any problem (25%)
• Had problems in their use and exchange (2%)
• Had problems only in their use (1 %)
• Had problems only in their exchange (1 %)
37. Were you asked for any sort of payment? (only the ones that received 
the PEP)
• No (54%)
• Yes (12%)
• Don’t know; don’t remember (3%)
38. Did you try to communicate with the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) 
at some stage in the process?
• Yes (28%)
• No (61%)
• Yes, but it was not possible (8%)
39. By what means did you try to communicate? (only those that did try 
to communicate)
• Telephone (15%)
• E-mail (6%)
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• Website (www.MxVote06.org) (6%)
• Other (1%)
40. Why did you try to communicate?
• Clarifications about the process (9%)
• Doubts about the registry (4%)
• Doubts about some stage in the process (3%)
• Doubts about posting the vote (2%)
• Information about voting credentials (where and how to 
obtain it) (1%)
41. How adequate was the response according to what you requested? 
(only those that tried to communicate)
• Not very adequate (10%)
• Very adequate (13%)
• Adequate, but not much (5%)
42. To what extent did the response received clarified your doubt? (only 
those that tried to communicate)
• Clarified completely my doubt (12%)
• Clarified my doubt but not completely (5%)
• Did not clarify my doubt (7%)
43. Talking about the awareness campaign of the vote abroad, please tell 
me, were did you see or listen publicity related?
• Television (78%)
• Print media (39%)
• Radio (32%)
• Embassy/ Consulate (19%)
• Establishments (7%)
• Football stadiums (2%)
• Other (7%)
• Didn’t see any ad (12%)
44. About the publicity material that you saw or listened to, please tell 
me, what was it that those messages tried to tell you?
• Deliver the news that I could vote abroad (81 %)
• Explain what I had to do in order to vote abroad (37%)
• Explain where you could get more information (33%)
• Other (1%)
45. How much did these messages motivate you to participate in order to 
vote from abroad?
• They motivated me a lot (42%)
• They motivated me, but not much (35%)
• They did not motivate me (8%)
• Don’t know. Don’t remember (2%)
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46. Did you ever visit the webpage (www.MxVote06.org)? Could you get 
information about all the stages in the process or not?
• Yes (61%)
• No (36%)
47. Was the webpage useful or not? (only those that visited the page)
• Yes (48%)
• No (7%)
• Sometimes, others not (12%)
48. How many times did you visit it? (only those that visited the page)
• Between 1 and 3 times (42%)
• Between 4 and 7 (15%)
• More than 7 times (6%)
49. Did you ever call the free number IFETEL (l-86-MxVote06) to 
clarify any doubts about the process?
• Yes (29%)
• No (63%)
50. Was this number useful or not? (only those that called)
• Yes (17%)
• No (9%)
• Sometimes, others not (6%)
51. How many times did you call approximately? (only those that called)
• Between 1 and 3 times (22%)
• Between 4 and 7 times (5%)
• More than 7 times (2%)
52. When you called, were the instructions easy or complicated? (only 
those that called)
• Easy (18%)
• Complicated (5%)
• Not easy, not complicated (6%)
53. On average, how many times have you called Mexico in the last 
month?
• Between 1 and 4 times (28%)
• Between 5 and 10 (29%)
• More than 10 (36%)
• Have not called (4%)
54. On average, how many times have you sent money to Mexico in the 
last three months?
• Between 1 and 4 times (31%)
• Between 5 and 10(11%)
• More than 10 (6%)
• Have not sent (49%)
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55. How many times have you been to the consulate in the last year?
• Between 1 and 3 times (45%)
• Between 4 and 8 (5%)
• More than 8 (2%)
• Have not been at all (45%)
56. Do you belong to any organisation of Mexicans here where you 
reside?
• Yes (19%)
• No (78%)
57. Do you read any newspaper or magazine to be aware about what is 
happening in Mexico or not?
• Yes (88%)
• No (10%)
58. You, personally, how interested are you in Mexican politics?
• Very interested (82%)
• Interested, but not much (16%)
59. As far as you know or from the comments that you have heard, what 
do you think were the main problems that led other Mexicans to 
decide not to vote from abroad? Choose one, what do you think is the 
most important.
• Not having a voting credential (32%)
• They found out late or did not find out (20%)
• Complicated process (15%)
• They did not want to give their details for fear to the ‘migra ’ 
(border police) (13%)
• They simply did not want to vote (13%)
• Don’t know, depends (5%)
60. In your opinion, what was the most complicated process to vote from 
abroad?
• Have or obtain a voting credential (28%)
• Having to send the application by registered vote (24%)
• Meet the requirements (12%)
• Get an application (8%)
• Pay for the postage (5%)
• Send the vote (2%)
• Fill in the application (2%)
• Don’t know, depends (5%)
• Other (10%)
• No answer (7%)
61. Which one of the following options do you think is a better way to 
vote from abroad and keep the vote secret? Choose one, the one you 
think it is the best.
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• Internet vote (34%)
• Ballot box in consulates (34%)
• Postal vote (26%)
• Telephone vote (1%)
• Other (3%)
62. What benefit do you feel in having participated in the presidential 
election from abroad?
• I feel part of my country (45%)
• I carry out a civic duty (39%)
• I don’t feel any benefit (5%)
• I feel I support my loved ones (4%)
• None of the above (3%)
63. Changing the topic. In general terms, what did you think about the 
electoral and promotional material? Useful or not very useful?
• Useful (62%)
• Not very useful (28%)
• Don’t know, depends (6%)
64. Nice or ugly?
• Nice (61%)
• Ugly (11%)
• Don’t know, depends (22%)
65. Adequate or inadequate?
• Adequate (68%)
• Inadequate (14%)
• Don’t know, depends (11%)
66. Enough or not enough?
• Enough (62%)
• Not enough (24%)
• Don’t know, depends (8%)
67. Was it as it was expected?
• More of what it was expected (58%)
• Less of what it was expected (20%)
• Don’t know, depends (16%)
68. From the Mexicans that you know that voted from abroad and from 
what you know or have heard. How important was it for them to vote 
in the presidential election in Mexico this year?
• Very important (60%)
• Important, but not much (20%)
• Not important (4%)
• Don’t know, depends (13%)
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69. And for you, personally, how important was it that you could vote for 
the presidential election in Mexico from abroad?
• Very important (90%)
• Important, but not much (3%)
• Not important (1%)
• Don’t know, depends (2%)
70. In which country were you bom?
• Mexico (96%)
• US (1%)
• Other (2%)
71. In which country do you reside?
• US (64%)
• Spain (10.2%)
• Canada (4.3%)
• France (3.3%)
• Germany (3%)
• United Kingdom (2.8%)
• Italy (2.2%)
• Sweden (1%)
• Switzerland (1%)
• Netherlands (0.8%)
• Australia (0.5%)
• Chile (0.5%)
• Costa Rica (0.5%)
• Others
72. How long have you been living outside Mexico?
• Between 1 and 5 years (45%)
• Between 6 and 10 (31 %)
• More than 10 (20%)
• Less than 1 year (2%)
73. Have you acquired the nationality of the country where you reside?
• Yes (14%)
• No (72%)
• In process (11%)
74. Where do you work or what do you do? (see chapter 5)
75. How many years did you study? (see chapter 5)
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Annex 6. Zacatecan migrant legislator Manuel de la Cruz, activities at the state 
legislature between 2004 and 2006
Table 1.
P o licy -m a k in g  activ ities o f  the m ig ra n t dep u ty  M an u el d e  la  C ru z b etw een  200 4  a n d  2 0 0 6  in  the  
leg is la tu re  o f  th e  sta te  o f  Z acatecas
P rod u ct C on ten t D ate S ta tu s
L ega l in itia tiv e
That proclaim s D ecem ber, the 18th as the day o f  the 
Zacatecan M igrant W orker 07 -D ec-0 4
In
C om m ission
To add the requirements to those candidates that aspire to  
represent migrants 31-M ay 05
In
C om m ission
To allow  Zacatecans abroad to vote for governor, deputies 
and m unicipal presidents 24-A u g-05
Approved in 
general
To allow  citizens to supervise, guard and execute public 
work 25-A pr-05
In
C om m ission
P oin ts o f  
ag reem en t
To request resources to the federal governm ent for the 
‘3 X 1 ’ programme for migrants 30-Sep-04
Approved in  
general and in 
particular
To support form er ‘braceros’ that request the paym ent o f  
their savings 26-O ct-04
Approved in 
general and in 
particular
In support, as the state’s leg islative power, for the vote o f  
M exicans abroad 14-Apr-05
Approved in 
general and in 
particular
To allow  the issuance o f  voting credentials to the highest 
number possib le o f  M exican migrants settled in the U S 10-M ay 05
Approved in 
general and in 
particular
In support to former ‘braceros’ without docum entation 09-Jun-05
Approved in 
general
To propose that the state’s leg islative show s solidarity  
with Central Am erican migrants that transit through  
Zacatecas 26-Jul-05
Approved in 
general and in  
particular
To request the M inistry o f  Tax and R evenue that publishes 
rules o f  operation that define the paym ent to former 
‘braceros’ 16-A ug-05
Approved in 
general and in 
particular
To request the Federal E xecutive to carry out the legal and 
diplom atic processes w ith the U S governm ent, so  that the 
organization ‘Centre o f  Agricultural Workers: Bracero 
Project’ g ives back the docum ents to  those former 
Zacatecan ‘braceros’, from  whom  those docum ents were  
rem oved illega lly 29 -N o  v-05
Approved in  
general and in  
particular
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To request the Federal E xecutive to carry out a judicial 
investigation for the murder o f  G uillerm o M artinez 
Rodriguez, w hich took place in Decem ber, the 31rst 2005  
betw een the border o f  M exico  and the U S ll-J a n -0 6
Approved in 
general
To exhort the M inistry o f  Tax and R evenue to re-assign  
resources through the M inistry o f  Social D evelopm ent for 
the ‘3 X 1 ’ programme for migrants in the state o f  
Zacatecas 22 -Feb-06
A pproved in 
general and in  
particular
Exhortative
To request the M inistry o f  Tax and R evenue and the 
M inistry o f  G overnm ent (SEG O B) to extend the deadline  
for registry to ‘braceros’ until the 31rst o f  M ay 2006. In 
addition, to request the C om m ission o f  Population, 
Frontiers and M igratory Issues in the Federal Congress to  
carry out a reform to Article 6 o f  the Law  that creates the 
trust fund for former ‘braceros’, so  that those, w hich can  
prove with their registration (in SEG O B) or otherwise  
show their original contract, could be added as 
beneficiaries
To support the veto to the SB 1-160 proposal in the state o f  
California
To carry out D ecree 204, w hich advised that the phrase 
‘the Zacatecan M igrant’ was found on the w alls o f  the 
state’s legislature
0 6-Jun-06
0 7 -0 c t-0 4
0 1 -D ec-04
A pproved in 
general and in  
particular
Sent to the 
state o f  
California
A pproved  
and executed
To the governm ent o f  the state o f  Zacatecas, so  that its 
police forces do not com m it any abuses against those that 
have cars that cam e from  abroad ll-J u l-0 5
Approved  
and sent to 
the state’s 
executive
To m unicipal, state and federal dependences to  g ive  
support to the ‘p a isa n o ’ programme 13-D ec-05
A pproved  
and sent to 
three lev e ls  o f  
governm ent
Pronouncement
To m unicipal, state and federal dependencies in order to  
train their personnel and police  forces w ith the aim o f  
protecting the integrity o f  ‘p a isa n o s ’ and their fam ilies on 
their w ay back to M exico 26-Jun-06
A gainst the deviant actions o f  vigilantes against Latinos 26-A pr-05
A pproved  
and sent to 
the three
lev e ls  o f
governm ent
Sent to
Federal
E xecutive
the
To m eet in the m onum ent o f  ‘the migrant’, where m e
governm ent and society  can express our support o f  m edia
immigrants in the US 0 6-A pr-06 channels
Published in  
the main 
m edia
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C om pilation  
o f  four
docum ents
In representation o f  the Zacatecan society  to the Latino written by
M ovem ent in the U S for a com prehensive reform for the experts on  the
benefit o f  m illions o f  undocum ented immigrants______________ 18-A pr-06 topic_________
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